In the immediate aftermath of World War I, German militarism was seen as a major cause of the war. The victorious Allies blamed theGermans for the War. As the passions of the moment slowly ebbed and historians and journalists began to assess what happened, the idea og German war guilt and German militarism began to ebb and other explanations began to emerge that were not just focused on Germany, causes like entagling alliances, the arms race, capitalism, imperialism, arms manufacturers and other issues. With the rise of the NAZIs and World war II, the idea of German militarism reemerged as a cause of World War I. There is no question that the German Army had considerable prestige and influence in the German Empire. Historians point out that in most countries the Army supports the state, but the history of Prussia was more like a state supporting an army. Brandenberg-Prussia was a relatively small, poor country. It could survive in a rough neigborhood (north central Europe) only by training and equipping a substantial army. This was expensive and state revenue went primarily to support the army. Prussia expanded because of its standing army. It fared well in a series of wars, most of which were short. Countries with standing armies tend to do best in short wars. The Prussian military tradition to incourage aggresiveness and attack because the Prussian advantage wained if wars were not ended quickly and Prissia with its limited resources was at a disadvantage in long wars of attrition. It was Prussia with its military tradition an the Hohenzollern dynasty that finally united Germany. Thus the institutions and values of Prussia became central in the new German Empire. Imperial Germany was not, however, a poor country with limited resources. Imperial Germany with its large army and substantial industry was the most powerful country in Europe and had the capability of dominating Europe. It is not fair to say that the German military was the cause of the World War I, but it certainly is a cause. The German military advised Kaiser Wilhelm that they could defeat France in a short campaign before the Russians could mobilize. And Kaiser Wilhelm was predeposed to accept their advise. As a boy, he had watched his father, Crown Prince Friedrich retirn from a successful campaign againsr France. He undoubtedly wanted the same kind of milatary laurels.
In the immediate aftermath of World War I, German militarism was seen as a major cause of the war. The victorious Allies blamed theGermans for the War. As the passions of the moment slowly ebbed and historians and journalists began to assess what happened, the idea og German war guilt and German militarism began to ebb and other explanations began to emerge that were not just focused on Germany, causes like entagling alliances, the arms race, capitalism, imperialism, arms manufacturers and other issues. With the rise of the NAZIs and World war II, the idea of German militarism reemerged as a cause of World War I.
Historians point out that in most countries the Army supports the state, but the history of Prussia was more like a state supporting an army. Brandenberg-Prussia was a relatively small, poor country. It could survive in a rough neigborhood (north central Europe) only by training and equipping a substantial army. This was expensive and state revenue went primarily to support the army. Prussia expanded because of its standing army. It fared well in a series of wars, most of which were short. Countries with standing armies tend to do best in short wars. The Prussian military tradition to incourage aggresiveness and attack because the Prussian advantage wained if wars were not ended quickly and Prissia with its limited resources was at a disadvantage in long wars of attrition. Many European Wars in the 17th and 18th centuries involved long complicated wars of manuver. This was not the Prussian military tradition. It should be stressed thatone element of the 20th century was not the barbarous treatment of pridsoners of War and civilian populations. Here the Prussian military tradition was in the European mainstream.
It was Prussia with its military tradition an the Hohenzollern dynasty that finally united Germany. There were other options. Austria was another contender. And several German states developed liberal, democratic traditions in the 19th century. And the Revolutions of 1848 almost led to the formation of a liberal, democratic state. The Hamburg Convention, however, failed. The Russians intervened to save the Austrians and the Prussian Hohenzolern monarchy survived, albeit after making some comstitutional concessions. And in the end it was Prussia with its stronger military and military traditions that unified Germany. Thus the institutions and values of Prussia became central in the new German Empire. Imperial Germany was not, however, a poor country witn limited resources like Prussia. Imperial Germany with its large army and substantial industry was the most powerful country in Europe and had the capability of dominating Europe. This essentially destabilized the ballance of power in Europe that resulted from the Congress of Vienna.
We are not entirely sure about the details on the influence of the German army in Imperial Germany. There is no question that the German Army had considerable prestige and influence in the German Empire. The German Empire was a parlimentarian state, albeit with substantial limitations on democracy because of the constitutionsal powers of the Kaiser. And with the Kaiser the Army had great influence. Here there was a long historical association and it was the Army that enabled the Hohenzollern's to unify Germany. It should not be thought thazt the Army's infludence was only with the Kaiser. m This act also brought the Army considerable influence in parliament (the Reichstag). By the early 20th-crntury, Socialists had gained considerable power in the Reichstag. Even so, this did not prevent the Kaiser's Government from securing enormois military appropriations. It also did not prevent Admiral Tripitz from obraining the large appropristions need the build a highseas fleet to challenge the British.
It is not fair to say that the German military was the cause of the World War I, but it certainly is a cause. The German military advised Kaiser Wilhelm that they could defeat France in a short campaign before the Russians could mobilize. And Kaiser Wilhelm was predeposed to accept their advise. As a boy, he had watched his father, Crown Prince Friedrich, return from a successful campaign againsr France. He undoubtedly wanted the same kind of milatary laurels. And the German Army in particular feared a fully mobilized Russian Army. Thus the Army pressed for a declaration of War if the Tsar ordered the mobilization of the Russian Army.
It was the Kaiser that made the decesion to go to war. This was something that the German Army could not do, although it strongly pressured the Kaiser. One that decession was made, however, the Kaiser essentially transferred control of the German state to the Army. And when the promised quick victory did not materialize, the Armny gradually extended its control of the German state and economy. By the end of the War, the German Army was essentially running Germany.
Navigate the Boys' Historical Clothing Web Site:
[Return to Main World War I causes page]
[Return to Main World War I page]
[Introduction]
[Activities]
[Biographies]
[Chronology]
[Clothing styles]
[Countries]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[Essays]
[FAQs]
[Glossaries]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Boys' Clothing Home]