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The British political leadership even before Chamberlain became primeminister with the rise of the NAZIs in Germany adopted the policy of appeasement. The British as a result did not respond approptriateky with Hitler launched a massive rearmament program, including a new airforce. Chamberlain explained to intimates that what Churchill and his friends did not understand was that Britain did not need to match the Germans, only to have a defense estblishment that was caable of hurting Germany. He believed that would be sufficent to disuade Hitler. The focus of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in an era of limited budgets before the War was to build a strategic bomber force with the assumption that the 'bomobers would always get through'. The idea was that this would disuade the Germans from launching another war. Fewer resources were put into fighter development to the point that Britain nearly entered the War with canvas body bi-planes fighters that would have been totally outclassed by the advanced German all-metal mono-wing Me-109. (The Royal Navy did have to enter the war with bi-planes.) The need for fighters to escort the bombers was not understood by the British. The investment in bombers proved a tragic mistake. Prime Minister Chamberlain and the French declined to use them as they would invited German retaliation on French cities. In addition the British bombers had limited capabilities. They were slow and poorly armed. German Me-109s fighters cut them to pieces during the day and the bombers did not have the navigational capabilities to bomb at night. With the fall of France, German cities were largely out of range to British bombers. RAF Fighter Command was not totally neglected, primarily because the need for fighters to intercept bomber raids picked up by the Chain Home Network was understood. Limited financing, however, limited fighter development. British fighters faired poorly in the initial fighting in France (1939-40). Pilot and coimmand inexperience and the lack of radar to protect air fields were some of the problem. Fortuntely for the British, the Channel stopped the Panzers. Thus the campaign shifted to the air. And the RAF with the support of radar was able to score the first Allied victory of the War--the Battle of Britain. The British victory was of greater importance than generally recognized. It did even more than just saving Britain. After the Blitz, the British set out to build a modern strategic bomber force to bring the war to the Germans. The result was the iconic Avro Lancaster. A huge portion of the British war economy was devoted to building a strategic bombing force which the British hoped could win the war without the huge infantry losses of World War I. RAF Bomber Command would join the American Eighth Air Force in the around the clock bombardment of NAZI Germany, the Americans by day and the British by night.
The first British air units were formed eight years after the 1903 Wright Brothers' flight took place in America (1911). The Royal Engineers formed an air battalion made up of one balloon and one airplane company (1911). The Admiralty also formed the first naval flying school, at the Royal Aero Club ground at Eastchurch, Kent a few months later (1911). The British decided to set up a combined Royal Flying Corps (RFC) with naval and army wings and a Central Flying School at Upavon (1912). The specialized training needed for naval aviation soon became apparent. Separate organization were establish just before World War I broke out. The the naval wing of the RFC became the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), the military wing retaining the title Royal Flying Corps (1914). The RFC at the outbreak of hostilities had 179 aircraft although only a small number were actually serviceable. They dispatched four squadrons to France with the BEF. Britain sought to significantly expand The RRC. At first they had to but engines from French manufacturers. The Sopwith Camel was one of the best known British fighters during the War. Near the end of the War, the British decided to reform a combined army-navy air service. They combined the RNAS and RFC were into the Royal Air Force (RAF) (1918). The RAF was constituted as a separate service with its own ministry under a secretary of state for air. The strength of the RAF at the end of the War was almost 291,000 officers and airmen (November 1918). It had organized 200 operational squadrons and about the same number of training squadrons having a combined total of 22,647 aircraft. The British would be the first country to suffer from a strategic bombing campaign. The Germnans would use both Zepplins and the Gotha Bomberr to strike British cities, especially London. The nombing would have no realmimpact oin the War, except tohighten animosity toeward the Germans. It eould, however have a real imopact ion World War II. After the War the RAF set up a cadet college at Cranwell, Lincolnshire to train officers (1920). The RAF staff college was opened at Andover, Hampshire (1922).
