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The major Pacific naval engagements in between Midway (June 1942) and the decisive engagements in the Central Pacific (June-October 1944) were fought around Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons (August-December 1942). They were some of the fiercest naval battles because the two fleets were more closely balanced than at any other time of the War, although the Japanese still had the advantage. The Japanese realized that the American offensive at Guadalcanal is a much bigger operation than they had believed. As result, they decided on a major fleet action to destroy first the American naval units supporting the Marines and then the Marine beachhead itself. The result was the most important of the Solomons naval battles--Santa Cruz (October 26, 1942). It would be the last of the major carrier battles until the Battle of the Philippines Sea off the Marianas (June 1944). The Pacific Fleet would not have decided to oppose the Japanese except that the Marines on Guadalcanal were at stake. Unlike Midway, the Americans did not have the advantage of naval decrypts or a massive land air component. (The Cactus Air Force was a fraction of the size of what Nimitz has crammed on Midway.) It was thus a true fleet test. The primary action was the carrier assaults. And here the Japanese came out on top. They sank Hornet and badly damaged Enterprise. The American strikes were not as coordinated as the Japanese, but American pilots did succeed in badly damaging two of the Japanese carriers (Zuihō and Shōkaku). Jun'yō and Zuikaku were largely unscathed, but their air components suffered terrible losses. As a result, this would be the last battle in which Japanese carriers would be able to mount effective assaults. Adm. Kinkaid decide to withdraw Enterprise. This would have left the Japanese in control of the southern Solomons, but Adm. Kondo decided to withdraw his carriers as well. It was understandable, especially as so many planes and pilots had been lost, but a huge mistake. If the Japanese were going to win the Pacific War, it had to be in 1942 before America's far greater industrial capacity swamped the Japanese with new ships and advanced aircraft. But the Japanese withdrew their carriers from the South Pacific. This meant that the Pacific War would be decided by who could build the greater carrier force for the inevitable decisive battle. And there could be no doubt about who was going to win that contest. Withdrawing their carriers almost meant that the Marines on Guadalcanal had a fighting chance. The Cactus Air Force meant that surface attacks on the Marine beachhead were impossible during the day. Night attacks were possible, but could not be accurately targeted.
Unlike Midway, the Battle of Santa Cruz did not occur because American cryptologists had cracked the Japanese naval code (JN-25). Even so American intelligence assessments were involved. Halsey and his staff determined that the Japanese were planning a major naval strike to break the deadlock at Guadalcanal. A change in JN-25 had American cryptologists in the dark. But radio traffic analysis, meaning an analysis of the volume and direction of Japanese naval messages, and reconnaissance sightings suggested an eminent Japanese assault.
Enterprise under repair at Pearl was hurried repaired for battle. She received the new Boffers 40mm anti-aircraft guns and new air groups (October 10). This was only possible Because Adm. Nagumo decided against a third strike on Pearl. This would have destroyed the ship repair facilities and the ability of the Pacific Fleet to use Pearl as a forward naval base. Now Adm. Nagumo had to face the consequences of his own decisions. Nimitz rushed Enterprise south (October 16) and rendezvoused with Hornet, only 2 days before the battle (October 24). The two carriers became the core of Task Group, originally formed to land the Marines on Guadalcanal. The American force was commanded by Admiral Thomas Kinkaid and what remained of the American carriers in the Pacific.Task Forces 16 and 17 included the two carriers, the battleship South Dakota (BB-57), half-a-dozen cruisers (with several of the new specialized antiaircraft light cruisers), and 14 destroyers. Another force, built around the battleship Washington (BB-56) was available, but did not participate directly in the battle.
Halsey was correct, the Japanese were planning a major strike. They had at first underestimated the size of the American force on Guadalcanal and the strength of the naval commitment. Thus the inadequate forces they sent against the Marines on the island and the Allied naval forces protecting the Marines failed. The Japanese did not want to commit their carriers in the confined waters of the Solomons. So they planned to deploy in the open waters east of he southern Solomons nd north of the Santa Cruz Islands. Here they could support a coordinated land offensive on Guadalcanal. The Japanese fleet was to covering a major reinforcement attempt of Guadalcanal, but they also hoped to have the opportunity to engage and destroy the remaining elements of the Pacific Fleet which they calculated would have to come to the aid of the Marines in Gudalcanal. In particular they hoped to finally destroy the last two American carriers.
The naval force the Japanese assembled this time was no half measure. And this is indicated by the Japanese name for the battle--the Battle of the South Pacific. At Truk they reinforced the two fleet carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku, the carriers missing at Midway, with two additional carriers, Hiyō and Junyō (early October). The Imperial Navy sent south the most powerful naval task forces they had assembled since Midway.
Erroneous reports from Guadalcanal led the Japanese to think that their fround force on Guadalcanal had taken Henderson Field. Poor communications with the ground forces on Guadalcanal would hamper the Japanese throughout the Guadalcanal campaign. Japanese land forces on Guadalcanal launched a major attempt to capture Henderson Field (October 24-26). They attacked the U.S. Marine beachead defending the Henderson Field Airfield. It became known as the Battle for Henderson Field or the Battle of Lunga Perimeter. The attack was decisively defeated. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, estimated at 20-30 times the American losses. They were never again able to launch an attack of comparable dimensions. A Japanese naval force approached Guadalcanal during the day, believing that the Cactus Air Force had been disabled (morning of October 25) to support their ground forces. The Cactus Air Force responded with attacks throughout the day. They sank the light cruiser Yura and damaged the destroyer Akizuki.
