** World War II -- aftermath in Germany : post-War food crisis








World War II Germany: Post War Food Crises (1945-48)


Figure 1.--These eager German children in Berlin are being fed at school. Food was in short supply after the War. The press photo was taken February 22, 1946. Notice how warmly the children are dressed. Schools at the time were often unheated, either because the heating system was danaged or fuel (usually coal) was unavilable. The press caption read, "Personal observtions of Emil Reynolds, Acme Correspondent Correspondent, of a good many of Europe's children has borne out the conclusion that the small fry in Germany are as healthy, if not healthier, than most small fry. Under the Four Power Governnmnt, Berlin schools instituted a school feeding program in Nov. 1945. Allied nutritional auhorities, who had established an initial food ration of 1,360 calories as sufficient for children under 15 years old, increased the rations by another 190 calories for the school program. The meal consists of one pint of hot potato or noodle soup, and is cooked in about 100 school and public kitches throughout Berlin. Evidence of diet deficiencies have declined markedly since the beginning of the progrm. In addition to improving the health of the child, the program has increased attendance at the schools. Nutritional teams continually check on the health of the population, and schools remain an important part of their itinerary. These photos by Emil Reynolds were taken during a meal in one of the schools. Another paper carried this caption for the photo. "Children line up in orderly fashion for their share of hot soup at one of the schools in Berlin. Famine conditions are usually reflected first in the helth of a nation's children. In these photos, the children appear to be healthy."

The most immediate problem the Germans and the Allied occupation authorities faced was food. Food rations had been severly cut and food hard to get during Winter 1944 and the situatiion steadily deteriorated as the NAZI regime collapsed. Germany was a heavily industrialized nation and as a result a net food importer. The Germans were well fed during the War by seizing food from the occupied countries. Hitler had expected to obtain all the food Germany needed in the East. In actuality, food seized in the East barefly covered the needs of the Wehrmacht operating there. It was the occupied Western Europe that fed the German war economy. France was especially important, but food was also imported from Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other occupied countries. This led to severe food shortages in those countrie and in the case of Greece, a deadly famine. When the Wehrmacht was driven out of the occupied countries, Germans faced a serious food problem. As a result, if the War with its indistries destroyed, Germany could no longer aford to import food, even if it could be found. The food problenm was especially serious in the Western occupation zones. About 60 the population of Germany lived in the French, British, and American zones. This was the most heavily industrialized area of Germany. Before the War, only about 40 percent of the country's food was produced in the west and the War damage had significantly impaired food production. Not only were there food shortages, but the Allied bombing had destroyed Germany's transportation system, so it was difficult to transport food from the rural areas to the cities even if it was available. The Soviet occuption zone encompased largely rural eastern Germany which was more self sufficent in food production. In addition, other food producing regions in Pomperania, Silesia, and East Prussia were transfered to both Poland and the Soviet Union adding to food shortages in the western occupation zones. President Truman asked former-Presidenbt Herbert Hoover to work on the food problem in post-War Europe and Asia where millions of people faced famine. Hoover had become famous during and after World War I for his work in feeding war-ravaged Europe. He had also headed the American Relief Administration (1917-21). His work in implemented food-rationing and distribution policies for the U.S., Europe and Russia saved millions if lives. Truman appointed Hoover honorary chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee (1946). The former president, although 71 years old worked relentlessly traveling around the woirld study the famine and work out solutions to food problems. Again American food relief saved millions. The United States and its Allies were not at first anxious to include the Germans in their food relief effrts. Allied policy toward defeated Germany were not yet determined at the time the NAZIs surrendered (May 1945). Many inderstandably wanted to pubish the Germans. American Secretary Morgethau conceived of de-industrializing the country. American food relief shipments to Germany were at first prohibited. This did not begin to change until the situation became desperate (December 1945). The U.S. Army policy was to allow the German standard of living to fall to the average of the neighboring countries. [Ziemke] This did not mean that food was taken from the Germans, but it did mean that American food aid was limited. Ameicans were not even allowed to send CARE packages to Germans. This did not change until even later (June 5, 1946) And German POWs were reclassified as Disarmed Enemy Forces. This meant they did not have to receive the same ratios as American soldiers as required by the Geneva Convention. This situation led to the 1946-47 German Hunger Winter.