Britain since the initial American Wright Brothersl Flyers played a major role in the development of aviation. The British built some of the most effective World War I aircraft, including the Sopwith Camel, the Sopwith Triplane, the SE-5A and the Bristol Fighter. At the end of WorldcWar vI the British possessed the world's largest air force (more e than 22,000 planes) and was preparing a strategic bombing campaign against Germany. After World War I, a number of British companies were active in aviation. The British produced a series of sleek and fast seaplane racers which dominated international competitions (1920s). The great Empire Flying Boats came into service. Aviation experts experiments with air-to-air fuelling. De Havilland produced sleek airliners like the Albatross. Researchers experimented with radar. British women fliers (Amy Johnson and Jean Batten) competed witb America's Amelia Aerheart. Britain at the time that Hitler seized power in Germany (1933) had the largest aviation indistry in Europe. This made commercial since given the far-flung Empire. The rapid NAZI rearmament program suceeded in gaining air superority only because the British failed to respond in time. In contrasr to the funds the NAZIs lavished on the Luftwaffe, a parsimonious British Air Ministry almost cancelled the Spitfire project. The Royal Air Force almost entered World War II with biplanes still in service. (The Royal Navy did enter the War with biplanes.) The British had the capacity not onlt to match the Germans, but actually to outproduce them. Only Britain's abhorence of war and desire to avoid large military expenditures enabled the NAZI to gain the advantage that nearly resulted in Britain's defeat in World War II. As late as the Munich Crisis, Prime Minister Chamberlain was concinced that he could avoid war by reasining with Hitler (1938). Once Britain began to rearm, it rapidly closed the gap and by the time of the Battle of Britain, the British aviation industry was outproducing the Germans. The Royal Air Force eaked out a narrow victory in the Battle of Britain (1940). The problem for the British was not the availability of aircraft, but the fact that they did not have an adequate number of trained pilots to fly them. The Supermarine Spitfire arrived just in time to participate in the Battle of Britain. Few of the Spitfire pilots had much experiemce when they entered combat agsinst the experience Luftwaffe pilots. The British unlike the Germans had the indistrial capacity to produce both a tactical and strategic air force. Great Britain’s Vickers, Avro, Bristol, and De Havilland began building bombers in large numbers. Hawker and Supermarine concentrated on fighters. The British produced one of the great bombrs of the war--the Avro Lancaster. Royal Air Force Bomber command played a major role in the strategic air campign against Germany. Other important British World War II aircraft included the Spitfire, Hurricane, Typhoon, Tempest, Beaufighter, Sunderland, and Mosquito. The British produced the Gloster Meteor, one of the few jet aircraft to rnter service during the War. It was not as effective as the Luftwaffe ME-262.
The British political leadership even before Chamberlain became primeminister with the rise of the NAZIs in Germany adopted the policy of appeasement. The British as a result did not respond approptriateky with Hitler launched a massive rearmament program, including a new airforce. Chamberlain explained to intimates that what Churchill and his friends did not understand was that Britain did not need to match the Germans, only to have a defense estblishment that was caable of hurting Germany. He believed that would be sufficent to disuade Hitler. The focus of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in an era of limited budgets before the War was to build a strategic bomber force with the assumption that the 'bomobers would always get through'. The idea was that this would disuade the Germans from launching another war. In the Hoiuse of Commons debates, it was Churchill that largely focused in the Luftwaffe and Chamberlain's failure to keep up with the Geramsn. Others focused in the Royal mNaby and Army. Chamberlain has in many ways been treated unfairky, given what his options were, but one daming inductment is the extent to ewhich he kept the facts about German rearmament from the British public.
The Royal Air Firce in the inter-War era put a lot of their limited resources into building bombrers. Fewer resources were put into fighter development to the point that Britain nearly entered the War with canvas body bi-planes fighters that would have been totally outclassed by the advanced German all-metal mono-wing Me-109. (The Royal Navy did have to enter the war with bi-planes.) The need for fighters to escort the bombers was not understood by the British. The investment in bombers proved a tragic mistake. Prime Minister Chamberlain and the French declined to use them as they would invited German retaliation on French cities. In addition the British bombers had limited capabilities. They were slow and poorly armed. German Me-109s fighters cut them to pieces during the day and the bombers did not have the navigational capabilities to bomb at night. The RAF came very close to enterring World War II with bi-plane fighters. The Hurican was basically a biplane fixed with a mono-wing. The Spitfire was Britain's first true mono-wingb fighter.
