Figure 1.--Japanese Type 95 Ha-Gō (九五式軽戦車 ハ号 ) light tank used wasthecountry's min battle tank. It appeared in 1936 and was still in use at the end of tge Waer, The priority give to the Imperial Japanese Navy for available steel limited the number of tank that the Japanese could build, especially types heavier than the Type 95. The Type 95 was comparable to the American M-3 Stuart, but woefully inadequate against heavier types. Notice the small 37 mm main armament. The Japanese produced some 2,300 Type 95s. (The United States built some 50,000 M-4 Shermans which use four times more steel than the Type 95.) The Imperial Navy's insatiable demand for steel meant that the Army was unable to produce larger numbers of Type 95s or significant numbers of heavier types. The Type 95 was an advanced tank when it appeared in 1936, but by 1942 when this photograph was taken it was already badly outclassed by American, British, German, and Soviet tanks. Even so the Japanese continued the Type 95 as its main battle tank for the rest of the War.

Japan at the time of World War II was the only industrialized country in Asia. While the country made enormous gains, it was still did not have the scientific and industrial prowess of the European powers, let along the Soviet Union and America. Japan like Germany prepared for war by devoting a huge portion of its national economy to the military at aime that the democracies severely limited military spending. Even so, given the country's limited industrial capacity, it had to concentrate its efforts in a few priority areas. The Japanese chose to focus on aircraft and naval ships. Tanks were one of the weapons systems on which the Japanese were impaired because of their scarse resources. This is interesting because the Japanese Army was the dominant service and came to control the Japanese Government. The choice of aircraft abd ships is interesting. The emphasis does not seem to have been the result of any well-conceived military doctrine as was the case in Germany, but rather prestige. Both aircraft and naval ships were seen as a matter of national prestige. Japan entered World War I as a British ally. It did not, however, deploy tanks during the War. After the War, Japan as part of an overall military modernization prgram purchased tanks from European (British and French) manufacturers. (The Germans were prohibited by the Versailles Treaty from developing or acquiring tanks.) The first tanks acquited included the French Renault FT and NCI, and the British Vickers 6-Ton Medium tanks. These were used as prototypes from whivh Japanese manufacturers began to develop their own light and medium tanks and continued purchasing European models. The reliance on European models meant that the Japanese lagged behind in tank technology. And there were elements that were not easy to copy such as hardened steel. Early Japanese tanks were made with soft steel. Japanese tanks thus at the onset of the War were poorly designed and thinly armored. Until the battles with the Sioviets in Manchuria (July 1939), the Japanese seemed to have been unaware as to how badly they lagged behinf in tank technology. The Japanese often cut corners in military arms production. The effectiveness of the Zero was in part because it was light (meaning weak armor). Poorly armored tanks were possible when fighting the Chinese, but a rescipe for disaster when fighting the Soviets, British, and Americans. Little progress was made during the War to upgrade their tank forces. Japanese tnks were lightly armored and weakly gunned. Nor did the Japanese have the industrial capacity to produce them in large numbers. Available still went primarily to the Navy, after Midway, in a despeate war of survival with a resurgent American Pacific Fleet. The Japanese used their tanks to some effect against the poorly equipped Chinese and the poorly supplied Americans in Baatan. They could not be used very effectively in the island campaigns of the Pacific War because of their poor characteristics, American air power, and the inability of the Japanese to adequately supply their isolated island garisons. As with Italy, the Germans transferred very little of their tank technology to the Japanese. And at the end of the War when the Germans became more generous with their technology, the Japanese no longer had the industrial capacity to produce tanks in any number, especially advanced tanks. The Red Army both before the War (July 1939) and at the end of the War (August 1945), swept aside ineffectual Japanese armor in Manchuria. The Japanese experience in Manchuria figting the Soviets (July 1939) should have led them to reassess the idea of waging war against a modern industrial power. It did not, somewhow the miliarists controlling the government decided that Japan should launch a with an even more heavily industrialized country--the United States.

Japanese Industry

Japan at the time of World War II was the only industrialized country in Asia. While the country made enormous gains, it was still did not have the scientific and industrial prowess of the European powers, let along the Soviet Union and America. The most important single factor in industrialization was stell profuction. Here Japan outclassed all of Euriope, but productuion was only a small fraction of that of the United States and the European powers. And most of the steeel that Japan produced went into naval construction. This meant that only limited anounts of steel was available for building tanks. And both the number of tanks built and the quality of their tanks would show this basic weakness. Given the country's limited industrial capacity, it had to concentrate its efforts in a few priority areas. The Japanese chose to focus on aircraft and naval ships.

Early Japanese Victories

Japan like Germany prepared for war by devoting a huge portion of its national economy to the military at a time that the democracies severely limited military spending. Japan was on a war footing at a time that Britin and France were on a peace time standing. This allowed the Japanese to build up a powerful force that would stun both America and Britain. The Japanese were further aided by the NAZI victories in Europe (1939-41). This forced the British to concntrate their forces in Europe, struggling to even survive. As a result, the Japanese reigned supreme for 6 moths, carving out a huge empire in Southeast Asia and the westrn Pacific. These easy victories ended at Midway (June 1942). The American Pcific Fleet cut the heart out of the Imperial Navy's First Air Fleet, sinking four of the six Japanese main-line carriers. This disasterous loss, forced the Japanese to continue devoing much of their limited stel produtiin to naval construction, especilly building new carriers. Steel for new and improved tanks was simply not available.

