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The battleship at the onset of the War was regarded as the capital ship type by most naval strategists and the public, the primary measure of naval power. Battleship construction before the War was affected by naval arms treaties. A related ship type was the battle cruiser, essentially a poorly armored battleship. The most famous was HMS Hood. Most British battleship were outfitted with either 14 inch or 15 inch guns. The American battleships built before the war mostly had
14 inch guns and they were followed by the newer Iowa class of battleships with 16 inch guns. Most German pocket battleships had 14 inch guns but their two main battleships, the Bismarck and the Tirpitz had 15 inch guns. The Japanese also went through a series of battleships with guns getting bigger with each new design culminating with the Yamato-class. Both of the two ships built had the largest guns ever put on a ship. They
were 18.1 inch guns. Just a hit by one shell could blow a destroyer in two if it hit in the right spot.
These 15, 16 and 18 inch shells usually had more then 2,000 pounds of explosives in them. And had a range of 20 to more then 25 miles. [Military History] At the onset of World War II, navies were ranked in terms of capital ships, meaning battleships. Naval strategy was built around these ships. Naval technology and tactics during World War II, however, evolved around two areas that none of the navies thought to be critical before the War--carriers and submarines. The new fast battleships and smaller ships were assigned the role of protecting the carriers. Older battleships were relegated to softening up invasion beaches.Battleships became a ship type of only secondary importance, essentially floating gun platforms to protect the carriers.
Despite the emergence of the carrier, the Japanese devoted huge resources to build two super battleships--Yamato and Musashi. The Imperial Navy planned to build 13 of these massive ships. The Americans and Japanese in the Pacific had both planned war winning fleet action, all based primarily on their big-gun battleships. Both countries developed fleet air arms, but it was widely believed that the expected fleet action would be decided by battleships. The core of the Japanese battleship force was the massive Musashi and Yamato. Each with 18.1 inch guns which could outrange the 16 inch guns of the American battleships. The importance of carriers was not understood before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Building massive ships with huge guns made sence before the rise of naval airpower. With carriers, these huge ships simply became large targets and their construction meant that many more useful smaller ships were not built.
The battleship at the onset of the War was regarded as the capital ship type by most naval strategists and the public, the primary measure of naval power. Most naval strategists were still thinking abiout the battleship as the primary capital ship. The Americans and Japanese wee still thinking about a climatic naval battle in the Westrern Pacific to be decided about the battleships. Carriers were seen a imprtant in a scouting role. Japan and America were building carriers, but battleships still dominated stategic thinking. The Japanese devoted massive quantities of their limited resources into building superbattle ships. Germany meaning Hitler's thinking was focused on building big battleships. The British saw their superority in capital ships offering a degree of securuty. They built carriers, but hard to understand the Fleet Air Arm did not have modern carrier aircraft when the War broke out. They would depend heavily on the Americans for carrier aurcraft throught the War. The Italians were building battleships and fast cruisers, but no carriers. The French were also focused on battleships and only built one carrier. There were factions in these navies that argued for naval aviation, but they were still a minority, the gun club dominated naval thinking at the onset of the War. Only the Japanese decimation of the American battleship line at Pearl Harbor fundamentally changed naval thinking. Just as the Americans were left without battleships after Pearl Harbor and had to rely on their carriers, the Japanese after the battle of the Philippines Sea (June 1944) were left without an effective carrier force and had to fight the greatest naval battle in history primarily with their capital ships leading to disaster in the Battle of Leyte Gulf (Octobr 1944). Even aviation oriented admirals, however, had a lingering orientation on battleships. Adm. Halsey longed to bring the Japanese fleet under the big guns of his new battleships, almost leading to disaster in the Leyte battle. This of course occurredv with the destruction of the Japanese Southern Force in the Surigao Straits by the resurected survivors of Pearl Harbor.
Battleship construction before the War was affected by naval arms treaties. For the Americans, the Panama Canal was a factor, limiting the size of the battleships they built. The Japanese had no such size constraints.But the main consdtraints were political. The countries that had the capity to build battleships decided not to do so for political reasons--a desire to limit military spending (America and Britain). Countries with limited naval building capabilities decided to increase military spending to the maximum of their capability. This meant that the democracies (America, Britain, and France) which had the capability of out producing the totalitarian power, failed to do so. At the same time, the totalitarian powers (Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union) commited huge resources to military spending. In the case of Germany, the NAZIs covertly borriowing huge anounts to fund massive increases in arms production. This meant by the outbreak of World War II, the totalitarian powers possessed greater military power than the democracies. Naval power was an exception. The totalitarian powers had greater effective land and air power. Naval power was an exception. Here the power equation was more ballanced. The British Royal Navy far exceeded that of Germany. In the Pacific the Americans and Japanese looked balanced, but Japan actually possessed an edge. Passage of the American Two Ocean Navy Act (July 1940) put the Japanese on notice that American industry was going to produce naval vessels that their much smaller industrial base could never compete with. The parity if not edge they had achieved with the United States was going to disappear. Of course capital ship take several years to build. So Japan had time to react, but it was very clear to the Japanese milkitary that if they were going to resist American pressure to withdraw from China, it had to be now. And control of China was central to Japanese nationalist thinking.
