German U-Boat Campaigns: Operation Drumbeat (January-June 1942)


Figure 1.--As part of Operation Drumbeat, German U-boats began sinking U.S. vessels (January 13, 1942). The U.S. Government down-played the sinkings, but they were very real for the peopl involved. This is 8-year old Ray 'Sonny' Downs with his big sister, 11-year old Lucille. The were on the 'Heredia' which was toredoded by U-506 miles away from New Orleans in the Gulf of Mexico. The U-boat commander describes entering the mouh of the Misissippi in his hunt for targets. In the ensuing chaos the whole family was separated. The whole family was returning from South America so their father inthe wake of Pearl Harbor could enlist in the military. Mother was injured, but all four survived. Many were not so lucky. Despite operating off the U.S. coast, the U-boats suffered very few losses.

Dönitez after the declaration of War dispatched a U-boat force to the coast of America (December 1941). The U.S. Navy was unprepared. Naval planners did not expect an attack off the U.S. coast. There were no convoys at the time. The U-boats mostly attacked at night. City lights were kept on, coastal shipping used the lights. The lights also perfectly siloutted the American ships. The U-boats in particular focused on the tankers. The U-boats attacks began January 13 and achieved considerable success against the unprepared Americans. NAZI Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels having to contend with the disater on the Eastern Front was delighted. He wrote in his diary, "WE have issued a special communiqué to the effect that the German submarines have succeeded in sinking 125,000 tons of enemy shipping off the American Atlantic coast. That is an exceedingly good piece of news for the German people. It bears testimony to the tremendous activity of our submarines and their widely extendended radius of action, as well as to the fact that German heorism conquers even the widest oceans. At last a special bulletin! We certainly needed it, and it acts like rain on parched land. Everybody regards the communiqué as a very effective answer to the warmonger Roosevelt, whom the whole German people curse. Many people are in a quandry as to whether they ought to hate him or Churchill more." [January 25, 1942--Goebbels, p. 45.] Notice that he does not mention Stalin. The Germans in 5 months succeeded in sinking around 400 merchant vessels and tankers--about 2.5 million GRT of shipping. All that damage was done with an incredibly small force, never more than 12 U-boats. Blimps, yachts, PT boats, and other vessels were deployed for coastal patrol. Amrican Naval commander Ernest King was not as committed to convoy as the British. This was especially the case because the Navy did not have sufficent escort vessels to both convoy troop ships and war equipment to Britain and to convoy coastal merchant vessels. The U.S. Navy in early-1942 was also hard-pressed in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor. King finally decided that poorly defended convoys were worse than no convoys at all. While coastal shipping suffered, America did not lose troop ships to the U-boats. The U.S. Navy began organizing coastal convoys when more escort craft became available (May 1942), after which the attacks ceased.

Arsenal of Democracy (1940-45)

President Roosevelt first used the term "Arsenal of Denocracy" on December 29, 1940 in one of his Fireside Chats, radio boradcasts, to the American people. He expalined the importance of supplying the people of Europe, at the time primarily Britain with the "implements of war". He said that the United States "must be the great arsenal of democracy". The very day he spoke, a Luftwaffe raid on London severly damaged famous buildings and churches in the city center and engulfed St. Paul's Cathedral in flames. [Gilbert, p. 356.] Hitler feared America more than any other country, but was convinced that Britain could be defeated before America could be mobilized or American industry could be effevtiverly harnassed for the war effort. Neither the NAZIs or the Japanese had any idea just how effectibely American production could be converted to war production. Air Marshall Goering sneared. "The Americans only know how to make razor blades." Four years later with the Luftwaffe in tatters, Goering said he knew that the War was lost when American P-51 Mustangs appeared over Berlin escoring waves of bombers. The record of American war production is staggering and in large measure determined the outcome of the War. American supplies and material would have been useles if the supplies did not reach Europe.

