Figure 1.--.

Ball Bearings

Ball and roller beatings are vital item for just about everything mechanical that moves. That means most engines and most weapons/weapon system require ball bearings. These speciality engineering balls reduced rotational friction and support loads by separating moving axles. They were found in airplane engines, tanks, guns, submarine engines and much more. Ball bearings are neceesary, for example to rotate a turret. This includes an small light-weight aircraft turret or a lsarge heavy tank turret. Yhe sasme principle is at work. The sanme is true for the rapid firing German MG-34 and MG-42 machineguns. They were depedebnt on ball bearings. The more something moved, the more it needed ball bearings or similar device like crankshaft bearings in larger cars abd trucks, but ballbearings are used in oarts like trabsmission. This includes weapons like toroedoes and asrtillery which you do noy normlly associate with ball bearings. There are coutless ball bearings found on ships and aircraft. They all need ball beaungs and kots of them. Without ball bearings those various devices would grind to a halt. Some weapons can operatev without ball bearings, but not very many. And thise thast do require the application of lubricantsBecause of the oil shortages, this was something the Germans were not in a position to supply. Ball bearings are not as easy to manufacure as you might think. That is because they mut meet rigid specifications. A small fraction of a milimeter can bring a device to a stop. The manufacturers have to be exact.

Soviet Ball Bearings

Mos of the duscussion of ball-bearings in World War II refer to the German ball-bearing industry and theAllied strategic bombing campaign. We note one claim that as a result of German opetration Barbarossa (June 1941), the Soviets lost most of their ball-bearing indistry. Appararently it was mostly located in the western Soviet Union and could not be moved. It dies nit seem to have been used by the Germans. The Diviets mnay have destroyed it before retreating. One reprt suuggests that the Sioviets were able to maintain production as a result of Lend Lease shipments. We have been unable to fiund details on Soviet ball bearing production.

Strategic Bombing Campaign

World War II was the first war in which aircraft played a critical reole. And an important part of the role was strategic bombing which devastated the Axis powers. The strategic bombing left German cities piles of rubble and Japanese cities smoldering cinders. The Allies have been crticized for this on moral grounds. Ironically it is the Axis which began strategic bombing both before and after World War II began. Germany bombed British cities and shelled French cities in World War I !915-18). Japan began bombing Chinese cities (1931). Italy bombed Ethiopian cities (1935). Germany and Italy bombed Spanish cuties during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). You do not see complaints from Axis countries as long as it was Axis bombers devastating cities in other countries. The German and Japanese outrage over strategic bombing did not begin until the Axis air forces began to lose the capability to bomb other countries and the Allied bombers began to reach Axis countries. The Allies as they pursued the strategic bombing campaign realised it was a huge undertaking. Germany and countries it occupied was an immense area with countless factories. Destroying all the factories was a daunting task. Eventuall yh British gave up on daylight bombing and turned to destroying whole cities. The Americans who were committed to daylight bombing settled on ball bearings as a potential choke point. American intelligence identified a Gernan shortage of ball bearings (1942). So when the 8th Air Force began nombing targets within the Reich and ball bearing plants became a target (1943). The idea was to bomb important ball bering factories to intensify the perceived industrial shortage.

Point Blank (June 1943)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff issued the Pointblank Directive (June 1943). The authorised Operation Pointblank, this pruortised the dsestruction if the Luftwaffe fighter squadron as part of the Allied Combined Bomber Offensive. The goal was drawing it away from frontline operations as part bo the preparation for the Allied Cross-Channel invasion. Air superority was a necessary condition for any such invasion. The Germans were already withdrawing Luftwaffe squadrons from the Ostkrieg to protect German ciuties from Allied bombing. The Ostheer would have to fight the Red Army largely without air cover. The Luftwaffe was, however, not yet destroyed meaning that the Cross Channel invasion was not yet possible because the Luftwaffe was concentrated in the West. The Pointblank Directive instructed RAF Bomberr Bomber Command and the USAF Eighth Air Force to bomb targets such as aircraft factories as part of the destruction of the Lufwaffe. Pointbank was confirmed at the Allied Quebec Conference/Quadrant (August 1943). Bomber Command which was attacking at night largely ignored Point Blank and did not measurably change operations. It was impossible to target factories at night. It was difficult enough during the day. This meant that it was baically up to the Americans to carry out Point Blank. This meant the bombing German aircraft plants and engaging the Luftwaffe fighter protection. [Zalonga, p. 12.] The Eighth Air Force conducted large-scale daylight raids on cities with aircraft plants, specifcally fighter production which was the bulk of German airctaft production. As part of this effort, ball-bearing factoties were also targetted. The Luftwaffe had no choice but to defending the cities involved. And trendous air battles took place. Eight Air Force losses in 1943 were very heavy as the USAF did not yet have long range escorts that could company against these raids. This only began to change when when P-51 escorts reached the theater (December 1943). They had the range to accompany the bombers all the way to the targets. This is when the Luftwaffe began to experuence unsustainable losses (early-1944). It was in the skies over the Reich that that the Luftwaffe was destroyed. The Germans continued to prioduce aircrafts, but the corps of veteran, highly competent pilots was steadily being eroded.