Military Doctrine

Tanks were one of the important World War II weapons systems on which the Japanese were severly impaired because of their limited industrial base. They did devote some of their scarse resources, but the industrial capacity was just not there to develop an important tank force, either in numbers or quality. This is interesting because the Japanese Army was the dominant service and came to control the Japanese Government. The choice of aircraft abd ships is interesting. The emphasis does not seem to have been the result of any well-conceived military doctrine as was the case in Germany, but rather prestige. Both aircraft and naval ships were seen as a matter of national prestige.

Japnese Tank Program

Japan entered World War I as a British ally. It did not, however, deploy tanks during the War. After the War, Japan as part of an overall military modernization prgram purchased tanks from European (British and French) manufacturers. (The Germans were prohibited by the Versailles Treaty from developing or acquiring tanks.) The Japanese Army was cetainly interestd in tanks. The first tanks acquited included the French Renault FT and NCI, and the British Vickers 6-Ton Medium tanks. The Japanese at tge end of World War I purchased a British Mark IV tank that was to be used for trials with the intention of beginning a tank servuce (1918). Immediateky after the war the Japanese purchsed six British Whippet tanks that were turned over to the Infantry School (1918-19). With the outbrek of the Russian Civil War, the Japanese sent two Whippets to Vladivostok. At the time the Japanese were intent on establishing a foothold in Siberia. The Japanese purcased 13 French Renault FT light tanks (1919) which were eventually assigned to the 1st Tank Unit of the 12th Division (1925). The Japanese also purchase French NC27 Renault tanks which they designated the Renault Otsu-Gata (1920s). The British and French tanks were used as prototypes from whivh Japanese manufacturers began to develop their own light and medium tanks and continued purchasing European models. Japanese World war II tanks would show the pedigree of the British and French tanks.

Tank Technology

The Japanese reliance on European models meant that the Japanese lagged behind in tank technology. And there were elements that were not easy to copy such as hardened steel. Early Japanese tanks were made with soft steel. Japanese tanks thus at the onset of the War were poorly designed and thinly armored. Until the battles with the Sioviets in Manchuria (July 1939), the Japanese seemed to have been unaware as to how badly they lagged behinf in tank technology. The Japanese often cut corners in military arms production. The effectiveness of the Zero was in part because it was light (meaning weak armor). Poorly armored tanks were possible when fighting the Chinese, but a rescipe for disaster when fighting the Soviets, British, and Americans. Apparently the Japanese were not fully aware of how far they were behind in tank technology. Successes in China may well have been a factor here.Little progress was made during the War to upgrade their tank forces. Japanese tanks were lightly armored and weakly gunned. As with Italy, the Germans transferred very little of their tank technology to the Japanese.

War Production

The Japanese during the War did not have the industrial capacity to produce them in large numbers. Th Army could build up a tank force when Bitain and France were not building tanks in large numbers. This changed with Pearl Harbor. Japanese steelstill went primarily to the Navy, after Midway, in a despeate war of survival with a resurgent American Pacific Fleet. And at the end of the War when the Germans became more generous with their technology, the Japanese no longer had the industrial capacity to produce tanks in any number, especially advanced tanks.The mumbers here are notable. The available steel limited the number of tank that the Japanese could build, especially types heavier than the Type 95. The Japanese produced some 2,300 Type 95s over a production run of 10 years--230 tanks annually. The United States built some 50,000 M-4 Shermans which use four times more steel than the Type 95 over a little iver a 3 year production run, about a staggering 17,000 Shermans annually. Nothing could more clearly state Japan's totl defeat in the Pacific War. d tanks are just one weapon. Sttistics on the production of other weapons show imilar disparities.

Quality

The United States not only out produced Japan numerically, but the quality of American weapontry was with few exceptions much higher. Tanks are evaluated in three primary area: fire power, armor, and mobility. The Japanese tanks failed in all three of these key measures. Tanks were just one uch example. The Japanese Type 95 was a reasonablt advanced modelmwhen in first appeard. Unfortunateky for the Japanese, they made few advances in tank technology while the other major belligerants made considerable advances. The Type 95's main armament was low powered 37 mm gun. This was in World War II terms, a pea shootr. And the armor protection was very poor. A reader writes, " You are right on with how the Japanese under estimated the need for better tank productions to fight outside of China. I once read a claim that .50 cal. armor piercing rounds could penetrate it's weak armor." The Type 95 was comparable to the American M-3 Stuart, but woefully inadequate against heavier types. Notice the small 37 mm main armament. The Japanese tanks were also slow, unable to maintin a rpid advance.

Usage

The Japanese used their tanks to some effect against the poorly equipped Chinese and the poorly supplied Americans in Baatan. They could not be used very effectively in the island campaigns of the Pacific War because of their poor characteristics, American air power, and the inability of the Japanese to adequately supply their isolated island garisons. The Red Army both before the War (July 1939) and at the end of the War (August 1945), swept aside ineffectual Japanese armor in Manchuria. The Japanese experience in Manchuria figting the Soviets (July 1939) should have led them to reassess the idea of waging war against a modern industrial power. It did not, somewhow the miliarists controlling the government decided that Japan should launch a with an even more heavily industrialized country--the United States.

Created: 1:26 PM 4/13/2015
Last updated: 4:04 PM 4/13/2015