World War II: Totalitarian (Axis and Soviet) Assessments of America


Figure 1.--

The Axis powers and the Soviets had to take America into account as they planned their aggressions. The Japanese had to take America into account because the Philippines Islands, at the time an American commonwealth. This was a major problem because the Philippines sat squarely on the sea lanes between the Home Islands and the Southern Resource Zone they were determined to conquer. These countries had to deal with American diplomats. And their assessments of the United States largely determined how they responded to American diplomats. Thus it is interesting to look at how these powers looked at the United States. Unlike The totalitarian owers, American with its free press and open society meant that it was possible to easily assess the American military and indistrial power. Ironically the country that made the most disasterous mistake was the country which studied going to war with America most carefully--the Japanese. For the Germans there was no real study, it was simly a decesion Hitler made in his own mind. It was an act of pent-up vengence without any thought to the consequences.

Germany

The German senior officer corps was made up almost entirely to a man of World War I veterans. These men knew the impact of America on the War. And this was just the role of the American Expeditionary Force in the fighting on the estern Front. Ameican industry unlike World War II did not play a decisive role in the War. These men with the Wehrmacht mired in the snow of the Soviet Union could not have conceived of going to war with Anerican again. But Htler did not ask their opinion. Hitler of course had served on the Western Front during World War I, but not in an area where the Americans were active. Hitler never commissioned a study of America's military potential. For the Germans there was no real study, it was simly a decesion Hitler made in his own mind. It was an act of pent-up vengence without any thought to the consequences. Hitler had never traveled beyond Austria, Germany, and occupied areas of Belgium and France. He was, however, an intelligent person and had a vague idea about America's industrial capacity. You see that in Mein Kampf (1924). Hitler did not go into specifics, but he saw America was the rising world power leaving Britain in its wake. What impressed him the most was that Ameriuca was a continental power, but he also mntioned in large Germanic population. He wrote, "Today many European states are like pyramids stood on their heads. Their European area is absurdly small in comparison to their weight of colonies, foreign trade, etc. We may say: summit in Europe, base in the whole world; contrasting with the American Union which possesses its base in its own continent and touches the rest of the earth only with its summit. And from this comes the immense inner strength of this state and the weakness of most European colonial powers. [Hitler, p.139.] Later describes America as 'the new master' [Hitler, p. 638.] and he refers to the Gernmanic origins of most of the population. By his second book he changes his opinion on American etnicity, but continues to see America as a danger. As far as ee know, there was no important adviser ir interest group promoting war with America. Adm. Dönitz was complaing about U.S. destoyers protecting Bfitish convoys. President Roosevelt had launched an undeclared naval war in the North Atlntic. No one else had the stomache for war with America. Göring's stock had fallen since the Luftwaffe's failure over Britain. As chief of the Luftwaffe, Göring was paryticularly concerned about American air craft construction potential. [Göring]

Italy

Italy like Japan did not study entry into World War II. It was a decision made by dictator Benito Mussolini who though he was getting into a war that Germany had already won (June 1940). He did not want to miss out on Italy's share of the booty. He saw that France was defeated and assumed that Britain would shortly follow. America diplomats were attemopting to convince Mussolini to stay out of the War. They failed. On June 10, 1940, As President Roosevelt prepared to deliver the commencement address at the University of Virginia where his son is graduating with a law degree, he learned that Italy had declared war on France and Great Britain. Rather than deliver his prepared speech, Roosevelt instead commnted omn Mussolini's action and called on America to end its isolationism. The president described the American diolomatic approached to Italy. He then spoke with great emotion, "The Government of Italy has now chosen to preserve what it terms its "freedom of action" and to fulfill what it states are its promises to Germany. In so doing it has manifested disregard for the rights and security of other nations, disregard for the lives of the peoples of those nations which are directly threatened by this spread of the war; and has evidenced its unwillingness to find the means through pacific negotiations for the satisfaction of what it believes are its legitimate aspirations. On this tenth day of June, 1940, the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor. On this tenth day of June, 1940, in this University founded by the first great American teacher of democracy, we send forth our prayers and our hopes to those beyond the seas who are maintaining with magnificent valor their battle for freedom." Mussolini had no idea he would soon be engaged in aong war ad face the Soviet Union and America. The Japanese Ambassador met with Mussolini (December 3). He informed the Duce that negotiations were at a deadlock and war was imminent. He then invoked the Tripartrate Alliance, asking Mussolini to declare war on America and no separate peace. Count Ciano tells us that Mussolini coomented, "Thus we arrive at the war between the continents, which I has for seen since 1939." [Ciano, p. 414.] Of course he had forseen no such thing and had spurned American diplomatic iniatives. Terrible news arrived in Rome before and after Pearl Harbor. Also reports of a Red Army offensive in the East and German retreats reach Rome (December 3). The Italian commander in Libya reported a serious situation and are haning to break contavct wioth thE btitish (December 6-7). NAZI Foreign Minister Ribentrop rquested a joint declaration of war on Ameica. (Decenmber 11). Reports on losses in Africa, 67 klled, 10,000 prisoners. Count Ciano commented. "One doesn't have to think very long to see what those figures mean." [Ciano, p. 416] Two heavy cruisers lost (December 13).

Japan

The Japanese had to take America into account because the Philippines Islands, at the time an American commonwealth. This was a major problem because the Philippines sat squarely on the sea lanes between the Home Islands and the Southern Resource Zone they were determined to conquer. Ironically the country that made the most disasterous mistake was the country which studied going to war with America most carefully--the Japanese.

Soviet Union

The Soviets were the most isolated from America because their autharkic trde policy and the fact that their aggression was conducted in Eastern Europe, east of the NAZI empire. This shielded them from media views. The NAZIs invaded and occupied Western Europe bringing them to the Channel cost and the full glare of the international media. The Soviet Union not only had access to publically available information, but it had n important espionage effort in place. We are not sure yet to what extent Stalin was interested in American develooments. Unlike Germany and Japan, America does not seem to have been a major concern.

Sources

Ciano, Galeazzo. Hugh Gibson, ed. The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 (Garden City Publishing: New York, 1946), 582p.

Göring, Herman. In Gilberto Villahermosa. World War II Magazine (September 2006). Göring was interogated immeduiately after the War in Prisoner of War Camp No. 32 (July 25, 1945). Major Kenneth W. Hechler of the U.S. Army Europe’s Historical Division asked the questions. Captain Herbert R. Sensenig served as the translator.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf Tran. Ralph Manheim (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1971), 694p.






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Created: 4:16 AM 8/3/2018
Last updated: 4:16 AM 8/3/2018