Figure 1.--This news photo was captioned, "Al Khalil, occupied Jordon: A young Jordanian boy tries to seel souvenir beads to two amused Isreali girls in the Army, one shoulders a rifle while the othefr sniffs a flower during theitr walk through the Isreli-occupied toen of where street vendors have gone back to busuness as usual." This press photo is dated June 26. 1967, two weeks after the conclusion of the Six Days War. The caption refers to Jordan because Jordan after the initial Israel-Arab War in 1948 has annexed the West Bank. Al Khalil is the Arab term for Hebron, a popular tourist site. An important point often ignored in press coverage is that the collapse of the economies in both the West Bank and Gaza did no come with the Isreli victory in the Six Days War, but with the Palestinian Interfada years later.

"We plan to open a general assault on Isreal. This will be a total war. Our basic aim is the destruction of Israel"

--President Gamal Abdel Nasser, May 28, 1967

The Six Days War changed the dynamic of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. The United Nations for 8 years after the Suez War patrolled the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai. Egypt and the other Arabs states remained hostile to Israel and were determined to destroy the Jewish state. Egypt was the key. No other Arab state would confront Israel without Egypt. Modern arms are expensive. The Soviet Union was, however, willing to sell Egypt and other Arab countries with large quantities of modern weapons. (They never got paid for most of them.) It was part of Soviet policy to gain influence in the region. Nasser backed with this infusion of Soviet weapons decided to confront Israel militarily. His actual intentions are unclear, but destroying Israel was extremely popular on the Arab street. Nasser organized an alliance with Syria and Jordan. He moved 100,000 troops to the border equipped with an incredible force of 1,000 modern tanks. He ordered the United Nations out. An audacious Israeli air attack destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground. Egyptian Air Force commanders were at first afraid to tell Nasser what had happened. Radio Cairo claimed that the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed. The Arab public was ecstatic. Nasser urged the Syrians and Jordanians to join the war with Israel. He assured them that Egypt was winning the war in the Sinai. In fact, without without air cover from the air, the Egyptian army was left vulnerable to attack in the stark desert area between Israel and Egypt. Israeli armor decimated the Egyptians and pushed to Suez. The Israelis then turned on the Jordanians and Syrians that had invaded further north. The Israelis managed to seize the rest of Jerusalem. The Six Days war was the seminal event of the Middle eastern Conflict. Virtually every Arab country even today has as its primary demand, a return to the pre-1967 borders.

Gamal Abdel Nasser

Gamal Abdel Nasser, an Egyptian colonel, overthrew King Farouk. Nasser was a strong proponent of Arab nationalism. They justified their seizure of power by a committed to modernizing Egypt and restoring greatness to the Arab people. His emotional speeches and wide appeal throughout the Arab world. He preached a single, triumphant Arab nation. He gradually raised to great prominence throughout the Arab world. There was even a public relations union with Syria. Nasser believed in no accommodation with Israel. Differences over the Aswan Dam caused Nasser to move toward the Soviets who offered both engineers and financing for the dam, but large quantities of weapons. Nasser by 1967 was prepared to destroy the Jewish nation militarily. He and other Egyptian officers considered Egypt's defeat in the First Israeli-Palestinian War (1948) and the Suez War shameful and were determined to destroy Israel. Arab leaders have a way of declaring victory after battlefield defeats, even disastrous defeats. Nasser was extremely accomplished at this. He claimed that the 1956 Suez War was a victory because he had forced Israel, Britain and France to withdraw. But the UNEF and the movement of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran were a reminder that Egypt had not won the War. And there were intra-Arab politics that pressed on Nasser. He had come to power with a process to make Egypt a modern prosperous state. Here he made little progress in addressing the deep seated problem of poverty. He also experienced a failed war in Yemen. And he was embarrassed by taunts from Fatah and the Muslim Brotherhood to move against Israel.

Yemen

Nasser managed to bog the Egyptian Army down in aiding the Nassarite officers who seized control of the Yemeni goverment and declared a republic. They then had to fight the former monarchy and tribes supporting the monarchy (1962). Saudi Arabia assisted the monarchy with arms and financing. The Egyptians began bombings Saudi targets. President Kennedy ordered Strike Command to provide a combat squadron to help the Saudis, The rules of engagement included preparations to engage Egyptian planes. Nasser committed Egyptian ground forces to support the republicans. Five years later there was no sign of a resolution. Nasser ordered the ground forces home to strengthen the forces being assembled to destroy Israel. The Egyptians and Saudis agreed on very little except the need to destroy Israel. As a result, the Saudis also agreed to withdraw from Yemen.

Israeli National Water Carrier Plan

The Israeli National Water Carrier Plan proved controversial. This was a plan to pump water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate farms in southern and central Israel. The project was based on a plan developed by U.S. envoy Eric Johnston (1955). Such a plan in a small area required international consultations. Syria, Jordon, and Israel all had an interest in the Sea of Galilee. Arab engineers agreed to the plan. Arab governments refused, however, to participate because this would be de facto recognition of Israel. Syria even began a water diversion plan in the Golan Heights mpacting the flow of the Jordan River. Israel and Jordan met secretly and agreed to adhere to the quotas established by the plan. Fatah seized on the Israeli diversion of water, charging that it was an 'imperialist event'. Interesting, today Israel is pumping desalinized water into the Sea of Galilee.

Palestine Liberation Organization -- PLO (1964)

Yasser Arafat intensified his call for war to destroy Israel. And Arafat in the Fatah newspaper, Filistinunah ("Our Palestine") began to lampoon Nasser and other Arab leaders for their failure to invade Israel. Nasser controlled the Egyptian media, but Filistinunah was outside his control. Nasser decided to undercut Arafat and other Palestinian hardliners. Nasser through the Arab League engineered the foundation of the Palestine Liberation Organization --PLO (1963). The PLO was formally constituted during a meeting of the first Palestinian Congress (1964). Almost immediately the PLO began to splinter into factions. Nasser had thought that unlike Fatah, he could control the PLO. The first PLO leader he installed, the extremely bombastic Ahmed Shukhairy, proved to be incompetent. Gradually Arafat's Fatah as the largest faction gained control of the PLO. Arafat realized that he could prick Israel, but the only way that Israel could be destroyed was by war and the Egyptian Army. Only Egypt had the military force capable of accomplishing this.