A related ship type was the battle cruiser, essentially a poorly armored, but fast battleship. The most famous was HMS Hood. Even in World War I, the Royal Navy was coming to the conclusion that this was a failed concept. The fate of Hood showed the inherentb weakness. This prioved be largely moot because the whole concept of the Battkeship also gave way to the carriers--the new capital ship.
Most British battleships were outfitted with either 14 inch or 15 inch guns. The American battleships built before the war mostly had
14 inch guns and they were followed by the newer Iowa class of battleships with 16 inch guns. Most German pocket battleships had 14 inch guns but their two main battleships, the Bismarck and the Tirpitz had 15 inch guns. The Japanese also went through a series of battleships with guns getting bigger with each new design culminating with the Yamato-class. Both of the two ships built had the largest guns ever put on a ship. They
were 18.1 inch guns. Just a hit by one shell could blow a destroyer in two if it hit in the right spot.
These 15, 16 and 18 inch shells usually had more then 2,000 pounds of explosives in them. And had a range of 20 to more then 25 miles. [Military History]
At the onset of World War II, navies were ranked in terms of capital ships, meaning battleships. Naval strategy was built around these ships. Naval technology and tactics during World War II, however, evolved around two areas that none of the navies thought to be critical before the War--carriers and submarines. The new American fast battleships and smaller ships were assigned the role of protecting the carriers. Older battleships were relegated to shore bombardment, softening up invasion beaches. Battleships became a ship type of only secondary importance, essentially floating gun platforms to protect the carriers. There were battkeship engagemebnts, but for the most part battleships played a secondary role in the War. The major battles were largely decided by the carriers. Ironically, Japan which launched the War with its powerful Kido Butai (1941) had to fight the largest naval battle in history primarily with its battleships--a recipie for dusaster. There were no more battleships built after World War II.
Brutain was threatened in the early 19th cebtury by a combined French and Spanish fleet which Naoleoon had builtvto support an invasiom. This threat was ended by Adm. Horatio Nelson at Tralagar (1805). The British Government after the Napoleonic Wars (1800-15) adopted an informal standard of maintaining a fleet at least equal to the combined strength of the next two largest navies. This standard was not always met during the 19th century, but there was no real challenge to British control of the sea. Parliament began to become concerned about British naval superiority (late-1880s). By this time the all metal battkleship was taking form as the capital ship to replace theship-of-the kine. It would be the battleship that would be thevshipn upon whch naval power was based. Concer at the time was ion France and Russia, but Germany was unified as a resukt of the Franco-Prussian War (1871) and America was also emrging as a potent industrial power. Battleships were hugely expensive. Only highly industrailized nations could afford or build battle ship fleets to rival the Royal Navy. Parliament devated the spending needed for b=new battleshios, but there was firm popular support for it. Parliament passed the Naval Defence Act (1889). Itb officially adopted the 'two-power standard'. Subsequent autorization was provided for 10 battleships, 38 new cruisers, and other smaller ships. It is at this time that Wilheklm II became German Kaiser. And influenced by Adm. Tirpitz, the German Empire began building battleships. And soon after the united States began a nacal iniitiated a naval expansion program. Britain shocked naval expers around te wiorld when itvlaunched HMS Dreadnought, an all big gun battleship. Dreadnought became the standard by which all national navies were compared. It also came at a time in which the Kaiser was buiding a blue water fleet to challenge the Royal Navy. And President Roosevelt senmt the Great White Fleet around the world to shw off Anericas rxpnding naval powee. The show down between Britain and Germany came at Jutland, a massive battle of battleships and battle cruisers (1916). The Germans were Desperate to break the deadlock on the Western front. The German High Seas Fleet came out. German gunnery scored important hits, but could not match the fire power of the much larger British Grand Fleet. The Germans would not come out again. After the War Britain was bankrupt and could not afford an arms race with the United States. The Washibgton Naval Conference agreed to limits on naval spensing. America and Brutain were allowed the largest number of battleships. Italy, Japan, and France were allowed smaller numbers. Germany ascpaty of the World War I settlement was not allowed to have battleships. The Japanese were outraged at the slight, but actually benegitted from it because American and British construction was restricted. Aircraft carriers appeared (America, Britain, and Japan), but naval planning contiued to emphsize battleships. Japan with drew from the reaty limits and Germany with the rise if the NAZIs begn naval expansion. Seveal cruss and pocket battke shios ere built, but a true batteship was not launched until Bismarck (1939). It was far beyond treaty limits. Japanese and German naval expansion resulted in renewed Ameruvan and British construction leading to the fleets that woukd face off when Hitler and Stalin launched World War II (1939). Despite the emergence of the carrier, the Japanese devoted huge resources to build two super battleships--Yamato and Musashi. The Imperial Navy planned to build 13 of these massive ships. The Americans and Japanese in the Pacific had both planned war winning fleet action, all based primarily on their big-gun battleships. Both countries developed fleet air arms, but it was widely believed that the expected fleet action would be decided by battleships. The core of the Japanese battleship force was the massive Musashi and Yamato. Each with 18.1 inch guns which could outrange the 16 inch guns of the American battleships. The importance of carriers was not understood before the outbreak of the Pacific War. Building massive ships with huge guns made sence before the rise of naval airpower. With carriers, these huge ships simply became large targets and their construction meant that many more useful smaller ships were not built. This was a major mistake made by the Japanese given their limited industrial capacity.