German Food Situation : Last Year of the War (1944-45)

The most immediate problem the Germans and the Allied occupation authorities faced was food. Food rations had been severly cut and food hard to get during Winter 1944 and the situation steadily deteriorated as the NAZI regime collapsed. Germany was a heavily industrialized nation and as a result a net food importer. The Germans were well fed during the War by seizing food from the occupied countries. Hitler had expected to obtain all the food Germany needed in the East. In actuality, food seized in the East barely covered the needs of the Wehrmacht operating there. It was the occupied Western Europe that fed the German war economy. France was especially important, but food was also imported from Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and other occupied countries. This led to severe food shortages in those countrie and in the case of Greece, a deadly famine. The Red Army reached the easterborders of the Reich (mid-1944). The Western Allies reached the western birder of the Reich (September 1944). When the Wehrmacht were driven out if the occupied countries, Germans faced a serious food problem. No only could they no longer seize food from the occupied countries, but Allied air attacks on Germany steadly destroyed the transport system. This meant it became increasingly difficult to get the food harvested by German farmers into the cities.

Allied Planning

There was no Allied planning on the occupation of Germany other than determining the boundaries of the occupation zones. It was not decided to even provide for a French Zone until Yalta. And Stalin only agreed as long as the French Zone came out of what was decided on for the Americans and British zones. This was no Allied planning, because each of the Allies had not yet determined policies in each their own zones. The United States led by Treasury Secretary Moregenthau had formulated a plan, but it was never formlly accepted as American policy. And important elements in the U.S. Government objected to it. Morgenthau's thinking ws that the Soviets in their largely argricultural eastern sector could help feed the heavily industrialized western sectors. Stalin expressed an interest un this wanting reparations in industrail equipment and plants. Details were to be worked out as part of the four-power occupation authority. Morgenthau's influence was based on his personal relationship with president Roosevelt. When Roosevelt's died (April 1945), just before VE-Day, Morgenthau ceased to have a major voice in U.S. policy. President Truman was anxious to replace him as soon as possible. America was inly one of the four occupying powers. And in lieu of joint agreed policies, each of the four Allied powers were free to establish policies in their zones. And quickly after VE-Day it became clear that eorking out joint policies with the Soviets would be virtually impossible. America was, however, the critical country because only the United States had the food available to feed Germany. America at the time was shipping large quantities of food to each of the other Allied powers as part of Lend Lease.

JCS 1067

The most immediate need concerning the occupation of Germany was instructions for the U.S. Army forces preparing to enter the Reich. The War Department prepared a Handbook for Military Government in Germany. The War Department released it (August 1944). Secretary Morgenthau was furious abut it. He and Secretary of War Simpson had very different ideas about the occupation of Germany. The War Department Hanbook reflected Stimpson's vision of the occupation, a rapid restoration of normal life for the German people and the reconstruction of the country. Morgenthau had a very different vission. He was horrified at NAZI war crimes and the Morgenthau Plan for occupying German clled for partition and deindustrialization of defeated Germany. Morgenthau complained to President Roosevelt about the Handook. President Roosevelt agreed with Morgenthau, commenting, "Too many people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place that only a few Nazis are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization." As a result, the Handbook was revised. The result was Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1067 (JCS 1067). It ordered the U.S. Arny involved with the military occupation of Germany to "...take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany [or] designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy". And the Army in addition was ordered that starvation, disease and civil unrest were to be kept below such levels where they would pose a danger to the troops of occupation. The President by this point in the War was in very poor health and his ability to study complicated issues in dtail was limited. On this issue he rlid heavily on Morgenthau and like all Americans was shickd at the horrendous sites found by Allied forces entering the Reich. Advisers warned him that JCS 1067 was a mistake and unworkable. It would mean that the Germans "stew in their own juice". Roosevelt's response was "Let them have soup kitchens! Let their economy sink!" )Match 20, 1945). When asked if he wanted the German people to starve, he reprtedly replied, "Why not?" [Beschloss, p. 196.] As a result, unlike the significant efforts performed by Civil Affairs groups that operated in Sicily, Italy, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, the U.S. Army did not at first destribute food in Germany. General Clay who was put in charge of the military occupation recognized from an early point that JCS 1067 was a problem. He saw a humanitarian and political situation developing. He summed up the potential impact, "There is no choice between being a communist on 1,500 calories a day and a believer in democracy on 1000 calories (August 1945)." With JCS 1067 still in force, Clay began to pursue more rational policies. JCS 1067 was superceded by JCS 1779 which noted that "an orderly, prosperous Europe requires the economic contributions of a stable and productive Germany." (July 1947) ['Pas de Pagaille!'] In fact it had lond sence been disregarded. Gen. Clay who would become arotecto more than an occupier in the eyes of the German people, would write in his memoirs that "there was no doubt that JCS 1067 contemplated the Carthaginian peace which dominated our operations in Germany during the early months of occupation." [Murray, p. 129.]