Escalating Arab Terror Attacks (1964-67)

Armed action between Israel and the Arabs did not begin with outbreak of the Six Days War. Israel for several years was asailed by both Fatah terror attacks and attacks supported or even carried out by the Arab militaries. The PLO’s creation resulted in a substantial increase in terror attacks. In 1965 there were 35 raids. In 1966 this increased to 41 attacks. In the first 4 months of 1967, there were 37 attacks. The attackers consistently attacked unarmed civilians. 【Sachar, p. 616. 】 The pattern was a little different along the various borders. Along the Egyptian border, despite the war-like language coming from President Nasser and Egyptian media, actual attacks were limited. A few came from Egyptian-occupied Gaza. It is unclear to what extent the Egyptian Government was fomenting the attacks. We do know that the number of attacks were lower than along the Jordanian and Syrian border. The existence of United Nations border peace keeping force may have been a factor (UNEF1). . Along the Jordanian brooder, the Fedayeen conducted cross-border raids, primarily targetting Israeli civilians. The objective was to destabilize. Israel retaliated with incursions against Palestinian targets in the West bank. Along the Lebanese border there was minimal activity. It was along the Syrian border that mot of the Fatah terror attacks came. It was Syria hat most vigorously embraced Fatah and supported it. Many of the attacks were in fact Syrian Army troops disguised as Fatah so Syria could deny responsibility. Despite the minimal results achieved by Fatah, the Arab press devote considerable publicity to them, including where they were launched from. There was an obvious contrast with the lack of action from Egypt despite Nasser's bombastic speeches. Some authors believe that this rivalry was far of the fermet that led up to the Six Days War. It seems to have been a motivation for Nasser's aggressive actions against Israel that led to the War. Nasser seems to have felt a need to prove himself to the Arab street. Historians debate if Nasser's aggressiveness was more driven by the Syrian rivalry or the Fatah movement. It does seem to be the case that the actions of the Palestinians and Syrians pushed Nasser to moving against Israel. Of course neither created Nasser's desire to eliminate Israel, he was strongly motivated in that direction, but it seems to have at a minimum reduced his inhibitions and affected his judgements concerning the dangers of war.

United Nations Peacekeepers (UNEF1)

United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of U.N. military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab countries which had invaded Palestine to destroy the Jewish state. The operation became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). A new group of U.N. Peacekeepers was organized as part of the arrangements associated with Israel's withdraw from Sinai after the Suez War (1956). Paralysis in the U.N. Security Council led to action in the General Assembly. The General Assembly authorized the first United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) with resolution 1001 (ES-I). U.N. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold played a key role in this unprecedented action. Only Egypt allowed the U.N. observers on their side of the cease-fire line. The United Nations observers for 8 years patrolled the Israeli-Egyptian border in the Sinai. They were unable to prevent irregular Palestinian attacks, but they did effectively keep the two armies apart. This greatly reduced the danger of an unintended war. The further apart the two armies were, these less likelihood of an incident setting off a war. As long as the two countries accepted the arrangement than the livelihood of War was reduced. The United Nations force could not resist an invasion by one side. But as long as both of the two sides were were interested in peace, the U.N. Force could prevent an accidental war. It could also establish record of violations. But if one side was determined to launch an attack, the UNEF had no real capability to prevent it. And Nasser as well as other Arab leaders were determined to destroy Israel. And the Sinai border was at the center of the conflict. Egypt was had the largest population and was the most important Arab state. Without Egypt there could be no Arab war with Israel. The UNEF was also a conflict indicator. If Egypt demanded that the UNEF be removed, this suggested that war was eminent.

Military Preparations

Military operations varied widely in the Arab countries and Israel. The two key weapons were fighter aircraft and tanks. The Soviets provided Arab states a wide array of top of the line modern weaponry at favorable terms. This included aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, tanks, and artillery as well as an array of small arms. We are not entirely sure of the financial arrangements, but it was mostly done on credit. We believe the Soviets never got paid for much of this weaponry. But the Arabs got a huge quantity of very effective, modern weaponry. This was during the Cold War and the Soviets were basically buying allies. The Arabs at the time were in phase of Arab socialism promoted by Nasser and the Bath Party. (Socialism did not work out any netter for the Arabs than it did for the Soviets.) The Middle East was a strategic area because of the West's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The backbone of the Arab air forces was the Mig-19, an excellent, tough and maneuverable fighter, although sub-sonic. The Soviets had begun to deliver Mig-21s, but the basic plane faced by the Israelis was the Mig-19. Soviet assistance went primarily to Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. It was Egypt and Syria (front-lines states) that posed the greatest danger to Israel. The Arabs by the time of the Six-Day War had a seemingly overwhelming 5 to 1 advantage in aircraft and a 2 to 1 advantage in tanks. It was not only numbers, but much of the Arab arsenal was more modern weaponry. While the Soviets were provided the Arabs vast quantities of expensive modern weaponry, Israel was essentially on its own. The Soviet weaponry was hugely expensive, the Arabs could not have afforded to buy it because the countries preparing to invade Israel were not the wealthy oil states. Israel was a small country with very limited resources. It could not begin afford to purchase modern weaponry on that scale and did not have the economic resources to create a modern weapons industry. Much of Israel's limited resources were used to purchase French aircraft. The Israeli Air Force was based on the French Mirage III fighter. The Israels purchased 72 French Mirage IIIs (1962). The Israelis turned to the French because America and Britain were participating in an international arms embargo. But as the Soviets were not participating the result was to prevent Israel from arming while the Arabs were arming to the teeth. Thanks to the French, the Israelis had a fighter to take on the Soviet Migs. The French armed the Mirage with missiles. The Israelis insisted they be modified for cannon. The Mirage was faster than the Mig-19, but the Mig was more rugged and more maneuverable. The real difference was in the capability of the military planners and the training of the pilots. Armor was another matter. The Arabs had modern Soviet tanks, including T-34/85s as well as other models. The Israelis had a hodgepodge of basically obsolete World War II tanks, including Centurion, Pattons, and Shermans. These tanks were obtained by scouring Europe for junked tanks and repairing them. The Israelis had also seized quite a number of Egyptian tanks in the Suez War (1956). The French sold then surplus tanks, but only the Arabs had modern tanks. The French has upgraded some of their Shermans and the Israelis proceeded to do the same for the others they has acquired. Thus the Israelis fought the Six Days War with basically obsolete World War II tanks, but ones that had been upgrades with a very effective main gun. The result would be the greatest tank battles since World War II with over 2,500 involved.

Egyptian Actions

President Nasser since seizing power made incendiary speeches against Israel. He finally began a series of concrete steps that lookd like the prelude to war. Backed with an infusion of advanced Soviet weapons, he seems to have decided that Egypt now had the military capability to confront and defeat Israel militarily. His speeches included increasingly inflammatory language. Actual concrete steps were threatening to Israel. 1) Nasser negotiated a military alliance and war plan with Syria and Jordan. 2) He closed the Straits of Tiran, denying Israeli shipping access to the Red Sea. (The Israelis had made it clear that closing the Straits wold be seen as an act of war.) And closing international waters was just that. 3) Nasser ordered the United Nations observers (UNEP) out as he prepared his attack (May 16). The commander of the United Nations' Emergency Force (UNEF), General Indar Jit Rikhye, was ordered by General Muhammad Fawzy, Chief of Staff of the United Arab Republic, that he immediately withdraw the UNEF. UN Secretary-General U Thant suggested that UNEF be relocated onto the Israeli side of the cease-fire line, but Israel refused. The Secretary General ordered the UNEF commander to withdraw (May 19). It is unclear if Nasser really wanted the UNEF withdrawn. But they were and now the Egyptians were face to face with the Isaelies. 4) Nasser began to bring back troops from Yemen to beef up Egypt's combat strength. 5) He moved 100,000 troops to the border armed with 1,000 modern Soviet tanks (May 1967). Closing the Straits were alone an act of war. Expelling the UNEP and moving troops to the border were clear indications that Egypt was preparing to attack. One report suggests that Nasser was willing to use poison gas. We can not yet confirm this or have details about Egyptian poison gas weapons. It is clear that Nasser took all these actions without any provocative steps from Israel.

