Figure 1.--.

The northern Arctic route for Lend Lease aid was from Iceland and Scotland to Murmansk and Ark Aangel. This was potentially the most important because it was the most direct route the Soviet front lines. This route at times proved almost suisidal. The Artic convoys convoys faced a daunting gaunlet of German forces because the Germans had occupied Norway (April 1940). The convoys were attacked by U-boats as well as German surface ships and aircraft based in Norway. This combined with the severe Arctic weather made the route the most dangerous one. The Allies organized 78 convoys to the Soviet Union using the northern route (August 1941 and May 1945). The first Allied aid to the Soviet Union was delivered over the northern route. The British organized the first convoy less than 2 months after the NAZI invasion. These were begun by the British even before the U.S. Congress approved Lend Lease aid for the Soviets because of the desperate need of the Red Army. The first convoys were organized from Iceland but eventually (after September 1942), the convoys assembled at Loch Ewe in Scotland. The Arctic convoys had two letter and number identifiers: PQ or JW for the trip north to Russia, andthen the inverted QP or RA for the return trip south.

Barbarossa (June 1941)

Having failed to defeat the British, Hitler decided that he had to advance his time table and defeat the Soviet Union before America entered the War. He decided to do what he said was the central mistake of Sorkd War II--wage a two front war. Stalin began the war as Hitler's ally. For both, the NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact (1939) was a temporary true. Both men knew that there would be an eventual show down. Hitler struck first. Both Churchill and Roosevelt knew the German attack on the Soviet Union was coming. Stalin, allied with Hitler at the time, refused to believe their warnings. The initial German opperations were stageringly successful. Stalin was shocked and retreated to his dakha. German and foreign military experts concluded that tghe Red Army was defeated and the War won. Churchill realized that this was the central campaign of the War, If Hitler could destroy the Red Army, he would have won the War. Churchill immediatly made the decision to assist the Soviet Union with war material.

Epic Sea Battle

At first, especially as Britain was so short of shipping, the only way of getting supplies to the Soviets was the shortest route--was the Murmansk Arctic run. This set in motion an unrelenting, epic sea battle fought wihin the seasonally changing confines of the otentially deadly Arctic pack ice and the jagged coast of Norway. A few months latr, American ships laden with Lend Lease material joined the British. The Allies organized 77 convoys laden with 4.5 million to of supplies and war materaial. The Germans managed to sink 98 ships. In the Artic most of the crews were lost when their vessels sank.

The Route

The northern Arctic route to supply the Soviets was begun by the British even before the arrival of American Lend Lease. The convoys formed off Iceland and Scotkand and then made the run to Murmansk and Arkangel in the Soviet Union. The first northern convoys were organized from Iceland but eventually (after September 1942), the convoys assembled at Loch Ewe in Scotland. his was potentially the most important because it was the most direct and thus quickest route to the the Soviet front lines. The Soviet ports were the closest available ports to the Soviet front line troops. The available logistical facilities were well equipped for the rapid unloading dispersal of materiel. Despite the facr that the merchant seamen were delivering vital war material, suspicious Soviet security officers refused to let the seamen off their vessels. The problem was that the route of the convoys took them close to the coast of NAZI-occupied Norway. While the northern route offered advantages, it was the most perilous route. Both the Germans and the weather represented serious obstacles. The convoys had to follow the Norwegian coast. This brought them within the range of Luftwaffe attacks in additon to u-boats and suface ships.

Danger

The Murmansk run was one of ice covered ships struggling against the elements. It would have been a diificult run has the merchant men nOd had to face Luftwffe bombers based n Norway and te Kreigsmarine. After the loss of Bismarck, most of the action of the German surface fleet, especially Shornhost??, was used to stop the Arctic convoys. With the exception of convoys to Malta, this was the most dangeroud Allied convoy route of World War II. Convoys could move further north to try to avoid Luftwaffe attacks, but the further north they went, the worse the weather conditions and ice berg danger. Even without the Germans, the northery lattitudes meant brutal weather conditions. The short Arctic summer offered some relief from the weather, but it meant 24 hours of day light, making it easier for the Luftwaffe to find them. One author describes what the crews faced, ""Some ships' crews fought back after a bomb or topedo hit. They believed it was better to keep on fighting rather than to freeze to death in the sea. Only three of the American merchant ships carried 3-inch cannon. The rest were armed with .50-caliber machine guns. The amunition used by the machine guns bounced off the armor plate of the German olanes if not fired at almost point-blank range. Defense, the crews realized, did not mean much, But it was a relief for nervous tension and kept a man from going insane." [Walling]

