|
World War II began in Europe and again food became a major issue. Hitler and Stalin as allies launched the War, but they could not have beenmore different. German was a highly indistrialized nation with an undfficent peasant farm system and needed to import food. The Soviet Union was a country which had recently developed an indstrial base, but had a huge agricultural potenial. Stalin had sought to end peasant agriculture, which he did through Collectivization, but in the process reduced output. Hitler had given some thought to question of food. He correctly assumed that if and when Britain entered the War, that the Royal Navy would implement another naval blockade. And to avoid the shortages of food and raw material, he would turn east. First he negotiated an alliance with Stalin in which the Soviets would supply food, oil, and other critical raw materials. This was, however, only a temporary sollution. The whole idea of the War was to seize the East (meaning European Soviet Union) and turn it into a vast German agricultural colony. Hitler made this very clear in Mein Kampf. But Hitler just wanted the land--not the people on it. Thus part of the food history of the War was the denial of food to unwanted people to kill them. This included the Jews, but was hardky limited to them. A much larger and more dangerous target was the Slavs. Germany's answer to the food problem was a more effective rationong system and the exploitation of conquered countries. Hitler planned that the food would come from the East, but because the Wehrmacht failed to destroy the Red Army, the food from the East, primarily went to feed the Wehrmacht operating their. It was the occipied West (especially France) that would help feed the Reich duringthe War. Britain was also dependent on food imports. A very efficent rationing system combined with Kend Lease shipments from America kept Britain in the war and its people fed. And again after the War, American relief supplies prevnted mass starvation in war ravaged Europe--including Germany. America also helped feed the Soviet Union during the war. After the war, Stalin was intent on installing Communist police state satellites in an Eastern Europe empire and the United States cut off food and other Lend Lease shipments.
Belgium is one of the most surprising World War II food stories. The country was still as in World War I not self sufficient in food production and dependent on imports. But unlike World War I there there would be no arrangement to allow American food in to save the Belgians. Churchill was opposed to such measures and the Germans were determined to use the Belgian economy to support the war effort. Even so, while food supplies were tight and the Belgins lost weight, they did not starve. The Greeks in a similar circumstances experienced a dreadful famine. Because of the World War I experience the Belgian authorities before the War prepard an emergency rationing system. It went into effect the day the Germans invaded (May 10, 1940). [Van den Wijngaert, pp. 55-56.] German occupation policy as that each occupied country was to feed the German occupation force. Thus Belgian farmers would have to feed not only the Belgian population, but also the German occpiers. This was a danting task as with the occupation, the 1.2 million t of grain imported annually abruptly ceased. [Collingham, p. 168.] The German food plan was that with the invasion of the Soviet Union, vast quantities of food would be available from the East. This of course did not materialize and G�ring, Backe and others had to look o Western Europe to feed the German people. And throughout Western Europe, German authorities used food as a weapon and a bargaining tool to force compliance. [Van den Wijngaer, p. 23.] The food allocated to the Belgian citizens was about two-thirds of that allocated to Reich citizens. [Gildea, et. al, p. 26.] One report suggests that food shortages led ro weight lossess of 5-7 kilograms of weight per person in 1940, the first year of occuption. [Van den Wijngaert, p. 60.] Rationing did not guarantee availability. Often food and other rationed goods were simply not availanle. [Jacquemyns and Struye, p. 307.] What saved the Belgians was the black market. The Germans set prices that farmers received for their crops. The prices wre set very low which discoraged production a potential disaster for a country that wa not self sufficent in food production. The black market prices, however, were so high that farmers actually increased production. As a result, food was available in Belgium, albeit at high prices. [Nefors, pp. 256�257.] We do not at this time have details on just how the poor survived the war, but a combination of low-priced rationed goods and judicious black market purchases seems to have carried the Belgian people through the War.
Britain as a major industrial power had to imported food and unlike Germany was vulnerable to having its supply lines severed. The U-boat commerce war in the North Atlantic was the most serious threat to Britain during the War. It is arguably the single most importnt campaign of the War. As a result, Britain introduced a very severe rationing system. No one starved or even went without adequate caloric intake, but the British diet was very boring. A cohort of British children grew uo without knowing what chocolate, oranges, and banana were. It did not take long when GI's began arriving in numbers for British kids to figure out that the Americans were not only friendly, but had pockets bulging with chewing gum and chocolate bars. Luvky was the Britih boy orgirl whohad a GI bilitted in his home. Both the Dominions and America produced huge quantities of food that coud supply Britain as long as the sea lanes could be kept open. Lend Lease provided not only arms, but vital food deliveries as well. Lend Lease meant that Britain could rely on virtually unlimited supplies from America.
