Figure 1.--As the Germans closed in on the Belgian ports (May 1940) many fishermen carried their family and friends to England. This substantially reduced the Belgian fishing fleet which had supplied the Belgian and German market with fresh fish. The War swept fishing vessels from the North Sea. Here a Belgian fishermen returns to his home port after the War. The press caption read, "Back Again in Their Home Port: Ostende fishermen returning to harbour hoist up thei catches in skips from the trawler ready for sellig on the quayside." The photograph was taken in 1945, probably about September.
Belgium is one of the most surprising World War II food stories. The country was still as in World War I not self sufficient in food production and dependent on imports. But unlike World War I there there would be no arrangement to allow American food in to save the Belgians. Churchill was opposed to such measures and the Germans were determined to use the Belgian economy to support the war effort. Even so, while food supplies were tight and the Belgins lost weight, they did not starve. The Greeks in a similar circumstances experienced a dreadful famine. Because of the World War I experience the Belgian authorities before the War prepard an emergency rationing system. It went into effect the day the Germans invaded (May 10, 1940). [Van den Wijngaert, pp. 55-56.] German occupation policy as that each occupied country was to feed the German occupation force. Thus Belgian farmers would have to feed not only the Belgian population, but also the German occpiers. This was a danting task as with the occupation, the 1.2 million t of grain imported annually abruptly ceased. [Collingham, p. 168.]
The German food plan was that with the invasion of the Soviet Union, vast quantities of food would be available from the East. This of course did not materialize and Göring, Backe, and others had to look to Western Europe to feed the German people. And throughout Western Europe, German authorities used food as a weapon and a bargaining tool to force compliance. [Van den Wijngaer, p. 23.] The food allocated to the Belgian citizens was about two-thirds of that allocated to Reich citizens. [Gildea, et. al, p. 26.]
One report suggests that food shortages led ro weight lossess of 5-7 kilograms of weight per person in 1940, the first year of occuption. [Van den Wijngaert, p. 60.] Rationing did not guarantee availability. Often food and other rationed goods were simply not availanle. [Jacquemyns and Struye, p. 307.]
What saved the Belgians was the black market. The Germans set prices that farmers received for their crops. The prices wre set very low which discoraged production a potential disaster for a country that wa not self sufficent in food production. The black market prices, however, were so high that farmers actually increased production. As a result, food was available in Belgium, albeit at high prices. [Nefors, pp. 256-57.] We do not at this time have details on just how the poor survived the war, but a combination of low-priced rationed goods and judicious black market purchases seems to have carried the Belgian people through the War.
Food Situatioin
Belgium is one of the most surprising World War II food stories. The country was still as in World War I not self-sufficient in food production and dependent on grain imports. The German Arny did not, however, unlike Worlds War I seize the civilian food supply. But unlike World War I there there would be no arrangement to allow American food in to save the Belgians. Churchill was opposed to such measures and the Germans were determined to use the Belgian economy to support the NAZI war effort.
Eastern Blood Wall
Himmler could not wait to begim implemnting Generalplan Ost, the German plan for occupied Soviet Union and other eastern territories intil after they won the War (Autumn 1942). At the time German advances into the Cauacauses and Stalingrad looked like the tide of war was turning back in the German favor. Himmler chose the area around Lublin (Zamosc, the eastern corner of the General Government). The SS had extensive oerations (factories and concentrartion camos) in the area and it was a rich agricultural zone. The SS began arresting and deporting Poles. Over 100,000 Poles were brutally driven from 300 villages, some in the dead of winter. The process continued even afrer the Stalingrad disaster. Some 4,000 of the children with blond hair and blue eyes were selected for Germamization as part of the Lebensborn program--one of Himnker's pet projects. The plan was to move in German farmers, the beginning of a Blood Wall between the Reich and the Slavic East. This was a concept formulated by SS-Oberführer Konrad Meyer, an agronamist deeply involved with formulating Generalplan Ost, at times on Himmler's personal staff. The SS moved in some 9,000 ethnic Germams including Home to the Reich Volksdeutschen from Bessarablia (Romania) and 5,000 Reich Germans. This of course was far less than the number of ousted Poles. And the new farmers were unfamiliar with the local climate and soil conditions. The result was a substantial decline in harvests. [Luczak. p. 120.] This decline wrecked Himmler's bloody experiment given the food situation in the Reich, at least postponed it until the War was won. It would made a difference if the food was feeding Poles, but much of the Polish harvest was going to feed Germans. In addition, the German settlers faced resistance/partisan attacks. German brutality had made the area a hot bed of Polish resistance actibity. And conditions for the new settlers were terrible. Homes and whole villages had been burned down, many by theur owners or partisans. Much of value had been removed. Clothes given the settlers was from the SS murderous elimination of the Jewish ghettoes, often still dirty and blood stained. [Harvey, p. 270.] German teachers were sent to 'civiize' the Volksdeutschenm teching then German lanbufe such as cleanliness, home keeping, child raising, and modern agricultural methods. They reported appaling conditions. The Volksdeutschen were resentful of second class treatment and the Reich Germans were frustrated by inadeqiate potection from partian/resistance attacks. The settlers thus began to move into the safety of nearby towns and abandon their assigned farms. Even the SS could not convince more German farmers to move East which was seen as coid and primitive, in part due to NAZI prooaganbda. So Himmler arrested and deported Luxenbourg farmers who were seen as anti-German. It was clear that bo substantiak number of German farmers were not going to move East, the SS began considering Danish and Dutch farmers who were seen to have the needed Germanic blood. Hermann Roloff in the Reich Office for Spatial Planning was working in occupied Belgium and the Netherlands was put in charge of the process, notably he did not consider Belgian farmers including the Flemish. Uktunately only 600 Dutch farmers went East, and those who survived returned with horor stories.
