* World War II -- Battle of the Atlantic technology weapons organizatiuons








World War II: Battle of the Atlantic--Technology, Weapons, and Organization

World War II weapons and equiopment
Figure 1.--.

One way to follow the Battle of the Atlantic is chronologically as we have sketched out. But it is also useful to look at some of the major developments in technology, eweaponty, and organization separately as the chrnoloogical view scatters many of these topics making it difficult to study and assess them. The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest of the War and the most important conducted by the Western Allies. All of the military campaigns conductred by the Western Allies depended on the sucess of the Battle of the Atlantic. From the beginning, naval mines were imprtant. The initial problem for both the Royal Navy and the Kreiegsmarine was locationn. The Germans had to located the Allied convoys. The Allies had to locate the German ships, primarily the U-boats. Here the primary tools were electronic: directional finding, radar, and sonar. Directional finding was used by the Allies before the German naval Enigma was cracked. The Royal Navy miscalculated. The Sonar developed in World War I was not nearly the game changher that the Admiralty had anticipated. New sonars were developed, including Magnetic Anoimaly Detectioin (MAD) and sonabuoys. Advances in radar made a big difference as the campaign developed, especially HFDF (Huff Duff). Here the cavity magnitron was critical. All kinds of new weapons were developed to destroy U-boats such as Lee Lights and Hedhehogs. The Allies organized Hunter Killer Groups and closed the air gap. The Germans made changes as well like introducing snorkels but failed to deploy advanced new U-boat types, in part because of the Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign. Codebreaking was pursued by both the Allies and Germams. The Allied cracking of Enigma, especially breaking the Shark code made a huge difference in finally defeating the U-boats. There was not only hardwear research, but operational research. Admiral Dönitz introduced Wolf Packs as soon as he had sufficent U-boats. He was at a disadvantage because when a U-boat was lost, he usually did not know why. This made it very difficult to understand failures and develop counter measures. The Allies, however, were able to assess German U-boats and tactivs and work out needed tactical responses. Patrick Blackett and Sully Zuckerman led important research teams. American and Canadian shipyards turned out new escorts in large numbers. American Liberty sgiops miore than replaced sunk merchantmen. Air cover was vital in defeating thev U-boats, especially long range air craft. Here the American B-24 Liberators were especially imortant. Also imprtant were jeep carriers and the British Short Sunderland. The Germans called it the 'flying porcupine'. Historians focus on technology and naval and air operations. Both were vital, but organizational structure was also important. [Gardner] Both the nature of the beligerant alliances as well as the structure of the militaries were important. The Anglo-American Alliance was the cloest and most important alliance in history. And that cooperation was on display in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Axis essentially fought two separate wars with no real coopoeration. Japanese submarines could have cut off the the British Eighth Army in Egypt during the all imortant 1942 poeriod. This could have led to a possiblr coinnection, but the Japanese refised to commit their submarines in strength to the Indian Ocean or to commerce warfare. The Allies promoted inter-service cooperation and air and sea firces played a key role in the Allied victory. The British set uo inter-service bodiues: the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee and the Joint Intekigence Committee (JIC). The Germans in contrast like the Japanese raised inter-service rivalry to a new level. Hitler was suscpicious of his military and did not promote inter-service cooperation. Göring virtually refused to assist Dönitz in the Battle of the Atlantic. He severely limited FW-200 Condor flights out into the Atlantic.

Assessment

One way to follow the Battle of the Atlantic is chronologically as we have sketched out. But it is also useeful to look at some of the major developments in technology and organization separately as the chrnoloogical view scatters many of these topics making it difficult to study and assess them. The Battle of the Atlantic was the longest of the War and the most important conducted by the Western Allies. All of the military campaigns conductred by the Western Allies depended on the sucess of the Battle of the Atlantic.

Technology

The initial problem for both the Royal Navy and the Kreiegsmarine was locationn. The Germans had to located the Allied convoys. The Allies had to locate the German ships, primarily the U-boats. Here the primary tools were electronic: directional finding, radar, and sonar. Directional finding was used by the Allies before the German naval Enigma was cracked. The Royal Navy miscalculated. The Sonar developed in World War I was not nearly the game changher that the Admiralty had anticipated. New sonars were developed, including Magnetic Anoimaly Detectioin (MAD) and sonabuoys. Advances in radar made a big difference as the campaign developed, especially HFDF (Huff Duff). Here the cavity magnitron was critical.

Weaponry

Both the British and the Germsbs began the bsttle with bssicalkly Worlkd War I tdechnology and equioment. Royal Navy and Kriegsmsrine commanders were both hapered by their sadmiraties' pre-War decision to downgrade the threat and potentiasl of the U-boat. From the beginning, naval mines were imprtant. All kinds of new weapons were developed to destroy U-boats such as Lee Lights and Hedhehogs. The Allies organized Hunter Killer Groups and closed the air gap. The Germans made changes as well like introducing snorkels but failed to deploy advanced new U-boat types, in part because of the Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign. American and Canadian shipyards turned out new escorts in large numbers. American Liberty Ships more than replaced sunk merchantmen. Air cover was vital in defeating the U-bpats, especially long range air craft. Here the American B-24 Liberators were especially imortant. Also imprtant were jeep carriers and the British Short Sunderland. The Germans called it the 'flying porcupine'. American efforts to use blimps proved ineffective. The German FW-200 Condor had some success, but was defeated by ship launched Huricanes.

Codebreaking

Codebreaking was pursued by both the Allies and Germams. TBoth had succdesses. Allied cracking of Enigma, especially breaking the Shark code made a huge difference in finally defeating the U-boats. The Naval Enigma was the toughest challenge to Bletchley Park bedcause the csutious Dönitz added a rotor. But Bletchly everntully suceeded. Part of its success was the fact that German operations in tyhe SAtlntic ernabked the British to seiuze Enigma mzchindes and code materials on both weather ships sand U-boats--all with out Dönitz learming about it.

Tactics

There was not only hardwear research, but operational research. Admiral Dönitz introduced Wolf Packs as soon as he had sufficent U-boats. He was at a disadvantage because when a U-boat was lost, he usually did not know why. This made it very difficult to understand failures and develop counter measures. The Allies, however, were able to assess German U-boats and tactivs and work out needed tactical responses. Patrick Blackett anf Sully Zuckerman led important research teams. Allied Hunter Killer Groups proved increasingly effective.

Organization

Historians focus on technology and naval and air operations. Both were vital, but organizational structure was also important. [Gardner] Both the nature of the beligerant alliances as well as the structure of the militaries were important. The Anglo-American Alliance was the cloest and most important alliance in history. And that cooperation was on display in the Battle of the Atlantic. The Axis essentially fought two separate wars with no real coopoeration. Japanese submarines could have cut off the the British Eighth Army in Egypt during the all imortant 1942 poeriod. This could have led to a possiblr coinnection, but the Japanese refised to commit their submarines in strength to the Indian Ocean or to commerce warfare. The Allies promoted inter-service cooperation and air and sea firces played a key role in the Allied victory. The British set uo inter-service bodiues: the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee and the Joint Intekigence Committee (JIC). The Germans in contrast like the Japanese raised inter-service rivalry to a new level. Hitler was suscpicious of his military and did not promote inter-service cooperation. Göring virtually refused to assist Dönitz in the Battle of the Atlantic. He severely limited FW-200 Condor flights out into the Atlantic.







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Created: 12:08 AM 12/22/2020
Last updated: 12:08 AM 12/22/2020