U.S. Policy

The Eisenhower Administration in the 1950s sought to achieve a balance in the Israeli-Arab conflict based on the assumption that if no country had an advantage, there would be no resumption of fighting. The tripartite U.S.-British-French declaration established the policy of not making arms sales to either side. The Kennedy and Johnson Administration continued this policy. Nasser after the War attempted to explain the Egyptian defeat by perpetrating the lie that the Egyptian Air Force was attacked by the American 6th Fleet which was deployed in the Mediterranean. This lie is still widely believed in Egypt. Actually U.S. policy at the time was not at all committed to the defense of Israel. The U.S. Defense Department reportedly secretly drew up operational plans for a military confrontation with the Israel Defense Forces to prevent Israel from occupying territory in Arab countries, especially Egypt. As the crisis developed in May-June 1967, the plan developed by the Defense Department planners involved an attack on Israel in the event it initiated a war with the Arabs. The military plan involved using air attacks, paratroopers, and Marines to stop IDF armored spearheads in the Sinai. This was during the peak of the Viet Nam War. The U.S. military prepared many such contingency plans. We are not sure if there was a similar plan prepared if the Arabs attacked. The primary American effort at the time to defuse the situation was a diplomatic effort to organize an international convoy to break the Egyptian blockade by sending ships through the Straits of Tiran, supposedly defusing the situation. The plan was code-named Regatta and 26 countries were asked to contribute ships. Congress and 24 of the countries invited rejected the plan.

Arab Public Pronouncements

Arab media broadcasted violent public pronouncements by Arab officials denouncing Israel with inflammatory rhetoric and incendiary charges. They made it absolutely clear that their objective was to destroy Israel. Most left unsaid what was to be done with the Jewish population. Others were more frank. These could only be interpreted as preparing their countries for war. The Syrian chief of staff stated, "Our objective is the freeing of Palestine and the liquidation of the Zionist existence." The Iraqi president exclaimed, "Our goal is clear--to wipe Israel off the face of the map." Egyptian President Nasser described a "total war ... aimed at Israel's destruction." In other statements he used the term, 'extermination'. That word used in connection with Israel and Jews has obvious connotations. The PLO pledged, "We shall destroy Israel and prepare boats to deport the survivors, if there are any." These and similar statements inspired frenzied mass demonstrations throughout the Arab world. These and similar statements and the public attitudes are important. The Arab street was shrieking for blood as had repeatedly been the case of riots and attacks on Jews for centuries. This was no longer possible in the Arab world as for the most part they had already driven Jews out of their countries. Now to get at Jews, they now had to attack Israel. there were shocking, bloodcurdling threats of mass extermination for all Israelis, young and old. Arab political and religious leaders leaders competed with each other to see who could utter the most horrendous promise of massacre and slaughter. The historic Muslim Arab cry of countless past pogroms 'Itbah Al-Yahud', an Arabic phrase meaning "Slaughter the Jews," was heard from countless Arab radio and television station as well as newspapers. Also heard was another historic battle cry, 'Khaybar ya Yahod'. This was a 7th century battle cry used by Islam's great prophet, Mohammed and his followers used when attacking the Jewish community in Khaybar. It was chanted by mobs throughout the Arab world. Mohammad's surprise attack, ending a 10-year treaty. Later Mohammad attacked the Jewish Bani Quraysh tribe, beheading many of the men and boys and enslaving the women and younger children. While little known to American readers. These events are well known to Arabs and those who have studied the Koran. Notably, we do not notice any Arab leader speaking in public that advocated peace and compromise. Any consideration of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict can get very complicated. Here the obvious observation is that Arab leaders and the Arab public wanted war and a military solution. There was no peace party among the Arabs, even though Muslims constantly tell us that Islam is a religion of peace. It is also important to note that the Arab armies prepared detailed war plans. These were no plans on how to resist an Israeli attack, but only plans on how to attack Israel.

Soviet Pronouncements

The Soviets armed the Arabs to the teeth with billions of dollars of modern weaponry. here was an economic issue here. The the Israelis could not begin to afford the level of armament that the Soviets were bestowing ion the Arabs. Israel was a very small country and at the time sill had a relatively weak economy bcause of socialist policies. Massive military spending could potentially bankrupt Israel. The small Israeli Defense Force would not only face huge Arab troop numbers, but massive quantities of modern aircraft, tanks, and artillery. It should be recalled that this was before the era when American began arming Israel. The Soviets issued pronouncements firmly supporting the Arabs. The Soviets couched the conflict as a struggle against imperialism. Unsaid was the huge numbers of Jews from Third World Muslim countries that had been driven to Israel by Arab and other violence and would come to make up the majority of the Israeli population. Of course other countries in the Soviet Empire endorsed this position. At the same time the Soviet Jewish Movement was beginning to take shape. Soviet Jews were highly assimilated. Some believe that the Six Days War played an important tole in that movement generating a sense of pride among Russian Jews who for the most part had been deprived of their religion and cultural heritage. The Six Days War despite the one-sided Soviet media reporting appears to have stimulated an interest among a basically secular Jewish population in their history and heritage, an important development in the Cold War. This would prove to be the first observable crack in the Soviet colossus. Also it is notable that the Soviet arms deliveries were based on loan agreements. The Soviets never got paid for all the arms delivered.