Belgian Rationing System
Because of the World War I experience the Belgian authorities before the War prepard an emergency rationing system. It went into effect the day the Germans invaded (May 10, 1940). [Van den Wijngaert, pp. 55-56.] Other food sources were fishing or growing vegetables in allotments. [Van den Wijngaert, p. 60.]
German Occupation Policy
German occupation policy as that each occupied country was to feed the German occupation force. The German food plan was that with the invasion of the Soviet Union, vast quantities of food would be available from the East. This of course did not materialize and Göring, Backe and others had to look to Western Europe to feed the German people. And throughout Western Europe, German authorities used food as a weapon and a bargaining tool to force compliance. [Van den Wijngaer, p. 23.] Ur mught be inagined that the Germans would provide food to sustain the Belgian economy as poart of the NAZI Großraum.
German Food Allocations
The food allocated to the Belgian citizens was about two-thirds of that allocated to Reich citizens. [Gildea, et. al, p. 26.] One report suggests that food shortages led ro weight lossess of 5-7 kilograms of weight per person in 1940, the first year of occuption. [Van den Wijngaert, p. 60.] Rationing did not guarantee availability. Often food and other rationed goods were simply not available. [Jacquemyns and Struye, p. 307.] The Germans established the Coprpration Nationale de l'Agriculture. Nrcause of the low prices farmers were required to accept, ir woild have resulted in narional atarvation--proficing only a meager 1,200-1,500 calories per person. It would be up to Belgian farmners to feed the country and meet German demnands for food. The Germans set th basuc allocation at 225 grams (7.9 oz) of bread each day, and 250 grams (8.8 oz) of butter, 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) sugar, 1 kilogram (2.2 lb) meat and 15 kilograms (33 lb) of potatoes each month. Later in the war, even this quantity was not always available in the shops. [Gildea, p. 26.].
Shortages
Even so, while food supplies were tight and the Belgins lost weight, they did not starve. The Greeks in a similar circumstances experienced a dreadful famine. The Belgians managed to avoid a famnine, but there were serious shortages and malnutrition, especially among children who like the elderly were especially viinerable. Tuberculosis which is assocaited with malnitrition became a serious problem with children. The most vulnerable were those with no access to the black market. One such groop was prisoners in jails. They began dying of starvation (1942). Urban office workers also suffered disproportionately as there salaries were basically froze and had no way of earning exrra income. One source estimates taht both Belgian abd french families were spending something like 70 percent of their income on food. [Cunninghan, p. 171=72.]
This was all measu=ured by the dclkinng height of children, some that occurred througout German occupied Europe. Some 80 percent of Belgian children were suffeing to caruous degrees with rickets, caused by vitamin D deficiency.
