The Korean War: American Inchon Landings (September 1950)

Figure 1.--The North Korean coomanders never conceived of an American amphibious invaion. Here an abndoned child was photographed as the 1st Marine Division and South Korean Marines fought their way ino Inchon. The photograph was taken September 16, a day after the landings.

General MacArthur from Japan conceived of an amphibious invasion at Inchon to cut off the North Korean Army largely committed in the south arond the Pusan Peninsula. The Petagon and Presidenbt Truman were very skeptical about MacArthur's plan. MacArthur insisted and his prestige the carried the day. The North Koreans did not think there was any danger of a U.S. invasion. The American invading force faced a seawall and a huge tidal problem. A force of 70,000 Marines and U.S. Army Soldiers landed at Inchon (September 15). It is difficult to understand how such a substantial force could hvevben surepticiously assembled. It caught the North Koreans between two strong forces. The Inchon landings also caught the Soviets by surprise. Stalin ordered General H.M. Zakharov to Korea (September 18). He advised Kim Il-sung to immediately halt the Pusan offensive and to redeploy his forces north to defend Seoul. Stalin did not have the Chinese briefed on North Korean troop numbers or their operational plans. We are unsure about the contacts between North Korea and China at this time. His assessment was that the North Koreans should only attempt to reduce the Inchon Briidgehead if they had reserves of 100,000 men. Otherwise they should withdraw to the north, Tough fighting around Seoul followed, but the Americans reached Seoul (September 17). The capital was declared secure (September 25), but fighting continued for ome time. North Koren resistance collapsed and what was left of the North Korean Army retreated north. American aircraft hammered the North Koreans as they retreated north. In addition to the men lost, the North Koreans lost most of heavy equipment including their Soiviet-supplied tanks and artillery. The North Korean units around Pusan which were unable to move north began to disintegrate. Only about 25,000-30,000 North Korean soldiers suceeding in reaching the north. [Schnabel] Stalin was furious. He had thought that his North Korean allies had won the campaign. Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo (September 27). He blamed the reverses on the incompetence of the North Korean commanders. He also criticized the Soviet military advisers. [Barnouin and Yu, p. 143.] We are unsure just what happened when they retuned to the Soviet Union. Nikita Khruschev who by this time had been elevated to the Politburo. He could not understand why Stalin did not intervene. [Khrushchev]

Pusan Perimeter (July-August 1950)

Genral MacArthur when the North Koreas struck (June 1950) did not have the resources to stop the North Korean drive south. His strategy was to secure Pusan at the southeastern corner of the Korean peninsula. Here the South Korsans and a small American force that had been rushed to Korean from Japan made their stand. This was overseen by Eigth Army commander Walton Walker. Despite DPRK assaults in firce, the U.S. Army and the ROK forces managed to build a secure defenive line. Pusan was a major port which was needed to ship supplies into Korea. The first Americans to arrive in Korea was Task Force Charlie followed by a marine regiment. The commander was ordered to stop the North Koreans as far north of Pusan as possible. The Army at first hoped to hold Taijon, an important rail center. Task Force Smith deployed, but such a small force was incapable of doing so and had to fall back toward Pusan. Taijon fell (July 27). The North Koreans pushed the South Koreans and Americans back to a small perimiter around the southern port of Pusan. It look for a while like Pusan might fall, but the U.S. units managed to hold the permiter. Slowly the U.S. forces built up in the perimter. Armour and artillery arrived in quantities and air forces were deployed and power began to have an affect. A bnew bazooka proved effective against the Soviet T-34 tanks. The small U.N. permiter meant that the U.S. forces could easily move to the front and were close to supply dumps. The North Koreans on the other hand began to have supply problems. Air strikes began to interdict supply lines which were vulnerable because of the distance from North Korea.

Inchon

Incheon is Korea's the second largest port and now the third lrgest ciyu. It is a city of historical significance. It ws where the Hermit Kingdom began to moderize. Located only 23 miles (36 km) west of Seoul, it was the capital's port. It was in Inchon that Korea opened up to the world (1883). This ended centuries of self-imposed isolation fom foireign contact. Inchon s located in northwestern South Korea, bordering Seoul to the west and and Gyeonggi to the east. The city was a small village of 4,700 people when Jemulpo port was built to provide a harbor for westerners. The city was not new to warfare. The Battle of Chemulpo Bay was fought there--the first shots of the Russo-Japanese War (1904). As late as the Korean War it was still a relatively small port city. The Americans who landed at Inchon could not have imagined the huge, glitzy modern city that Inchon has become.