Difference of Opinion

There was a differences of opinion among the Allies on Germany's ball-bearing vulnerabilkity. American Inteligence identified a ball bearing 'bottleneck' (1942). This was while the Eught Air Force was still building up and raids into the Reich had begun. The American thus made ball bearings the second-most-vital Pointblank industry for the Combined Bomber Offensive (March 1943). The British did not agree. Air Marshal Arthur Harris, commanding RAF Bomber Command disputed the intelligence identfying ball bearings to be the 'critical node' in the German war economy. Harris refused to cooperate with the Americans on the ball-bearing offensive. He inmsusted that ballbearings were a false 'panacea'. Of course Harris's assessment may have been influenced by his own targeting assessments, namely raids in Berlin. We note discussing agreeing with Harris. One assessment reads, "Ball bearings were not the bottle neck which American Intelligence reported. Germany had huge supplies of ball bearings and were able to import them from other European countries, including neutral countries like Switzerland, and Sweden. Despite America making ball bearing production facilities a key target in 1943 and 44, despite many costly missions to destroy those production facilities, the United States never seriously compromised Germans ball bearing supply." We note NAZI Armanent Minister, Albert Speer, thought that the Allies had hit on a real vilnerability in ther German war economy. [Speer, 371-74.]

First Schweinfurt-Regensburg Raid (August 1943)

German ball-bearing manufacturers had a long history of manufacturing in Schweinfurt. The first Schweinfurt-Regensburg ball-bearing raid was an Eighth Air Force oppertiomn conducted (August 17, 1943). This was just 2 weeks after the devestaing raids on Hamburg. Schweinfurt located deep within the Reich was a much more difficult target than Hamburg. The deeper into the Reuch the grater the vulneabikity for unescorted bombers. Mission No. 84 was a strike by 376 heavy bombers of 16 bomb groups against German ball bearing mnufacture heavily concentrated in the Schweinfurt area, over 50 percent of production. There were two major manufacturers. The Kugelfischer plant produced 22 percent of the tital. The Vereinigte Kugellagerfabriken I and II produced 20 percent. Another 1 percent ws orofuced at the Fichtel & Sachs factory. The attacking force divided up rather ghan focusing on the ball bearing plants. . The greatest damage was to an aircraft assembly plant at Regensburg. Ball bearing production fell nearly 40 percent. [Speer, p. 371.] The Germans did their best to 'patch-up' the damage. Relocating production would have ment having to cease production for 3 months. Araments Minister Speer after the War reported thast a sustained campaign would have been dsaterous to the German war economy. [Speer. pp. 371-72.] The Germans had to fall back on reserves. The distance was far beyond the range of available fighter escorts. The raid suceeded in inflicting substantial on the Regensburg target, but at crippling cost. There were 60 bombers lost and many more damaged beyond economical repair. That was over 15 percent if theattacking force if you only consider the planes lost. At such rates, no flyers would reach their required 25 missions. The Eighth did not have the planes or men to sustain such loses. Thus an immediate follow-up raid that may have done substabtial damage top he German war economy.

Second Schweinfurt Raid (October 1943)

The Eighth Air Force was not able to stage a follow-up raid for 2 months. The Americans finally struck again (October 14). The bombers still did not have long range fighter escorts, although escorts did cover tgeapproach and oartbof the return, b jt there was no escort civerage in Reich air soace. This time the focus was entirely on ball-bearings. The steadily increasing efficiency of the German anti-aircraft effort, both Flak and aircraft was devastating. And this time the loses were even highrer than in the first raid. The Eight had to suspend deep penetration raids for 5 months, until the P-51 sqadrons had been built up. The mission consisted of 291 B-17s. There were 60 Forts lost -- over a quarter of the attacking force. In addition, 17 Forts were damaged so severely they were scrapped. Another 121 had varying levels of battle damage. The losses were the most devestating air raid expererenced bu the USAF during the war. Air crew losses were also heavy. Hitler was elated with the results seeing itbas a great air victiory wuth part of American aircraft were strewn over a vsast area of the Reich. [Speer, p. 374.] There was danage dine. Ball beraing priduction was reduced nearly 70 percent. The sutuatiin as dire. Reserves had been consumed and imports had not met expectations. Some relief obtained through sunsituring slide bearings. But accordung toi Speer, what save the Germnan war ecxonomy was that Allied attacks in ball-bearing pmants ceased. [Speer, pp. 372-73.]

