Figure 1.--

Not fully appreciated in the inter-War era, except in Germany, was the importance of a new weapon--the tank. The horrors of trench warfare caused military planners to focus on new weapons to restore mobility and to avoid a future war resulting in mass losses of foot soldiers. While it was the Allies that developed tanks, it was the Germans that after the War gave the greatest attention to developing new weapons and tactical doctrines. It was with the Germans that tanks fit in most closely with the historic German way of war. Frederick the Great summarrzed it consisely--'kurz und vives' (short and lively). 【Citino】 Throughout modern European history, for the Germans (meaning Brandenbug-Prussia) to win a war thery had to win it quickly. This was necessary because Prussia was a relatively poor state ewith a poorly developed economy. It could not win long exended wars of attrition with larger wealthier countries. What Prussia did was to maintain a relatively large standing army so it could strike quickly in time of war. His also made Prussia a valuable coalition partner. Prussia became known as army with a country as opposed to a countywih an army. Frederick and other German ilitary figures stressed 'Bewegung' (movement). Blitzkreig captures this, but was moe of a press term than the term used by the German military. The German military was notdeerred by he diater of World War II. Blamimg it on the Jews and Socialiss, helpd clear them of resonsibility for the disaster of World War I. They studied what happened and how to win the next round. And he tank provided a way of speeding up their offensive operations. Some German generals ike Mansteinand Guderian saw the tank as hat could ensure that they would not be dragged into another devestaing war of attrition. The Allies in contrast fell back on defensive strategies reflected in France using much of its military spending to build the Maginot Lne. Then came the Great Depression. Britain and France cut back on military spending. The British respondd by cutting military spending. The Royal Navy was the senior service. All three services exprienced cuts, but the Army suffered the most severe cuts, advrsely impacting tank development. The resonse to the Depressionm in Germany was different. The Depression in Germnny led to the rise of Hitler and the NAZIs. And after seizing poweer (1933), Hitler turned on he budgeary spigots. Thus while the Allies were cuting miliary spending, the German generals suddenly had the appopiations they had been denied for over a decade. nd freed of the Versilles restricions, hey could begin to build the military equipment needed for a modrn militry. Tanks were high upon their shopping list. At the same time, there were a range of mechanical improvements. The Germans signed the Rapollo Treaty (1922) with the Soviet Union that allowed them to evade the Versailles Peace Treaty and work with the Soviets on tanks and tank tactics in Russia. There were voices in all the major coutries tht addressed the issues of armored tactics. J.F.C. Fuller enuciated the doctrine of spearhead attacks with massed tank formations. The basic doctrine was then developed by Heinz Guderian (Germany), Percy Hobart (Britain), Adna R. Chaffee, Jr. (United Sttes), Charles de Gaulle (France), and Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Soviet Union). All reached similar conclusions. Hitler was impressed with General Guederian and gave considerable emphasis on armor in the NAZI rearmament campaign. Stalin was also impressed with armor, but unlike Hitler he purged the Red Army. One of the priority targests were the Red Army officers who worked with the Germans under the Rapallo Treaty. Most were shot or condemned to the Gulag. Thus while Hitler promoted officers like Guderian and Rommel who had a grasp of modern mechanized warfare, Stalin weeded some of the best minds out of the Red Army. only the German Wehrmacht adopted the theory into practice on a large scale. The result was the victory in the West Against Britain anf France (May-June 1940). It would be the superior German tactical dictrine along with disaterous French leadership, not superior tanks that the German Blitzkrieg so stunningly successful. The disaterous performance of the Red Army during Barbarossa (June-December 1941) was in part a reflection of Stalin's purges.

Britain

Then with theWall Street Crash (1929) came the Great Depression (1930s). THe Allies (Britain and France) cut back on military spending which has alreadbeen reduced during he 1920s. The British respondd by cutting military spending. The Royal Navy was the senior service. All three services exprienced cuts, but the Army suffered the most severe cuts, advrsely impacting tank development. Until theearly-1930, theBritish were the world ledes in nk technology and tank forces. From this oint, the British were rapidly eclippsed by he Germns and Soviets. And the reaon was basically money. Both Germany and the Soviets devolted substntantial resources to tank deveklopment. And they were develoing advanced ideas about tactical doctrine. he impct was that Britain was unprepard when Hitler and the Soviet Union invaed Poland launching World War II (September 1940). Britain lost its lead and wuld not achieve even parity until the end of the War. Meaning British tankers would have to fight the War with inferior tanks. In some cases crininally inferior. Britain would grually develop effective tactics which had to taken into account uperior German tanks. Britain was only saved by American tanks which were also not up to German standards, but goodenough to helpachieve victory.