French Embargo

France played a key role in the survival of Israel. This included diplomatic support. France hadrecognized the independent Jewish state (1949). And France supported Israel membership in the United Nations. The key role France played, however, was selling weapons. The Soviets which supported Israel at first soon ordered its European satellites not to sell weapons. They would then become the major arms supplier for the Arabs. The United States while supporting Israel diplomatically, provided little aid and refused to supply weapons. Individual Americans, mostly Jews, aided Israeli financially, but not the U.S. Government. American policy at the time was to contain the Israel-Arab conflict by keeping weapons out of the region. Britain because of their desire to placate the Arabs was not about to provide weapons to the Israelis. This could have meant death of Israel, especially after Soviet arms shipments began at scale. It was France who stepped into arm the Israelis at this critical early stage of Israeli independence (1953). France for a time became Israel's closest ally and supporter. This was interesting because of the major powers, France had the most substantial history of anti-Semitism. France at the time was fighting Arab nationalism in Algeria and resisting Egyptian efforts to seize the Suez Canal. French support was crucial because it provided Israel's only access to advanced weaponry. Israel at the time was a very new-state with a very basic economy. The only way that Israel could obtain advanced jet aircraft was from one of the major powers. And only France was willing to sell jet aircraft to the Israelis. This was the beginning of the modern Israeli air force. The French provided Israel's first high-performance combat aircraft. Less public at the time was French aid in jump starting the Israeli nuclear program. The 1956 Suez Crisis was the watershed event for Israeli-French relations. Israel was hard pressed by the Egyptian military build up, especially the appearance of Soviet weaponry. They thus went along with a secret British-French plan to maintain control of the Suez Canal. Israel initiated a surprise invasion of the Egypt Sinai. The British and French intervened, ostensibly to protect the Canal and hopefully remove Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The British and French, however acted without American support. The United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations forced Israel as well as Britain and France to withdraw. While the plan failed, the French became Israel's major arms supplier. This included French jets, eventually the Mirage which became the backbone of the Israeli Air Force. President DeGualle made both some pro-Israeli statements as well as some troubling statements when he returned to power (1960), but France continued selling weapons. With the end of the Algerian war (1962) DeGaulle began the process of repairing France’s relations with the Arab world. This conflicted with France's Israeli relationship. Arms sales, however, continued until President Nasser began escalating the conflict with Israel taking steps little removed from War (1967). This apparently forced France's hand. The French Government had to pick a side. The French decided that it was in their interest to shift allegiance from Israel to the Arabs. Despite the the unprovoked aggressive moves by Egypt, France shocked the Israelis by imposing an arms embargo which mostly hurt Israel (June 3). The French also warned senior Israeli officials to avoid hostilities. This was potential disaster for Israel. The Soviets were arming the Arabs, but now Israel was being denied arms. This essentially forced Israel to launch a preemptive strike. Israel had no way of maintaining its aircraft without French spare parts. When Israel launched a pre-emptrive strike (June 5), France condemned it even though ironically Israel’s stunning air victory was achieved with mostly French-made aircraft. A few months later President DeGaulle told reporters that France had 'freed itself ... from the very special and very close ties with Israel, adding an editorial that Jews were 'an elite people, sure of itself, and dominating.' It is unclear how important that thinking was compared to basic power politics--the growing influence of Arab states. Ostensibly, France embargoed shipments to the Arabs as well. But because the Arabs were obtaining their arms from the Soviets, only Israel was adversely affected. The French held up 50 Mirages bought and paid for by Israel in a French warehouse. President DeGualled retired (1969). President Georges Pompidou would bring about better relations, but Pompidou continued the weapons embargo. Fortunately, by this time, Israel was developing a modern economy capable of building advanced weaponry--something no Arab country was capable. In addition, the United States to counter the flow of Soviet weapons into the region, began supplying advanced arms to Israel.

Israeli Reaction

The Israelis were unsure how to respond to the Arab preparations. Many did not want to stage a preemptive attack because of the impact on world opinion. A cabinet vote was deadlocked, 7 for and 7 against a preemptive strike. Moshe Dyan was appointed defense minister. Dyan was a man of action and believed that Israel had no choice but to strike first given the Arab advantage in virtually every measure of military power. The French arms embargo forced Israel's hand. It meant that the IDF could not maintain its air power while Soviet arms deliveries would steadily strengthen the Arab militarizes.

Operation Focus: Preemptive Israeli Air Attack (June 5)

Operation Focus is the most successful air campaign in history. The Luftwaffe devastated the Soviet Red Air Force (1941) and the Japanese destroyed naval and air force at Pearl Harbor, but the Germans and Japanese lost both wars. Focus saved Israel and led to the overwhelming victory of the Six Days War. Egypt especially the powerful Egyptian Air Force was a mortal threat to Israel. On paper, it was the strongest air force in the Middle East. The Soviets had provided the Egypt a huge force of top-of the-line modern aircraft with capabilities comparable if not exceeding that of the Israeli Air Force. (At the time the United States and the Europeans were refusing to sell aircraft to Israel. Egypt purchased purchased the Soviet planes on credit. We don't believe that the Soviets ever got paid. Minister of Defense Moshe Dyan authorized the airstrike that the IDF had been preparing for some time. The author of the plan was Air Force Commander Ezer Weizman. Just before the War, Weizman was promoted to be the IDF's Deputy Chief of Staff. Focus was executed by his replacement Mordechai (Motti) Hod. The objective was to catch the Egyptian Soviet supplies air force on the ground--Operation Focus. The audacious Israeli air attack succeeded in destroying the Egyptian Air force on the ground. Virtually the entire Israeli Air Force (IAF) of 1,800 planes was committed to the daring attack--Operation Focus . They flew in under the Egyptian radar. Observation of Egyptian air operations noted that most pilots had a coffee break after morning patrols. This was when the Israelis struck and found virtually the entire Egyptian Air Force on the ground with little or no defensive precautions such a protective revetments. The Israeli pilots struck with amazing precession. The IAF pummeled Egyptian airfields. Egypt's airfields were a primary target as Egypt had the most potent air force. The IAF would also hit airfields in Syria and Jordan, but only after those two countries attacked Israel. An Iraqi airfield on the Jordanian border wold also be hit after an Iraqi attack. The IAF was primarily concerned with crippling the Egyptian airfields in the Nile Delta. Aircraft there were equipped with long-range missile systems, capable of striking civilian targets in Israel. Only 20 Israeli planes were lost, mostly by Soviet supplied anti-aircraft missiles. IAF fighter jets also made sure any existing runways were demolished, so as to paralyze the remaining enemy warplanes. Bombing runways meant that the Egyptian planes not immediately destroyed could not take off. Eventually 400 Arab aircraft were destroyed on the ground. The IAD assaults on Egypt were completed within a few hours. The IDF was thus free to focus on Arab ground forces and play a ground support role. This would be a major factor in the ensuing ground campaign. The IAF began hitting Arab troop dispositions and attempts to enforce and supply those positions. More Arab airfields were hit on the second day of fighting. By the end of the war, the IAF had destroyed 451 Arab aircraft, losing only 46 planes of their own, and this despite the fact the Arabs had modern Soviet aircraft and airfields protected by Soviet radar and anti-aircraft missile systems. The success of Operation Focus prevented Arab air attacks on Israeli cities and IDF troop movements. The IDF had command of the air as the war unfolded. Egyptian Air Force commanders were at first afraid to tell Nasser what had happened. Radio Cairo as a result announced that it was the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed. The Arab public was ecstatic. The Israeli press releases reports were at first discounted as exaggerated propaganda by the Western Press. In fact they proved accurate.

