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Hitler was had no quams about reducing Warsaw and London to ashes, was furious that German cities were being bombed. The problem that he faced was with German resources being increasingly taxed on far-fling battlefields, his means of resoinding were limited. He transferred two bomber groups of about 100 planes each from Sicly which conducted raids targeting historic treasures of British cities. Hitler at this stage of the War still spoke on German radio. He called the raids Terrorangriffe (terror attacks). His tirade is interesting. He had shown a willingness to attack the historic trasures of other coutries. His chief complaint was essentially that it was German cities being bombed. Hitler promissed to cross out the cities attacked from his Baedeker guide book. Baedeker was well known throughtout Europe before the War as publishers of tourist guide books. The British thus referred to them as Baedaker raids. The Luftwaffe destoyed some landmaks such as the cathedral town of Exeter (April 24) and the Regency town of Bath, destroying the Assessmby Rooms and many homes (April 25-27). Next the Luftwaffe it the cathedral town of Norwich (April 27-29). The Luftwaffe staged a small raid on Canterbury (May 31). There was another small attack on York (October 31) in reprisal for Cologne and Mainz. This was the final reprisal raid. The depleted Luftwaffe was no longer capable of mounting these raids. Hitler was unable to strike again at Britain until the V-1 campaign following D-Day. The Baedeker Raids had no real affect on the the British war effort, thet did, however, impair the German war effort. Removing the Luftwaffe bombers from Sicily helped relieve the critically important British bastion of Malta. Malta which at the time was barely stuggling to survive from intensive Axis bombardment. The Allies conducted the trategic bombing campaign without impairing other military operations. Hitler on the other hand ordered terror raids and used planes that had to be remove from major military operations. The first example was during the Battle of Britain when Hitler diverted forces attacking forward RAF bases to London. Here we see forces upon Hitler's orders being withdrawn from the critical Malta campaign . These were both critical, The ballance of forces, however, had turned decidedly against the Germans since the Blitz. The Luftwaffe no longer had a substantial force to throw at Britiain. Th Luftwaff was fully engaged in Russia and to a much lesser extent the Mediterranean. The German raiders dropped an estimated 3,300 t of bombs on Britaincontrasted to 53,800 t that the Allies dropped on Germany. [Tedder] These numbers are stark testimony to the extent to which the ballance of power had shifted in the air.
The Battle of Britain was Hitler's first defeat. It made it impossible for Hitler to knock Briatain out of the war and provided the time needed for Britain to reequip the Army resuced from Dunkirk. It also concinced President Roosevelt to bavk Britain to the hilt, eventually leasing to Lend Lease. (The British from some reason call it Lease Lend.) But perhaps because it was a deensive victory involving rellarively small numbers of airmen, the Battle of Britain is often not given the same importance of other major engagements. In fact, it was central to the Allied victory. The Germans faced a danting task at the outset of the war, they faced enemies with far greater men nd material and industril nd agricuktural economies. Hitler in his mind was that superior German technology and science as well as Nationalist Socialist ardour would win the war. And in the Battle of Britain, less than a year into the War, the British emerged victorious because of their superior use of technology and which a much smaller force. A more rational individual would have reconsidered his strategic vision, Hitler did not. It was crucial. America would have found it very difficult to pricedure the war without Britain, including thE battle of the Atlantic, the Strategic Bombing Campaign, and the liberation of Western Europe began with D-Day. And there were consequences not only in the West, but in the east as well. The Luftwaffe was badly damaged in the Battle of Britain. Realtive loss figures do not fully depict the extent of the losses. Most of the German planes shot down were bombers with crews. And whether or not the crews were killed or bailed out, they were lost to the German war effort. Many of the British pilots sjot down, bailed out and unless seriously wounded, were back in the air within days.
The initial British bombing raids in 1939 dropped leaflets. The British were reluctant to actually bomb German cities, in part fearing reprisal raids from the Luftwaffe. I have little information on the French at this time. There was not significant bombing campaign, except for Luftwaffe operations in Poland (September-October 1940), until the Battle of Britain. After the fall of France (June 1940), German cities were no longer as vulnerable to RAF attacks. Bomber Command had only small numbers of heavy bombers and they were slow, poorly defended, and had a limited load capacity. Throughout the Battle of Britain, small numbers of British bombers hit German targets in night time raids. The raids were wholly ineffectual in a military sense. Hitting a military target at night with 1940s technology, especially 1940 technology was very difficult. Sometimes the raiders did not even hit the intended city. Some of the raids were also very costly in air crews and planes. The raids did have an in important psychological impact. British raids on Berlin so enraged Hitler that he ordered a change in Luftwaffe tactics in the Battle of Britain, which may have well resulted in a favorable turn in the battle in favor of the British.
The Germans shifted the Luftwaff east during early-1941 in pepration for Barbarossa. This was the end of the Blitz. At the same time, RAF Bomber Command equipped with inadequate aircraft and suffering serious losses, also reduced bombing raids. This brought a lull in the air war in the West. The Luftwawffe had moved east. RAF Bombrr Command did not yet have an eddective heavy bpmber. The Amerivab 8th Air Force wsas just building up its operation in England.
