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The German Western Offensive is generally depicted as a stunning victory at low cost with no serious opposition. It certainly was a stunning victory at minimal cost compared to the 4 years of combat during World War I. And the Heer's ground losses were relatively limited, especially against a country with a large, well armed modern army. The Luftwaffe's air losses ere different matter. Despite the Luftwaffe victories, there were serious German losses. Rarely mentioned is that the Germans lost about 1,400 aircraft and a substantial number of crews. Such a number is substantial especially as the size of air forces in 1940 were much smaller than would be case of fore size in th the subsequent war years. And the losses were sustained in only 6 weeks of combat. This was apparently twice as costly as the German planners had anticipated. German Air Ace Adolf Galland after the campaign was extremely dismissive of the opposing aircraft, writing, "In addition to obsolete Hurricanes the pilots flew French types: Morane, Bloch, and Potez. Our Me-109E was technically superior to them all." 【Robinson, pp. 122-23. 】 After the Battle of Britain began , he would speak very differently about the Spitfire. He believed that by the time Dunkirk was abandoned, that the "The enemy air force was heavily damaged. .... The extensive losses it had sustained began to make itself felt." He seems to have badly misjudged the situation. Much of the French Air Force had been deployed in the south. Some sources say that the French air Force was largely destroyed. One historian maintains. "At the armistice the French air force was still stronger than it had been on the 10th May." 【Horne 】 It is true that the Royal Air Force (RAF) Hurricane squadrons committed to France were badly mauled. There were over 900 aircraft lost, including 453 Hurricanes. Often not mentioned by historians and apparently not appreciated by the Germans, including Galland, is that most of the Hurricane losses were aircraft destroyed on the ground. There was no system like the Chain Home Network set up in France. It was something ignored by the French planners who built the Maginot Line. Thus the attacking air force, in this case the Germans, had a great advantage which they naively assumed they could repeat in the Battle of Britain. One study reveals that terrain analysis shows that 378 of th RAF losses 'were either destroyed on the ground, or were aircraft under repair that had to be abandoned.' 【Robinson, pp. 122-23. 】 That means that the Germans only shot down 75 Hurricanes in actual air combat. At the same time the Luftwaffe lost a substantial number of aircraft. We note a figure of 1,389 being commonly cited. Out of that number 367 fighters, mostly Me-109s. 【Robinson, pp. 122-23. 】 Another historian provides a slightly different figure. 【Hooton, Phoemix, pp. 267-68. 】 Unlike the Allies, few of the German fighters were shot up on the ground. That is a substantial number for a supposedly 'technically superior' fighters. We do not have a lot of detail about air combat during th Battle for France. The Dutch and Belgian Air Forces were composed of largely obsolete aircraft and at any rate mostly destroyed on the ground. Thus the German losses had to be mostly due to the RAF Hurricanes and French fighters. A CIH reader reports that the Germans lost a staggering amount of aircraft during Operation Fall Gelb, way more than they had anticipated. This not only included fighters. There was massive loss of transport planes, the most serious loss that was truly felt by the Germans. The Luftwaffe had about 800 Ju-52s when Hitler and Stalin launched World War II (September 1939), but by June 1940 only a quarter were still more or less operational. The losses in the earlier invasion of Norway were substantial. The losses during the invasion of the Netherlands were particularly heavy. The loss of almost 75 percent of the transport fleet was never fully compensated for during the war. It meant that as the Germans began planning Operation Sea Lion that they had little airborne capability to support a seaborne invasion. While the loss of the transports may not have made a major difference with Sea Lion. The shortage of transports certainly affected the German response at Stalingrad and Tunisia (November 1942). Another significant matter is the German pilots and air crews shot down. Some of course were killed or badly injured, but many survived and were perfectly healthy and interned in POW camps. As they were shot down over France, this meant French camps. The British tried to convince the French to transport than to England. But the French refused. And thus when France capitulated, the Luftwaffe recovered all of these highly trained men. They would be a substantial aid to the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain which turned into a battle of attrition with the RAF.
The German Western Offensive is generally depicted as a stunning victory at low cost with no serious opposition. It certainly was a stunning victory at minimal cost compared to the 4 years of combat during World War I. And the Heer's ground losses were relatively limited, especially against a country with a large, well armed modern army.
The Luftwaffe's air losses ere different matter. The Luftwaffe played a critical role in the German victory bin the West. Despite the Luftwaffe victories, however, there were serious German losses. Rarely mentioned is that the Germans lost about 1,400 aircraft and a substantial number of crews. Such a number is substantial especially as the size of air forces in 1940 were much smaller than would be case of fore size in th the subsequent war years. And the losses were sustained in only 6 weeks of combat. This was apparently twice as costly as the German planners had anticipated.
