Figure 1.--This image of the German Ostheer could not be more telling. Study the image. There are bikes and horses, but not a motor vehicle any where in sight. Now American and British infantry were on foot at the front, but these solders are not at the front, but moving toward and obviously distant front. Look at the horizon to assess the distanc they are moving on foot. The idea of invading the Soviet Union on foot is ludicrous, but it is exactly what the Germans did. This is not unlike how Napoleon's Grand Armee invaded Russia in 1812, albit these Germans at least had bicycles. It is true that the Germans had poweful, well equipped Panzer divisions, but what you see here is what the great bulk of the Deutsche Ostheer looked like and moved. (Notice how different it is from the Newsreels ('Die Deutsche Wochenschau') Goebbels showed to the German people.) And while Hitler committed the vast majority of German MANPOWER to the East, he devoted German INDUSTRIAL OUPUT primarily to the West, leaving the Ostheer poorly equipped and supplied for the decisive campaign of World War II. Just look at this group and ask yourself, how much industry was required to equip units like this. And remember that what you see here is what constituted something like 80 percent of the Ostheer.

Germany was a major industrial country, but not the world's dominant or even largest industrial power. Thus German industrial allocations had to be carefully calculated if they were to win the War. Fortunately for mankind, they were not. And this was especially true of the war in the East with the Soviet Union--the Ostkrieg. The Ostkrieg was certainly the decisive engagement of World War II. Whoever prevailed there was going to win the War. The Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign did far more than damage German war industry, it forced the NAZIs to devote the majority of Germany's potent, but limited industrial power on the war in the West instead of where it was most needed--the Ostheer. Contrary to popular conceptions, the German economy was not effectively harnessed for war. Civilian consumption was not drastically curtailed as was the case in Britain. Women were not further mobilized for war work, especially married women. Industrial production was not totally directed at the War effort. Only when the War began to go against Germany and Albert Speer was appointed Armaments Minister (1942) did German industry begin to take needed steps to maximize production and reach some of its potential. 【Speer 】 The Germans, as a result, despite the bombing were able to expand war production. This was the case through 1943. Only in late 1944 and the full force of the strategic bombing force was released from D-Day support did the German economy begin to collapse under the weight of Allied bombing. Some have used this to charge that the Allied bombing campaign was ineffective and a misallocations of resources. This is not the case. Without the bombing, the Germans could have substantially increased war production in 1942 and 43. Some time ago I notice a comment in an important book on World War II. The author states that the German war economy was oriented to the war in the West, and not the Ostkrieg. 【Weinberg 】 That rather surprised us at the time, but we have since come to conclusion that he was absolutely correct. It took a huge industrial effort to support operations in the West (the West Wall the Air War, the Battle of the Atlantic, the Atlantic Wall, the V-Weapons, etc.). In contrast the Ostheer was mostly unmotorized infantry using horse-drawn carts. We are always amazed that when authors describe the Ostkrieg, they almost always phrase the importance in terms of manpower (German deployment and casualties), never in terms of industrial power. Manpower is important, but as any military historian knows, it is only one factor in warfare, and not always the most important. Our contention is that the War in the West forced Hitler to send the Ostheer into the Soviet Union largely on foot and once there without the industrial support needed for the decisive engagement of the War.

Industrial Mobilization (1943)

Hitler and others in the NAZI Party and Wehrmacht hierarchy believed that Germany had lost Wold War I because of a collapse of the home front. There was widespread belief that the 'November Criminals' had betrayed Germany--a total fabrication. The collapse of civilian morale, largely because of privations, was however, very real. Hitler thus was unwilling to order total mobilization of the German War economy because of concern about civilian morale. The early victories came so easily (1939-40), that he actually partially demobilization and suspended some military projects. Hitler was convinced after the fall of France (June 1940), that Germany had won the War. Only after the shocking defeats in 1942, did the NAZIs turn to total mobilization overseen after the death of Fritz Todt by Albert Speer. Some authors think Speer's role is overstated, but there is no denying that total war mobilization as proclaimed by Propaganda Minister Goebbels was the goal. and this was going to impact the Home Front. Even so, the German population fared fairly well until they were driven out of the occupied countries that they were exploiting.

