Figure 1.--. |
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Major changes ocurred in the Battle of the Atantic during 1941. German shipyards began delivering larger numbers of U-boats, giving German U-boat commander, Admiral Dönitz, an increasingly potent firce. At the same time, the British and Canadians were also adding escorts for convoy protection. The British were making technical advances in their ASW effort. One was forward seeking radar introduced early in 1941. It would be some time, however, before all escorts got them. Congress passed the Lend Lease Bill (March 1941). The President's interpretation was that Congress's action to provide Britain war material gave him the authority to get those supplies safely to Britain. This meant that the U.S. Navy would escort convoys with Lend Lease supplies. OKM and Hitler were optimistic that the surface fleet, including Bismarck would along with the U-boats would shut down the convoy lanes. Bismarck could destroy an entire comvoy. The whole British fleet was mobilized to sink the Bismarck (May 1941). The same month, Bletchley Park finally broke into the Marine Enigma (May 1941). This helped redirect the covoys while Britain was still building its escort strength. One month later, Hitler launched Barbarossa (June 1941). It was an effort to gain the living space and resources Germany lacked. The Allied strategy was two fold: 1) sink U-boats and 2) build more merchant ships than the Germans could sink. And to accomplish those goals, The Royal Navy not only imporivd its ASW capability, but the Americans spearheaded by automobile industrialist Henry Kaiser began the Liberty Ship program which would eventually outpace U-boat sinkings even at the heigth of their success. President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter (August 1941). Soon after, the President launched an undeclared naval war months before America entered the War.
The British had advanced radar enough to play an important role in the Battle of Britain, but this required the use of large ground stations and high towers. Perfecting the technology so the sets could be placed on ships, especially small escort vessels protecting convoys, proved a challenge. Further advances were needed before the sets could be manufactured in large numbers, but Royal Navy escorts began receiving forward seeking radar (FSR) (early-1941). It would take longer to get them to the Royal Canadian Navy. The first results were a shock to the Germans. U-boat ace Günther Prien and U-47 went missing while attacking Convoy OB-293 (March 7, 1941) There is some disagreement about precisely what occurred, but it is believed that British destroyers HMS Wolverine and HMS Verity found U-47 west of Ireland by using the new radar and attacked. The two destroyers took turns covering each other's sonar blind spots and dropped depth charges until U-47 rose before sinking and then exploded underwater with an orange flash. British radio broadcasts began asking where Prien was. The Germans finally had to admit that he was missing. The FSR could at first just be used in the immediate vivinity of a ship, but by the end of the War, a U-boat could be found when it surfaced virtually anywhere in the Atlantic. Dönitz had no idea what had happened or when a week later he lost two other top U-boat commanders. This illustrates a serious disadvantage the Germans had. When U-boats went missing, the Germans often had no idea why. Thus there was no way gthey could devise counter measures. Only if the U-boat managed to escape could Dönitz attemot to understand what British SAW tactics and scientific advances.
Lend Lease if not the most important measure, is surely one of the most important laws ever passed by Congress. The NAZI Blitz on London, reported nightly on the radio by Edward R. Murrow had a profound impact on American public opinion. President Roosevelt with the fall of France committed the United States to assisting the countries fighting the NAZIs (June 1940). U.S. law at the time reuired that Britain pay for equipmet and supplies. Public opinion polls by December, 1940, indicated that 60 of Americans favored helping Britain, the only country still resisting the NAZIs, even if it meant war. This and the President's overwealming reelection, strengthened his hand in Congress. Passage, however, was by no means certain. Here Republican presidetial candidate Wendel Wilkie plasyed a major role in winning Congressional approval. The U.S. Congress's in March, 1941, passed the Lend-Lease Act proposed by the Administration. It proved to be one of the most important pieces of legislation in history. The Lend-Lease Act empowered the president to "lend, lease, or exchange" war materials with nations whose struggle against aggression was considered necessary to American security. It made the United States the "arsenal of democracy," not only for the United States, but for a vast coalition of allied nations forming around Britain and the United States. The President's interpretation was that Congress's action to provide Britain war material gave him the authority to get those supplies safely to Britain. This meant that the U.S. Navy would escort convoys with Lend Lease supplies.