Hitler had great hopes for his capital ships. The Germans had hoped to wage commrrce campaign using gheir pocket battleships like Graf Spee which were faster than the British ships. They also began deploying raiders and actual bsttleships. This soon proved to be a flawed srategy and it would be discarded as the Royal Navy methodically began destroying these ships, first wiyh Graf Spee off Uruguay (December 1939). But it was the loss of Bismarck (March 1941) that shocked Hitler who kept them out of furtherv fleet ctions. It would be the U-boats that would wage the commerce campaign against Britain. The Gernan heavybships would force the British to keep much of their fleet in home waters. Sinking Bismarck led to the Admiralty dispatch Repulse and Prince of wales to defend Singapore (december 1941). Deloying them without air cover led to disaster. With the bulk of the Royal Navy capital ships in home waters, Italy entering the War was a real threat (June 1940). Unlike the Grmans, therec werec a seriesc of fierce fleet actions, butvthe out-gunned Royal Navy managed tp largely destroy the Italian Fleet. Hiler wanted to lay his hands on the French fleet, but as promised the French Navy prevented this. Once deciding to withdraw his cpital ships from the Atlantic, Hitler had to get them home from the French ports. This he did, ernbarasing the British with the successful Channel Dash (February 1942). After that the major ships attacked some of the Arctic convoys but basically hid in the Norwefiand fijords. Hitler became so disenchanted with his big ships, that he had heavybifels of Gnisenau removed to installed in the Atlantic Wall (1943). Tripitz became a target for the British midget sunmarines and bombers. The German capital ships proved a huge waste of resources, accomplishing very little. They required massive quantites of steel, copper, and other scarce resources to build. These resources could have been used to build other weaponry, including tanks, artillery, aircraft, and much else.
Both the U.S. and Imperial Navies expected a Pacific War to be decided in a major fleet action by big gun battlefields. The Japanese built two super battleships (Yamato and Musashi) to win that battle. Even Pearl Harbor did not entirely change this mindset. It was a factor at Leyte in Halsey racing north to engage the Japanese Northern Force and leaving San Bernadino Strait unguarded. As the War played out, battleships engaged in few impressive actions in the Pacific War --the greatest naval war in history. Given the length of he War , the scale and scope of the fighting. and the number of battleships deployed this is quite surprising. No one before the War had imagined this in their wildest imagination. Three navies deployed battleships. The British battleships sent to protect Singapore were sunk with days of arrival by Japanese aircraft. The American battleships of course were sunk at Pearl. The carriers would decide the outcome of the war. The Pacific fleet with its battleships resting on the bottom of Pearl Harbor or in repair yards had no alternative, but to develop operations centered on the carrier. It is at this time that ghe Japnese made a huge mistake. Fixated on Kantai KLessen, the Japanrse held most of their battkeships back from the battles in the Solomons (August-Novenber 1942). Had they not, they cold have destroyed much of what was left of the bttrred Pavific Fkeet and retken Guadalcanal. Ultimately the American battleships did have two impressive actions. One was in the Solomons when the new American fast battleship Washington with Enterprise damaged, proved to be the deciding factor in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, blasting the Japanese battleship Kirishima out of the water. This an another battleship lost caused the Japanese to begin withdrawing from the Gudalcanakl, not daring to risk any more battleships. The other impressive American battleship action was achieved by the resurrected victims of Pearl Harbor who devastated the Japanese Southern Force in Surigao Strait during the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1944). The American battleships achieved the classic crossing of the 'T'-- a naval commander's dream. The performance of the Japanese battleships can be illustrated with Haruna. It participated in most of the major naval battles of the Pacific War. And despite this none of its actions can be call impressive. At Midway, for example, the most important naval battle of the War, all Haruna did was provide antiaircraft support in a failed effort to protect the doomed Japanese carriers and then pick up the survivors. The only other action of importance was a bombing of Hendserson Field which crippled the Marine Cactus Airfield for a few days -- hardly impressive. Here Haruna was not any kind of special case. The lack of impressive naval actions was true of the Japanese battleship fleet in general. Even the mighty Yamato did not have any impressive actions, in fact Yamato did less than Haruna.
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