Manpower

The German Army was committed to Poland and the Western Offensive leading to the fall of France. (1939-40). Afdter a short Balkans campaign, the bulk of the German Army was committed on the Eastern Front for the Ostkrieg or Great Patriotic War as the Soviets called it. The Germans launched 150 divisions and some 30 allied divisions into the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa. German manpower in the east varied from 2.5-3.4 million (1941-44). Only in 1945 did it fall below 2.0 million. It was the decisive theater of the War and more forces were committed there than in any other theater of World WAR II--actually any other military campaign in history. Even after the Allies landed in Normandy (June 1944), the Ostheer was the primary German force. And it is absolutely true that in terms of manpower, it was the Soviet Red Army that cut the heart out of the German Wehrmacht. Some 70–85 million people perished during World War II, around 30 million of that number are believed to have been killed occurred on the Eastern Front, including 9 million children. 【Krivosheev 】 The Red Army was responsible for killing some 4.5 million German soldiers while the Western Allies accounted for only about 0.5 million German military deaths. The POW numbers taken are closer, but most of POWs taken by the Western Allies were taken in the final months of the War, especially after the Allies crossed the Rhine (March 1945). Notice that when the Soviet role in the War is presented, it almost always is exclusively or primarily focused on the German casualties, especially the deaths. These figures vary somewhat, depending on the source, but all of the reasonably dependable source show that it was the Red Army that cut the heart out of the Wehrmacht. There is no denying this.

Casualties

Manpower is a vital component of combat power. But it is not the only component. If it was, China would have won World War II. Yet we have historian after historian, highly competent academic declaring that the Red Army was the major factor in the defeat of NAZI Germany. And to prove this they use the same statistics, basically about 75-80 percent of the casualties sustained by the Germans were lost in the Ostkrieg. A respected military historian states flat out that 8 of every 11 German casualties were sustained in the East and "that should tell you roughly the proportion of their contribution to victory." 【House 】 The first part of this statement is the casualty statistic which is absolutely correct. The proportionality to victory, however, is absurd and it is difficult to understand why a competent historian would make such a claim. Manpower is only one element of combat power. Economics, industry, technology, raw material, and other factors are also important. And the Red Army victory is in large measure because Germany did not support the Ostheer adequately with its sizeable industrial sector. The Soviet economy was comparable to the German economy, but not as heavily industrialized. And a substantial part of industry and resources was lost as a result of Barbarossa. So why was the Ostheer so poorly equipped. The same historian who claims that manpower was key admits that Hitler sent an army mostly composed of ummotorized infantry east largely on foot. 【House 】 So why were the Germans unable to adequately equip the Ostheer? There are two primary reasons for this. First, the Soviets had adopted American-style mass production techniques and the Germans had not. Second, the Germans were forced to devote most of their industry to waging the war in the West. It does not take much industry to build the horse carts that went east with the Ostheer. It does take a lot of industry to wage the naval conflict in the North Atlantic and the air war over the Reich.

The Deutsche Ostheer

The Germany invaded the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa (June 1941). Until that the German Army was mostly deployed in the Erst. With Barbarossa The German Army was primarily committed to the East. The Ostkrieg became the decisive campaign of the War. The German Army is often represented as a thoroughly mechanized, modern force. Nothing could be further from the actual situation. They certainly had some powerful Panzer divisions with motorized infantry. As the war progressed, the tank compliment of the divisions steadily declined. These modern, mechanized units, however, were a small part of the Ostheer. This would be about 20-25 percent of the Ostheer. The rest, the great bulk of the Ostheer, was unmotorized infantry which moved east with horse-drawn carts carrying their supplies as well as moving artillery. This is why that 0.6 million horses were part of the Barbarossa force. This also mean that German logistics had to include using valuable supply shipment for the huge quantity of fodder needed for those horses. Notice that German war films give little attention to the unmotorized infantry and horses. Rather the official photographers focused on the Panzers and Luftwaffe. Not doubt they had orders to do this. It was not the image that Goebbels wanted to depict in thee weekly newsreels--'Die Deutsche Wochenschau'. But it means that existing footage gives the wrong impression. Rarely pictured was the great mass of the Ostheer moving east on foot. And it dies not taken much industry to build horse carts. A major reason for this was that most of German industrial production supported the War in the West. 【Weinberg 】 This left Ostheer poorly equipped and supplied. And it meant that they were vulnerable as the Red Army recovered from the Barbarossa disasters and began to become increasingly well armed and led.