The Sinai (June 5-7)

The Arabs had a substantial force of modern Soviet tanks. The Arabs has 1,400 tanks compared to 650 Israeli tanks. (We have seen varies estimates here, but all the estimates give the Arabs a substantial preponderance of tanks and other weapon categories. Egypt had the largest force and had led the preparations for the War. As a result, the outcome of the war would be settled in the Sinai or southern Egypt. Dyan struck first at the Egyptians at the same time the Air Force was hitting Egyptian air fields. The open territory of the Sinai was perfect for tank and air warfare. The Egyptians had heavily fortified the Sinai and formulated a defense following the advise of Soviet military advisers. The Israelis coordinated their devastating air strikes with aggressive attacks in the Sinai, this time focusing on the north and central sectors rather than the south. Nasser and Egyptian radio reported glorious victories in the Sinai and urged the Syrians and Jordanians to join the war with Israel. In fact, Israeli tanks broke through in the Sinai and were moving toward Suez. Egyptian forces which had heard the radio reports that the Israeli Air Force had been destroyed were puzzled when they not only saw Egyptian planes to support them, but were being attacked by the Israeli Air Force. The Egyptian put up a stiff defense but the Israelis achieved one objective after another. The Egyptian High Command with the Israelis seizing the strategic mountain passes and important crossroads, lost its nerve. Egyptian military chief, Marshal Amer, saw clearly what was happening and cracked (May 6, afternoon). Amer began issuing orders, many contradictory, to his field commanders. Basically he ordered an immediate retreat of all forces in the Sinai. Nasser concurred. The Egyptian soldiers had fought well and most units were still in tact, but at this point some important commanders sensing disaster abandoned their troops and fled back to Cairo to save themselves. There was no planned retreat or effort to organize a fighting withdrawal. Every Egyptian unit was on its own. And in the resulting condominium to reach Suez, the Egyptians lost far more men than during the fighting. The retreat turned into am uncontrolled rout. Many men perished in the desert dying of thirst. The Israelis monitoring Egyptian military communications instead of attacking the very substantial and Egyptian armor force, moved to close off the passes and road bottlenecks, thus trapping much of the fleeing Egyptian army. Most of the Egyptian armor and vehicles was destroyed or captured--much of it in working order. Vast quantities of supplies and equipment and thousands of prisoners were taken.

Israeli Plans

The Israeli preemptive strike and offensive was aimed at Egypt which had been threatening war. Only Egypt had the power to wage war against Israel. The other Arab states had military forces, but none of which on their own was an existential threat to Israel. Thus the Israeli war plan was simply to defeat the Egyptian Army in the Sinai and open the Straits of Tiran. The War might well have been restricted to the Sinai. There was no plan to seize other territory and in fact there were many Israeli leaders who counciled against expanding the War. What occurred beyond the Sinai happened because the Palestinians, Jordanians, and Syrians joined the Egyptians and attacked Israel. What followed was a disaster for the Arabs, but it was a disaster entirely of their own making. You would have thought that the Arabs by his time had learned that war had consequences. Clearly they had not.

Jordan (June 5)

King Hussein gave control of his army to Egypt (June 1). Egyptian General Riad arrived in Amman to take control of the Jordanian military. Israeli President Eshkol sent a message via Odd Bull to King Hussein assuring him that Israel would not initiate any action against Jordan aslong as long as they did not enter the War. 【Neff, p. 205.】 King Hussein responded that it was too late, and 'the die was cast'." 【Shlaim, Iron Wall, pp. 243–44.】 Nasser flat out lied to King Hussein, telling him that Egypt was winning the war in the Sinai. Israel had attempted to convince King Hussein to stay out of the War. Jordanian public opinion, however, strongly favored joining Egypt in the War. Not participating in the war to destroy Israel, could have cost him his crown. Thus King Hussein ordered his army to attack. The priority Jordanian target was Jerusalem. Jordan had seized parts of Jerusalem in the 1948 fighting and still controlled the Old City with the Temple Mount and Wailing Wall. And denied Jews access. The Israelis after the Jordanian attack on Jerusalem struck back. Israeli Army (Israeli Defense Force--IDF) doctrine strongly avoided being drawn into urban warfare because this negates the IDF's superiority in mobile warfare. Jerusalem was, however, a different matter. Dyan ordered Israeli paratroopers into Jerusalem. By this time the Egypt was pleading for a ceasefire to the War they had laumched. Aba Eban in the United Nations delayed action to give the paratroopers time to seize the rest of Jerusalem. The Israelis also seized the West Bank from Jordan. The Jordanians concentrated their forces on Jerusalem making it possible for the Israelis with the Egytain Army shattered to seize the West Bank.

Gaza Strip (June 5-6)

The Israelis were not concerned about the Gaza Strip. It was not high on their list of priorities. The central goal was to defeat he Egyptian Army. Egypt was the only Arab country with a force that could defeat the IDF. Thus the IDF with its limited forces did not prioritize Gaza. Israeli forces with a few exceptions steered clear of Gaza. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan actually forbid IDF forces from entering Gaza. Palestinian positions in Gaza began shelling the Israeli settlements of Nirim and Kissufim. IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin thus countermanded Dayan's instructions and ordered the 11th Mechanized Brigade under Colonel Yehuda Reshef to enter Gaza. The Egyptians responded with intense artillery fire. The Israelis succeeded in taking the strategically important Ali Muntar ridge outside of Gaza City, but failed to take the city. There were heavy losses including an Israeli and an American journalist. Members of UNEF were also killed. The next day reinforced with Colonel Rafael Eitan's 35th Paratroopers Brigade, the Israelis renewed the fight (June 6). At the end of the day, the Israelis had seized Gaza City and controlled the entire Gaza Strip. The intense fighting resulted in almost half of Israeli casualties on the southern front.

Syria: The Golan (June 8-10)