Undeclared Naval War (1939-41)

Almost from the beginning of war in Europe, President Roosevelt began what was to become an undeclared war with Germany in the North Atlantic. The first tenative step was naval patrols to to prevent belligerent ships from U.S. waters. Also he began to think about bases in Bermuda and the Caribbean only days after the war had begun. While America would not enter the War until December 1941, Britain had an ally in the Atlantic almost from the beginning of the War. At first the American role was limited, but as the situation worsend and the German's expanded the U-boat fleet, the American role expanded. The Royal Navy was ill prepared for the war. Lossess to the u-boats were severe, despite the fact the Keiegsmarine began the War with only a small force. Months before American entered the War, the U.S. Navy was involved in a full-scale shooting war to protect the convoys needed to keep Britin in the War. The American public was not fully aware of the extent to which the Navy was involved. The American effort, however, played a major role in allowing Britain to to survive the NAZI onslaught. Hitler was enranged with America's clear violation of its neutral status, but ordered the U-boat commanders to avoid incidents with the Americans until the campaign in the East had been successfully completed.

Hitler and Dönitz

America even before the War (September 1939) despite neutrality laws was no neutral and supported the Allies in various ways. And this increased as the War went on, especially after the fall of France (June 1940). . Aftr the Battle of Britain, it was American support that kept Britain in the War (March 1941). Both Hitler and Dönitz knew this. And the passage of Lend Lease meant that America was writing Britain a blank check. Dönitz and his U-boat commanders wanted to strike at the Americans. American escorts guarded both British and neutral merchants. American escorts generally did not attack the U-boats they encountered but would broadcast their locations to warn British convoys. This changed when President Roosevelt issued orders, essentially launching an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic (September 1941). This only increased the desire of Dönitz to settle score with the Americans. There had been clashes, mostly by mis-identification. Avoiding the Americans complicated U-boat operations. It was difficult for U-boats to distinguish between American and British/Canadian vessels, especially at night or in bad weather. And the need for identification was one more complication that U-boat commanders did not need. Roosevelt's orders for American escorts to engage the U-boats upped the ante. U-552 commanded by KL Erich Topp misidentified the USS Reuben James and sank it the mid-Atlantic (October 31, 1941). Reuben James became the first U.S. Navy vessel sank during the War. Not that Dönitz objected. He had submitted a war plan to OKW to deploy U-boats to American waters (September 1941). Hitler was adament, however, sinkings of U.S. ships were prohibited, unless the U-boats were being attacked by U.S. escorts and it was a matter of self defense. It was not that Hitler did not want to strike at the Americans, it was that he had his eye on the prize--the Soviet Union. He understood with the clarity that Dönitz with his naval focus in the West lacked -- that the War would be decided in the East. Hitler did not want America in the War until the Wehrmacht had defeated the Red Army. He understood that Germany could not win a war against and undefeated Soviet Union and a mobilized America. He thus held his mormal desires to lash out in check while the Panzers drove east into the Russian heartland. It was the same month that Roosevelt committed the U.S. Navy to war operations in the North atlantic that the Panzers began what Hitler was sure would be the war-winning drive toward Moscow. Dönitz was forced to continue to restrain his U-boats commanders.

Hitler Declares War on America (December 11, 1941)

A Japanese carrier task force executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941). The Axis Alliance was a defensive alliance. It required the three countries to come to the other's aid in case of attack, but did not require any action if one of the three attacked another country. Thus Hitler was not required to come to Japan's assistance, Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop stressed this in meetings with Hitler. Up to this time Hitler had avoided attacking the United States, even when President Roosevelt launched what was in effect an undeclared naval war in the North Atlantic. Thus Hitler's decision to declare war on America (December 11) is largely unexplained. Speaking before an audience of NAZI luminaries, Hitler announced his decision, explaining that America with its mixture of races would not be an important factor in the War. America was in fact the only country on which Hitler declared war. It was like the other important war decisions, a decision he made personally without any kind of staff discussion. He never explained his decision to his inner circle and historians today can only speculate concerning the decision. Even more unfathomable, he made the decision just as the Soviets launched their offensive before Moscow, clearly demonstrating that Operation Barbarossa had failed to knock the Soviets out of the War in a quick summer campaign. America was unprepared for war against either Germany or Japan. Hitler's declaration solved a problem for President Roosevelt of how after a Japanese attack to enter the European war against NAZI Germany. The Japanese and NAZIs were unaware of the dangers of war with an industrial potential of the United States. They were convinced that America's war production could not be accelerated or a national will to wage war coalesce in time to make an effective contribution.

