Figure 1.--.

Military commanders convinced Kaiser Wilhelm to resume unrestricted sunmarine warfare (January 1917). By this point in the War, Germany was becomung a military dictatorship. As a result, the misgibings of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg who had played a key role in the outbreak of the War, were disregarded. Hindenburg and Ludendorff with the support of the Crown Prince forced the decision to pursue unrestricted submarine warfare. The actual U-boat operations began (March 1917). This led to the United States's entry into the war (April 1917). German calculations centered on the capacity of the U-boat force to win the War. You see this in the Chancellor's speech to the Reichstag. And not for the last time, relatively little considration was given to the consequences of American entry. A factor here appears to be the fact tht the United States did nit have an army of any consequence. And the German naval commanders assured the Reichstag that they could prevebn the arrival of American forces in France. The Germans seriously under estimated the potential impact of American involvement. Gambling that the U-boars could fotce Britain out if the War and the Army could force a decission on the Western Front, the military insisted that Kaiser Wilhelm consent to resuming unrestricted sunmarine warfare. This was the critical decission of the War and the Germans made a catetrophic error.This is the Chancellors's sppect to the Reichstag explaining on the decision to resume Unrestricted U-boat Warfare (January 31, 1917). Notice that there is no mention of the danger of America declaring war. The speech is fascinating for many reasons. It was not a policy that the Chancellor endorsed, but forced upon him by the military. It shows that Germany took a long time to come to this decision and that it was not an overnight or spur of the moment decision and that they put the entire blame for the War on the Allies. That is not partivularly surprising in public statements, but it is interesting in that the Chncellor is one of the individuals most responsible for the War.

On December 12th last year I explained before the Reichstag the reasons which led to our peace offer. The reply of our opponents clearly and precisely said that they decline peace negotiations with us, and that they want to hear only of a peace which they dictate. By this the whole question of the guilt for the continuation of the war is decided. The guilt falls alone on our opponents.

Just as definite stands our task.

The enemy's conditions we cannot discuss. They could only be accepted by a totally defeated people. It therefore means fight.

President Wilson's message to Congress shows his sincere wish to restore peace to the world. Many of his maxims agree with our aims, namely, the freedom of the seas, the abolition of the system of balance of power, which is always bound to lead to new difficulties, equal rights for all nations, and the open door to trade.

But what are the peace conditions of the Entente? Germany's defensive force is to be destroyed, we are to lose Alsace-Lorraine and the eastern provinces of the Ostmarken, the Danube monarchy is to be dissolved, Bulgaria is again to be cheated of her national unity, and Turkey is to be pushed out of Europe and smashed in Asia.

The destructive designs of our opponents cannot be expressed more strongly. We have been challenged to fight to the end. We accept the challenge. We stake everything, and we shall be victorious.

By this development of the situation the decision concerning submarine warfare has been forced into its last acute stage. The question of the U-boat war, as the gentlemen of the Reichstag will remember, has occupied us three times in this committee, namely, in March, May and September last year.

On each occasion, in an exhaustive statement, I expounded points for and against in this question. I emphasized on each occasion that I was speaking pro tempore, and not as a supporter in principle or an opponent in principle of the unrestricted employment of the U-boats, but in consideration of the military, political and economic situation as a whole.

I always proceeded from the standpoint as to whether an unrestricted U-boat war would bring us nearer to a victorious peace or not. Every means, I said in March, that is calculated to shorten the war is the humanest policy to follow. When the most ruthless methods are considered as the best calculated to lead us to a victory and to a swift victory, I said at that time, then they must be employed.

This moment has now arrived. Last autumn the time was not yet ripe, but today the moment has come when, with the greatest prospect of success, we can undertake this enterprise. We must, therefore, not wait any longer. Where has there been a change?

In the first place, the most important fact of all is that the number of our submarines has very considerably increased as compared with last spring, and thereby a firm basis has been created for success.

The second co-decisive reason is the bad wheat harvest of the world. This fact now already confronts England, France and Italy with serious difficulties. We firmly hope to bring these difficulties by means of an unrestricted U-boat war to the point of unbearableness.

The coal question, too, is a vital question in war. Already it is critical, as you know, in Italy and France. Our submarines will render it still more critical. To this must be added, especially as regards England, the supply of ore for the production of munitions in the widest sense, and of timber for coal mines.

Our enemy's difficulties are rendered still further acute by the increased lack of enemy cargo space. In this respect time and the U-boat and cruiser warfare have prepared the ground for a decisive blow.

The Entente suffers in all its members owing to lack of cargo space. It makes itself felt in Italy and France not less than in England. If we may now venture to estimate the positive advantages of an unrestricted U-boat war at a very much higher value than last spring, the dangers which arise for us from the U-boat war have correspondingly decreased since that time.

A few days ago Marshal von Hindenburg described to me the situation as follows: "Our front stands firm on all sides. We have everywhere the requisite reserves. The spirit of the troops is good and confident. The military situation, as a whole, permits us to accept all consequences which an unrestricted U-boat war may bring about, and as this U-boat war in all circumstances is the means to injure our enemies most grievously, it must be begun."

The Admiralty Staff and the High Seas Fleet entertain the firm conviction - a conviction which has its practical support in the experience gained in the U-boat cruiser warfare - that Great Britain will be brought to peace by arms.

Our allies agree with our views. Austria-Hungary adheres to our procedure also in practice. Just as we lay a blockaded area around Great Britain and the west coast of France, within which we will try to prevent all shipping traffic to enemy countries, Austria-Hungary declares a blockaded area around Italy.

To all neutral countries a free path for mutual intercourse is left outside the blockaded area. To America we offer, as we did in 1915, safe passenger traffic under definite conditions, even with Great Britain.

No one among us will close his eyes to the seriousness of the step which we are taking. That our existence is at stake every one has known since August 1914, and this has been brutally emphasized by the rejection of our peace offer.

When in 1914 we had to seize and have recourse to the sword against the Russian general mobilization, we did so with the deepest sense of responsibility toward our people, and conscious of the resolute strength which says, "We must, and, therefore, we can."

Endless streams of blood have since been shed, but they have not washed away the "must" and the "can."

In now deciding to employ the best and sharpest weapon, we are guided solely by a sober consideration of all the circumstances that come into question, and by a firm determination to help our people out of the distress and disgrace which our enemies contemplate for them.

Success lies in a higher Hand, but, as regards all that human strength can do to enforce success for the Fatherland, you may be assured, gentlemen, that nothing has been neglected. Everything in this respect will be done.

Source: Charles F. Horne, ed. Records of the Great War Vol. V, (National Alumni: 1923)

Created: 5:27 AM 9/20/2015
Last updated: 5:27 AM 9/20/2015