*** World War II Pacific naval campaigns -- South Pacific Operation FS








World War II Pacific Naval Campaign: The South Pacific--Operation FS (1942)

Operation FS
Figure 1.--This photograph, we think from Fiji, was taken by British sailor Samuel John Bartlett from Plymouth, England. He was a crew member aboard the 'HMS Wellington', a Grimsby-class sloop, operating from New Zealand. It made a South Pacific cruise when he took this and other photographs (1938). With the outbreak of World War II (1939), 'Wellington' like most of the Royal Navy was ordered back to Britain (1940). There was a priority need for escort vessels. The ship spent the War fighting U-boats in the North Atlantic. Other Grimsby-class sloops were lost, but 'Wellington' survived. The Grimsby class was a step toward the evolution ofthe modern figate. The need for the Royal Navy to focus on the vital North atlntc sea lanes meant the job of taking on the Japanese and oposing Operation FS to seize Fiji in the Pacific War was left to the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Intrestingly 'Wellington', is one of the few surviving World War II ships and can be visited in its London, Thames berth.

Operation FS is the Japanese designation for seizing South Pacific islands east of Australia (Fiji and Samoa), but like Operation MO, the real objective was Australia. Japan launched Operation MO (early-May 1942). It was possible because most of the British Royal Navy had been withdrawn from the Pacific to fight the Battle of Atlantic with the German U-boats. And the primary British bastion, Singapore, fell to the Japanese (April 1942). The next month, Japanese amphibious forces embarked to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea and Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons. The dates for Operation FS to be launched after Port Moresby and Midway were in Japanese hands were set for New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa (July 8, 18, and 21). The First Air Fleet was to be deployed to support the island invasions. The goal was to cut Australian and New Zealand life lines to America. Japanese operations througout the Pacific Wae began with curring off targets from supplies and reinforcement (The Philippines,Mayalya, Singporte, and Burma). This was the srategy adopted for Australia. The Japanese demanded that Australia surrender (January and February 1942). Primeminister Curtin rejected their demands. General MacArthur had escaped from Corredidor and was overseeing the Allied build-up in Australia (March 1942). Men and supplies were streaming out from America. They could not reach the Americans in the Phiilppines, they could reach Australia. The situation was, however, still precarious. The Australian Army was still largely in North Africa fighting the Afrika Korps with the British. General Tojo speaking in the Japanese Diet issued a final warning to Australia (May 28, 1942). One historian explains, "Japan was now tightening the noose on Australia." [Frei, p. 172.] Shortly after Japanese midget submarines staged an attack on Sydney Harbor (May 31). The failure of Operation MI with the First Air Fleet's loss of four fleet carriers at Midway (June 4) radically changed the balance of forces in the Pacific and prospects for FS. Midway meant that Japan's desimated First Air Fleet was no longer had the capability of supporing FS. So the Japanese placed a greter emphasis on seizing islands and building air fields to help sever the all important sea lanes with America. It is at this time that Guadalcanal enters into history. The Japanese chose the southern-most island in the Solomons as the location of a key air base--Guadalcanal. And Japan at the time still had the naval, air, and army forces to seize the FS islands. The issues would be resolved on Guadalcanal by outnumbered and poorly supplied Marines and a series of fierce naval battles fought by the battered U.S. Navy around Guadalcanal -- before the large number of ships under construction in American shipyards had begun to reach the Fleet.

Australia

Australia figured in the initial Japanese war planning. Unless Australiaas was seized, the Southern Resource Zone (SRZ) was not secure. After Pearl Harbor the Japanese offensive exceeded their wildest expectations. They captured a vast empire streaching from the border of India east to the Solomon Islands. And in doing so they encountered little serious resistance. These conquests brought the Japanese to the waters off the northrn coast of Australia. The problem for the Japanese is that you cannot cionquer a continent with a navy. And the ovrstreache Japanese Army did not have forces available to conquer and occupy Australia. So while the forces could be brought together the Japanese conceived of two operations to prepare for the eventual invasion. The plan was to soften Australia up by seizing Port Moresby along the southern coast of New Guinea. This would provode air bases that could be used to hit targets deep into Australia. Th plan to seize Port Moresby was Operation MO. The next step was to interedict the troops and supplies coming from America. Gen. MacArthur in a daring escape from Corregidor reached Australia (March 1942). He was hoping to find an American army there. In fact, American men and material was just begining to arrive. And if the Japanese were going to take Australia, thar buildup needed to be prevented. And this effort was to be Operation FS, meaning seizing the islands off the northeastern coast of Australia. This would provide the Japanese air and naval bases that could be used to sever the sea links to America. Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa were the most Important. Australia did not have a substantial arms industry or a large population. Their army was in the Middle East. If the sea lanes with America could be cut, Australia would not have the men or military equipment needed to defeat a Japanese invasion.

