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The character of the air war changed in 1942. While Bomber Command had proven largely ineffective in the first two years of the War, this changed in 1942 as the new Lancasters appeared in numbers. America entered the War at the end of 1941, but the British carroed the bulk of the air war in 1942 while the 8th Air Force was building its forces in Britain. The basic change in the air war came with the British attacks on Lübeck and Rostock. The British, learming from the Luftwaffe employed incendiaries which largely destoyed both cities. Now German civilians were experencing the War and the destruction of their cities. While there were military targets in both cities, the larger purpose was essentially to completely destroy the cities. Hitler was infuriated at the British raids and ordered the so-called Baedeker Raids which while damaging the target British towns, actually adveresly affected the German war effort. The NAZIs with the Luftwaffe seversly streached on far-fling battlefields, no longer had the capability of matching the growing strength of Bomber Command. The British followed with the first 1,000 bomber raid which devestated Cologne. Bomber Command was unable to repeat the Cologne raid, but by the end of the year, the number of bombers and air crews had grown and the American 8th Air Force was ready to enter the fight.
Churchill in part because of Bomber Command's inability to effectively hit targets in the Reich scalled back the stastegic bombing campaign (November 1941). The public and restive MPs were disappointed in Bomber Commnd's lack of success. Morale was falling. The failue to stop the German vessels (Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen, and Sharnhorst) in their "Channel Run" further diminished Bomber Command's reputation (February 12, 1942).
Within weeks of Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941), American air commanders were in Britain preparing for the creation of the 8th Air Force. There were huge tasks to be accomplished. Bases had to be located and built. Planes had ti be built and crews trained and then transported to Britain. These activities continued all through 1942. The first tentative American raids did not take place for months and were relatively small, limited range raids in the occupied Lowlands and France (August 1942). For 1942 it wa up for Bomber Command to take the war to Germany.
The successful German Channel Run was followed by the British capitulation in Singapore--the greatest mass surrender in British military history. Churchill needed a success. MPs were questioning the Government's leadership. Churchill decided to drop the limits on targets in the Reich.
It was at this time that Air Marshall Arthur Harris took command (February 22, 1942). Hev has been described as a cold, martinent. Perhaps, but he was also a highly competent commander. He strongly believed that air power was a war-winning force and that Germany could be bombed out of the War and was determined to put the concept of area bombing into practice. Harris did not invent the concept. Butit was Harris who was chosen to put the concept into pravctice. Having watched the Luftwaffe Blitz on London, he was well schooled as to how to do it. Harris was given orders that removed restrictions on Bomber Command's operations and instructions to target the civilian population, just as he Germans had done. Harris may have been wring that the strategic bombing of Germany alone could win the War, but there uis no doubt that stratehic bombing played a major role in the Allied vuctory aand Harris was at the heart of it. .
The force that Harris inherrited was still not up to the task of strategic bombing. It was still composed of older, largely obsolete types. Bomber command only had 69 heavies. This was, however, changing. British factories were turning out increasing numbers of improved types of heavy bombers (Stirlings, Halifaxes, and Lancasters). Harris saw that the failure of Bomber Command up this point was largely due to attempts at percession bombing at night. Especially imprtant were the Halifax and Lancaster. The Halifax began arriving earlier, but in small bumbers. The Lancaster began reaching Bomber Command squadrons in the same month as Harris, although at first in only small numbers. Harris was crituical of the Haklifax, but in fact bith the Halifax abnd Lancaster gave Bomber Command the caoability of for the first time brining the War home to the German people. The two most important bombers in the Allied arsenal would be the Lancaster and B-17 Flying Fortress.
We have separated the air war to discuss separately. Of course all three elenents of the European campaign was interelated. The critical Battle of the Atlantic was still in doubt during 1942. The Kriegs Marine had begun the War with only a small force of U-boats. With the success achieved, Hitler had given considerable priority to U-boat construction. As a result Admiral Doenitz had a much larger and growing force in the North Atlantic as well as French bases. He was was achieving consideravle success against Allied convoys. The Briitish gave priority to Bomber Command attacksw on U-boat bases and shipyards where U-boats were being built. Bomber Command raids, however, were restricted by the fact that substantial forces were diverted to North Atlantic convoy duty.
Ironically. Bomber Command's first success under Harris was a precession raid. Bomber Command with 235 mombers hit the Rebnault factory at Billancourt (March 3). It was a huge plant turning out tanks and other armoured vehicles. The effectiveness of the raid in part resulted from two innovations introduced by Harris: 1) marking the target and 2) massed formations.