Belgian Farmers
Belgian farmers as a result of German occupation policy would have to feed not only the Belgian population, but also the German occpiers. This was a daunting task as with the occupation, the 1.2 million t of grain imported annually was sharply curtailed. [Collingham, p. 168.] The Belgians managed to inport 0.8 million t of grain over the 4 years of German occupation, a fraction of what had been imoported annually. Belgian farmers mnanafed to save their countrymen by successfully adjustiung to war time condutions. Basically what saved the Belgians was raw capitalism--the black maeket. A report from a Belgian who was a girl at the time explains how the NAZI aithoriries controlled the farmers and how the farmrts responded. "Life continued along very strange terms dictated by the Nazi Regime. In that they came and measured our land that we farmed, told us what crops we would, not should reap and how much, if any of that crop we were allowed to keep for ourselves. They counted our chickens and again told us how many eggs we had to supply them with. As you can imagine we often had shortfalls from their estimation, in these circumstances my father had to make up the difference from the 'Black Market'. That in itself was a dangerous thing to do. We always used to keep two pigs, one to fatten up whilst the other was butchered and any excess to our own needs, sold. My memory is that we managed to hide one so we were still able to use that one for our own needs. The family cow kept both the Regime and us in order with the quota of milk, etc. Many an evening was spent rocking the butter churn by the stove, although I can't remember keeping much of the butter, the remaining buttermilk was very much welcomed by us youngsters." [Eastham]
Black Market
What saved the Belgians was the black market. The Germans set prices that farmers received for their crops. The prices wre set very low which discoraged production a potential disaster for a country that wa not self-sufficent in food production. The black market prices, however, were so high that farmers actually increased production. As a result, food was available in Belgium, albeit at high prices. [Nefors, pp. 256-57.] Large operations were closely watched by the Germans and could only channel small quabtities into the black market. The Germans gave less attention to small-scale farmers. Many were able to sell much of what they produced in the black market. Not only were the Germans unwilling to devote the manpower to surveil small farms, but many individual civil and military officials participated in the black market, affecting the Gernan ability to control it. Of course the black marker was illegal and partipants had to be careful, but the profits were too great to resist by both the Belgians and Germans. Interesringly, the smaller an anuimal and easier it was to conceal, the smaller the number recorded in official statistics (rabbits, chickens, and goats). [Collingham, p.169.] Belgian farmers were able to avoid a Greek-style famine, because they were more mnodern and flexible. They suceeded by going down the food chain. Rather than producing livestock which had ro nbe ned, theyproduced large quantities of grain and potatoes. Abd the bkack market made it all possible. The huge difference between regulated and bkack maeket prices suggesr that if the Gernans had mot set sych low prices that Belgian might have produced fae more food. That would not only have bebefitted the Belhians, but provide nuch more food for the Germans to seize and ship to the Reich. For that reasomm, tiny Denmark was one of the major sources of food for the Reich. We do not at this time have details on just how the poor survived the war, but a combination of low-priced rationed goods and judicious black market purchases seems to have carried the Belgian people through the War. The exrent of the black market, however, acted to limit prices. As the supply invreases prices falls. And if prives increased too high, nit ibe coukd afford then.
Belgium was a heavily industrialized country and as in World War I, was not self-suffucient in food before the War. This in World War II was a very dangerous sutiation. German policy was to require each occupied country to make do on their on which mean that countries dependent on imports were in serious trouble. The Germans set the rations low, but not genocidally low as they did for Jews and others in East, but seriously inadequate if not supplemented. There was not the same racial aniumus toward the Belgians, especially the Flemish. Ethnicity was a major factor in how the occupied people were treated. This the Belgians went hungry, but for the most part did not starve, like the Dutch. Most of the country was liberated (September 1944). Food shortaes continued as there were shortages of everything, includung farm equipment and supplies. There was also shortage of farm livestock, both work animals and livestock broodstiovk. This affected productioin. And it woulof take time to return to normal levels. Unlike the East, the Germans did not wreck the farm economy. The immediate post-war tears were difficullt, but he recovery was fairly rapid after the War. As the Eureopean economy began to recover, people returned to work and once noire had money to buy food. The realtively limited wae damage (perhaps 8 percent of national wealth) was low by World War II standards. And despite the political instability, the Belgians implemented an enligtened and vgirous national economic policy. Monetary reform and liberalization of the economy resulted in vigiorous economic recovery and the revival of markert mechanisms. This was in sharp contrast to the policies the British Labour (Soicialit) Party adopted resulting in a slow recovery and failure to active an ecinmib mnitacle like the Germansand other continental partners. This greatly benefited Belgian farmers. The first few years after the War as in the rest of Western Europe were difficult, but donmeestic harvests were supplemented by energency relief agengecies like UNRAA abd private charities like CARE.
Sources
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (Penguin Books: New York, 1962), 634p.
Eastham, Jozefina A. J. nee Vedts. "Living in Belgium during WW2 occupation," WW2 People's War BBC (Icriber 15, 2014).
Gildea, Robert, Olivier Wieviorka, and Anette Warring. Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe English ed. (Oxford: Berg, 2006).
Harvey, Elizabeth. Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witneeses of Germanization (Yale Iniversity Press: London, 2003).
Luczak, Czeskaw. "Landwirtschaft und Ernähurng in Polen während der deutschen Nedatzungszeit 1939-1945," in Berbs Martin and Alam S. Milward eds, Agricilture and Food Supply in the Second Works War (Landwirtschaft und Bersorgung im Sweiten Weltkrieg) (Sceiota Mercaturae Verlag: Ostfildernb, 1985), pp. 117-27.
Jacquemyns, Guillaume and Paul Struye. La Belgique sous l'occupation allemande: 1940-1944 (Brussels: Éd. Complexe, 2002).
Nefors, Patrick. La collaboration industrielle en Belgique, 1940-1945 (Brussels: Racine, 2006).
Van den Wijngaert, Mark and Vincent Dujardin. La Belgique sans Roi, 1940-1950Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique, 1905-1950 Vol. II (Brussels: Éd.. Complexe, 2006).
Warmbrunn, Wener. The German Occupation of Belgium 1940-1944.