U-boat Force Dispatched (December 1941)

Dönitez after the declaration of War dispatched a U-boat force to the coast of America (December 1941). He had wanted to pre-position U-boats in U.S. waters, but was denied permission by Hitler who wanted to keep America out of the War. Pearl Harbor and the failure of the Wehrmacht before Moscow changed this. But it meant that a U-boat offensive could not begin immediately. What Dönitz sent was only a small force. Dönitz had only a few of the long-range Type VII C U-boats needed for operations in the western Atlantic. And some of those U-boats were detached on Hitler's orders for operations in the Mediterranean.

U.S. Navy Unprepared

The sea campaign in the Atlantic duriung the first 2 years of the War was fought out primarily in the Western Approaches (eastern Atlantic. This was primarily because of the limited range of most of the U-boats available to Admiral Dönitz. Also finding the British convoys in the Western Approaches was easier than in the mid-Atlantic where they were more dispersed. The U.S. Navy was thus unprepared for attacks on shipping in the Western Atalantic along the coast. American naval planners simply did not expect an attack off the U.S. coast and were not even aware that the Germans were capable of mountiing such a campaign. There were still no American convoys at the time. Admiral King, Chief of Naval Operations, opposed convoys. Some say he disliked the British and thus ignored their advice. Others say the irrasable Adm. King didn't like anyone. Upon appointment, King famously said, “When they get into trouble they send for the sons of bitches.” What ever the reasons, American merchant ships were thus on their own. The recently appointed Adm. King was handed an extrodinarily difficult assignment. He had no fleet auxiliary vessels. And the fleet he had were mostly designed to fight a World War I naval opponent and not a major commerce war. Destroyers had obsolete ASW equipment. And there were few Destroyer Escorts (DEs) that were most appropriate for escort duty. King had a few carriers, but as the British had found, fleet carriers were not designed to fight a commerce war. The U.S. Navy has concluded, like the Royal Navy, that the Uboat threat had been defeated in World War I and had not lanned for another U-boat camapign.

Campaign Launch (January 1942)

It took a month for the Germans to begin their campaign off the U.S. coast. German U-boats began attacks along the U.S. Atlantic coast early in the New Year (January 13). The experience U-boat commanders from the beginning achieved considerable success against the unprepared Americans.

German Tactics

The U-boats mostly attacked at night. City lights were kept on, coastal shipping used the lights. The lights also perfectly siloutted the American ships. The U-boats in particular focused on the tankers. America at the time was Britain's primary source of oil and this would be the case throughout the War.

American Response

The U.S. Navy deployed planes, blimps, yachts, PT boats, and other vessels for coastal patrol. The personnel involved were inexperienced and tactics still largely untested. The results were as a result meager, but did help restrict vthe U-boat attacks primarily to the night. American Naval commander Ernest King was not as committed to convoys as were the more experienced British. This was especially the case because the Navy did not have sufficent escort vessels to both convoy troop ships and war equipment to Britain and to convoy coastal merchant vessels. The U.S. Navy in early 1942 was also hard-pressed in the Pacific after Pearl Harbor.