The next target was in the high priority area--the Ruhr. Bomber Command with 211 planes hit Essen (March 8). The large Krup Plant there was unaffected. Essen was hit several more times, but proved a difficult target for Bomber Command. Efforts to mark the target and using the Gee system to direct actual bombing failed.
The first really effective attack on a German city was Bomber Command's assault on Lübeck. THe town wa a lovely medieval city, one of the old Hanseatic League cities. Bomber Command struck with a 234 bomber force which virtually destroying the historic city (March 28). Lübeck was a Baltic coast port which was an important supply point for Germnan forces in both Norway and Russia. It was also vulnerable because much of the city consisted of wooden houses. It took 32 hours to put out the fires. About half the bomb load was incenderaries. Half of the city was totally destoyed--the first German city to be destoyed in the War. Historians of the air war see the attack on Lübeck as a turning point. It was the first British raid on a city as a whole rather than a specific target in a city as well as extensive use of incendiaries. [Rumpf, p. 48.] There has been some discussion as to why Lübeck was chosen. There appears to have been large quantities of supplies three for the Eastern Front. One One observer insists that because the city was essentially an island that it made it easy to assess Bomber Command's new tactics. [Macmillan, Vol. IV p. 87.] The attack confirmed what the British had learned during the Blitz, the effectiveness of incendiaries. This was the only attack on Lübeck. The Red Cross succeeded in getting a British pledge, primarily because Red Cross supplies for POWs moved through the town.
Next Bomber Command hit Rostock, another Baltic port. It was even more important than Lübeck because of a nearby plant building Heinkel-111s as well as Arado plant.
Bomber Command launched 521 bombers. This was a major effort at this stage of the War. On the first night 468 bombers reached the city. The air craft plants wre hit, but the bulk of the attack appears to have been on the city itself. Nearly half of the bomb load was incinderaries, eflecting new British tactics. The British came in from the Baltic on four successive nights. Coastal cities were among the easiest to find. The city was also devestated. The Germans reported that 60 percent of the inner city was destroyed in the resulting fire. An estimated 100,000 residents had to be evacuated. Along with the loss of life and sugffering were the art treasures and buildongs of a beutiful medieval city. The British lost only 12 bombers.
The British had learned from the Germans. Harris estimated that the raids on Lübeck and Rostock alone had destoyed an area about equal to that destoyed by the Luftwaffe during the Blitz (1940-41). Wehrmacht casualties had begun to mount with the Red Army offensive before Moscow (December 1941). The raids on Lübeck and Rostock were the first actions that brought the War to German civilians. Virtually all major European wars since the Crimean War had been largely planned in Berlin, but fought on foreign territory. For the first time in a century, the British brought war to Germany. The terror and destruvtion that Germany had brought to other countries was now being visited on Germany itself. The Germans for the first time used the term "Terror" raids, a term that has become widely used by World War II historians. [[Rumpf, p. 53.] One wonders what Hitler and other NAZI leaders must have thought. Only a few months earlier they were sure they had essentially won the War, but with terrible losses in Russia and now the destruction of German cities, no one could now believe the war was won--aslthough most probably still believed that it would. Competent military planners, however, must have realized that Germany no longer faced a series of small, unprepared countries, but the combined forced of America, Britain, and the Soviet Union.
The Luftwaffe in 1942 was heavily committed in the East. Smaller forces were committed to the Mediterranean theater. The Luftwaffe was unprepared for the British attacks on cities in the Reich, especially massed bomber formations on the scale of the attacks on Rostock. Bomber Command's losses were relatibely light.
Hitler was had no quams about reducing Warsaw and London to ashes, was furious that German cities were being bombed. The problem that he faced was with German resources being increasingly taxed on far-fling battlefields, his means of resoinding were limited. He transferred two bomber groups of about 100 planes each from Sicly which conducted raids targeting historic treasures of British cities. Hitler at this stage of the War still spoke on German radio. He called the raids Terrorangriffe (terror attacks). His tirade is interesting. He had shown a willingness to attack the historic trasures of other coutries. His chief complaint was essentially that it was German cities being bombed. Hitler promissed to cross out the cities attacked from his Baedeker guide book. Baedekerthe was well known throughtout Europe before the War as publishers of tourist guide books. The British thus referred to them as Baedaker raids. The Luftwaffe destoyed some landmaks such as the cathedral town of Exeter (April 24) and the Regency town of Bath, destroying the Assessmby Rooms and many homes (April 25-27). Next the Luftwaffe it the cathedral town of Norwich (April 27-29).