This underpinning wa something Germany lacked and why Hitler made the momentius decesion to invade the Soviet Union and seize the needed resources by force. The British began growing their own food, even in small back gardens, sometimes next to the Anderson's Shelter. City girls signed up to join the Woman's Land Army as they did in World War I. British was responsible for one of the greatest tragedies of the War--the terrible Bengal Famine. Britain won the War, but was essentially bankrupted by it. Rationing continued in Britain for a decade after the War long after rationing was needed in France or even Germany. Few Briton's connected shortages and the need for rationing with the Socialist policies of their post-War Labour Government.
Denmark is a small country which like the other Nordic countrues attempted to remain neutral. Germany invaded an occupied the cojuntry (April 1940). It thus bcme a cog in the NAZI Gro�raumr and war economy. Of the four Nordic countries, Sweden and Denmark managed to maintain caloric intake at close to pre-War levels, his was not the case in Norway and Finland. Denmarrk was able to chieve this despite the fact that the occupying Germans shipped important quantities of food to the Reich throughout the War. Hitler when he invaded the Soviet Unuin (June 1941) thought that the Wehrmacht was solving the German food problem. As Barbarossa developed, the food obtained in the east brely cobered the needs of the three invading army groups. Tiny Denmark alone exported mpre meat to the Reich (768,000 tons) than the entire Soviet East (731,000 tins). Not only meat, but Western Europe including Denmark also provided much more grain to the NAZI war economy than the occupied East. [Collingham, p.165.] The simple fact is that Hitler could have gotten all the food he needed out of Western conquests if he had managed the NAZI Grossraum better. The disasterour invasion of the Soviet Union produced little food for the Reich, mostly food from the east only fed German forces in the East.
Finland was the second victim of aggression in World War II. The Soviet Union two month after invading Poland as NAZI ally invaded Finland launching the Winter War (November 1939). This was one of the greatest mismatches in the history of wafare. Finland was amall country of only 3.7 million with ainy army and no real arms industry. Somehow they single-handely held off the mamouth Red Army for over 3 months. Finally the Finns receiving little outside aid had to conceed and the major concession was Karelia. This was about 10 percent of Finnish territory and a much larger portion of the food producing agricultural land--perhaps 30 percent or so. When a country goes to war, agricultural production is normally adversely affected. Here America is an exception because its food producing sector operates far below capacity. Most other countries report declines, sometimes very significant declines. This is because farm labor (mostly men) are drafted for military service and other inputs like machinery, horses, fertilzer are reduced because of the needs of the war economy. Finnish food production was especially impaired because of the loss of Karelia. And because the poulation fled, there was no loss of mouths to feed. Even after the Peace of Moscow (March 1940) was signed, the Finns did not dare demobilize. There were some 420,000 evacuees from Karelia and the other territory. The Finns thus adopted a two part policy--the Rapid Settlement Act. It was designed to both ensure the supply of food and settle the refugees. The Finns began clearing new land for the evacuees to cultivate. [Vehvil�inen, p. 75.] The Finns looked to NAZI Germany, the only country willing to lend real support. The fall of France (June 1940) mean that there were no other options. The Germans convinced the Finns that their land could be won back and the Soviet threat to their security ended in a short summer campign. The Barbarossa campaign failed to destroy the Red Army and the Finns found themselves in a protarcted life and death struggle. The Finnish economy was adversely affected in part because of labor shortages. The Finns in addition to the lass of food producing Karela experienced a very poor havest (fall 1941). The result was a severe food shortage. Some of the army had to be demobilized to maintain industrial and agricultyral production. [Vehvil�inen, p. 96.] Finland was dependent of the Germans for food, fuel, and weapons. Finland informed Germany that it would need 175,000 short tons of grain to survive until the 1942 harvest. German officials would have rejected the request, but Hitler personally intervened and approved the Finnish request. The German began annual grain deliveries of 200,000 short tons amounting to nearly half of the Finnish domestic harvest. Even with massive German aid, Finland experinced severe food shortages. This is why the Finns continued the chil evacuation program begun during the Winer War. Along with malnutrition, the children were beinning to suffer a range of health problems. The Finns also had difficulty feeding Soviet POWs and civilian internees.