Convoys

As the U-boats began sinking many unprotected, unescorted American ships along the American Atlantic coast, the British Admiralty tried to convince Admiral King to start using the convoy system. Admiral King finally decided that poorly defended convoys were worse than no convoys at all. The British position was even a lightly protected convoy in most cases would have a better chance then single ships. To the U-boat skippers if they just missed a chance at an American ship all they had to do was wait in the sea route for an amazingly short timr until another ship would come along. If they missed a convoy it could be hours or days before finding another convoy and still have to worry about the escorts. At the time, the Canadians were getting oil from Caribbean islands (I beliece the Dutch West Indies). They did use the convoy system for escorting groups of oil tankers back and forth and never lost a ship. The U.S. Navy began organizing coastal convoys when more escort craft became available (May 1942). World War II historians have criticized Admiral King for not immedialky introducing a convoy system after Hitler declared war. One reason for his reluctance that the British probably caused more problems for temselves when they immeditely introduced convoys when the War began (September 1939). The U-boat Force at the time was very small and inexperienced. Some historians argue that, as a result, immediately introducing convoys at the about break of war, was probably premature on the part of the British. [Blair, p. 77.] The difference for the Americans was that the German U-boat fleet was both larger and more capable at the time Hitler declared war.

Campaign Ended (June 1942)

The German campaign ended (June 1942). By this time the small force of long-range U-boats were exhausted and could no longer be maintained on station. In addition, the U.S. Navy finally introduced a convoy system which complicated opetations.

Results

NAZI Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels having to contend with the disater on the Eastern Front was delighted with Drumbeat. He wrote in his diary, "We have issued a special communiqué to the effect that the German submarines have succeeded in sinking 125,000 tons of enemy shipping off the American Atlantic coast. That is an exceedingly good piece of news for the German people. It bears testimony to the tremendous activity of our submarines and their widely extendended radius of action, as well as to the fact that German heorism conquers even the widest oceans. At last a special bulletin! We certainly needed it, and it acts like rain on parched land. Everybody regards the communiqué as a very effective answer to the warmonger Roosevelt, whom the whole German people curse. Many people are in a quandry as to whether they ought to hate him or Churchill more." [January 25, 1942--Goebbels, p. 45.] Notice that he does not mention Stalin. The Germans in 6 months succeeded in sinking around 400 merchant vessels and tankers--about 2.5 million GRT of shipping. All that damage was done with an incredibly small force, never more than 12 U-boats. While coastal shipping suffered, America did not lose troop ships to the U-boats. Troops were moved domestically by rail. And the troop ships streaming to Britain were part of the escorted Atlantic convoys.

Impact

Operation Drumbeat yielded impressive results. And if U-boat operations continued at these levels, the allied war effort would have been affected. And as Lend Lease supplies began to reach the Soviet Union, the fighting on the Wastern Front would have also been affected. What Dönitz, Hitler, and Goebbels could not know is the Allied response in three key area: shipbuiling, technology, and , both with ship building and naval ASW capabilities. First wasthe Allied shipbuilding capability. The British did not have the shipbuilding capacity to replace the merchant vessels. British yards were hard put to supply needed naval vessels. America and Canad were different. American shipyards revolutionized shipbuildng to the poit that the 400 ships lost in Drumbeat were a footnote in the Battle of the Alantic. Many were smaller ships not suitable for the critcal Atlantic crossings. And the massive output of Liberty Ships did not impair the equally massive output naval fighting ships. And if that was not enough to stagger Dönitz, Canada virtually created a shipbuilding industry fom the round up, building small escort vessels that played a key role in the Battle of the Atlantic. Second, what Dönitz also did not antivipate was the speed with which America and Britain would develop effective new ASW technologies. A problem here was that sunk U-boats could not report the Allied advancs. This impaired the German ability to devse counter measures. Third was Allied intelligence. British code breakers cracked the naval Enigma. Dönitz's constant communicationwith his U-boats gave the Bletchly code breakers a great deal to work with. Döntitz was comcerned about Enigma. Naval operators were required to be much more careful than Heet and Li=uftwaffe operators. And Döntitz insisted on a third wheel to further scranble the codeing.

Sources

Blair, Clay. Hitler's U-Boat War: The Hunters, 1939-1942 (New York: Random House, 1996), 809p.

Gilbert, Matin.

Goebbels, Joseph. ed, Louis B. Lochner, The Goebbels Diaries, 1942-1943 (Doubleday: New York, 1948), p. 566.






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Created: 8:55 PM 8/2/2008
Last updated: 12:14 AM 11/16/2016