The Syrian Army totaled some 75,000 men and was mostly deployed south of Damascus on the Israeli border. 【Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, p. 76.】 The primary Syrian border position was the Golan Heights which overlooked the flat and vulnerable Israeli Galilee below. Here they were dug in with fortified, well designed concrete defensive positions. The Syrians had been fortifying the Golan for 18 years, during which hey would shell the Israeli settlements in the Galilee. Like the Egyptians, the Syrians were the recipient of substantial modern military equipment from the Soviet Union. Equipment that Israel on is own could not match in quality and quantity, especially because they had to focus on the massive Egyptian Army in the south. While he Syrian Army was much smaller than he Egyptian Army, President The Syria dominated by the Ba'ath had been even more confrontational than Nasser. The Syrians were building a canal cut the flow of the Jordan River into he Sea of Galilee which was important to the Israelis. They also for years had been intermittent shelling Israeli civilian settlements in the Galilee (northeaster Israel) from their positions on the Golan Heights. By 1967 they had some 265 artillery pieces on he Golan Heights. In the years and months leading up to the 1967 war, Syria had played a crucial role in raising tensions by engaging in acts of sabotage and incessantly shelling Israeli communities. Syrian Army units disguised as Fatah fighters penetrated into Israel and killed molly Israeli civilians. A subtext here was a struggle between the Syrians and Nasser for control of Fatah and who was he leader of he campaign to destroy Israel. At he time, Gen. Salah Jadid ( صلاح جديد) was the leader of the left-wing bloc of the Syrian Regional Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, and the de facto leader (1966-70). Hafez al-Assad, he Minister of Defense, would seize power hotly after the War. Syrian aggressiveness was a factor in goading Nasser's belligerence. The Syrian Army was a substantial force in Middle Eastern terms. They were well armed with modern Soviet weaponry. They had a larger force than he Jordanian Army, but poorly trained. The Syrian Army had been weakened by a series of uprisings, coups and counter-coups resulting purges which basically fractured the Syrian military establishment. 【Shlaim and Louis, 1967 Arab–Israeli War. pp. 86–87 】 Both Jordon and Syria were expecting The Egyptians to do most of the fighting. Syria to support the Egyptians and Jordanians began a concentrated shelling Israeli settlements from the Golan Heights, but did not initiate offensive operations except for a small-scale attack on Kibbutz Tel Dan. On the fourth day of the War (June 8). Syria accepted a UN cease-fire and there was a brief cessation of the Syrian shelling. The War could have ended there with Syria still in possession of the Golan. Syrian state radio, however, then announced that Syria was not bound by the U.N. negotiated cease-fire. The Syrian shelling resumed. Why the Syrians had a change of heart is unknown. And given the defeats suffered by he Egyptians, it bordered on insanity. Apparently the Syrians had convinced themselves that their formidable defenses in the Golan had deterred the Israelis. 【Barker, p.90.】 Up until his point, the Israelis were focused mostly on the Egyptians and the Sinai. They were still debating a major action in the north. Here with renewed shelling in he north the issue was settled. Israeli forces were ordered north in force. There were huge convoys and massive traffic jams in Israeli cities, especially Tel Aviv. Dyan ordered Israeli paratroopers to seize the Heights. It was a major undertaking considering the elaborate Syrian defenses. The Israelis had one huge advantage. Mossad had secured detailed plans of the Syrian Golan defenses. In the process, of seizing the Golan, the Israelis also destroyed all Syrian border defenses leaving the road to Damascus wide open to them. For the first time since the 1948 War, the Jewish settlements in the Galilee were free of Syrian shelling.

U.N. Security Council

Nasser who days before had expelled the U.N. observers in his preparation to attack Israel, now demanded U.N. intervention to stop the Israelis. In radio broadcasts he claimed that the battle-field disasters were part of a Western conspiracy. He claimed that the United States and Britain had aided the Israelis--ashamed to admit the incompetence of his leadership. In particular the Egyptians charged that the U.S. 6th Fleet had participated in the Israeli air strikes, an outright lie. The Soviets supported the Arabs in the United Nations. Israel delayed U.N. action to give the IDF time to seize the Old City of Jerusalem. And finally with the Syrians continuing to shell the Galilee, the Israelis turned heir attention on the Golan. Few people in history have suffered from incompetent leadership more than the Palestinians and Arabs. Arab leaders after the Six Days War, just as after each of the previous wars, insisted that Israel should simply return any land that had been lost. It never seems to occur to Arab leaders who after repeatedly trying to destroy Israel through military action, that there are adverse consequences to making war. The Arabs have repeatedly maintained that it was only reasonable for Israel to return territory lost in these wars. While at the same time igmoring the objective of destroying Israel if they had won the War.

USS Liberty (June 8)

The Israeli attack on the USS Liberty during he Six Days War is still unexplained. The USS Liberty was a surveillance vessel collecting electronic intelligence off Sinai. There were 34 Americans (33 sailors and 1 one Arab-language specialist of the National Security Agency) killed and 171 wounded. The Israelis claim it was a tragic mistake. Many in the CIA including Richard Helm believe that the Israelis attacked the Liberty on purpose, although they are baffled as to why. 【Helms】 Survivors of the attack complain that the U.S. authorities never pursued the incident properly with the Israelis. Conspiracy theories abound, especially among those who do not like Israel. The most likely explanation is simply the fog of war. Israel was at the time fighting for its life and decisions were made without the time needed to reasonably assess the situation.

Palestinian Villages (June 8)

The Israeli Army occupied large numbers of Palestinian villages during the Six Days War. Almost all were basically untouched. The IDF did destroy three villages---Imwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba (June 8, 1967). The 6,000 residents were deported. 【Kenan】 Israel knocked the houses down, and later the area became part of the Ayalon Park (known as Canada Park). One of the destroyed villages, Imwas, is thought to be a possible site of Emmaus of Christian scripture. The villages were treated differently because they were an actual military threat. They commanded the road to Jerusalem. Lots of Israelis were killed along that road, particularly during the the 1947-48 siege of Jerusalem. In a sense, the destruction of the villages in 1967 was a final phase of the 1948-49 War, when Israel tried and failed a number of times to capture the Latrun salient. The IDF acted differently here because of the strategic position of the villages.

Media War Reports

Media reporting became an issue in the War. Arab media, especially Egyptian media, reported huge, but non-existent Egyptian victories from the onset of the War. They hid the actual Israeli victories from the public as the War unfolded. Announcers may not have even been aware of the battlefield disasters. They were using reports issued by the military. At a time that the Israelis had destroyed the Egyptian Air Force on the ground and were driving toward Suez in the Sinai, Egyptian news reports were proclaiming great victories over the Israelis. After the Israeli Air Forcec (IAF) destroyed the Egyptian Air Force, Radio Cairo announced that their Air Force had destroyed the IAF. There were few doubters. Media reports before the war had assumed that their armies equipped with modern Soviet arms would have no trouble defeating the Israelis. The battlefield was in isolated reas far from Cairo and the major cities, so they had no reason to doubt. Nasser was not only keeping the truth from the Egyptian people, but his Arab allies as well because he was desperate for Jordan and Syria to enter the war. President Nasser when finally forced to tell the truth, announced his retirement. A shocked Egyptian public, however, poured into the streets. They did not blame Nasser. Nor did they question war policies of destroying Israel as a primary national goal. They were sure that mere Jews could never defeat Arab armies. So rather then Nasser, they blamed the United States. Despite his abject failure, they demanded that he remain in office. In an effort to reduce the humiliation of being defeated by Jews, Nasser ordered the media to perpetuate a lie, that American carrier aircraft joined in the IAF attack. This lie appeared in media throughout the Arab world. Arab countries broke off diplomatic relations with the United States. This lie is still commonly accepted by many. It was not only the Arabs which had a hard time believing the Israeli reports. A British commentator writes, "Many people believe that the astonishing Israeli victory was a miracle. I remember listening in England to Michael Elkins, the BBC reporter in Israel at the time, who broke the startling news of the Israeli victories on all three fronts; the Egyptian, the Syrian, and the Jordanian. But equally, many people also thought he was exaggerating Israel's total defeat of her enemies, preferring almost to the end of the Six-Day War to continue believing the strident but false Arab boasting that Israel was being destroyed." 【Sharpe 】

Nasser's Resignation (June 9)

Nasser was sure as he engineered the crisis that Egypt and his Arab allies had the military power to destroy Israel. He and the Free Officers had come to power in part to rectify the humiliation of the 1948-49 defeat. Their defeat in the Suez Conflict (1956) was excused because the British and French had participated in the conflict. The disastrous defeat in Sinai was a huge embarrassment. Egypt armed to the teeth by the Soviets had been defeated by tiny Israel. The defeat was humiliating to the Egyptian people and Nasser personally who had been assuring the Egyptians that Israel would be destroyed. He apologized, but blamed the defeat on American and British intervention. (On hearing this, American diplomats contacted the Egyptians asking why Nasser was saying this. The response was that Israel could not possibly destroy the Egyptian Air Force by itself.) Nasser told the Egyptian public, "I have taken a decision with which I need your help. I have decided to withdraw totally and for good from any official post or political role, and to return to the ranks of the masses, performing my duty in their midst, like any other citizen. This is a time for action, not grief... My whole heart is with you, and let your hearts be with me. May God be with us – hope, light and guidance in our hearts." Millions of Egyptians immediately poured into the streets in mass demonstrations for Nasser to stay. Some of this was organized by Nasser's political party, but much of it was the heart-felt outpouring of support for Nasser. Similar demonstrations occurred throughout the Arab World. Nasser rescinded his resignation.