Red Army Success

We do not wish to diminish in any way the bravery and determination of the Red Army. While we are critical of the brutal Soviet leadership, the Red Army soldiers and Soviet civilians paid a terrible price for their victory. And it was they who stopped the German Ostheer and defeated it. We all owe a great deal to these courageous men and women. Nothing can take away from this historic accomplishment. But we do object to Soviet and modern Russian authors who seek to dismiss the Western contribution. Any competent military historian knows that manpower is only one element in military power. A very important element to be sure, but only one. Other vital inter-related factors include economics (industry and agriculture), geography, ideology, technology, weaponry, and other elements. And when these factors are considered, the Western contribution to the War, even the fighting in the East can be seen as vital. Not only did American and British Lend Lease shipments play an important role in equipping and feeding the Red Army, but the war in the West while not involving the manpower of Ostkrieg, forced the Germans to commit most of their industrial output to fight the Western Allies. As a result, the Ostheer was poorly supplied and equipped. Only about 20-25 percent of the German Ostheer and virtually none of their allied forces (Croatian, Finn, Hungary Italian, Romanian, and Spanish) was motorized or well equipped. The great bulk of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry which moved east on foot. If Germany industry was not delivered to the West, the Ostheer would have been much better equipped significantly enhancing its combat power. Just look at the German unit here moving east on foot and assess its combat power. Notice the lack of heavy weaponry. Their supplies were moved with horse-drawn carts.

German Industry: Military Output

It is absolutely correct that that the bulk of German military manpower was committed in the East beginning with the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). It should not be assumed that because 75-80 percent of German manpower was deployed in the Ostkrieg that this automatically meant that 75-80 percent of German industrial output was devoted to the Ostkrieg. This is an assumption that many authors make. And it is incorrect. Something like 75 percent of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry moving East on foot with supplies moving up with horse-drawn carts. Much of their artillery was also moved by horses. Now industry was needed to equip the Panzer Divisions and motorized infantry that accompanied the Panzers--but this was a small part of the Ostkrieg. And it takes very little industry to produce horse carts and shoe leather. In sharp contrast it took a great deal of industry to produce the planes and ships which were primarily used to fight the war in the West. Even ordinance did not equate with troop disposition. Enormous quantities of ammunition were expended by the anti-aircraft batteries that defended German cities. Something like 3,300 shells were fired for every bomber brought down. This was an enormous price for the ammunition expenditure and the valuable 88 mm guns that were diverted from the Ostkrieg where the war was being decided. In fact the two largest industrial expenditures for the Germans were aircraft and and ships (including U-boats). And most of the German planes and virtually all ships were committed to the war in the West. Aircraft alone accounted for something like half of German industrial production for the military.

Major Industrial Commitments

We notice one historian after another making the point that the war in the East (Ostkrieg) dwarfed the war in the west. And the data they present to prove their contention is almost always manpower. Now here they are correct. The size of the Red Army and Ostheer dwarfed the forces in the West. Both the number of combatants and casualties were enormous, both Axis and Soviet. This is absolutely true. The forces deployed were immense as were the losses. The Red Army essentially tore the heart out of the German Heer in the savage fighting on the Eastern Front. But as any military historian should know, manpower is not the sole factor in generating combat power. World War II more than any war in history was an industrial struggle. And the deployment of manpower does not mean that the commitment of industrial power is identical. In fact there were gross disparities between German industrial support for the Ostheer and its western forces. As a result, the vast majority of the Ostheer was unmotorized infantry on foot using horses and bicycles as we see here (figure 1). And there is very little industrial output required to equip these divisions with horse-drawn carts and bicycles. German infantry divisins had very bfew vehucles. Allied infantry divisions in contrat has sizeable nehicle allotment. The Germans had powerful motorized Panzer divisions in the East, but the problem for the Germans was that they were such a small part of the Ostheer, only about 20 percent. The reason for this was in large part the war in the West. At the beginning of the War, both the Red Army and the Ostheer were largely unmotorized. But as the War progressed the Germans largely because of fuel problems became less motorized while the Red Army became more motorized, in part because of American Lend Lend deliveries of trucks. And while the War in the West involved far fewer combatants, unlike the Ostkrieg, the effort in the West required the commitment of the bulk of German industry output. This included not only equipping German combat forces, but also massive construction projects such as the West Wall and Atlanic Wall. All of this industrial effort going to support the War in the West meant that the Ostheer fighting the decisive battle of the War was poorly equipped and supported--a major reason for their failuree.