German Air Ace Adolf Galland after the campaign was extremely dismissive of the opposing aircraft, writing, "In addition to obsolete Hurricanes the pilots flew French types: Morane, Bloch, and Potez. Our Me-109E was technically superior to them all." 【Robinson, pp. 122-23. 】 After the Battle of Britain began , he would speak very differently about the Spitfire. He believed that by the time Dunkirk was abandoned, that the "The enemy air force was heavily damaged. .... The extensive losses it had sustained began to make itself felt." He seems to have badly misjudged the situation.
Much of the French Air Force had been deployed in the south. Some sources say that the French air Force was largely destroyed. One historian maintains. "At the armistice the French air force was still stronger than it had been on the 10th May." 【Horne 】
It is true that the Royal Air Force (RAF) Hurricane squadrons committed to France were badly mauled. There were over 900 aircraft lost, including 453 Hurricanes. Often not mentioned by historians and apparently not appreciated by the Germans, including Galland, is that most of the Hurricane losses were aircraft destroyed on the ground. There was no system like the Chain Home Network set up in France. It was something ignored by the French planners who built the Maginot Line. Thus the attacking air force, in this case the Germans, had a great advantage which they naively assumed they could repeat in the Battle of Britain. One study reveals that terrain analysis shows that 378 of th RAF losses 'were either destroyed on the ground, or were aircraft under repair that had to be abandoned.' 【Robinson, pp. 122-23. 】 That means that the Germans only shot down 75 Hurricanes in actual air combat.
At the same time the Luftwaffe lost a substantial number of aircraft. We note a figure of 1,389 being commonly cited. Out of that number 367 fighters, mostly Me-109s. 【Robinson, pp. 122-23. 】 Another historian provides a slightly different figure. 【Hooton, Phoemix, pp. 267-68. 】 Unlike the Allies, few of the German fighters were shot up on the ground. That is a substantial number for a supposedly 'technically superior' fighters.
There was massive loss of transport planes, the most serious loss that was truly felt by the Germans. The Luftwaffe had about 800 Ju-52s when Hitler and Stalin launched World War II (September 1939), but by June 1940 only a quarter were still more or less operational. The losses in the earlier invasion of Norway were substantial. The losses during the invasion of the Netherlands were particularly heavy. The loss of almost 75 percent of the transport fleet was never fully compensated for during the war. It meant that as the Germans began planning Operation Sea Lion that they had little airborne capability to support a seaborne invasion. While the loss of the transports may not have made a major difference with Sea Lion. The shortage of transports certainly affected the German response at Stalingrad and Tunisia (November 1942).
Another significant matter is the German pilots and air crews shot down. Some of course were killed or badly injured, but many survived and were perfectly healthy and interned in POW camps. As they were shot down over France, this meant French camps. The British tried to convince the French to transport than to England. But the French refused. And thus when France capitulated, the Luftwaffe recovered all of these highly trained men. They would be a substantial aid to the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain which turned into a battle of attrition with the RAF.
The Luftwaffe in 1940 was clearly the preeminent wold air force. It had the best trained and most experienced pilots and the most modern aircraft. It not only destoyed the air forces of the smaller countries, but after June, the French Air Force something it had no done in World War I. Now with bases stitching from the North Sea to the By of Biscay, it had the opportunity to knock out, the smaller, less experienced RAF. Of it had succeeded, it could then take on the large, but inexperienced Red Air Force. And as we know at the onset of Barbarossa, the campaign was a disaster for the Soviets. If they had knocked out the RAF, the strategic picture would have been very different. There would have been no air force in Europe to oppose them. But instead they they faced an RAF growing in strength. And a Red Air Force which was rebuilding beyond the Urals. (as the Red Air Force was largely destroyed on the ground--they still had a substantial corps of trained pilots. And across the Atlantic an American air force expanding at a rate the Germans dismissed as mere propsganda. But without Britain, the U.S. Army Ar Corps had no way of projecting its power to Europe. All the Germans had to do was to close the deal with British in the summer of 1940.
Almost never reported by World War II historians is that the Luftwaffe that flew into the Battle for France was not the same as the one came out of it. Fir the young pilots of the Luftwaffe it seemed as one author puts it that '... the sky itself had been handed to them.' Most assumed that the campaign against Britain would be no different than that against the RAF forces in France.