Lie of American Involvement

Nasser was afraid to tell the Egyptian people the truth. He and the Young Officers had legitimized their regime by a promise to modernize Egypt and defeat Israel. Israel's victory in the Suez War could be explained because of British and French involvement. The Six Days War was different--only Israel was involved. How could Nasser explain defeat again after more than 10 years in power and massive expenditures for arms. Nasser instead in vented a lie, that American carrier aircraft had joined in with the attacks on the Egyptian air force. The lie worked because Egyptians and other Arabs just didn't believe that the Israelis by themselves could defeat the Egyptians. It is a lie still widely believed in the Arab world. In fact, Israel at the time was receiving relatively little American aid, let alone active American involvement in the fighting. When asked about American support in Congressional hearings, Secretary of State Rusk replied, "No, we have provided tanks and Hawk missiles and certain other kinds of equipment to Israel, but their principal arms supplier has been France ... The Israeli air force is almost all French supplied." 【Rusk 】 Israel had obtained its fighter aircraft from France because the United States had refused repeated requests. American policy at the time was to maintain an arms balance in the region. Soviet policy was just the opposite. They were attempting to arm the Arabs to give them a decisive military advantage.

Threat of Soviet Intervention

The Soviets were astonished at the Israeli military successes. The defeat of their client states (Egypt and Syria) was a deep embarrassment. The Israelis hesitated with Jerusalem, partly out of fear of Soviet intervention. As the fighting continued in the Sinai and the Israelis moved on the Golan Heights in the north, the Soviets prepared to intervene. Air and naval units were put on alert. The Soviets considered committing air force units in Syria and an amphibious attack on Haifa. This was the most dangerous part of the war because it created the potential for super-power conflict. The United States had not supported Israel in the war, but it would not tolerate a Soviet invasion of Israel. The 6th Fleet which had been moving away from the eastern Mediterranean was given orders to move west to counter any possible Soviet intervention.

Cease Fire (June 11)

With the Egyptian Army defeated, Arab air forces in tatters, and the Sinai in Realism hands, the Isrealis were ready for a ceasefire. The Israelis and Arabs signed a cease fire (June 11). As a result of the War, Israel was no longer threatened by the Egyptian Army and the Straits of Tiran were open. This had been the Israeli objective. But they gained much more. They not only seized the entire Sinai to the Suez Canal, but the the West Bank, most of Jerusalem including the Old City, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. The Arabs had been dealt a stunning blow. Nasser was crushed and was never the same man again.

Significance

The Six Days War changed the dynamic of the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Before the War, Isreali was a tiny, isolated and beleagered state. After the War, Israel had become the dominant military power in the Middle East. It also became an occupying power by seizing the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and the Sinai. It not only gained in international status, but set in motion a totally unexpected interest in Juaism among the Soviet Unions largely assimilated Jewish population.

Israeli Peace Offer (June 19)

The Israel unity government, following the fighting of the Six-Day, publicly declared it willingness to return the territories occupied (June 19, 1967). The Israelis offered to return the Golan Heights (to Syria), Sinai (to Egypt) and the bulk of the West Bank (to Jordan). In return it wanted peace treaties (not cease fires) with the front-line warring Arab states, normalization of relations, and guarantee of navigation through the Straits of Tiran. Israel rejected the right of return for The Palestinian refugees nor did it demand reparations for Jewish refugees expelled by the Arabs. This was the 'land for peace' policy that Israel has attempted to pursue.

Soviet U.N. Resolution (June 19)

The Soviet Union on the same day the Isrealis made peace offers (June 19, 1967), submitted UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 519, demanding an immediate Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories with no requirement for peace or negotiations. The UNGA rejected the resolution (July 4).

Khartoum Resolutions (August 29-September 1)

Eight Arab heads of state met for an Arab summit conference held in Khartoum, Sudan (August 29 - September 1, 1967). The Conference is important because it essentially stated the consensus that would become the official policy of most Arab states toward Israel for the following two decades. The essential policy was No to Peace, No to Recognition, and No to Negotiation with Israel. This was a definitive restatement of the Arab policies since the 1949 armistice. This was a sharp rejection of Israel's 'land for peace' offer. The Arab heads of state rejected the idea of a petroleum embargo on the West. This had become a major idea floated in the Arab world. Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser after the disastrous defeat in the Six Day War has to find someone to blame the defeat on least the Egyptian people begin to question his leadership and policies. The Arab countries had been armed to the teeth with oil money and Soviet aid. There is no doubt that the Arabs had the military forces to destroy Israel. They failed due to poor leadership. When he spoke to the Egyptian people, he blamed the Israeli victory on air-support provided by the United States. This of course was an out right lie. He also orated, "The Sixth Fleet runs on Arab Petroleum." Other resolutions included the creation of a fund to assist the economies of Egypt and Jordan. Another agreement was reached to end the inter-Arab war in Yemen. Currently the Arab Khartoum Resolutions with the 'three no's' rejecting peace with Israel are currently being laundered into an attempt at reconciliation with Israel.

Soviet Mig-21

One virtually unreported incident during the Six Days War was that the Israelis obtained a Mig-21. The Soviets had only began to distribute these advanced aircraft to the Arabs. Thus they were not a factor in the fighting. Mossad managed to convince an Iraqi Christian pilot to defect with his Mig-21. This allowed the Israelis to closely examine the aircraft which would prove of immense importance when they faced the Mig-21 in the Yon Kippur War (1973). Presumably the Americans were also provided access.