Occupied Norway

The NAZIs invaded Denmark and Norway (April 1940). The operation was one in a series of German successes early in the War. It was considered an impressive military achievement at the time, although the Kriegsmarine lost most of its destroyers. What was not fully understood at the time was the impact of garroning coquered countries was affecting the potentiasl striking power of the Wehrmacht. The German forces garrisoning Poland, Norway, the Low Countries, France, the Balkansa as well as the North African and Italian campaigns eventually comprised a substantial commitment. This made it impossible for the Wehrmacht to bring its full force to bear for Hitler's primary objective--the destruction of the Soviet Union. This was especially the case because the brutal NAZI population alienated the local populations which required greater military force to keep subduded.

German Forces

This route at times proved almost suisidal. The Artic convoys convoys faced a daunting gaunlet of German forces because the Germans had occupied Norway (April 1940). The convoys were attacked by U-boats as well as German surface ships and aircraft based in Norway. This combined with the severe Arctic weather made the route the most dangerous one. The British staged a number of raids off Normay, harrasing coastal shipping. Swedish iron ore was shipped trough Norwegian ports. The British also staged a successful Commando raid on Vaagso (194?). This convinced Hitler that the British were planning to attempt an invasion. The result was a substantial German deployment. This included both the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe.

German Navy

The Treaty of Versailles (1919) placed stringent limits on the German Navy. The surface fleet was strictly limited and u-boats were prohibited. The Navy managed to do some research on sunmarines through foreign subsidiaries. There was also some cooperation with the Japanese. As part of its policy of apeasement, the British signed a naval trety with the NAZI Germany (1935). This permitted the Germans to build both battleships and u-boats. At the time the Royal Navy had concluded that ASDAC (SONAR) rendred u-boats obsolete. The Germans for their part placed their emphasis on surface ships, especially battle ships and heavy cruisers/pocket battleships. They also built u-boats, but they had a relatively low priority.

Battle of the Atlantic

Arguably the most important battle of World Sar II was the Battle of the Atlantic. Britain was an exporting country. But it needed to import food to feed workers and raw mteruals for industrial plants. Thus to keep fighting Britain needed to keep the sea lanes open to America and the Dominions. America joined that fight in the North AStantic even before sctually joining the War. The Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union were one part of the Battle of the Atlantic.

German Naval Strategy

The German Navy, with the exception of the 1940 Norwegian invasion, was primarily used for commerce raiding. The u-boat was primarily a commer raider. In this role the Germans lost the Graf Spee (1939) and Bismarck (1941). The fall of France had opened new opportunities with acess to the French Atlantic ports. As a result, major German vessels like Gneisenau and Scharnhorst were deployed there. With the entrance of the U.S. Navy into the war, commerce raiding ecame less tenable. This was especially the case as the Allies began closing the mid-Atlantic air gap and deploying jeep (small escort) casrriers. The Allies also developed technical advances such as Huff-Duff (radio triangulation equipment) nd improved, airborne centimetric radar. As a result, the Naval hhighcommand reasses their strategy of using capital ships for commerce raiding.

Operation Rösselsprung (1942)

The Germans gave no thought to the need to prevent the Allies from shipping supplies to the Soviets. Hitler believed that Operation Barbarossa would crush the Soviet Union in the summer of 1942. When Barbarossa failed in front of Moscow (December 1941), the Germans sought to stop the Artic convoys organized by the Allies. The Germans launched Operation Rösselsprung ("Knights Move") to stop the Arctic convoys and seal off the northern Soviet ports. Theur basic strategy was not only to use the Luftwaffe and u-boats, but to commit the primary vessels of the Kreigsmarine's surface fleet. Hitler approved the deployment of surface ships to Norway.