A major problem for the Japanese was they were never sure about just what carriers the Americans had and where they were located. They reported the sinking of the main carriers several times. Thus when they kept popping up in subsequent battles, they were unsure about what they had sunk. The Japanese seem to have taken pilot reports at face value without any meaningful attempt to assess the reports. As a result they were never bl to put together accurate assessments of the American forces they faced.
The main Japanese force proceeded south, intent on destroying the American carriers they believed to be in the area. It was commanded by Admiral Nobutake Kondo. Admiral Nagumo despite his failure t Midway, still commanded the main body carrier force. The Japanese force still had three carriers, two first-line fleet carriers (Shōkaku and Zuikaku and the small carriers (Junyō). Along with the carriers, the Japanese force included 4 battleships, 8 heavy and 2 light cruisers, and 21 destroyers. The Japanese had generally held their carriers away from the Solomon naval battles because of the restricted waters and the desire to reserve their carriers for a war winning, major fleet action against the U.S. Pacific fleet. This was to be their decisive stroke. An accident on Hiyō forced it to retire to Truk (October 22), reducubg their carrier force to three.
The Santa Cruz Islands are located some 250 miles east of the southern Solomons. They are not geologically part of the Solomons, but are part of the modern Solomon's nation. They are just north the New Heberdes (modern Vanuatu). The New Hebrides would be a major supply and staging area for the Marines on Guadalcanal. Espiritu Santo 550 miles to the south was the closest source of supplies. It also meant that fighters could be flown in from Espiritu Santo.
The Battle of Santa Cruz occurred when the Japanese and American carrier groups found each other. Halsey ordered Adm. Thomas Kinkaid to attack, hoping that they might achieve another Midway. He cabled Kinkaid, "ATTACK REPEAT ATTACK". Kinkaid launched a small attack, but it failed to find the Japanese. The two naval forces searched for each other and finally found each other's carriers late in the afternoon. Both fleets launched major strikes. The Japanese managed to get their strike off first. At this stage of the War, it was still the better trained and disciplined Japanese carrier groups that had the edge on the Americans. American carrier operations were still not as disciplined and were operating with inferior air craft types. This would, however, prove to be the last important successful Japanese carrier strike of the Pacific War. The Battle of Santa Cruz occurred when the Japanese found Hornet. In force, but confused fighting, the Japanese badly damaged Hornet (October 26) which was left dead in the water. The Japanese also badly damaged Enterprise, but as it had been obscured for a time by a rain squall was not put out of action. Kinkaid left with the possibility of leaving the Pacific fleet without any operational carriers, withdrew Enterprise. American damage control equipment and crews were superior to the Japanese crews and managed to get Hornet back to life. It was, however, ravaged by another Japanese air strike and had to be scuttled. The American strikes were not as coordinated as the Japanese, but American pilots did succeed in badly damaging two of the Japanese carriers (Zuihō and Shōkaku).The Japanese attacks also damaged the South Dakota, the heavy cruiser Portland (CA-33), the antiaircraft cruiser San Juan (CL-54), and the destroyers Mahan (DD-364) and Smith (DD-378). An errant U.S. torpedo is believed to have sunk the Porter (DD-356)
The Japanese after finally sinking Hornet which had been reduced to a hulk, decided not to pursue the damaged Enterprise battle group. Santa Cruz was a victory for the Japanese, but yet again they did not press their victory. This is difficult to understand given the Japanese ferocity in hopeless causes later in the War. The Japanese turned back rather than launching a major attack on the Marines at Guadalcanal. At the time Halsey was left without carriers to oppose them, only the small Cactus ir Force which could not have withstood a major carrier strike. The damage to he two carriers and the terrible loss of air crews probably explain the Kondo's decision to retire back to Truk. Ad. Halsey did not know at first that the Japanese carriers would not attempt another foray south and he had no carriers left to oppose them.
Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner who had predicted Pearl Harbor played a key role in keeping the marines supplied. 【Spector】 Not only did the Marines prevail on the Island, but the Allies successfully wore down the Imperial Navy. American shipyards were turning out ships at a phenomenal rate while the Japanese fleet was being steadily depleted. What could not be replaced were the superbly trained Japanese air crews. The Americans despite the furious fighting and hits on the carriers lost only 26 aviators while the Japanese lost 148 aviators. 【Lundstrom, pp. 454-56.】 This in addition to Midway and the other Solomon battles would mean that the Japanese by 1943 would fight the War not only with increasingly obsolete aircraft types, but with poorly trained air crews. If the Japanese were to win the War it had to be in 1942, yet they were unable to turn their still substantial naval advantage and even battle victories into victory in the campaign. Overall ship losses were roughly equal, surprising giving the superior Japanese forces. . In retrospect, Santa Cruise wold prove to be the last major Japanese naval victory of the Pacific War. Halsey after the Battle concluded Kinkaid had hesitated. Kinkaid blamed poor communication. Halsey removed Kinkaid from carrier duty. The break led to great animosity between the two that would resurface at Leyte Gulf. 【Thomas, p. 70.】
Lundstrom, John B. Guadalcanal Campaign.
Spector, Alan. The Eagle and the Rising Sun: The Japanese-American War 1941-1943 (Norton, 2003).
Thomas, Evan. Sea of Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign, 1941-1945 (Simon & Schuster: New York, 2006), 414p.
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