RAF Fighter Command was not totally neglected, primarily because the need for fighters to intercept bomber raids picked up by the Chain Home Network was understood. Limited financing, however, limited fighter development. British fighters faired poorly in the initial fighting in France (1939-40). The Luftwaffe outclassed the British and French fighters in the Battle for France. It was, however, not because of the quality of the fighrers--it was alrgely due to tactics. Pilot and command inexperience and the lack of radar to protect air fields were some of the problem. The Britisha and French pursued defensive tactics, flying patrols which without radar was a failed strategy. Even so, they short down quite a number if German olanes. Unfirtunately the French as part of the armidtice, tuermn them all back oiver to the Germans. With the fall of France, German cities were largely out of range to British bombers.
he origins of the British Chain Home Network (CHN) lie in the German World War I Zeppelin raids on London and other British cities. In a twist of history, had the Germans not used the Zeppelins to raid British citiesm the CHN probably would not have been built and the Luftwaffe would have won the Battle of Britain. A Brirish researcher, Sir Robert Watson-Watt, working on thunder storms began using primitive radar. He notice that his experiments were spoiled when a plane flew by. This was not a major new discovery. Reserachers had noticed this phenomenon before Workd War I, but had no instruments to measure it. The Air Minisry concernd about possible bomber attacks, immediately latched on to Warson-Watt's work on Radio Directional Finding (RDF) The British were not the only country working on radar. Most contries with an air force, including the Germans, were researching it. The British with their fear of bombing, thanks to the Germans World War I raids, commited real resources to it. The result was the Chain Home Network (CH) which was operational along the British coast by 1940. A critical mistake made by the Luftwaffe was their failure to appreciate the critical importance of the British CH network. CH was a network of 52 overlapping radar stations from Pembrokeshire to the Falklands. [Davidson, p. 415.] This was the beginning of the so called Battle of the Beams and it was to have a major impact on the outcome of the Battle of Britain. Radar was not unknown to the Luftwaffe, but in 1940 they failed to fully appreciate its significance. The Germans were much less interested in radar at the time because they were primarily focused on offensive opeations and ground support. Radar at the time did not offer much that could contribute to that mission. The CH network allowed the RAF to effectively use its numerically inferrior forces to best advantage, in effect manifying the force. [Brown] Without radar, the RAF would have required a much larger fighter force than it had so it could maintain aerial patrols. The British CH network could follow Lufwaffe raiders while they were still forming up over France and then crossing the Channel. It was, however, an outward looking system. Once the Germans were overland, the RAF had to rely on ground observers to track the German planes. The radar could identify RAF planes with IFF, but only about a third of the RAF fighters were so equipped when the Battle of Britain began. The British defense was conducted from Oxbridge where the reports from the radar stations and ground observers were collected and evaluated so orders could bev issued to RAF Fighter Command. The Germans were aware of the CH network, although they did not fully appreciate its value. At an early stage of the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe went after the CH towers, but they proved difficult targets, especially as the RAF fighters savaged the slow-flying Stukas JU-87. The JU-87 was an effective ground support dive bommber and could have taken out the towers, but was vulnerable to modern fighters. They could be used only where the Luftwaffe had achieved aerial supperiority. After several JU-87 Stuka squadrons were devestated by FAF fighters, they were withdrawn from the campaign. And when the Germans did manage to hit a CH tower, they noted little impact. The CH towers wre overlapping. In addition, the British has mobile units ready to plug any gaps which the German bombers may have created. The Lufwaffe thus early on gave up even targetting the CH towers. It was one of a series of mistakes.
Fortuntely for the British, the Channel stopped the Panzers. Thus the campaign shifted to the air. And the RAF with the support of radar was able to score the first Allied victory of the War--the Battle of Britain. It was widely covered at the time, including nighly briacasts from America on the Blitz. The result was not just that the Luftwaffe was damaged, but it undermined the whole NAZI swar effort. Hitler's strategy was victory in the West so that he could turn all his effort on the Soviet Union. Viuctory in the West woyld make availanle vast resources. But the failure to defeat the British meant that not only could the Germans not immport the supplies thry needed, especioally oil, but they had to devote vast rsources to fight the war in the West, especially after Hitler broufgt America into the war. Much of HGermany's induisdtrial output was used to fight the war in the West. It did not take much industry to fight the Ostkrieg. Most of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry on foot with horse-frawn carts for supplies. In terms of manpower, the German effort was primarily in the East, but German industry was primarily diverted to the West. The war in the West in cintrast required vast industrial inputs. Hitler understood when he launched taht Germany would never be able to match his targets numerically, but he bet on the technological superiority of German industry. But not even 1 year into the War, the Bayyle of Britain showed that Germann technologu was being matched by the British. The British victory was of greater importance than generally recognized. It did even more than just saving Britain. It wasv avital stepmin saving Western Civilization.