Tirpitz

The Tirpitz was deployed to Norway. Tirpitz, with a four destroyer escort departed Wilhelmshaven en route to Trondheim (January 14, 1942). Tirotz arrived in Trondheim (January 16). The escorting destroyers returned immediately to Wilhelmshaven and Brest to play a role in Operation Cerebus. The Krriegsmarine had very few escort vessels, in part because of the losses associated with the 1940 invasion of Norway. Tirpitz was anchored at Aasfjord. he British found her camouflaged and defended by anti-torpedo nets (January 23). The Admiralty was unsure just how the Germans planned to use Tirpitz. There were several possibilities. One of course was to disrupt the Arctic convoys. Another was to break out into the Atlantic convoy routes. The British attempted to bomb Tirpitz but were unsuccessful (January 29-30). It was first deployed in an unsuccessful effort to interdict PQ12 (March 6-12). An operation led by HMS Campbelltown destroyed the dry-dock at St. Nazaire March 28-29, 1942). This was the only french facility capable of handling Tirpitz. This was one reason the Germans decided to hold Tirpitz in Norway. [Kennedy]

The Channel Dash: Operation Cerebus (February 12)

Gneisenau and Scharnhorst which had been operating from French Atlantic ports made a dash through the Channel for redeployment to Norway (1942). [Schofield] This was of considerable embarassment to the British who ar the time were reeling from the surrender of Singapore and losses in the Western Desert. The British were unprepared for a Channel dash. They thought that Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Prinz Eugen berthed in Brest might attempt to break out into the Atlantic to attack convoys. The Germant executed Operation Cerebus. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen sailed from Brest through the Channel to Brunsbuttel at the mouth of the Elbe in Germany. The British wre shocked that the RAF did not interdict the vessels. There was some damage as the result of mines, but all three vessels successfully transited the Channel and could be used for deployment in Norway.

Concentrating forces

The Kreigsmarine succeeded with the Channel Dash, but cocentrating their suface fleet in Norway proved difficult. The Krissmarine ordered Admiral Scheer and Prinz Eugen to sail from Wilhelmshaven for Trondheim (February 20). Prinz Eugen was intercepted and torpedoed by HMS Trident off Trondheim, (February 23). Damage was severe enough that it had to return to Wilhelmshaven. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau hd been damaged by mines during the Channel Dash and were undergoing repairs at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. Unfortunatelyfor the Germans, the British were expanding the air war. At this early stage of the campaign, the British focused heavily on German ports. In part because they were the easiest targets to find and in part because attacking shipyards building uboats were a high priority. The Germans could build bomb-propf pens to protect some u-boat facilities, but this was not possible for battleships. Bomber Command struck the dockyards at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel (February 25-26). Gneisenau was hit hard. Her bow was burnt out and A turret blown off its barbette. The Germans were forced to take her out of service for major construction. As a result of steady Bomber Command attacks on the German shipyards, these repairs were never made.

Fuel

One serious limitation the Germans had in operating capital ships was fuel. This was especially the case in operations to interdict the Arctic convoys because the fuel had to be brought ll the way to northern Norway. This was at the outer reach of the German supply lines and German tankers were vulnerable to attack from the Royal Navy. Tirpitz was a magnificent ship, but it consumed huge quantities of fuel.

Result

The Kriegsmarine, even with these powerful ships, achieved very little. They failed to inderdict PQ12 (March 1942). They did raid Spitzbergen (September 1943). The poweful Tirpitz sent most of the War in Norwegian fjords. She was finally sunk by the RAF in Tromsø fjord (November 11, 1944). Gneisenau was damaged in the Channel dash and was never deployed to Norway. The Royal Navy sank i>Scharnhorst in the engagement over JW-51B. Hitler was frustated by the poor performance of the Kriegsmarine. Most of the Arctic convoy vessels sunk were sunk by u-boats.

The Royal Navy Home Fleet

With the Keiegsmarine buildup, the Royal Navy had to prepare for major battles off Norway to protect the Arctic Convoys. The British Home Fleet held King George V, Rodney(needing a refit), and Renown (escorting a convoy for the Middle East) to del with with Tirpitz. The Admiralty ordered King George V, Renown, Victorious and their escorts to sail from Hvalfjord (Iceland) in the direction of Trosmo when a report suggested that Tirpitz had sailed from Aasfjord (February 19). [Smith] One of the Royal Navy's great advantages was naval aviation. The carrier HMS Victorious, however, had an inexperienced air crew that among other problems had not extensively practiced with torpedoes. In addition Victorious was still equipped with obsolete Albascore aircraft. Although carriers were normally a great advantage, the terrible Arctic weather often prevent planes from being launched. The force was further strenthened with Duke of York (late February).