Disrupting NAZI War Production

The War in the West not only forced the Germans to direct most of their industrial output to the West, but it also weakened the German war economy in two important ways. First the Strategic Bombing Campaign not only damaged Germans industrial plants, but forced the Germans to adjust production by diversifying manufacture (shifting to smkller disprsed plants) and going underground. both of which adversely affected production quantity and quality as well as increasing demnds on the transport sector. Second, the British and than the Anglo-American blockade made it impossible for the Germans to import needed raw materials, except from neutral countries that were in danger of NAZI invasion. Germany lacked almost all raw materials, especially oil. And the blockade prevented major imports except from Axis ally Romania and the Soviet Union -- as long as the NAZI-Soviet alliance lasted (1939-41).

Assessment

We do not meamn to denigrate the monumental achievement of the Red rmy and Soviet people. It was the Red Army that tore the heart out of the Osther which was the dominant German military formation. The point we are trying to make is the War in the West forced the Germnans to devote much of their war economy to fighting the Western Allies rather than giving the Ostheer the material support it needed to destroy the Red Army. This means that the destruction of NAZI Germany was truky a joint effort o=f the Grand Allianmce with bith the Soviets and Western Allies mnaking very real contributiions. Our issue uis with Soviets and now Riussians whjo insist that they sungle-handedly defeated NAZI Germany and that the War in the West was a mere side show. This argument has been picked up by Marrxist university prpfessors who look for arguments to denegrate the West inckluding the Western war effort.

Historical Reassment

Now we think it is absolutely true that the Soviet Red Army played a central role in the War and that the Soviet role was often overstated in the West. There are two reasons for this. First, every country is primarily interested in the performance of their own fiughting men. For this reason Hollywood and Britush bstydios have mostly made films about the War on the West. And American and Broitiush studios for the same reason have mostly wrote about the war in the West. Jtst as Soviet historians have mostky wrote about the Osrkrieg. Second, the Soviet Unioin and now Russian has be mostly closed Soviet archives to Western historians. This has mean that Western historians unterested in the Ostkrieg have been unable to research it. It is a little dusengernious to complin that your country's achievement are poorly recognized and at the same time prevent scholars from studying those achievements.

New Work

After the War, Western historians focused almost exclusively on the War in the West. Then there was a period when many Wester histirians looking primarily at the huge domensions of the Ostkrieg, especially the manpoower commitments began to downplay the war in the West. Increasingly today there is a geater appreciation of the War in the West. World War II has come to be see as a titanic land battle, decided by mass armies, most importantly those on the Eastern Front. One hustiruan shows us the war in a completely different light. In this compelling new history of the Allied path to victory, he argues that in terms of production, technology and economic power, the war was far more a contest of air and sea than of land supremacy. He shows how the Allies developed a predominance of air and sea power which put unbearable pressure on Germany and Japan's entire war-fighting machine from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Air and sea power dramatically expanded the area of battle and allowed the Allies to destroy over half of the Axis' equipment before it had even reached the traditional 'battlefield'. Battles such as El Alamein, Stalingrad and Kursk did not win World War II; air and sea power did. 【O'Brien 】 We tend to bsee the Ostkrieg as somewhat more impoerabt than O'Brien, but his book provides an accurate assessment iof the vital omprtanbce of the War in the West.

Sources

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Dyson, Freeman (1979). Disturbing the Universe (Harper & Row: 1979).

House, Jonathn M. "Why Germany lost: The three alibis," World War II History Roundtable (January 11, 2014).

Irons, Roy. Hitler's Terror Weapons: The Price of Vengeance (Harper: United Kingdom, 2002).

Krivosheev, G.I. Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses. (Greenhill: 1997).

Kuehn, John. "War on the Atlantic, Not Battle of: Misconceptions & Clarifications" Dole Institute talk (2014).

Kurtukov, Igor, "Профессионалы изучают логистику"

McNab, Chris. (20 March 2014). Hitler’s Fortresses: German Fortifications and Defences 1939–45 (Bloomsbury Publishing: 2014).

O'Brien, Phillips Payson. How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II (Cambridge Military Histories: 2015).

Ordway, Frederick I, and Mitchell R. Sharpe. (2003). Ed. Robert Godwin. The Rocket Team Space Series No. 36 (Apogee Books: 2003)

Speer, Albert. Richard and Clara Winston, trans. Inside the Third Reich (Avon Books: New York, 1970), 734p.

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Westermann, Edward B. Flak: German Anti-aircraft Defenses 1914–1945 . Modern War Studies. (University Press of Kansas: 2001).

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