France's rich soil and mild climate has been a major factor in European history since classical times. It was why France was such an important country throughout the medieval era. Much to Hitler's surprise, he did not obtain the food and resources he needed in the East. The food he obtained there was barely sufficent to feed the invading Wehrmacht armies. Instead it was the food harests from occupied Western Europe, specially France, that helped supply the German war economy. This was done through repartions specified in the Franco-German Armistice (June 1940) and an exchange rate that heavily overvalued the Mark. P�tain and Vichy concluded that France had to appeal to the gerosity and good nature of Hitler and the NAZIs and afopted a policy of collaboration France became a vital cog in the German war economy. Hitler had planned to conduct the War with the bounty won in the East. This oproved to be ilusionary. Rther it was the vounty from the West that supported the German war economy. The German exploitation of the French economy increased in intensity as the war progressed. Huge quantities of food and other consumer goods flowed from Western Europe (especially France) to the Reich. Not only did the Germans begin conscripting French workers, but French food rations had to be constantly lowered forthe French people so that food could be shipped to Germany. German occupations policies were to compel the shipment of low-cost food to the Reich. This meant here was little incentive for farmers to produce above minimal levels nd to direct product on to the black market. The result was that farm harvests declined adding to shortage on the domestiv market. Rations had thus fallen to increasingly low levels by the time of the Normandy D-Day landings (June 1944). The French had no control over this and was a taste of what the Germans had in store for the French had Hutler managed to win the War. P�tain and Vichy had hung their star on the obediently collaborating NAZIs and supporting the German war effort and now the French people were paying the consequences. It would have been nuch worse had the British also caved in to the Germans.
Food shortages had severely hampered the Central Powers in World War I. The German World War I effort had been seriously compromised virtually at the onset because of its food policies in Belgium, helping to back the Allied narrative of a brutal aggressor nation. And over the long run, food shortages at home undermined national morale. Germany was a highly industrial country highly dependent on fopd imports. Germany had a large, but inefficent almost totlly non-mechnized farm sector. This affected living standards in rural areas. Hitler was determined to avoid the mistakes of World War I in which food shortages resulting from the Allid naval blockade undermined civilan morale. The farm vote was crucial in being the NAZIs to power. Once appointed Chancellor, Hitler showed no interest in addressing the farm problems and ignored his Minister of Agriculture wwho had helped to create a firm block of support in rural areas for the NAZIs. Hitler's solution of the farm proble was simple--remilitrize and seize the agricultural lands of the East to make the country self suffient in food production. The NAZI-Soviet Non-Agression Pact guaranteed access to Soviet grain before Hitler launched the War. At first mild rartioning system was introduced. POWs, especially French POWs, were used to replace the agricultural work force conscripted for military service. And as Deutsche Whermacht and Blitzkrieg overwealmed one country after another, the Germans exploited those countries to supply the German miitary and civilian population. Little regard was given to the effect on the occupied population even in countries where the Germans were not intent on mass killing. The Germans from the beginning of the War used as a weapon, targeting millions of people with the Hunger Plan as part of their overall plan to change the ethnic map of Europe. German policy was in part designed to ensure food supplies to the German domestic market and in part to kill millions of unwanted people. Rations in the ghettoes were set a starvation levels. Children were among the most vulnerable and began dieing in large numbers. This was not fast enough for Hitler and his SS killing machine. Jews were hunted down relentlessly throughout NAZI occupied Europe and often killed first because they were non-workers. For most children it was just a matter of surviving until the war ended. They could do without many things, but food was not one of them. Many combatant countries ration food. Both Germany and Japan needed to import food to supply their populations. Hitler was molded by Germany's World War I experience. The U-boats again threatened to force Britain out of the War. Hitler was determined that food shortages not be allowed to undermine German home front morale. As a result, the economies of occupied countries were plundered to supply the Reich. Food was rationed in the occupied countries, often at low levels. Commonly workers got higer allocations. In the occuped East, only workers received ration allocations. The Germans denied food to 'non-producers' and populations in intendedto eliminate. Hitler envisioned the East as supplying the Reich with food it needed to procedute the War. As the War progressed, the East barely supplied the needs of the Wehermact fighting there. It proved to be food from the occupied West that supplied the Reich. Adequate food was availble to the German people until Allied Armies had driven the Wehrmacht out of the occupied countries (especially France) and were at the borders of the Reich (fall 1944).