Charites

Before the NAZI era, churches played a major role in German charities and humanitarian efforts. With the advent of the War, the NAZI Party agencies and NAZI-controlled agencies were resoonsiv=ble for relief efforts. As in other areas of German life, the NAZI Party gained control over fund raising and charitabke and humanitarian efforts. The NAZI agency coordinating charities was the Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt (People's Welfare Organization -- NSV). The German Red Cross (GRC) assisted with emergency food distribution during the War. The NSV was a NAZI Party organization. The Red Cross was a well-established German institution when the NAZI seized power. As with other institutions, the NAZIs moved to throughly NAZify it. As a result, along with legitiamte efforts to assist German civilians and soldiers, the German Red Cross was involved in atrocities and war crimes. The Director of the GRC was Dr. Ernst Grawitz (1937-45). He was involved in infanous medical experiments on Jews and homosexuals. [Forsythe, p. 45.] As a result, the NSV and GRC were dissolved. The Germans had to reconstiture their charity and welfare organizations. Internation relief agencies began operating in Germany assisting the United Nations Reliief and Rehibiltitation Administration (UNRRA) with efforts to assist the millions of NAZI victims brought into the Reich to work in war industries. These agencies were not allowed to assist the German people. The Allies placed very strict controls on relief supplies and travel. [Wiggers, pp. 281-82.]

Western Zones: Food Problem

As a result of the War with its industries destroyed, Germany could no longer aford to import food, even if it could be found. The food problenm was especially serious in the Western occupation zones. About 60 the population of Germany lived in the French, British, and American zones. This was the most heavily industrialized area of Germany. Before the War, only about 40 percent of the country's food was produced in the west and the War damage had significantly impaired food production. Needed inputs to farmers like equipmebt and fertilizer were unavailable. An farmers lost a substantial part of their work force--POWs. Many Polish and French POWs were used a fatm labor. And these men were quickly repatriated to their countries. Not only was the German agricultural sector disrupted, affecting production, but the Allied bombing campaign had destroyed Germany's transportation system, so it was difficult to transport food from the rural areas to the cities even if it was available. Often not mentioned are price controls and inflation. Farmers were essentilly not being adequately compensated for their hard work--there was no reward for the hard work of expanding production. The Soviet occuption zone encompased largely rural eastern Germany which was more self sufficent in food production. In addition, food producing regions durther east in Pomperania, Silesia, and East Prussia were transfered to both Poland and the Soviet Union adding to food shortages in the western occupation zones. In the first months of the occupation (May-December 1945), civilians in the American and British occupation zones received 1,200 calories a day. The non-German Displaced Persons were receiving 2,300 calories through emergency food imports delivered by UNRRA and international relief groups. [Wiggers, pp. 279-80.] The problems with German agriculture, the damage done to the transportation system and an extrodinarily cold winter combined to create a food crisis during the 146-47 winter. German food consumption amounted to 1,000-1,500 calories per day. And in addition there were sever coal shortges--meaning that many homes were not heated or only minimally heated during the terrible cold winter. [Wiggers p. 244.] Compare this to average adult calorie intake in the United States (3,200-3,300), Britain (2,900), and the U.S. Army (4,000).