The Luftwaffe staged a small raid on Canterbury (May 31). There was another small attack on York (October 31) in reprisal for Cologne and Mainz. This was the final reprisal raid. The depleted Luftwaffe was no longer capable of mounting these raids. Hitler was unable to strike again at Britain until the V-1 campaign following D-Day.
The Baedeker Raids had no real affect on the the British war effort, thet did, however, impair the German war effort. Removing the Luftwaffe bombers from Sicily helped relieve the critically important British bastion of Malta. Malta which at the time was barely stuggling to survive from intensive Axis bombardment. The Allies conducted the trategic bombing campaign without impairing other military operations. Hitler on the other hand ordered terror raids and used planes that had to be remove from major military operations. The first example was during the Battle of Britain when Hitler diverted forces attacking forward RAF bases to London. Here we see forces upon Hitler's orders being withdrawn from the critical Malta campaign . These were both critical, The ballance of forces, however, had turned decidedly against the Germans since the Blitz. The Luftwaffe no longer had a substantial force to throw at Britiain. Th Luftwaff was fully engaged in Russia and to a much lesser extent the Mediterranean. The German raiders dropped an estimated 3,300 t of bombs on Britaincontrasted to 53,800 t that the Allies dropped on Germany. [Tedder] These numbers are stark testimony to the extent to which the ballance of power had shifted in the air.
Harris and Bomber command were assembling a gigantic force--a 1,000 bomber strike. There was considerable difference of opinion over this raid. Most military experts at the time did not think a 1,000 bomber raid possible. Some Bomber Command planners thought the project to risky. Harris was single mindly commited to the undertaking. It was difficult to assemble the force. Bombers had to be recalled from North Atlantic comvoy duties. In the end it was a make-up force of many largely obsolete types were used, but Bomber Command mounted the first 1,000 bomber raid of the War. Until that time a Luftwaffe force of 487 bombers hitting London had been the largest raid of the War (October 1940). Both the Luftwaffe and Bomber Command normally had much smaller forces. Bomber Command struck Cologne, the third largest city in Germany (May 30). The bomber force ws assembled from 52 different airfields. The result was a stream of 1,046 planes was 70 miles long and they attacked in three waves. They easily found the city because of its location on the Rhine Rivr. The results was absolute devestation. The Luftwaffe had in raids on London, Coventry, and other British cities what incendiaries could do to a great city. The British used these lessons, but in raids on a scale far beyond the Luftwaffe attacks on Britain. The were firestorms which devestated the central cities. The deaths in the raid was realtively limited compared to upcoming raids, 600 acres of the city was destoyed along with 250 factories making machine toos, chemicals, and sunmarine parts. The damage exceededthat od Lübeck and Rostock combined. An estimated 45,000 people lost their homes and great masses of people clogged the roads out of the city. For the first time in the War, a new group of refugees appeared--German refugess. These losses need to be put in context. At the time of the Cologne raid, the NAZIs had the gas chambers in Auschwitz in operation. There were 460 people killed in the Cologne raid. The NAZI gas chambers in Auschwitz each had a capacity to kill 2,000 people at a time and could be used several times daily. Bomber Command lost 40 planes, much less than anticipated. Harris telephoned Churchill who was in Washington to brief him on the results. Harris was subsequently knighted. At the time, Bomber Command was the only Allied force effectively striking at the Germans. The Germans were astonished that the Allies could assemble such a force. They assumed that the Americans must have participated, but it was an all British force. [Rumpf, pp. 54-56.] A Dutch reader writes, "Cologne was bombed many times until there was nothing left to destroy anymore. The worst attack as you describe was on May 30 1942 when the British dropped 2,000 tons of high explosives on the city. The devastation was total, except for the famous cathedral that was severely damaged, but still standing. When I visited after the War in 1947 Cologne was still in ruins, but the streets were cleared and cleaned. There were piles of rubble everywhere. I remember eating ice cream in front of the Dom (cathedral) with my German cousins. We all knew what starvation was and we enjoyed the ice cream in spite of the fact that the quality was lousy." [Stueck]
The NAZIs were amazed when they learned that the Cologne raid was an all British raid. Consternation followed when Bomber Command staged further mass raids on Essen (June 1) and Bremen (June 25). Essen in particular was a target that Harris wanted. It proved a difficult target to find at night. Luftwaffe commanders for their part were astonished that the British could muster such massive forces and strike repeatedly. Unsaid was the fact that the American 8th Air Force was also building a large force and had not yet entered the fray. The attacks on Essen and Bremen, however, were largely ineffectual. Weather and navigational problems impaired results.