Planning

General MacArthur from Japan conceived of an daring amphibious invasion to land american forces begind North Korean lines at Inchon to cut off the North Korean Army largely committed in the south arond the Pusan Peerimeter. It also afforded the possibility of taking the cpital--Seoul. Taking Seoul became very important to MacArthur. The Petagon and President Truman were very skeptical about MacArthur's plan which entailed serious risks. The force to be used was X Corps, the only American resrves. If the landings failed. The United states would not have the forces needed to break out of the Pusan Peninsla and liberate South Korea. [Malkisian, p. 25.] MacArthur insisted and his prestige the carried the day. The North Koreans did not think there was any danger of a U.S. invasion. They were focused on Pusan and completing their conquest of the South. Among the risks was the landing site chosen by MacArthur. The American invading force faced a seawall and a huge tidal problem. MacArthur's solution was to land during the tidal window which would allow the landing craft to reach the beach. Marince were assigned the task of seizing Wolmi-do, a small island that commanded Inchon Harbor. The landing force was to first seize Inchon city and then nearby Kimpo airfield. Onc secure they wouls strike east toward Seoul. Seoul was not only of symbolic importance. It was Korea's central rail and road hub. Possession of seol would block a sunstantial portion of the DKPR deployed around the Pusan Perimeter from reaching North Korea.

Landings (September 15)

The X Corps force of 70,000 Marines and U.S. Army Soldiers assaulted Inchon (September 15). The assault began with a naval at air bombardment of Wolmi-do Island (early-September 15). Gen. MacArthur supervised the landings from the USS Mount McKinley. The 5th Marine Regiment began the assailt. The 1st Battalion landed on Wolmi--do without serious resitance on the first tidal window (6:33 AM). The other batalions landed at Inchon itself on the following tidal window (5:30 PM). They had to scale a sea wall and drive through DPRK bunkers to seize high fround overlooking the bridgehead. The 1st Marine Regiment landed mearby on the Por's sothern outskirts. By the morning, the Marines were 6 miles (10 km) inland on the road to Seoul. [Malkasian, pp. 25-27]

Surprise

The American Inchon landings caught the North Koreans completely by surprise and suddenly left the DPRK Army caught between two strong forces. It is difficult to understand how such a substantial force could have been surepticiously assembled. Bu the landings were a total surprise. It is not that Kim Il Sung and Kim Ch'aek were ignorant of geography. Korea's peninsular gegraohy made an amnphibious invsion an obvious possibility. The United states had been so uncommitted that they di nit expect such an aggressive move. And thy had expeienced such success that they jut assumed that victory was within their grasp. So they concentrated their forces for the Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge and final victory. Thus Inchon and seoi]ul as left largely undefended.

Soviet Reaction

The Inchon landings also caught the Soviets by surprise. Stalin ordered General H.M. Zakharov to Korea (September 18). He advised Kim Il-sung to immediately halt the Pusan offensive and to redeploy his forces north to defend Seoul. His assessment was that the North Koreans should only attempt to reduce the Inchon Briidgehead if they had reserves of 100,000 men. Otherwise they should withdraw to the north, Stlin at this stage pof the Cold War was willing to risk a confrontation wih North Korea. He was mot willing to risk a direct confrontation with the United States. Usually the deliberations in the Kremlin were a complete mystery. Thanks to Nikita Khrushchev, we know a little about Stalin's thinking. Khrushchev tells us, "Stalin was partly to blame for the precarious situation which the North Koreans were in. It's absolutely incomprehensible to me why he did it, but when Kim Il-Sung was preparing for his march, Stalin called back all our advisers who were with the North Korean divisions and regiments as well as all the advisers who were serving as consultnts and helping build up his army. I asked Stalin about this, and he snapped back at me, 'It's too dangerous to keep our advisers there. They might be taken prisoner. We don't want there to be evidence for acusing us of taking part in this business. It's Kim Il-Sung's affair.' So our advisers were recalled. As a result, the North Korean Army was in trouble from the start. When the pitched battles began after Chemulpo [Inchon], I took very much to heart the reports we received about the tragic situation Kin Il-Sung had gotten himself into." Khrushchev broached the issue again with Stalin. "Comrade Stlin, wouldn't it be a good idea to lend more qualified help to Kim Il-Sung? He wants to fight for his people to make all Korea free and independent?" He goes on to say, "Stalin reacted to my remarks with extreme hostility. I was astonished." [Khrushchev, p. 370.] This kind of thinking of course a decade latter led to the Cuban missle crisis and what could have been thermonuclear war. Khrushchev didnot believe in liberal democracy and he presided over the crushing of the Hungarian Revolution (1956). He was, however, no Stalin. He did not believe in mass murder and ithout basic human emotions. Nor was he willing to pursue teror on a mass scale. That said, he was not as cautious as Stalin and given his commitmnt to Communism, he brought the world the cloesest to thermonuclear war that it ever came.