The Schools

A priority after the War was to get the schools up and running again. This was complicated by two major problems. First, the school buildings in the industrial cities were destroyed or heavily damaged. Many schools were unheated, both because of damage and coal shortages. Second, the NAZIs over their 12-year rule had thorougly NAZIfied German teachers. Instructors who were not firm believers had been purged from the system. Some has sucessfully kept quiet, but even many of the luke-war and apolitical over time had been replaced. Finding non-NAZI teachers that had been cleared by De-NAZIfication tribunals slowed the process. At first mamy schools were only open for short period. Students in some cases only came to pick up assignments. There was a great desire to get the schools going by German officials, and most of the children. Even the children not academecally inclined were drawn to the schools because most had feeding programs. This was a matter of both humanitarian as well as sound feeding policy. Children were especially vulnerable as a result of malnutrition. We do not yet have much information on these feeding programs. We know the Allies and the Soviets agreed on a Berlin feeding program for the schools. A rare show of unity. We believe that the schools throughout Germany were provided food, but we have few details at the time. And we do not know to what extent Soviet pracice differed, if any, to the Western Allies.

Allied Concerns

The Allies at the beginning of the occupation were unsure about the civilian population. Given the 6 years of the War and the degree to which the Geramsn supported Hitler the NAZI regime, Th Allies expectd considerable resistance. The Allies in the final month of the War even shifted troop movents to make sure NAZI forces could not escape into an Alpine redoubt. Apparently military authorities issued orders not to share their food with the German population. Thinking that providing food tocivilians would aid NAZI resiatance. We don't understand this thinking. Military authorities even went to the extreme of ordering Ameriian houswives allowed to join their husbands not allow Germain maids tontake lefyover food home.

Reason for Harsh Policies

Looking back on the early months of the occupation, it is easy to criticize both the fundamental concept of the Morgenthau Plan and the severity of 1067. It nust be remenbered, however, that the Allies had just endured the most deadly war in human history in which they came closer to losing than is commonly appreciated today. The greatest effort in American and British history was required as well accptung one of the aggressor nations (the Soviet Union) into the anti-NAZI crusade. Millions od people had been killed. And unlike World War I, this was not just a consequence of war, but an actual NAZI war goal, the murder of whole peoples (and not just the Jews) and the reduction by tens of millions of other peoples. The extent of NAZI barbatity became apparent as Allied Armies enterested the Reich. The NAZI attrocities and crimes are without parallel in human history, although the numbers killed were actually smaller than the number of people killed by Soviet and Chinese Communists. It was aiitle difficult to become too disturbed about hungary Germans when the same German people starved millions of people to death and had plans to starve manu more millions. The Hunger Plan was German national policy for reducing the number of unwanted people.

Change of Relief Policy

As the critics of JCS 1067 has warned, it was both uneforceable ancounterproduvtive. The occupation forces began backing off from it from an early point. And the Truman Administration began to shift policies. President Truman ordered international relief organizations to be allowed to enter occupied Germany to assess the civilian food situation (early-1946). [Wiggers, p. 282.] The United States and its Allies were not at first anxious to include the Germans in their food relief efforts. The food sitution was desperate in many of the countries victmized by the Germams. Allied policy toward defeated Germany were not yet determined at the time the NAZIs surrendered (May 1945). Many understandably wanted to opubish the Germans. American Treasury Secretary Morgethau conceived of de-industrializing the country. American food relief shipments to Germany were at first prohibited. This did not begin to change until the situation became desperate (December 1945). The U.S. Army policy was to allow the German standard of living to fall to the average of the neighboring countries. [Ziemke] This did not mean that food was taken from the Germans, but it did mean that American food aid was limited. Americans were not even allowed to send CARE packages to Germans. This did not change until even later (June 5, 1946) And German POWs were reclassified as Disarmed Enemy Forces. This meant they did not have to receive the same ratios as American soldiers as required by the Geneva Convention. This situation led to the 1946-47 German Hunger Winter.