The Germany Navy when war broke out in 1939 had no way of matching the Royal Navy. Only limited effort was made to build a U-boat fleet. Rather resources were given to build lrge, superbly engineered ships. And nothing symbolized this more than the Bismarck, the largest and finest battleship built until that time. The High Command conceived of a commerce raiding operation to support U-boat operations. Hitler had misgivings about the operation when informed. Admiral Lutjens sailed Bismarck from Gdynia with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen (May 18). The High Command positions two supply ships and five tankers in the Atlantic to support the operation. Scouting ships were dispatched to locate targets. Bismarck sank HMS Hood, a battle cruiser, and heavily damaged the new HMS Prince of Wales. Only three men survive Hood. The fleet received the terse message "Hood sunk." The Admiralty ordered all available battle groups to converge on Bismarck which because of damge in the May 24 engagement made for Breast on the French coast. Bismarck manages to eluded the pursuing ships. A British Catalina flying-boat located Bismarck. Force-H coming north from Gibraltar launched Fairey Swordfish from the Ark Royal (May 26). The first wave mistakingly attack HMS Sheffield A second strike achieve two hits on Bismarck, one of which affects the steering. The next day the converging Royal Navy surface fleet destroyed Bismarck (May 27).
Hitler had repeatedly describe the two front war effort as aey factor in losung World war I. When he launched World War Iki, he was determkned not to repeat that mistake. The failure to defeat Britain was frustating. And his lust for the resources of the East was the main goal of the War from the onset. he convinced himself that the ionly way to defeat Britain was to destroy the Sioviet Union. And he saw it as critical to accomplih this before America finally joined Britain in the War. Hitler launched his long coveted invasion of the Soviet Union (June 22, 1941). Operations were primarily conducted by the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe. The Kriegsmarine played a minor supportive role. The success of the German operations and the participation of the Finnsh forced the Soviet Navy to withdraw to Lenningrad and Kronstadt. This left the Baltic a German lake so that mineral ores and other supplies from Scandinavia could continue to fuel the NAZI-war effort.
Both the British and Germans worked on each others naval codes. The German naval code was one of the highest priorities of British code breakers at Blechly Park. The naval enigma machines proved more difficult to crack than the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe enigmas. The Kriegsmarine was more security conscious. Codes were changed every month and security procedures wre very closely foilowed. Finally the Royal Navy succeeded in taking the German weaher boat Munchen off Norway and with it code books (May 7, 1941). The next dy the Navy took the U-110 and with it a priceless enigma machine (May 8, 1941). The Germans were unaware of this and surprised with the U-boats begn to have trouble locating convoys. The Germans had been sinking an average of 58 merchant vessels monthly, but this fill to 17 in July 1941. The Germans 6 months later changed their enigma machines to include a third encryption wheel (November 1941). This change meant that the Blechley Park Ultra team could no longer read neaval nessages. Until the team again unraveled the emigma code, the Royal Navy was in the dark for much of 1942. It took Ultra code breakers 9 months to begin to read the Germn naval code agaun (July 1942). Eventually it was the Ultra decripts that helped the Allies locate the wolfpacks. This allowed naval authorities to route the convoys and to deploy hunter-killer groups. Ultra also helped located the milch-cow U-boats that kelped the wolf-packs supplied. The Germans also worked on British naval codes. The British introduced Naval Cipher 3 (October 1941). The Germans managed to break the code in 3 months. At the height of the Battle of the Atlantic this provided Doenitz's U-boat fleet invaluable information.
The the German u-boat operations proved highly effective, despite the fact that Hitler launched the War years before the Kriegsmarine was prepared. Donietz began the War with only 57 U-boats. he was convinced that with enough U-boats he could knock Britain out of the War by cutting her off from her overseas Dominions and America. The strenhth of the U-boat fleet steadily grew. The threat was so severe that President Roosevelt at considerable political danger confronted the isolationists while America was still neuratl and provide assisstance even destroyers to protect convoys. Eventually the President ordered the Navy to engage the U-boats in an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic months before Hitler declared war on December 11, 1941. Even so the U-boats sank 445 merchant ships during 1941. In return the British succeded in sinking only 38 U-boats.
It was not only the British who ignored the danger of the U-boats before the War. Hitler assigned the Kriegsmarine the lowest priorirt of the three seevices. And both Hitler and OKM wanted surface ships, especially large ships. As a result, Admiral Dönitz received very small numbers of U-boats: 14 uboats (1935), 21 (1936), 1 (1937>, 9 (1938), 18 (1939), and even only 50 (1940). It was only in 1941 as the accomplishments of Dönitz's fleet became increasingly obvious that German priorities began to signifucantly shift. German shipyards turned out 199 U-boats (1941). Finally Dönitz would have the force he needed to wage a major submarine campaign. Peak construction would reach 286 U-boats (1943).