Bomber Command analysts were astonished by how rapidly Cologne recovered. Within just a month the city was returning to normal. Clearly Lord Cherwell and Sir Arthur were wildly optimistic about "bombing Germany out of the War". And these large raids were beyond the capability of Bomber Command to sustain as they were using cobbled together forces. Bombers were urgently needed for convoy duty. Bomber command gradually had to fall back to raids of no more than about 300 bombers for the rest of 1942. Harris had, however, showed what Bomber Command could do and continued acquiring more of the new Lancastrs and training crews. Harris also began to look forward to support from American who were now also building a massive momber force in England. Bomber Command planners Plan Branch was preparing for the 1943 campasiign.
At the beginning of the War no one really knew the potential impact of aerial bombardment. Some air commanders believed that the opponent could be literally bombed out of the War. This view was strengthened by Luftwaffe attacks on Warsaw and Rotterdam. The French decided not even to defend Paris, declaring it an open city. British resists brought the effectiveness of air power by itself into question, as did the impact of the massive British raids on Germany. Another factor that air commanders were learming was the accuracy of the raids. A combination of limited navigational accuracy, bad weather, and anti-air craft defenses and above all the need to bomb at night meant that only a limited number of bombers were actually able deliver theor bombs on target. Air inteligence found that only one-third of Bomber Command crews delivered their bombs to within 5 miles of the target. Britain by this stage of the War was devoting an enormous share of its limited resources to bomber construction. When Churchill was informed of these findings, he wrote "Unless we could improve on this there did not seem much use in continuing night bombing." [Churchill, p. 250.] Churchill noted that the bombing campaigned had not "lowered Germany's war production or civilian morale". [Churchill, p. 457.] Harris was not disuaded that and believed that an expanded bombing campaign could still crack German resistance. There was actually a reason, although I am not sure how much it entered into Churchill's calculations. Bomber Command for most of 1942 was the inly llied force striking at Germany. The bombing may have been accurate, but it forced the Germans to divert massive number of 88mm guns from the battlefield to anti-aircraft defenses. These were the same artillery pieces used as anti-tank weapons. It also forced the Lutwaffe to divert fighters and pilots from the East where the War was in effect being decided. The effort of the Western Allies was only minimal compared to the Soviet effort, but any effort was of some consequence at this stage of the War. The Luftwaffe had played a crucial role in the NAZI Western campaign during 1940. The Luftwaffe proved much less effective in the much more expansive Eastern campaign. The Luftwaffe was just not large enough to be able to fully support Wehrmacht operations. Diverting fighters to protect German cities as well as the Mediterrannean campaign further diluted the Luftwaffe's effectiveness in the East.
Luftwffe Commanders had a different assessment of the British strategic bombing campaign. British intelligence was coirrect that Germany's war economy had not been significantly affected by the bombing. What the British did not fully understand was the impact of the bombing on the Luftwaffe. The British has destroyed about 10 percent of the effective strength of the Luftwaffe, over 5,000 fighters and 3,800 other ar craft. The Germans had managed to expand aircraft production, but replavement crews were being rushed through the training so that they did not meet the standards of their predecessors. The trainees were rushed through the program because of the stress being placed on the Luftwaffe by the Allies, but also because of limited supplies of aviation fuel. The Luftwaffe in 1942 was turning out 900 pilots monthly, but they were not equal in quality or number to the Western Allies [Rumpf, p. 58.] And this dies not consider the rebuilding Red Air Force. The Germans had begun the war with the most powerful, modern, and best trained air force in the world. As a result of the fighting during 1942 and the Allied war effort, this was no longer the case. The Western Allies had planes of comparable quality, in greater numbers, and a more effective training program. Göring had assured the German public that enemeny bombers could not penetrate the Luftwaffe's protective shield. The British bombing campaign had proved that the Luftwaffe had no such cpability. While the Luftwaffe could not prevent the attacks, it could exact a high toll on British bombers. Casualties were limited on some of the Brirish raids, but the Luftwaffe was perfecting its night fighter arm. The Luftwaffe devoted considerable energy in the second half of 1942 to devloping tactics and equipment to find and attack the British bombes at night. The Germans were beginning to achieve considerable success with their night fighters.
Churchill, Winston. The Second World War Vol. IV.
Macmillan, N. The Royal Air Force in the World War four volimes (London: HMSO, 1949-50).
Rumpf, Hans. Edward Fitzgerald, trans. The Bombing of Germany (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1962), 256p.
Stueck, Rudi. E-mail (August 18, 2009).
Tedder, Lord. Air Power in War (London: 1948).
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