Britain almost went to war wtih bi-plane fighter squadrons still in service to confront the fast German ME-109s. The Royal Navy did still use the Fairy Swordfish bi-planes on its carriers. British Hawker Huricans and Spitfires early in the War exposed weaknesses in the Luftwaffe. The British like the French also used their aircraft poorly, but fortunately haf the Channel which bought the time needed to adjust air combast tactics. The British produced an excellent fast light monbber--the Mosquito. It was made of plywood rather than aluminum which was hard to obtin. The British used the legendary Avro Lancaster to bomb at night, probably the most effective bomber of the War, until the B-29 came into service. The British began working on jets quite early in the War. They introduced the Glocester Meteor (1944). It was the only plane fast enough to chase a V-1. A Metror managed to tip the wing of the V-1! and send it spirling out of control to explode in the countryside. Meteor pilots sighted ME-262s, but I do not know of any actual air combat between the two jets.
After the Blitz, the British set out to build a modern strategic bomber force to bring the war to the Germans. The result was the iconic Avro Lancaster which began reaching RAF squadrind (March 1942). The Lanc had the range to reach German cuties and carried a substantial bomb load. It was used preinarily for night time raids. A huge portion of the British war economy was devoted to building a strategic bombing force which the British hoped could win the war without the huge infantry losses of World War I. A the same time Arthur Harris assumed command of Bomber Command. He ardenbtly brlieved that strategic bombing could win the war. The American Eighth Air Force would join Bomber Command in the around the clock bombardment of NAZI Germany, the Americans by day and the British by night. The Americans and British differed oin bombing tactics. The British were rught that even the hgeavilybarmed N-17 Superforts could not fight their way into German airsoace without unacceptable losses. Firtunately for the Amerrticans, the long-range P-51
Mustang fighers arrived to escort the bombers (December 1943). And within months they had largely destroyed the Luftwaffe--making the D-Day landings possible. Strategic bombing alone did not win the War, but it played a more important role than admitted by many. many of those who criticise the strategic bombing campaign do so for ehat they call humanitarian reasons rather than the facts involved. In addition to the damage to German war induistries, the bombing forced the Germans to divert huge resoursces from the Ostkrieg as wella s to withdraw the Liuftwaffe from the East and France to protect German resources.
As strategic bombing targetting distant sites became an important feature of World War II, the beligerant countries began developing navigational signals. The resulting technological effort became what is now called the Battle of the Beams or as Chufrchill phrased it--the Wizzard War. Here the Germans were even more ahead of the British than on radar. The German Freya radar was more advanced than anything in the Chin-Home Netwirk. And in this case were the first to develop a usable system. This is rather curious because the Germans had developed a largely tactical airfirce. It was the British that had ficused in bimbers, almost entering World War II with biplane figters, (Actually the Navy wsas still using biplanes well into the War.) The Luftwaffe began working on navaigational beams for bombers (1939). There first system was Knickebein (Crocked Leg), using a system of interesting beams. This was not at first of major importance to the Germans because the Luftwaffe was developed as a tactical air force. Its inintial assignments were daylight operations in support of ground forces. The German pilots and crews could over relatively short distances navigate by land marks or revive directions from ground spotters. This changed with the Battle of Britain, specificalkly the Blitz. When the Germans were forced to bomb at night because of day light losses, the began to use Knickebein which could direct the Luftwaffe bombers to the cities whuch were targetted. The system was not precise, but good enough to get the bombers to the targetted city at night. The British did not beliece that sych a system was possible because oif the vcuriuture of the earth. Thankfully British intelligence picked up some warmings and R.V, Jineses in Air Ministry (Intelligence) managed to detect the signals and develiop counter measures. What followed was a cat and mouse operatiin with tge Gerans developing new systens and the British counter measures. This declined in importance as the Luftwaffe withdrew most of their fighter and bomber squadrons to support the Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union (March 1941). It is at this point that the Battle of the Beams shifted primarily to British navigational beams. ncredably, RAF Bomber Command had no such systemns at the outbreak of the War. RAF bombers were susposed to find targers using celestial navigation. There was no effort to test the effectiveness of such findings which birders in sheer lunacy. Not surprisingly, early raids were not only inaccurate, but often could not even find whole cities. The British as a result, well after the War began, commenced working on navigational signals of their own. The British early in the War had found that their bombers could not attack during the day because of Luftwaffe fighter defenses and even when penetrating fighter defenbses, cloud cover often obscured ground land marks. Bomber Command thus has to shift to night bombing. They thus faced the same problem the Luftwaffe faced--navigation. Thus the Briish developed navigation beam systems pf their own: Gee and Oboe were developed. Gee-H eventually proved so precise that RAF Bomber Command could bomb more accurately at night than the Americans during the day with their Nordon Bombsights.