American Food Effort

President Truman asked former-Presidebt Herbert Hoover to work on the food problem in post-War Europe and Asia where millions of people faced famine. Former President Hoover had become famous for his World War I Relief Effort during and after the War. Hoover oversaw the American food relief effort which first saved Belgium and then fed war-ravaged Europe. He had also headed the American Relief Administration (1917-21). His work in implemented food-rationing and distribution policies for the United States, Europe and Russia saved millions of lives. Truman appointed Hoover honorary chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee (1946). The former president, although 71 years old worked relentlessly traveling around the world study the famine and work out solutions to food problems. Again as in World War I American food relief saved millions.

Political Consequences (1946-48)

The food situation in Germany had political consequences. Germans in the Western Zone were afraid of the Communists. what the Red Army soldiers had done to Grman women and what the KGB was doing throughout Eastrn Europe was known in Germany. But the Germans liked to eat and if the Allies did not improve the food situation, the public would have drifted left band aceepted Soviet domination. A cghoatic situation was developing in Germany--the heart oc central Europe. But we are not just talking about Germany. The economic situation in Geramy wouls affect overall European recovery. Without a prosperous, well-fed Germany there would be no European economic recoverty or at least not rapid recovery. [Erker, pp. 49-50.] And by 1947 a chaotic situation was developing in a hungary Germany. Despite the food situation in Germany and hunger in Germany, few hungary Germans understood the dimensions of what the NAZIs had inflicted on the conquered people during the war and the level of starvation and death. The hunger in Germany ws very real nd because it began only at the end of the NAZI era, the public begn to blme food shortahes on the Allied occupation. Protests spaked by hunger began in the Ruhr and spread to the Rhineland and Westphalia (February 1947). THe biggest protest was some 300,000 coal miners (April 3). Protests continued sporadically into the summer. [Trittel, p. 378.] The ptotests subsided during the winter, another hard winter, presunably protesting in the cold, especially during a severe winter, is no fun, but began again (early-1948). Again the protests began in the Ruhr and spread to Hamburg. The dock workers went out on strike. In the south, Bavarian workers staged a 1-day general strike. Occupation authories boted that the strikes were becoming more organized and cooedinated. Another mass actio occurred in lower SaxonySome 100,000 workers struck for 2 weeks(May 1948). It is at this point that Soviet ductator Josef Stalin stepped in and blocaked West Berlin (June 1948). And in doing so he permanently settled the direction of German politics--but not in the direction he planned.

Berlin Air Lift (June 1948)

Berlin was at the center if the Cold War. Many believe that the Cold War began and ended in Berlin. The beginning would be the Soviet efforts to push the Western Allies out of Berlin. The end was the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Berlin was conquered by the Red Army in savage fighting during the end of April 1945. Stalin was intent on the Red Army taking the prize and lied to General Eisenhower about his intentions. Wehrmacht commanders west of Berlin could not understand why the Americand did not push for Berlin. When the Red Army approached his bunker, Hitler committed suicide. As decided at the Yalta Conference, the three principal Western Allies (Britain, France, and the United States) were given occupation zones in the conquered NAZI capital. As Berlin was located well within the Soviet occupation zone of Germany, all supplies had to pass through the Soviet zone. As a result, the Western allies and the Berlin people were vulnerable to Soviet pressure. This and the symbolic value of Berlin made it the focal point of the Cold War. It was at Berlin that the first major confrontation of the Cold War occurred. Stalin decided in 1948 that he could blockade Berlin and force the Western allies out and the people of West Berlin into submission. Ironically the people of West Berlin were saved by American and British pilots, in most cases the same men that only 3 years earlier had been bombing German cities and had reduced Berlin to ruble. President Truman was determined that the United States would not leave Berlin and a massive airlift was organized and even during the winter, more supplies were reaching Berlin than before tht Soviets had instituted the blockade. One of the pilots was struck by the Berlin children who still lived in desperate conditions after the War. The children of course had little idea of the larger issues involved, but were caught up in the episode when one of the pilots began dropping chocolates in little parachutes when he reached Berlin. Other pilots began doing the same. The Berlin children began calling him Uncle Chocolate and thousands wrote with directions as to how to how the American pilots could hit their homes! Finally with the success of the Airlift, Stalin relented and rail and road links were reopened in 1949.