Doolittle Raid (April 1942)

The United States struck basck against Japan by launching an unpreceented bomber attack from athe carrier Enterprise. The raid was led by Lt. Col Jimmy Doolittle. The raiders focused on Tokyo, but other cities wre hit. Little ctual damage was done, but the Imperial Navy was humiliated for allowing an attack to come o close to th Emperor. The Japanese had made a serious mistake by missing the American carriers at Pearl and then not immediately engaging them. Instead the First air Fleet was given various assignments including an unecessary foray into the Induan Ocean. The bombing caused Admoral Yamamoto to push for his masterpiece--Operation MI. This was a n=massive operation to seize Midway Island and this force the american carriers to battlle. The High Command were not sol on Yamamoto's complex plan, but gave their permission with the caveat that Operation MO be launched first. They wanred to get on with the Ausrralian project as soon as possible.

Operation MO (May 1942)

Japan launched Operation MO (early-May 1942). It was possible because most of the British Royal Navy had been withdrawn from the Pacific to fight the Battle of Atlantic with the German U-boats. And the primary British bastion, Singapore, fell to the Japanese (April 1942). The next month, Japanese amphibious forces embarked to seize Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea and Tulagi Island in the southern Solomons.The Japanese Navy executed its plan for the the New Guinea Campaign (air strikes against Lae and Salamaua, disembarkation in Huon Gulf, New Britain (Rabaul), New Ireland (Kavieng), Finch Harbor (also called Finschhafen), and the capture of Morobe and Buna). This was achieved with little or no opposition by the Australians--the Mandate country. Japanese strategists envisioned those territories as support points to implement the most important objective--the seizure of Port Moresby. The executiom of these operations was assigned to the Japanese Naval task force led by Admiral Chūichi Nagumo who had led the Pearl Harbor strike. After completing the seizure of the Dutch East Indies with their vital oil resources. The Japanese and Adm. Nagumo shifted the focus to New Guinea. The Japanese seized Christmas Island (March 1942). The Japanese were able to seize the Island without a fight because the Indian garrison mutinied against their British officers. The American submarine Seawolf damaged the Japanese cruiser Naka. The Japanese Navy General Staff conceptualized Operation Mo (1938). Seizure of Port Moresby would provide important air bases to bomb Austrralia and would support the next step--Operation FS to isolate Australia and New Zealand. Unfortunately for Adm. Yamaoto, MO did not go well. American code breakers revealed the effort and the American Pacifiic Fleet carriers engaged the Japanese carriers in the Coral Sea. For the first time in the Pacific War, a major Japanese invasion force was forced to withdraw. Port Moresby remined in Australian hands. While the Lexington was sunk and Yorktown heavily damaged, a Japanese light carrier was sunk--the battle report 'scrarch one flat top' electified America. More importantly, two of the mainline Japanese carriers which Yamamoto had planned to use at Midway were out of commission. Adm Yamamoto's decision to go ahead with only four carriers at Midway would lead to disaster. Fortuntely for the Americans, the Adm. Yamaoto totaly misjudged the Coral Sea battle.

Geography

Geography is one of the major determinants of military strategy. And for the Allies it was the major determinnt of Pacific War strategy. As a result, emeny military movements could be basically sussed at by stuying the map. This is what the Japanese had to do. The Americans were aided by code breaking. Both were a factor in the Battle of Midway. Admiral Nimitz bet the ranch by committing his three available carriers at Midway. Had they failed, there is little doubt even without code breaking where the Japanese would strike next -- the island groups off the northeast coast of Australia (including New Caledonia, Fiji, and Samoa). These names do not rise high on any assessment of World War II island groups. But that is only because the Japanese had to cancel FS after the First Air Fleet's disaster at Midway. These islands were a kind of shield, protecting the sea lanes between America and both Australia and New Zeland. America ships were deliveing men and equipment in prodigeous numbers and quantity to Australia. Any Japanese offensive to seize Australia would have to begin by seizing these islands and severing the sea lanes. It is no accident that the first major effort of the America Pacific fleet was fought in the Coral Sea just north of these islands. That battle was fought to save Port Moresby, but the Japanese planned to return to the Coral Sea to seize the these islands as their next step after Midway.

Timing (July 1942)

Operation FS, like Operation MO, was focused on Australia the last major Allid position in the South Pacific. Operation FS was to be launched immeditely after Port Moresby (MO) and Midway (MI) were in Japanese hands. This mean that a more intense bombing of austrralia could beg=gin and the with the destruction of the american carriers, there would be no important Allied naval force to be reconned with. The dates were set for New Caledonia (July 8), Fiji (July 18), and Samoa (July 21). The First Air Fleet was to be deployed to support these island invasions. The Americans had begun to build up forces on these islands, but they were noy yet major bastions and with the support of the six mainline carriers of the First Air Fleet, Japanese success was very likely.

