German Western Offensive: Lutwaffe Losses (May-June 1940)

Luftwaffe Western Offensive
Figure 1.--The Gerams launched their long-anticipated Wester Offensive (May 10, 1944). An important part of the assault in the Netherlands was conducted with the Junkers transport (Ju-52) -- a knock off of the Ford Tri-motor. The Ju-52s were used to drop paratroopers over airfields and bring in troops obce the airfield was secured. This is Ju-52 that crashed landed in afield somewhere in the area around Horst and Venlo, Limburg Province. A Dutch soldier is on guard while Dutch locals take a peek. The photograph was taken before the Germans had gained control, otherwise civilians would not have been allowed to approach it. The Germans lost a staggering amount of airplanes during 'Operation Fall Gelb', way more than they had anticipated. The massive loss of transport planes was the loss that was especially felt by the Germans. The Luftwaffe had some 800 Ju-52s when Hitler and Stalin launched the War (September 1939). By the time the fighting in France was over (June 1940), only about a quarter were still more or less operational. The loss of almost 75 percent of the air transport fleet was never fully compensated for during the war. It meant that in the subsequent planning for Operation Sea Lion>, there could be no significant paratroop component. While the loss of the transports may not have made a major dirrerence with Sea Lion. The shortage of transports afversely afected the German respnse at Stalingrad and Tunisia (November 1942). Photosource: War Museum Overloon/Liberty Park. Colorised by Dick Trom.

The German Western Offensive is generally depicted as a stunning victory at low cost with no serious opposition. It certainl was a stunning victory at minimal cost comapred to the 4 years of combat during World War I. Despite the Luftwaffe victories, there were serious German losses. Rarely mentioned is that the Germans lost about 1,400 aircraft ans a subsatntial number of air crews. Such a number is substantial especially as the size of air forces in 1940 were much smaller than in the subsequent war years. And the losses were sustained in only 6 weeks of combat. This was apparently twice as costly as the German planners had anticipated. German Air Ace Adolf Galland after the campaign was extremely submisive of the opposing aircraft, writing, "In addition to obsolete Hurricanes the pilots flew French types: Morane, Bloch, and Potez. Our ME109E was technically superior to them all." [Robinson, pp. 122-23.] He believed that by the time Dunkirk was abandoned, that the "The enemy air force was heavily damaged. .... The extensive losses it had sustained began to make itself felt." He seems to have badly misjudged the situation. Much of the French Air Force had been deployed in the south. Some sources say that the French air Force was largely destroyed. One historian maintains. "At the armistice the French air force was still stronger than it had been on the 10th May." [Horne] It is true that the Royal Air Force (RAF) Hurricane squadrons committed to France were badly mauled. There were over 900 aircraft lost, including 453 Hurricanes. Often not mentioned by historians and apparently not appreciated by the Germans, including Gulland, is that most of the Hurricane losses were aircraft destroyed on the ground. There was no system like the Chain Home Network set up in France. It was something ignored by the French planners who built the Maginot Line. Thus the attacking air force, in this case the Germans, had a great advantage which they naively assumed they could repeat in the Battle of Britain. One study reverals that terraines analysis shows that 378 of them "were either destroyed on the ground, or were aircraft under repair that had to be abandoned." [Robinson, pp. 122-23.] That means that the Germans only shot down 75 Hurricanes in actual air combat. At the same time the Luftwaffe lost a sunstantial number of aircraft. We note a figure of 1,389 being commonly cited. Out of that number 367 fighters, mostly Me-109s. [Robinson, pp. 122-23.] Another historian provides a slightly diferent figure. [Hooton, Phoemix, pp. 267-68.] Unlike the Allies, few of the German fighters were shot up on the ground. That is a substantial number for a susposedely 'technically superior' fighters. We do not have a lot of detail about air combat during th Battlr for France. The Dutch amd Belgian Air Forces were composed of largely obsolete aircraft and at any rate mostly destoyed on the ground. Thus the German losses had to be mostly due to the RAF Hurricanes and French fighters. A CIH reader reports that the Germans lost a staggering amount of aircrat during Operation Fall Gelb, way more than they had anticipated. This not only included fighters. There was massive loss of transport planes, the most serious oss that was truly felt by the Germans. The Luftwaffe had about 800 Ju-52s when Hitler and Stalin launced World War II (September 1939), but by June 1940 only a quarter were still more or less operational. The losses in the earlier invasion of Norway were substanial. The losses during the invasion of the Netherland were particularly heavy. The loss of almost 75 prercent of the transport fleet was never fully compensated for during the war. It meant that as the Germans began planning Operation Sea Lion that they had little airborne capability to support a seaborn invasion. While the loss of the transports may not have made a major dirrerence with Sea Lion. The shortage of transports afversely afected the German respnse at Stalingrad and Tunisia (November 1942). Another significant matter is the German pilots and air crews shot down. Some of coure were killed, but many survived and were intered in POW camps. As they were shot down over France, this meant French camps. The British tried to convince the French to transport than to England. But the French refused. And thus when France capitualted, the Luftwaffe recovered all of these highly trained men. They would be a substantial aid to the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain whivh turned into a battle of attritiion with the RAF.

Sources

Hooton, E.R. Phoenix Triumphant. Hoonton lists 1,428 Luftwaffe losses. This was mostly (1,129) mdue to enemy action. He lists 1,092 aircrew killed, 1,395 aircrew wounded, and 1,930 aircrew missing. Corresponding French losses were 574 a/c lost in the air (of which 174 were lost to Flak), 460 aircrew killed and another 120 taken prisoner. RAF losses were 959 aircraft (of which 477 were fighters and 381 bombers) and 912 aircrew killed or missing (of which 312 were pilots) and another 184 aircrew wounded.

Horne, Alistair. To lose a Battle - France 1940 (1969).

Robinson, Derek. Invasion 1940.








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Created: 4:09 AM 7/7/2019
Last updated: 4:09 AM 7/7/2019