They enjoyed French beaches, looked at the White Cliffs of Dover through binoculars, and enjoyed the best French wines as the French Air fields were being readied and forces for the British campaign were being assembled. Unlike the Heer, the Luftwaffe had taken serious losses. And while it was much larger than the RAF, it was still a relatively small force. It was now a seriously damage force. Th Battle for France had been won, but at a substantial cost. The Luftwaffe had lost 30 percent of its bombers. And 20 percent of its Me-109 fighters. And this meant the aircrews that went with them. Crew that would take longer to train than to build air craft. Germany had not prepared for along war. And this showed starkly in the raining program for airmen. Such huge losses could not be easily replaced. Spare parts were hard to com by. And aircraft for anything beyond basic maintenance had to be return to factories in the Reich. There was no systematic rotation or rest ycle for pilots that had been heavily involved in combat since the Norwegian campaign (April 1940). There was no set tour of duty. German pilots flew until they were wounded or shot down. .
The Battle of Britain was the first major campaign fought in the air. The German initiated their long awaited western campaign in May 1940. Paris fell June 14 and France capitulated June 22. The fall of France meant that Britain stood alone and for a year had to valiantly fight the Germans without allies. American public opinion was decisively isolationist--against involvement in another European war. Most Europeans and Americans thought Britain would soon collapse and further resistance was futile. But the British stirred by Prime Minister Churchill did fight. The Luftwaffe quickly established bases in France and by July 10 launched preliminary strikes in what has come to be called the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe while better trained and outnumbering the RAF was ill prepared for the campaign. They did not appreciate the critical importance of the British home chain radar network. They also had no strategic bomber fleet. The air offensive was to be conducted with two engine bombers that proved highly effective in short range tactical operations, but were not well suited for longer-range strategic bombing. The Battle of Britain began in earnest on July 10 and reached intensive levels on August 13 with Luftwaffe raids on British airfields and aircraft factories. Hitler had assumed that the Luftwaffe could force the British to capitulate. He saw world politics in racial terms and in reality wanted the British as allies or at least neutrals in his planned invasion of the Soviet Union. Unlike his strategy against the Poles, Dutch, and Belgians, there were no German terror bombing of London and other British cities. The Luftwaffe im its August campaign seriously weakened the RAF and Fighter Command was having increasing difficulty maintaining its forward air bases in Kent. Then off-course German bombers accidentally bomb London on August 23-24. RAF Bomber Command on August 25-26 mounted a small reprisal raid against Berlin. Hitler is furious and orders an immediate change in Luftwaffe tactics. Rather than completing its offensive against the RAF infrastructure, Hitler ordered a "blitz" on British cities which began in earnest on September 7. The Luftwaffe wreaked havoc on civilians in London and major English cities. An estimated 42,000 civilians were killed. Thousands of civilians were killed. Edward R. Murrow broadcasting from London ("London calling ...") described Britain's valiant resistance to rapt American radio audiences, greatly affecting American attitudes toward the Hitler and the NAZIs. White British cities burned, the RAF was given a respite, allowing its forward air bases to recover from the damage done in August. As a result the RAF was able to mount increasingly costly attacks on the German bomber fleets. The Luftwaffe eventually is forced to shift to nighttime raids. Night bombing made it impossible to hit actually military and industrial targets, only cities could be targeted. The British were battered, but held. It was the first German defeat of the War. The narrow, but decisive victory in the Battle of Britain changed the course of the War. The Luftwaffe eventually ended the major offensive against the British as the German military in 1941 began preparing for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler's long awaited dream of invading the Soviet Union which at the time was a virtual German ally. As Hitler turned his evil view east toward Russia, a huge unsinkable aircraft carrier with a population willing to make virtually any sacrifice remained in his rear. For the NAZIs, the loss of the Battle of Britain was a crusing blow, not only because of the serious losses, but because it was a struggle involving scientific and technical ingenuity in which the Germans had assumed that they had a commanding lead.
Hooton, E.R. Phoenix Triumphant. Hoonton lists 1,428 Luftwaffe losses. This was mostly (1,129) mdue to enemy action. He lists 1,092 aircrew killed, 1,395 aircrew wounded, and 1,930 aircrew missing. Corresponding French losses were 574 a/c lost in the air (of which 174 were lost to Flak), 460 aircrew killed and another 120 taken prisoner. RAF losses were 959 aircraft (of which 477 were fighters and 381 bombers) and 912 aircrew killed or missing (of which 312 were pilots) and another 184 aircrew wounded.
Horne, Alistair. To lose a Battle - France 1940 (1969).
Robinson, Derek. Invasion 1940.
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