The Convoys

The Allies organized 78 convoys to the Soviet Union using the northern route (August 1941 and May 1945). The first Allied aid to the Soviet Union was delivered over the northern route. The British organized the first convoy less than 2 months after the NAZI invasion. These were begun by the British even before the U.S. Congress approved Lend Lease aid for the Soviets because of the desperate need of the Red Army. The convoys constantly sailed to the Soviet Union beginning with the first convoy in August 1941. There were two exceptions. There were two gaps in 1942 (July-September) and 1943 (March-November). Some of these convoys were especially notable.
PQ 1 (August 1941): Responding to desperate Soviet requets for aid, PQ 1 was organized by the British even before the U.S. Congress had authorized that Lend Lease be extended to the Soviet Union.
PQ 9 (January 1941): The British Admiralty concerned about the movement of Tirpitz called off the movement of Artic convoys January 17-25. The Admiralty cancelled PQ9
PQ 12 (March 1942): The Germand launched Operation Sportpalast to use Terpitz to interduct PQ12 and retuning QP8. This was the first German effort using the newly deployed capital ship. The Home Fleet deployed in two squadrons depated Scapa Flow to protect PQ12 and QP8 (March 3). King George V was used as the flag ship and with Victoriousand their and escorts sailed closed to PQ12 along the Norwegian coast. The second squadron with Renown as the flagship, Duke of York and their escorts sailed north to Jan Mayen Land to meet QP8 returning from the Soviet ports. A Luftwaffe Fw 200 sighted PQ12 (March 5). Tirpitz was ordered to intercept and sailed with three escoring destroyers (March 6). The two Royal Navy squandeons commanded by Admiral Tovey and Vice Admiral Curteis rendezvoused at near to the cross-over point of PQ12/QP8 (March 6). The Germans eparate Tirpitz and its escorts to cover a larger search area (March 7). The British attempted to intercept Tipitz. At one point south of Bear Island, the Home Fleet, Tirpitz, and the two convoys were within 90 miles of each other, but because of the terriblle weather did not make contact, in part because aircraft could not be launched. The German destroyers did sink a strahler from QP8 and the Soviet escort MV Izhora (March 7). Destoyers had more limited fuel loads than the capital shis and thus both British and German destoyers at different times had to return to port to refuel. The Admiralty ordered PQ12 to sail north of Bear Island (March 8). Heavy pack ice made this impossible. Tirpitz finally abandoned the search for PQ12 (March 8). The British spotted Tirpitz and Frederich Inn Victorious attacked withs its Albacore aircraft, but without success. Tirpitz reached Narvik (Match 9). The British attempted tointercept with destroyers ad submaines, but Tirpitz reached Trondheim (March 13). Admiral Hipper sailed from Brunsbüttel to Trondheim, arriving (March 19). Operation Sportpalast was a huge disappointment to the Kriegsmarine. Despite the use of their most powerful surface assett ad huge quantities of fuel, they had sunk only one merchant vessel.
PQ 17 (July 1942): PQ 17 consisted of 26 merchant vessels. The first convoys made it through with relatively minor losses. Gradually the Germans built of their forces to stop the convoys. The most tragic convoy was PQ17. The Kriegsmarine deployed its primary surface ships to stopping the Arctic convoys. The Admiralty ordered PQ17 was to scatter when they received reports that German battleships had sailed. Convoy escorts were primarily for u-boat defense and were not capable of engaging large surface warships. The German ships had sailed but were just changing port. Without the protection of the convoy, the merchant vessels were at the mercy of u-boats. U-boats and Luftwaffe aircraft sunk 25 of the merchant ships in PQ17. [Evans]
JW51B (December 1942): The engagement associated with fighting JW51B through is known as the Battle of the Barents Sea. The Kriegsmarine sortied out with a powerful force, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and pocket battleship Lützow to attack convoy JW51B. The German force was repelled by a much weaker Royal Navy fiorce made up primarily of destroyers. This prived to be one of the most important naval engagements in Alantic area-- the Battle of the Barents Sea. The nen involved not only fought it out with the oposing naval force, but perhaps the most severe weather conditions under which a naval battle was ever fought. Eight of the Kriegsmarine's most powerful ships failed to sink a an important convoy escorted only by four British destroyers. The british destroysers were steadfast, they stayed with the convoy despite having to face off with the heavy Gernan fleet elements. The Germans were equivocal, believing they were not suposed puersue an action resulting in major losses. Hitler was so insensed at the resukt that he dismissed Admiral Raeder as Kriefgsmarine commander for incompetence and replaced him with admiral Dönitz. [Pope]
JW55B (December 1943): The The engagement associated with fighting JW55B through is known as the Battle of the North Cape. The Royal Navy using JW55B as bait lured out the battlecruiser Scharnhorst It was sunk by HMS Duke of York and her escorts.