Czechoslovakia

The Czechs managed o secure a nation fr he first time ince the medieval era at the end of World War II (1919). Of all he small EUropean tates engulfed by the NAZIs and World War II, it wasboh a democratic sae and had a modern avanced indusrial nase--most prmnently the Skoda Works. As result, the Czechs had substantial, well armed forces with strong border defenses and a tank force as least as modern as the Germans and willing to fight. Pime-MInister Chamberlain made a decision for peace and to trust Hitler that the Sudetenland would be hus last terriorial demand in Eurioe an thahe only wanted to unite German peoples (September 1938). It is an unknown question as to how the Czehs would have fought had Chamberlain stood up to Hitler. It is known that Hitler lied about his territorial ambitions. Chamberlain upon retuning from Munich, triumphatly waved the paper with Hitler's signature when he got off the plane. (Te secnd famous 'scrap of paper' in Anglo-German history. We also know that he Skoda Works significantly increased the German arms manufacturing capbilty, including artillery and tanks. And all located beyond Allied bombing range. Reich Marshal Güing puthis bother, Albert in charge of Skoda which is a story of its own.

France

The Allies in contrast oo Grmany fell back on defensive strategies reflected in France using much of its military spending to build the Maginot Lne.

Germany

Not fully appreciated in the inter-War era, except in Germany, was the importance of a new weapon--the tank. The horrors of trench warfare caused military planners to focus on new weapons to restore mobility and to avoid a future war resulting in mass losses of foot soldiers. While it was the Allies that developed tanks, it was the Germans that after the War gave the greatest attention to developing new weapons and tactical doctrines. It was with the Germans that tanks fit in most closely with the historic German way of war. Frederick the Great summarrzed it consisely--'kurz und vives' (short and lively). 【Citino】 Throughout gran history, for the Germans (meaning Brandenbug-Prussia) to win a war thery had to win it quickly. This was necessary because Prusia was a relatively poor state. It could not win long exended wars of attriion with larger wealthier countries. What Prussia did was to maintain a relatively nlarge standing army so it could strike quickly in time of war. His also made Prussia a valuable coalition partner. Prussia became known as army with a country as opposed to a countywih an army. Frederick and other German ilitary figures stressed 'Bewegung' (movement). Blitzkreig captures this, but was moe of a press term than the term used by the German military. The German military was notdeerred by he diater of World War II. Blamimg it on the Jews and Socialists, helpd exhonerate them from any resonsibility fo the fisaster of World War I. They studied what happened and how to win the next round. And he tank provided a way of speeding up their offensive operations. Some German generals ike Manstein and Guderian saw the tank as what could ensure that they would not be dragged into another devestaing war of attrition. The resonse to the Depressionm in Germany was different. The Depression in Germnny led to the rise of Hitler and the NAZIs. And after seizing poweer (1933), Hitler turned on he budgeary spigots. Thus while the Allies were cuting miliary spending, the German generals suddenly had the appopiations they had been denied for over a decade. And freed of the Versilles restricions, hey could begin to build the military equipment needed for a modrn militry. Tanks were high upon their shopping list. At the same time, there were a range of mechanical improvements. The Germans signed the Rapollo Treaty (1922) with the Soviet Union that allowed them to evade the Versailles Peace Treaty and work with the Soviets on tanks and tank tactics in Russia. There were voices in all the major coutries that addressed the issues of armored tactics. J.F.C. Fuller enuciated the doctrine of spearhead attacks with massed tank formations. The basic doctrine was then developed by Heinz Guderian (Germany), Percy Hobart (Britain), Adna R. Chaffee, Jr. (United States), Charles de Gaulle (France), and Mikhail Tukhachevsky (Soviet Union). All reached similar conclusions. Hitler was impressed with General Guederian and gave considerable emphasis on armor in the NAZI rearmament campaign.