The Kriegsmarine and its u-boat arm was assigned the task of cutting Britain off from its Empire and the United States. Had they succeeded, Germany may well have won the War. The goal was to sink more ships than the Allies could build. The German u-boat campaign suceeded in sinking substantial numbers of Allied shipping. For a time the u-boats were even winning a war of attrition. Despite those losses, the Allies ended the War with a larger merchant fleet than at the onset of wat. The reason was a revolution in ship building, one of the most significant developments in the War--the Liberty Ship. Part of the American response was to increase ship construction and here the liberty ship was the center-piece of the American effort. American industrialist Henry Kaiser played a key role by developing a revolutionary new way of shipbuilding--assembling mass produced parts. Kaiser had never bult a ship before. The unfamiliarity of Kaiser and others with ship building was undoubtedly a factor n their succees in developing an innovative construction system. [Sawyer and Mitchell] More than 30,000 parts were mass produced by factories in 32 states. The modular construction techniques developed changed shipbuilding forever. With American shipyards working flat out to build crtically needed naval vessels, the liberty ship cargo vessels were built in what amounts to virtual shipyards all along the U.S. coast. This allowed the United States begining in 1941 to harness skills, resources, and facilities to an extrodinary degree. The output was almost unbelieveable. Not only were labor requirements to build a ship reduced by to thirds and it was done largely by workers who had never worked in shipyards--many had never even seen the sea before. The first liberty ship protype was built in 244 days. Eventually the proces was reuced to an incredible 42 days. One ship as a publicity exercise was actually built in 4 days and 15 hours. Most of the Liberty yards in 1943 began producing Victory ships, a larger and faster freighter that was to be capable of commercial use after the War. The United States, despite the u-boat offensive finished the War wih a merchant fleet larger than it had begun with. The United States expanded its shipbuilding capacity by more than 1,200 percent. American yards built over 2,700 Liberty Ships, 800 Victory Vessels, 320 T-2 Tankers, and various ships. In all, more than 5,200 ships were built.
The American an British Merchant Marine was the most dangerous duty in World War II. The men in the American Merchant Marine were not part of the military, yet the losses were very serious. Ironically, many of the men joined the Merchant Marine because they failed physicals for military service. Presiden Roosevelt wanted to give the Ametrican merchant mariners veteran status, but died before achieving this. The situation was not rectified until the 1980s.
The Atlantic Charter is one of the key documents of the 20th century and remains still relevant today. President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill meet aboard the Prince of Wales on August 9-13, 1941 at Placentia Bay. The Prince of Wales had been badly mauled by Bismark in May. It was to be sunk by a Japanese aerial attack in December. Roosevelt and Churchill issue the Atlantic Charter. The two were war time allies. Britain had weathered the worst that the NAZI Luftwaffe could throw at it. America and Britain were fighting the U-boats in the North Atlantic to keep Britain alive. It was clear that America would soon be drawn into the War. America had already played an important role in keeping Britain alive and the two countries were the only hope of the occupied European and in fact Western civilization itself--threatened by the evil tide of NAZI tyranny. The two leaders, the two most important men of the 20th century, agreed to a simple, but elegant eight-point statement of their aims which today still stands as the central credo of the Atlantic Alliance. There is no record of what was said privately between Churchill and Roosevelt. The Primeminister told colleagues, however, that the President planned to enter the War and that expanding American naval actions in the North Atlantic would eventually result in an incident that would provide austification for a declration of war.
Almost from the beginning of war in Europe, President Roosevelt began what was to become an undeclared war with Germany in the North Atlantic. The first tenative step was naval patrols to to prevent belligerent ships from U.S. waters. Also he began to think about bases in Bermuda and the Caribbean only days after the war had begun. [Freidel, p. 323.] While America would not enter the War until December 1941, Britain had an ally in the Atlantic almost from the beginning of the War. At first the American role was limited, but as the situation worsend and the German's expanded the U-boat fleet, the American role expanded. The Royal Navy was ill prepared for the war. Lossess to the u-boats were severe, despite the fact the Keiegsmarine began the War with only a small force. Months before American entered the War, the U.S. Navy was involved in a full-scale shooting war to protect the convoys needed to keep Britin in the War. The undeclared war in the North Atlantic began a shooting war (September 1941). The American public was not fully aware of the extent to which the Navy was involved. The American effort, however, played a major role in allowing Britain to to survive the NAZI onslaught.