Israeli Views

Most Israelis for good reason see the Six Day War as a just war that the Arabs forced them to fight. It has a hallowed place in the Israeli history. Israel captured the whole of Jerusalem during the Six Day War, including the Old City with its most holy site, the Temple Mount that is revered by both Jews and Muslims. Jerusalem has been the focus of longing for Diaspora Jews who were first forced by the Babylonians from their land and the Temple of their God. The well-known lament of the Babylonian Jews who wept “by the rivers of Babylon” and declared, “If I forget you, O Jerusalem, let my right hand wither.” 【Psalm 137 】 Since the Roman War and Diaspora (1st century AD), Jews have dreamed of returning to Jerusalem. The Seder traditionally ends the appeal, 'Next Year in Jerusalem'. Finally this has come to fruition. The Jordanians had denied Israelis access to the Wailing Wall--the remains of Solomon's Great Temple. It was in many ways the final achievement of the dreams of countless Jews over two millennia of history. We see celebration throughout Israel after the War. The military set up exhibitions showing off the vast array of mostly Soviet weaponry captured from the Egyptians. It seemed a modern miracle give the extent to which the Soviets had provided the much larger Arab armies modern weaponry. The United States at the time was not providing military assistance to Israel. Tiny Israel was hard pressed to finance a creditable military. A few left-wing Israeli authors have challenged this view of the War. We note one such author who maintains that Israel did not need to fight the War. 【Segev 】 The author provides a perceptive assessment of Israel at the time. He does not provide, however, any information to prove his central thesis that the war could have been avoided given the aggressive Arab actions, especially the series of steps toward war taken by Egyptian President Nasser. He certainly does not show that the Soviets had not provided the Arabs with a massive arsenal of modern weapons, because they clearly did. An arsenal a small country like Israel could not match as the United States at the time was not providing military assistance. He does not provide any evidence that Arab leaders and public did not want a military solution. They clearly did. It is undeniable through the public statements of Arab leaders and the enthusiastic way they were received by the Arab public that there was a desire for war. Nor does he provide any evidence of Arab leaders prepared to negotiate with Israel. They clearly did not want to negotiate, they wanted a military victory. An interesting point to bear in mind here is that the Israeli left is free to pursue such views in a democratic society. One has to ask, where is the left in the Arab world? Where is the desire for peace and toleration? What book comparable to the Segev book has been published in an Arab country? And why is there not a similar examination of Arab society and the continued Arab-Muslim pursuit of military solutions? And it is important To note that an Arab commentator taking the Israeli side would be putting his life in danger.

Arab View

For the Arabs, especially the Palestinians and Egyptians, the Six Day War was a disaster, in fact the Palestinians call what occurred 'The ?????' (the disaster). Not of course because the War occurred, but because the Arab armies were so decisively defeated. The Arabs see the War as Israeli aggression because the IDF fired the first shots, ignoring the constant Feydaeen attacks and the aggressive actions taken by the Egyptians threatening Israel. There was no pacifist or anti-War feeling in the Arab countries, rather there was great popular support for a war to 'liberate' Palestine as they saw it. The result of the War came as a great shock to the Arab world which could not believe that a despised minority like the Jews could defeat the great Arab nation. This was so shocking that a lie had to be invented to explain it, namely that the United States military had aided Israel. The United States at the time was not even providing substantial military aid, let lone fighting in Israel's behalf.

Impact

The Six Days War was not just an isolated military event. It upended the geopolitics of the Middle East. The Israelis increased their territory by more than six times. The war changed leadership in Egypt and with Nasser gone. Egypt ceased to be the leader of the Arab world as had been the case before the War. After the stunning defeat of Egypt, the Arab public begin to turn to irregular groups like the Feydaeen and Islamic groups like the Arab Brotherhood for leadership. Given the massive Soviet arms shipments to the Arabs, American policy began to change. When the Araby launched the Yom Kippur War, the United States would become involved. Israel emerged as a regional power and has remained the most formidable power of the region ever since. And with American military aid, Israel was unassailable. The character of anti-Semitism in the Arab world changed. The hatred continued, but they no longer looked down on the Jews as a cowardly, despicable people. And even worse for the Soviets than the Arab defeat and loss of huge quantities of unpaid for military equipment was the domestic impact. Soviet Jews watched the TV reporting and were stunned by the performance of the IDF. It ignited an interest in Judaism that Stalin's atheism campaign had largely extinguished. This led to the Jewish Refusniks and the campaign to permit Jewish emigration.

Media Assessments

It was a given that Arab media presents a biased assessment of the Six Days War, including Egyptian propaganda lies that American carrier aircraft joined in on the Israeli air attack. The surprising development is how Western media have joined in on the biased assessment of the War. The BBC on its website stated, "it took only 6 days for Israel to smash the armed forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria." The BBC goes on to emphasize that "the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Egyptian air force on the ground on the morning of 5 June 1967 in a surprise attack." 【Bowen 】 Shocking for a news service which loudly proclaims its objectivity, the BBC Middle Eastern Bureau makes no reference to Arab actions provoking the Israeli attack, including broadcasting bloodcurdling threats, a massive military buildup on the Israeli borders, expelling U.N. peacekeepers, closing of the Straits of Tiran-- an illegal blockade cutting Israel off from its main supply of oil. 【Jacoby 】 None of this was even mentioned by the BBC, only a surprise Israeli attack leading to the impression that it was unprovoked. The BBC goes on to claim that Israel's 'hugely self-confident' generals couldn't wait to go to war because they knew they couldn't lose. Actually Israel's military and political leaders were very concerned and terribly anxious that the Soviet-backed Arab military buildup had upset the military balance in the region. Yitzhak Rabin, the IDF chief of staff had even suffered a nervous breakdown. "The myth of the 1967 Middle East war was that the Israeli David slew the Arab Goliath." 【Bowen 】 Another commentator points out that the Arab Goliath was no myth and details how biased the BBC retrospective was. 【Jacoby 】 In addition while Israel struck first against Egypt (because of Egyptian provocations), Israeli actions against the Palestinians (Gaza), Jordan (Jerusalem and the West Bank), and Syria (Golan Heights) occurred only after attacks by the Arabs in these areas.

Sources

Bowen, Jeremy, Middle East Editor, Retrospective on the Six Days war, BBC Website (2007). 40th anniversary. See Jeff Jacoby's analysis below

Barker, A.J. Arab-Israeli Wars.

Ehteshami, Anoushiravan and Raymond A. Hinnebusch. Syria & Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System> (London: Routledge, 1997).

Jacoby, Jeff. "The 40th anniversary of Israel's astonishing victory in the Six Day War," (2007).

Kenan, Amos. Israel: A Wasted Victory (1970). Kenan is a prominent Israeli writer who as a young Isreali Army reservist took took part in the operation destroying the three Palestinian villages.

Neff, Donald. Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East (Linden Press/Simon & Schuster: 1984).

Rusk, Dean. Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee, June 9, 1967.

Sachar, Howard. A History of Israel: From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979).

Segev, Tom. 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East (Metropolitan, 2007), 673p. Segev is a columnist for the left-wing Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz.

Sharpe, Victor. "The Six-Day War: Israel's Miraculous Victory," American Thinker (June 10, 2012).

Shlaim, Avi and William Roger Louis. The 1967 Arab–Israeli War: Origins and Consequences. (Cambridge University Press: 2012).

Shlaim, Avi. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (W. W. Norton & Company:2000).

Created: 3:14 AM 10/2/2004
Spell cheked: 5:10 PM 12/7/2025 Last updated: 5:10 PM 12/7/2025