The NAZIs after seizing power began to redirect German food imports, away from maritime imports and the West. Imports from Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslabia rose from 10 to 30 percent. [Collingham, p. 69.] At the omset of the War, Italy made major purchases of Hungaria and Yugoskav weat (September 1939), concerned anout being able to supply the domestic market. Hungary was also a source of sugar for Germany. Major purchases were made to enliven the 1942 Christmas soured by the news from Stalingrad. [Collinhham, p. 217.] The Red Army as it entered Hungary and Romania (1944) adopted the German policy of seizing food from local supplies. [Collingham, p. 342.] This allowed increases in military rations. After the War, Hungary was one of several countries with severe food shortages affecting public health ibdicators like infant mortality. [Collingham, 481.]
Italy was primarily an agricultural economy unprepared and incapable of fighting a modern war. There was considerable industry in the north, but not enough to arm Italian soldiers with modern weapons. Mussolini bragged about 8 million bayonet. Bayonets they had, but effective tanks, artillery, trucks, aircraft, and other acoutements of modern warfare they did not have. The Italian agriculture south was still almost medievl with poor yield and inadequate harvests to feed the country's growing population. Large numbers of Italians emigrated to America and South Amerca (especially Argentina) (late-19th and early-20th century). One reason that drove Italian colonial expansion in Africa was to find arable land on which Italian farm coloists could be settled. Although an agriculatural country, Italy needed to import food, especially grains. And like Germany, this put Italy in a weak position to wage war, especially against Britain whose Royal Navy could prevent maritme imports. But Mussolini did not want to miss out on the war booty being won by his Axis ally, Hitler. And as could have been predicted, food became a major problem for Italy after entering the War (June 1940). Unlike Germany, Italy was assigned only a small area of France to exploit and thus could not tap France's agricultural abundance. Germany with its own food problems, was unwilling to supply their Italian allies with food. Large scale conscription adversely affected agriculture by reducing the availability of farm labor. And Italy soon lost its colonies in East Africa (1941) and North Africa (1942). British defeat of the Italian Navy and Allied control of the Mediterranean along with the destruction of the Italian merchant fleet left the country cut off from the word market and unable to import the food it needed to feed its people. This situation pnly worsened when the Allies invaded (September 1943). The ensuing fighting up the Italian Peninsula further disrupted the farm economy leding to dreadful food shortages. Only American food deliveries prevented wide-spead starvation.
Serfdom was the medieval European farm labor system. It was not strongly introduced to Russian until the end of feudalism in Western Europe (late-16th century). Tsar Alexander II freed the serfs (1861), but it was done so as not to alienate the landed aristocracy and essentially created a disaffected, landless or labnd-poor rural proletariat. Russian under the Tsars exported vast quatiies of grain. Russian agricultural was inefficent, but the vast black soil area of the Ukraine was highly fertile and produced boutiful harvests. After the Revolution grain exports declined as peasants refused to produce grain for which the new Soviet state refused to pay a reasonable price. The Soviet agricultural sector was weakened before the War by Stalin's agricultural reforms, essentially murdering most of the country's best farmers (the so called kulaks) along with their families and introducing a highly inefficent collectivist system. This gave Stalin control of Soviet agriculture, but at a cost of significantly reduceing havests. Then when Hitler launched Barbarossa (June 1941), the Germans quickly seized control of much of the most fertile Soviet agricultural lands, the incredibly productive black soil areas of the south as well as Belarus (the eastern part had been Polish before the War. The Soviets could move factories east beyond the reach of the Germans, but not farms. This created a huge problem for the Soviet war economy. An important expert of World War II food policies describes the price the Soviets paid to defeat the Germans as collosal, Some 30 million Soviets may have died and only about a yhird were military. The rest were civiklians and hear starbatiin and malntrition were a major cause. [Collingham, pp. 317-18.) Adequate food was not available for the Red Army and Soviet civilian population. Soviet food plocy was to gice priority to the Red Arnmy and the industrial workers producng arms. Children below 13-years of age weere also a priority. Above 12-years of age, unless you were in the mikitary ot an industrial worker, you could starve unless you could somehow gain access to supplementary food above the offucial ration. American Lend Lease provided badly needed food supplies, without which the Soviet war effort would have been critically weakned. Much of this food went to the Red Army, SPAM became a mainstay of the Red Army dfiet. The population as a whole benefitted indurectly as othewise more food would have had to be diverted to the military. Even worse off were the civilans trapped in German occupied areas. Unless they worked for the Germans, there was no access to food which was a calcukated policy as part of the German's horific Hunger Plan. The tragic situation in Lenningrad cut off from the rest of the country for 900 days is well known. Less well know is the terrible food shortages in the rest of the counttry. This is one reason the population of major Soviets cities dwindled as people fled into the countryside seeking food. The Germans held these important agricultural areas foe 2-3 years. Ukraine into 1943 and Belarus and the Baltics (annexed by the Soviets) untill 1944. But even after liberation, the infrastructure had been so damaged that resuming production was a great challenge.