The Allies sucessfully used airpower as a principal assett in the all important Battle of the Atlantic. The Germans did not. The Luftwaffe was developed and trained as a ground support force to support the new Blitzkrieg operations devised by German military strategists before the War. Most of the officers when the Luftwaffe was officially formed were drawn from the Whermacht (1935). Krriegsmarine thinking was wedded to big-gun battleships and a desire to refight the Battle of Jutland. Little thought was given to aviation. The Luftwaffe's first experiences with naval warfare was gained during the Norwegian campaign (April 1940). And as confirmed at Dunkirk, a rapidly maneuvering warship, especially small slender escorts proved a chalenging target. There were several reasons why the Germans failed to successfully use air power in the Battle of the Atlantic. First, the Luftwaffe was built as a short range tactical force. There was limited production of the long range aircraft needed for naval warfare. The reasin for this was simple. The Germans did not have the industrial capacity to build both a tactical and strategic air force. Second, the Luftwaffe suffered enormous losses after the Germans invaded the Soviet Union (June 1941). Many of the losses during Barbarossa were due to the severe weather conditions rather than the Red Air Force which was largely destroyed during the first week of the German attack. This severely limited the forces after 1941 thart could be maintained in France to support the Battle of the Atlantic. Third, with Hitler declaring war on America (December 1941), the appearance of massive American air formations in Briain adding to RAF strength, meant that the Luftwaffe would be overwealmed in the West. Fourth, geography limited the potential role. The French ports were south of the major Atlantic convoy routes where the Battle of the Atlantic was fought out. German long-range aircraft could reach the Western Approaches, but there they had to contend with RAF Coastal Command without fighter cover. Much of the Luftwaffe contribution to the Battle of the Atlantic was when the Germans first seized the French Atlantic ports (1940-41). The Luftwaffe's naval arm, the Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik, began long-range reconnaissance flights to solve the major problem Admiral Dönitz and his U-boats faced--finding the British convoys. The Luftwaffe used Fw-200 and later Ju-290 maritime patrol aircraft. This was at first very successful. The Germans claimed the flights began to sink 365,000 tons of shipping (early-1941). The British began launching fighters from convoy merchant ships as a stop-gap measure. The British expanded RAF Coastal Command and later deployed esport carriers as well as . Losses of reconnaissance aircraft discouraged the Luftwaffe commanders. The Luftwaffe's major achievement in support of Battle of the Atlantic was providing air cover as the Kreiegsmarine built enprmous protected U-boat pens in the French ports during 1941. JG-2 and JG-26 were posed to attack British bombers. At the time, RAF Bomber Command did not yet have Lancasters and the required day light raids by the obsolete RAF bombers would have been very costly. The Luftwaffe also played a role from Norwegian bases in attacking the Arctic convoys carrying supplies to the Soviet Union. After 1941, the German dominance in the air gradually faded meaning that Fliegerfuhrer Atlantik no longer had forces capable of making a significant contribution. The losses on the Eastern Frontb in particular seriously depleted the Luftwaffe. And the arival of the Americans (1942) meant increasing raids raids on German facilities in France even beffore the major air attacks on the Reich began. The Germans committed a Gruppe of He-177s (1943). [Cooper, p. 297.] They could have been effective in a combat environment in which the Luftwaffe had air superiority, but this was no longer the case by 1943. The Gruppe suffered severe losses at the hands of Allied fighters. This Gruppe was equipped with advanced radio controlled anti-shipping missles, but they were not capable of fighting off Allied aircraft. Aftr the loss of fully trained crews, they had to shift to night flights which severely reduced successes. The Luftwaffe units in French ports also provided fighter cover for U-boats moving into and returning from Atlantic operations as well as blockade runners. Bismarck was trying to reach the safty of Luftwaffe air cover and the French port of Brest when caught by the Royal Navy (May 1941). Luftwaffe air cover was effective in 1940-41, but less so as Allied air power began to grow (1942). Their major contribution remained air cover for the massive steel-reinforced concrete protected U-boat pens that continued to protect the U-boats until after the D-Day invasion (June 1944). The Germans in the L'Orient pens even held out until after the German V-E Day surrender.
The British lost the carrier HMC Courageous on anti-Uboat at the beginning of the War (September 1939). Air cover was the key to defeating the U-boats, but the Admiralty did not want to endanger its carriers as these operations made them vulnerable. The solution was escort carriers, small carriers that were expendable. The first escor carrier ws HMS Audacity which carried six aircraft. It was sunk by U-751 whike excirting a convoy returning to Liverpool from Gibraltar (December 21). The wolf back attacking the convoy lost five U-boats and the convoy was not badly damaged. The British would make escort carriers an important part of their ASW effort. Churchill raised the issue with Roosevelt and the U.S. Navy began adding them to fleet as well. They were cheap and easy to build.
Cooper, Mathew. The German Air Force 1933-1945: An Anatomy of Failure (New York: Jane's Publishing Incorporated, 1981).
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