Solving the Food Problem

American occupation uthories were concerned tht the Germans were becoming more mobilized and could potentially choose Communism. This was what Stalin had expected would occur in Eastern Europe. The degree to which NKVD force was needed surprised him. Germany was different than Eastern Europe. Until the NAZIS seized power, Germany had a vey subsrantial Communist Party (KPD). And the Socialist Party (SPD) had been the largest party. Workers in particular had been the largest supporters of the KPD and SPD. Thus the possibility of the Germans xchosong Communism was not a perposterous idea. At the time, it was quite posible that Italy and France might vote in Communist Governments. And American authorities were concrned that the food crisis was radiclizing Germans, paving the way for a Communist Germany. [Trittel, p. 389.] Gen. Lucias Clay as U.S. Military Govenor of Germany was concerned about the food situation and economic failure driving the Gerans into Communist hands. Often unacknowledged in the academic literature is the similarities between the Soviet and NAZI economies. The NAZI econimy was not a free market econmy, kt was a highly regulated economy with price controls and a high level of goverbnment control. The Allies had not changed this basic structure. The inflation left the Matrk virtually valuless and price control meant that were o marlet incentives for farmers and industrialists t produce. Worst still, civilians had to spend hours in lines or in markets bardering goods rather than in produtive activities. Luwwid Erhard, a anti-NAZI economist an adviser to the U>S> occupation authorities, managed to convince Gen. Clay that basic reforms were needed. And the Americans managed to convince the British and French to go along. The result was a Currency Reform taking many Marks out of circulation, thus incresaing the value of those in circulation (June 20). Other redorm measures included ending price controls and oher regulations. Then rationing was ended (July). There were two results. First Stalin institued a blockade of West Berlin. Second, the German Economic Miracle was set in motion. Almost over nightfood and consumer goods appeared in the stores. Food consumer goods shortages disappeared and industry started hiring workers.

Special Activities

We note some special food programs in the Western Zones. We notice school feeding programs (figure 1). We are not sure where the food came from, but suspect it was American relief supplies. Eventually CARE packages started arriving. This was a new program began during World War II. We also note an American summer camp program for the children. Summer camp was nothing knew in Germany, but the program was different than during the NAZI era. The children got plenty of good food and and sunshine and their physical condition was closely monitored. The children participating looked skinny and many had scabies. Scabies is an itchy, highly contagious skin disease caused by an infestation by the itch mite Sarcoptes scabiei generally associated with poor sanitary conditions. These eforts were very important through the 1940s as the German Economic Miracle began to take hold.

Sources

Beschloss, Michael R. The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945.

Erker, Paul. Ern�hrungskrise und Nachkriegsgesellschaft: Bauern und Arbeiterschaft in Bayern, 1943-1953 (Klett-Cotta: Stuttgart, 1990).

Forsythe, David P. The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross (Cambridge University Press).

Murray, Williamson. Ed. A Nation at Warin an Era of Strategic Change (2004).

Reynolds, Emil. Acme correspondent (February 1946).

Trittel, G�nter J. "Hungerkrise und kollertiver Protest ein Westdeutschland (1945-1949)'" in Manfred Gailus and Heinrich Volkmann, eds. Der Kampf um das t�gliche Brot. Nahrungsmangel, Versorgungspolitik und Protest 1770-1990 (Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 1994), pp. 377-91.

Wiggers, Richard Dominic. "The United States and the refusal to feed German civilians after World War II." in Steven Bela Vardy and T. Hunt Tooley, eds. Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Boulder: Columbia University Press, 2003).

Willoughby, John. Remaking the Conquering Heroes: The Postwar American Occupation of Germany (Palgrave Macmillan/Palgrave, 2003).

Ziemke, Earl F. The U.S. Army In The Occupation of Germany 1944�1946.

"Pas de Pagaille!" Time Magazine (July 28, 1947).







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Created: 5:28 AM 4/28/2012
Last updated: 5:51 PM 2/17/2019