Sweden managed to remain neutral, avoiding invasion and occupation during World War II, the only Nordic country to manage this. The reason was that Sweden provided the NAZIs what they wanted, vital shipments of iron ore. Germany could not have fought the War without Swedish iron ore. Invasion would have disrupted these shipments. The country was, however, adversely affected by the War. Sweden was an andustrialized trading country. The War impaired the country's ability to trade as a result of the British and German naval blockades. There were some accidental bombings. The Soviets bombed Str�ngn�s and other cities. It was the naval blockades, however, that had the greatest impact. This affected Sweden's ability to import fuel and food as well as to export its manufactured goods. Germany invaded Denmark and Norway (April 1940) this essentially made the westen Baltic a German lake. Every ship leaving Swedish waters had to get permission from the Germans. And the British North Sea blockade meant that every Swedish ship attempting to enter the atlantic had to be negotiated with British and German authorities. This of course significantly reduced the volume of Swedish trade. Swedish import of petroleum products and coal plummeted nearly 90 percent and over 50 percent espectively. The result was severe shortages. Fuel was not the only problem. There were also shortages of rubber, non-ferous metals, and food. The Swedes manged to get permission for a small number of Swedish ships with goods from neutral countries (mostly grains and from Argentina and oil from Venezuela) to pass through the British and German blockades. Food was a problem because Sweden was not completely self sufficent before the War and it became difficult to import food. In addition the fuel shortages and various war measures adversely affected the agicultural economy and production. Sweden attempted to adjust with severe rationing of both fuels and food. The Government despite all the problems managed to maintain consumption levels at satisfactory levels. [Angell-Andersen, p. 343.] Farmers managed to increase prodyction at some crops. One historian explains, "Food consumption changed in a uniform way in all the Nordic countries in that consumption of meat, sugar and fats decreased, while that of vegetable and potato increased in the period of interest. Even though the change was uniform, its magnitude
varied markedly." [Angell-Andersen, p. 344.] Some ersatz products were developed. The major effort was with fuel. They included wood gas and shale oil. [Wangel, pp. 444�465.] Despite the shortages, Sweden shipped food and arms to Finland when the Soviet Union invaded to country launching the Winter war (November 1939). The Swedes also took in some 70,000 Finnish children because of food shortages in Finland. The Swedes were able to get some food and coal from Germany. As the Germans did not occupy Sweden, they had to pay for the iron ore they imported.
Angell-Andersen, E, S. Tretli, R. Bjerknes, T.Fors�n, T.I.A. S�rensen, J.G. Eriksson, L.Rasanen, and T. Grotmol. "The association between nutritional conditions during World War II and childhood anthropometric variables in the Nordic countries," Annals of Human Biology (May�June 2004), Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 342�55.
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (Penguin Books: New York, 1962), 634p.
Gildea, Robert, Olivier Wieviorka, and Anette Warring. Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe English ed. (Oxford: Berg, 2006).
Jacquemyns, Guillaume and Paul Struye. La Belgique sous l'occupation allemande: 1940�1944 (Brussels: �d. Complexe, 2002).
Nefors, Patrick. La collaboration industrielle en Belgique, 1940�1945 (Brussels: Racine, 2006).
Van den Wijngaert, Mark and Vincent Dujardin. La Belgique sans Roi, 1940�1950 Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique, 1905�1950 Vol. II (Brussels: �d. Complexe, 2006).
Vehvil�inen, Olli. Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia (New York: Palgrave, 2002.
Wangel, Carl-Axel. Sveriges milit�ra beredskap 1939�1945 (Stockholm: Milit�rhistoriska F�rlaget, 1982).
Navigate the CIH World War II Section:
[Return to Main Children and food in World War II: Europe page]
[Return to Main Children and food in World War II page]
[Return to Main Children in World War II page]
[Return to Main war and children page]
[Biographies]
[Campaigns]
[Children]
[Countries]
[Deciding factors]
[Diplomacy]
[Geo-political crisis]
[Economics]
[Home front]
[Intelligence]
[POWs]
[Resistance]
[Race]
[Refugees]
[Technology]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