Objective

The Japanese goal goal was to cut Australian and New Zealand life lines to America. Japanese operations througout the Pacific Wae began with curring off targets from supplies and reinforcement (The Philippines, Mayalya, Singpore, and Burma). This was the srategy adopted for Australia. The Japanese demanded that Australia surrender (January and February 1942). Primeminister Curtin rejected their demands. General MacArthur had escaped from Corredidor and was overseeing the Allied build-up in Australia (March 1942). Men and supplies were streaming out from America. This was vital because Australia did not have an industrial bas capbple of producing h weaponry needed for defense of the country. The Japanese could not reach the Americans in North America, they could reach Australia. And with the First Air Fleet intact and the Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa in Jpanese handsboth Australia and New Zealand would be cut off from America.

Precarious Situation (June 1942)

The United States began its South Pacific buildup soon after Pearl Harbor (December 1942). The situation at the time the Japabese has schduled Operation FS was, however, still precarious. American resources were still limited for which thre were many demands. And the central American strategic vision agreed with the British was Germany First. The Australian Army was still largely in North Africa fighting the Afrika Korps with the British. General Tojo speaking in the Japanese Diet issued a final warning to Australia (May 28, 1942). One historian explains, "Japan was now tightening the noose on Australia." [Frei, p. 172.] Shortly after Japanese midget submarines staged an attack on Sydney Harbor (May 31). The American build up had only begun and at the time that Admoral Ymamoto sailed with almost the entire Imperial Fleet for Midway to oversee his MI brainchild , Operation FS was only one month awayand the blnce of naval powerlay with the Japanese. After Pearl Harbor, the United states sought a forward training area and resupply base to serve as a potential line of defense against the Japanese sweep through the Pacific. Fiji geographically and logistically was the best location. At the time the, Fiji was a British colony , but had only the Fiji Regiment supported by the New Zelanders. The United States rush the green 37th Army Division to Jiji, which was in place (June 1942). The French on New Caledonia joined the Free French from a very early point, but ghere was no military force of any significnce on he island, omly the small Bataillon du Pacifique which was deployed to the Middle East like the Austrlian Army. The American Expeditionary Force landed in Noumea under the orders of General Pach (March 12). There were some difficult relations with the new governor, Admiral Thierry d'Argenlieu. New Caledonia as a highly effective unsinkable but immobile aircraft carrier against the Japanese, notably during the Battle of the Coral Sea (May 1942) and the intense naval battle around Guadalcanal (Auhust-November 1942). Shortly after Pearl Harbor An U.S. Marine Brigade arrived with 5,600 officers and enlisted men with their heavy artillery to defend the island (January 20, 1942). Samoans were recruited to form the Samoan Marine Brigade (Maligi Samoa) consisting of 350 men. Tutuila island would become the most important jungle training center in the South Pacific.

Japanese Failure at Midway (June 1942)

The failure of Operation MI with the First Air Fleet's loss of four fleet carriers at Midway (June 4) radically changed the balance of forces in the Pacific and prospects for FS. Midway meant that Japan's decimated First Air Fleet no longer had the capability of supporing FS. And without the First Air Fleet, Operation FS was impossible. So the Japanese placed a greter emphasis on seizing islands where possible and building air fields to help sever the all important sea lanes with America. It is at this time that Guadalcanal enters into history. The Japanese chose the southern-most island in the Solomons as the location of a key air base--Guadalcanal. And Japan at the time still had sunstantial naval, air, and army forces. The issues would be resolved on Guadalcanal by outnumbered and poorly supplied U.S. Marines and a series of fierce naval battles fought by the battered U.S. Navy around Guadalcanal. The battle would be fought before the large number of ships underconstruction in American shipyards had begun to reach the Fleet.

Kokoda Trail

Operation MO's objective was to complete the conwquest of New Guin by seizing Port Moresby. This would open up Australia to Japnese bombing. This objective did not die with the loss of the four of the four fleet carriers at Midway, tearing the hert of Kido Butai. This meant that Operation FS was no longer possible, but the Japanese decided to take Port Moresby by land. The towering Owen Stanley Mountains, however, meant thatv this was easier said than done. The result was fierce fighting with Australian infantry all along the Kokoda Trail. The Japanese had launchd the Pacific War under the belief that their warrior spirit and Western decdence would win the war. The fighting on the Kokoda Trail and elsewhere like Gudalcanal showed them that this was a serious miscalculation. The Australians and Americans were more than capable of waging war and that logistics more than warrior spirit would be a major factor in the War.






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Created: 6:48 PM 6/10/2016
Last updated: 11:13 AM 7/18/2022