Numbering System

The Arctic convoys had two letter and number identifiers: PQ or JW for the trip north to Russia, and then the inverted QP or RA for the return trip south.

Ultra

Ultra, the British codebreaking operation at Bletchley Park which cracked the Enigma codes. played an key role in winning the Battle of the Atlantic. The Kreigsmarine codes proved more difficult than the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht codes, but combined with radio-directional locating, convoys could be routed around u-boat concentrations. This was less possible for the Arctic convoys which had to follow the Norwegian coast. Ultra did allow the British to effectively assess the level of escort protection needed. It also assisted in battles with the German surface ships.

Soviet Naval Support

The Soviets did what they could to protect the convoys. They did not have the major vessels to provide escorts. They did use motor torpedo boats. There were 838 Soviet naval sorties to aid the convoys.

Land Battles

Western histories of the effort to deliver Lend Lease supplies via the Arctic route ficus almost entirely on the naval effort and the convoys themselves. Rarely mentioned are the associated land battles. The Germans launched a multi-corps offensive to take Murmansk, located on the Kola Peninsula shared with Norway and Finland. (Archangel was much further away across the White Sea.) The Soviet Karelian front Arctic defense and the or the Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes offensive involved the largest battles ever fought north of the Arctic Circle. These battles involved over 153,000 combatants. The initial German effort was Operation Silberfuchs (Silver Fox) (1941). The engagements involved some of the most savage fights on the Eastern Front. It has attracyed very little historical attention and very little has been published about it. The German attack with limited Finnish support was stopped by the Soviet 14th Army.

Results

The Artic convoys resulted in 1,400 merchant vessels reaching the Soviet Union with vital war supplies. The Germans succeded in sinking 85-87 merchant vessels, about one-third of these were in PQ17 alone. About 829 crewmen were lost on these vessels. The Germans also sank 16-18 Royal Navy warships with 1,944 sailors. The Kreigsmarine also suffered losses. They lost a battleship and at least 30 U-boats. The Luftwaffe also suffered losses.

The Cold War

The difficulties of getting war msaterial to the Soviet Union quickly after the Soviet Union let to misunderstanding among the Allies, especially when a second front could not be immediately launched. [Evans] Some authors charge that this in part led to the Cold War. Here we disagree. Just as World War II was launched by Hitler, the Cold War was Stalin's creation, caused by his desire to set up Stalinist police states in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe. It is difficult to see how the earlier delivery of supplies or an earlier opening of a second front would have chsnged Stalin's desire to control Poland and the other Eastern European countries. Stalin's invasion of Poland (1939) clearly demonstrated his plans for the country and the rest of eastern Europe. It had nothing to do with the Allied conduct of the War.

Russian View

A Russian Reader has provided us his insights on the Arctic convoys. This is especially useful because he is familiar with both the Russian and Western scholarship on the subject. The data and insights from Russian sources are especially helpful. Unfortunately we do not yet have a good English translation of the Russian text that he has sent us. Even so we can use his assessment even with a very basic computer translation.

Sources

Evans, Mark Llewellyn. "Great World War II Battles in the Arctic" Contributions in Military Studies, No. 172 (Greenwood Press, 1999), 192p. ISBN: 0-313-30892-6

Kennedy, L. Menace: The Life and Death of the Tirpitz.

Pope, Dudley. 73 North: The Battle of the Barents Sea.

Schofield, B.B. The Russian Convoys (1964).

Smith, P.C. Hit First, Hit Hard: The Story of HMS Renown, 1916-1948.

Walling, Michael G. Forgotten Scrifice (2012), 292p.

Created: 1:30 AM 10/8/2005
Last updated: 4:36 AM 11/12/2019