Liberating Seoul (September 17-25)

Tough fighting ensued around Seoul. There were some NKPA in position near Inchon. They stood and fought, but were outnumberd abd out gunned by the American landing force. NKPR forces fell bavk into Seoiul and made a stand there. Eventually some 20,000 NKPR attempted to hold Seoul. The Americans reached Seoul only 2 days after the landings (September 17). They fought hrd and vicious house-to house fighting ensued. The Americans declared the cuty secured (September 25). Actually fighting and sniper fire continued for some time. This did not just mean that the Korean capital was back in South Korean hands. It meant that much of the North Korean Army was cut off south of Seoul and their retreat north was blocked. Korea's road and rail network spread out from Seoul which is the historic capital of Korea and the used as the capital by Japanese colonial administration (1909-45). The North Koreans had to shift their retreat routes to the West.

North Korean Army Smashed

North Koren resistance around Seoul collapsed and what was left of the North Korean Army south of Seoul was cut off. Kim still refused to order a full retreat. He was so close to victory. To disengage and retreat is a difficult manuver for any army, but when not ordered to do so, even after being cut off is a recipie for disaster. It was the americanbs who finally broke the Pusan deadlock. Even while the fighting was going on in Seoul, the NKPA was still assaulting the Pusan Perimeter. Gen. Walton Walker commanding the 8th Army launched a break out from the Pusan Perimeter (September 23). Then the U.S. 1st Calvalry Dividion and 7th Infantry Division landed at Osan, south of Seoul with little opposition (September 26). If the North Koreans had desengaged at Pusan immeditely after the Inchon landings, a subtantial part of the army could hve reached the north. With the Pusan perimiter brek out and the Osan landings, the NKPA was essentially doomed. The attempt at an orderly retreat turned into a rout. Units attempting to retreat north were hammered by American aircraft. With Seoul in American hands, most of the rail and road lines were blocked. Korean rail and road links fanned out from Seoul. The North Koreans had to shift east, but this is not how the transport lines ran. Narrowing the escpe lines, made American air power more effective as it had a nore narrow area to pound. The North Korean units engaged around the western part of the Pusan Perimiter were unable to move north and began to disintegrate. Retreating forces east of Osan were cut off and destroyed. Some of the NKPA toops attmpted to organize guerilla operations in the Tebaek Mountins, but got little support from the population there. One report suggests that some ranking officers attemoted to surrender. Others continued costly attacks. The commanbder of the 13th NKPA 13 Div was shot by his chief of staff so the men could retreat. By the time the remanents of the NKPA was back crossed the 38th parallel, they had lost more than 150,000 men and 125,000 men had been captures. American losses were 18,000 men. [Malkasian, p. 27.] The losses were stunning. In addition to the men lost, the North Koreans lost most of heavy equipment including their Soviet-supplied tanks and artillery. Only about 25,000-30,000 North Korean soldiers suceeding in reaching the north. [Schnabel] Most of the NKPA prisoners during the War were taken at this time. ROK soldiers common executed NKPA soldiers and the NKPA had been equally brutal. The POWs would become a major issue in the War. The NKPA was if not anialated was destroyed as an effective military force. If North Korea was to remain Communist, either China or the Soviets would have to interven.

Soviets Do Not Intervene

Stalin was furious. He does not appear to have given the Korean affair a great deal of thought, kin contrast to his moves in Europe. He had thought that his North Korean allies had won the campaign. Stalin convened an emergency session of the Politburo (September 27). He blamed the reverses on the incompetence of the North Korean commanders. He also criticized the Soviet military advisers. [Barnouin and Yu, p. 143.] We are unsure just what happened when they retuned to the Soviet Union. Mikita Khruschev who by this time had been elevated to the Politburo. He could not bunderstand hy Stalin did not intervene. And he showed virtual conrempt for Khrushchev's suggestions which were in fact both amateurish and entirely based on ideology with little undertanding of wold affairs.. [Khrushchev]

Chinese

Stalin did not have the Chinese briefed on North Korean troop numbers or their operational plans. We are unsure about the contacts between North Korea and China at this time. North Korea at this time was essentially a Soviet client state. The Chinese Communists had just prevailed in the country's long Civil war (1949). As the North Korean Army ws desintetegrating, Chou En-lai suddenly appered in Russia to consult Stalin. Stalin told Khrishhev that Chou was sent by Mao to discuss the advisability of commiting Chinese troops to the fight. At first they concluded against it. But then they decided that China should come to the aid of the North Koreans. [Khrishchev, p. 371.] It is not clear what changed rheir mind, but it may be tht Mao insisted.

Sources

Barnouin, Barbara and Changgeng Yu. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2006).

Khrushchev, Nikita. Edward Crankshaw, intro, commentary, and notes. Strobe Talbott, trans. and ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Little Brown: Boston, 1970), 639p.

Malkasian, Carter. The Korean War 1950-1953.

Schnabel, James F. United States Army In The Korean War: Policy And Direction: The First Year (United States Army Center of Military History: 1992).

Created: 1:58 AM 11/17/2014
Last updated: 11:13 PM 10/19/2015