Italy

Italyws one of Europe's major countries in terms of population, but not in trms of te industry needed t builda modern army. Much of thearea south of Rome was sill basically feudal. The country's military ledership was alo largely ineffective. We ar not surehow to eplain this. Ialy invaed Ethiopia (1935). The Ethiopian Army was not even wel-equipped in 19th century terms. Even with aircraft, artillery, and machine guns, the Italian Army did not do well. Mussolini and his geneals had to resort to poion gas to finally defeat the Ethiopians. Italy did build tanks, but characteristically despite the Axis alliance, there was no cooperaton and sharing of miitary echnology. The Italian tanks were some of the worst of the War. They wee poorly armore, under-powered, and had poor guns. Theyworked in Ethiopia (1935-36), but were a disastr in he Western Desert wwen they took on the British (1940).

Japan

Japanese like Italian tanks were not up to World War II standards. Thyw were adequate when fighting forces without anti-tank forces ad air cover: China, British colonilal forces, and the Americans in the hilippibes. But as early as theyconfroned well equipped modern forces like the Soviet Red Army (1939), the Japanese were shown to be poorly led and their tanks eath traps. The Japanese ignor the Soviet expprience, but were reaquainted with their defincincies by theAmerist 1st MNarine Division on Guadalcanal (August 1942). The Japane tank were lighly armored under gunned. In the few armored engagemens of the Pacific War, Japanese tankwere easilydealt with. Japan simply did not have te indutrial capacity to buld a modern tank force. And he Axis alliance unlike theAnglo-American lliance prove no aid t he Japanese despiteadvanced German technology.

Spain

Spain did not build anks. The Spanish Civil War (1936-39), however, was a proving ground forarmored tactics for he totalitarian powers (Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union). The Allies (Britain and France) established an arms embargo. Thus Allied tanks and tactics were not tested. The totalitarian powers all experimented heavily with armored warfare. Unlike the Allies, they openly supplied the Spanish. The Gerans and Italians heavily supplied he Nationalists. The Soviets supplied the Republic to a lesser extent and did not send volueers. Stalin was reluctant to expose Red Army soldirs to the West. The Germans and Italians not only supplied arms, but also 'volunteers' to fight with he Nationalists. As a result, some of the earliest known examples of mechanised combined arms operations. For the mst part this was the Germans, but Republican troops equipped with Soviet-medium tanks and supported by aircraft, smashed Italian troops fighting wit the Nationalists in the 7-day Battle of Guadalajara (1937). 【Trinquier】

Soviet Union

Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin was also impressed with armor. And his First Five Year PLan focusing on industrilzation gave him an increasing ability to buid armor. (Often ignored, however, is that Tsarist Russia was rapidly industrilizing in theearly-20th century before the REvolution. Base on pre World War I trens (1900-13), Tsarist Russia would have also been more indutraiize if te Revolution had not occurrd.) Unlike Hitler, Stalin conducted a ruthless purges of his military, including the Red Army (1937-39). One of the priority targests were the most forward thinking Red Army officers who worked with the Germans under the Rapallo Treaty. Most were shot or condemned to the Gulag. This included Marshal Tukhachevsky and those associated with him. He was a proponent of what we now know as Blitzkrieg tactics. Tukhachevsky caled them 'Deep Operations'. Any one promoted teseideas became an NKVD target. Thus while Hitler promoted officers like Guderian and Rommel who had a grasp of modern mechanized warfare, Stalin weeded some of the best minds out of the Red Army. Only the German Wehrmacht adopted the theory into practice on a large scale. The result was the victory in the West against Britain and France (May-June 1940). It would be the superior German tactical dictrine along with disaterous French leadership, not superior tanks that the German Blitzkrieg so stunningly successful. The disaterous performance of the Red Army during Barbarossa (June-December 1941) was in part a reflection of Stalin's purges.

Sources

Citino, Robert M. The GermanWay of War (2005). Ciino mprovides he historical backgrond and how it impacved orld War II.

Kamenir, Victor J. The Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941, 320p.

Trinquier, Roger. Trans. Daniel LEE> Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency<

Zaloga, Steven. Armored Thunderboldt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II, 360p.

Created: 3:06 AM 1/20/2010
Last updated: 1:46 AM 11/19/2024