German Imports

Sweden was vital to the German war economy. The nost importan contribution was the export of iron ore. Some thing kike 25 oercent if Germany's iron ore camne from Sweden. Sweden was also an imprtant supplier of ball-bearings. The Swedish ball bearings industry had subsidiary operations in both Briitain and Germany. Swedish ball bearings were very important to the war effort in Britain and Germany. One estimate suggests nearly 60 percent of German supplies and over 30 percent% of British. These mumbers incluse theporoduction of subsiduaries. Sweden supplied larger quantities to Germany, but granted Britain access to Swedish territory to ensure the delivery of the bearings which had toi be cinducted through the German blockade. Britain obtained a discount not offered the Germans. Direct exports amounted to about 10% and 15% of total German and British supplies. Germany also obtained ball-bearinhgs in Switzerland.

Big Week (February 1944)

The Eight Air Force did not return to deep penetration until (February 1944). This time the bombers had P-51 fighter escorts all the way to and from the targets. The Eighth Air Force during last week of February 1944 staged Operation Argument which has become to be called 'Big Week'. Big Week included a USAF/RAF day and night raid on Schweinfurt (February 24). The primary target was Germany's aircraft industry. The 8th Air Force attacks were coordinated with 15th Air Force strikes from the south. Despite the losses in January, the Americans were determined to strike in force again. Plans were made for the 8th Air Force's massive force of 3,800 B-17 and B-24 heavy bomber, but had to be delayed by the clouds and snowy Winter weather. When the weather broke February 19 offering clear skies over Germany. Spaatz ordered "Let 'em go." The Eighth Air Force smashed at NAZI Germany with more than 1,000 bombers on the first day of the operation (January 20). There were 12 major targets in Germany and western Poland, areas annxed to the Reich. More escort groups were available.The bombers were accompanied by almost equal numbers of escorts (American P-38s, P-47s, P-5a as well as British Spitfires). The P-47s this time had dual wing tanks rather than a single fuselage tanks and were more effective than with earlier attempts to extend its range. American commanders were under no illusions about the potential cost. Estimates were as high as 200 bombers for the first day. The Luftwaffe contested the raids as hotly as they had in January. Surprisingly only 21 bombers were lost on the first day. During the operation the Americans flew 3,800 sorties whuch included 500 by the 15th Air Force. As part of Big Week the P-51s largely destroyed the Luftwaffe. The result was the Luftwaff was essentially a no-show when the Allies invaded (June 1941).

Destuction of German Industry (September 1944 - Aoril 1945)

With the Luftwaffe destroyed, the Allied bombers could gave begin the massive destruction of German industry. Instead direction of the bombing was turned iver to General Eusenhower who order the bombing of beach instalkatiins and the tranpot ciommectiions between the the Atalntic Wall beach installations and the Reuich war industriues. Thos made it difficult to fully provision the Atlantic Wall defenses. There were bombing raids into the Reich, but a limited effort. The Allied air campaign against Germany in the months leading up to the Normandy invasion had to be cut back. The Allies turned increasingkly to France. Targets in France associated with the landings were given the highest priority. The strategic bombing camapign had, however, forced the Luftwaffe to esentially pull back to Germany. As a result, there was virtually no Luftwaffe operations to oppose the Allied landings on June 6. After D-Day and the subsequent operations to support the beach head (June 1944) and breakout (July 1944), the strategic bombing campaign could be resumed in full force against Germany with an ever expanding air armada. The bombers when operations were resumed had fighter escorts, long range P-51 Mustangs which significantly reduced the losses of planes and air crews.

Sources

Golson, Eric B."Did Swedish ball bearings keep the Second World War going? Re-evaluating neutral Sweden's role," Scandinavian Economic History Review Vol. 60, No, 2 (2012). Eric B. Golson Pages 165-182 | Published online: 21 Jun 2012

Speer, Albert. Richard and Clara Winston, trans. Inside the Third Reich (Avon Books: New York, 1970), 734p.

Zaloga, Steven J. Operation Pointblank 1944: Defeating the Luftwaffe , Osprey Campaign Series No. 236 (Osprey Publishing: 2011).

Created: 9:02 AM 8/16/2021
Last updated: 9:02 AM 8/16/2021