The RAF began the War with adesperate effort toi deal weith the Luftwaffe in France and then over Britiain itself. There were few resources available for British outposts in the Mediterranean, especially when they were under no immediate threat. Thus cahnged wh Missolini eager to latch on to the German victories declared war. This brought Egypt and Malta into the fronr kine of the War (June 1940). At the time Malta had three obsolete biplanes for an air defebnse--chrudtened Faith, Hope, and Charity. The Bruitish dirces guarding the Suez Canal in Egypt was in only slightly better shape. This was the origins of the Desert Air Force (DAF) with many other names., It was created from No. 204 Group RAF under RAF Middle East Command in North Africa (1941). It was tasked with providing close air support to the British Eighth Army against the Gernan Afrika Korps. The DAD, at the time called the Western Desert Air Forces had 16 squadrons of aircraft (nine fighter, six medium bomber and one tactical reconnaissance) and fielded approximately 1,000 combat aircraft (October 1941). A year later, for the Second Battle of El Alamein, the DAF fielded 29 squadrons (including nine South African and three USAAF units) flying Boston, Baltimore and Mitchell medium bombers; Hurricane, Kittyhawk, Tomahawk, Warhawk and Spitfire fighters and fighter-bombers (October 1942). This totaled 1,500 combat aircraft, more than twice Axis contingent. And the DAF had all the fuel they needed while Axis dorced were being starved of fuel. The RAF began the War with a ineffective tactical docrtrune for aeweial combat. This was recyfied diring the Nattle of Britain. The RAF still had no close air aupport dictrine which the Geramns had from the beginning of the war in Poland. It was only in the Wester Desert that the DAF behan to develop close airt dsuppoort tactivs. (The Ameriucans foicused ion strategic bomving alsi did not have a close air support dictrine.) Furher advances were made in Utaly (1943-44). Allied clodse-air support would not be fully develooped until D-Day. The DAF consisted of squadrons from the Royal Air Force (RAF), the South African Air Force (SAAF), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and other Allied units.
The Nattle of the AStlantic begam with engagements netweem a few poorly armed escorts and U-boats. Gradually more escorts appeared and more advanced weaponty was developed. The key to feating the U-boats, however, was air cover. The U-bpats could not operate with aircraft overhead, especially akrcraft with effective weaponry, The British effort in the Atlantic was at first hobbeked by the limited strength of Coastal Command. Bomberr Command did not want to release therir bombers for convoy duty. And the moners they had hada limited rnanhe. One of the most efferctive wsas the Short Sundetland (Flying Porcupine). While Coastal Command could eventually cover the Western apopriaches. it would be the Americans and the B-24bLiberator that eoulkd finally close the Mid-Atlantic Gap. This was not just a matter of armed aircraft overhead. One of the most important Allied weapon of the War was the cavity magnitron, invented by the Britis and perfected and mass produced by the Americans. The cavity magnitron miaturized radar--allowing it to be carried by radar. This greatly expanded the search rngee of aircraft. Evebntually U-boats could be detected throughout the Atlantic and hunter killer grouos directed to destroy them.
The China-Burma-India Theater began badly for the British. And failure iun theair was a large oartnof the problemn , beginning with the destructiin of Force Z (Prince of Wales and Repulse). The British assessment wa that the Jaoanese were incapanle of develolping advanced aircraft on their own. Not only dis they sink Force Z, but quickly overwealmed Singao=por's small air contingent. Jaoanee air dominanceplayed akey role in the fall of Singapore and the Japanse conquest of Burma. The American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) was unable to save Burma, but would transform the air war in China. The Britosh and American retreated to India. From India, the Americans would fly aid to China over the Hump. The reconquest of Burma would be a largely accomplished by Nritish Empire forces, but the Americamns would play a major role in air operations that made this possible.
Davidson, Eugene. The Umaking of Adolf Hitler (Univesity of Missouri: Columbia, 1996), 519p.
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