Hitler had often said that fighting a two-front war had doomed Germany during World War I and was determined to avoid a similar mistake. British resistance during the Battle of Britiain changed his mind. Somehow he convinced himself that the easiest way to defeat the British was a short summer campaign in the Soviet Union. He had confidence in his military leadership. With the Soviets defeated, Britain he insisted would have to come to terms. Of course, the fact that the East was his major goal fronm tghe beginning was another factor. The Blitz is often dated as ending with the devestating May 10 raid on London. Even before this, the Luftwaffe had begin shifting east to prepare on the assult on the Soviet Union. Wehrmacht land forces which required more time to move were shifted east even earlier. This was nioted by the Sioviets. Hitler concocted excuses which Stalin accepted. The shift east was obvious to the British, not only because the Blitz ended, but because of the Ultra decrypts produced at Bletchly Park. Both Churchill and Roosevelt alerted Stalin (without revealing the Ultra secret), but the ever-suspicious Stalin dismissed the reports. It seems difficult to believe, but Stalin decided to trust Hitler more than Churchill and Roosevelt. He convinced himself that the British and the Americans were trying to draw him into war with the Germans that he would have to fight alone.
Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the soviet Union, was the greates military campaign in human history. As in the west, the camaign was led by the Luftwaffe and Panzers. The Panzer force was much larger than that which stuck the death blow to France. The Luftwaffe was not. The Luftwaffe had been been badly damaged in the Battle of Britain. German industry had replaced the planes, but the importnt point is that the Luftwaffe was no larger than that which had achieved the great victory over france. The battlefield in the West was very small compared to the vast Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe was large enough to be a major factor in the relatively small battlefields in the West. As a result, the Luftwaffe was never as importnt in the east as it was in the West. This is not to say it was not important. The Luftwaffe destroyed the Massive Red air Force. And they proved very effctive in ground support operations, but it never provided the Panzers and infntry the same level of air cover it had provided in the west. And air power was a vital aspect of Blitzkrieg. And because the Red Army was not destroyed in a short summer campaign, yjr Luftwaffe became a non-factor as a tesulr of the bitter Russian winter which significantly impaired operations. Given the slim edge by which the Germans failed in frontt of Moscow, this is a very important aspect of the war. Had the RAF not badly damaged the Luftwaffe, the Germans would have had a sibstantially greater air force of to support the Barbarossa offensive.
The lull in the bombing cmpaign changed in early 1942. Air Marshal Arthur Harris was appointed to head bomber command (February 1942). This was the same time that the new long-range Lancaster heavy bombers began reaching Bomber Command. There was an immediate expansion of bombing Germany. Harris understood that Gemany's costal cities were vulnerable targets and because they were on the coast, much easier to find than inland targets. This was essentially the start of the Allied strategic bombinb camoaign. Lubeck with many wood buildings was destroyed (March 1942). Rostock followed (April 1942). Until these raids, RAF bombing had been both ineffective to the Germans and costly to Brirish air crews. Now whole cities were being destroyed by the British RAF. The Luftwaffe resonse was the Kammhuber Line. As the British bombed by night and were not yet joined by the Americans, a relatively small number of night fighters, mostly the not very successful ME-110, prived suitable for the task. The Germans rapidly improved their night fighter capability and began buildin huge anti-aircraaft artullery parks around their cities. This was not without cost ti the German effort. It meant that less air cover, artillery, and amunition would be available for the Ostkrieg. And the primary AA gun was the 88mm gun--the same gun that the Ostheer needed for the unexpectedly effective Soviet tanks.
Hitler was inncensed by the increasing effective British biombing. This was not the kind of war he had anticipated. Germany was susposed to quick, shirt wars. And he saw Germany bombing other countries, not be bombed. Göring who had assured him this would never hppen fell lowerv in his estimtion.Hitler had no quams about reducing Warsaw, Rotterdam, and London to ashes, but was furious that German cities were being bombed. Harris was absolitely correct when he stated, "The Nazis entered this war under the rather childish delusion that they were going to bomb everybody else, and nobody was going to bomb them. At Rotterdam, London, Warsaw, and half a hundred other places, they put that rather naive theory into operation. They sowed the wind, and now, they are going to reap the whirlwind." The problem that he faced was with German resources being increasingly taxed on far-flung battlefields, his means of responding to RAF Bomber Command raids were limited. Strategic bombers required huge resources. And Germaby did nit have the industrial capacity to build heavy bombers. The Luftwafee only had two engine medium bonbers with limited range and moderate bomb loads. Even so, he ordered that two bomber groups of about 100 planes each from Sicly be transferred to France. This relieved opressure on Malta at a criutical point. Theyv were used to to target historic treasures of British cities. Hitler at this stage of the War still spoke on German radio. He called the raids Terrorangriffe (terror attacks). His tirade is interesting. He had shown a willingness to attack the historic trasures of other coutries. His chief complaint was essentially that it was German cities being bombed, rather than the Germans doing the bombing. This was not at all what Luftwaffe chief Görung had promised him. Hitler in turn promissed to cross out the cities attacked from his Baedeker guide book.
After the disater before Moscow (December 1941), the Germans substantially increased aircraft construction. As a result, the Luftwaffe reached a force size of about 4,120 aircraft. This would be its greatest reltive strength of the War. It would reach over 6,000 aircraft in 1943, but Soviet and Allied air strength would far outpace the Luftwaffe, in both numbers and quality of air crews. The bulk of the Lufwaffe was deployed in the east to support German offensives there during 1942, nearly 75 percent. Even so, sizeable forces were deployed in the west to combat rising Anglo-American air power. In addition, the Red Air Firce was recovering from fron the disaster of 1941. Much if te Red Air Force had been destroyed in the ground anfd thus many pilots survived. The Red Air Force by the end of the year was contesting air superority with the Luftwaffe. After 3 years of war the territory occupied by NAZI German was at its greatest extent. And this led to the dispersal of the Luftaffe's limited resporces. The Luftwaffe had to support Army Group South, split into two groups. Army Group A (including the Sixth Army) was battering its way into Stalingrad and Army Group B attempting to seize the oil resources of the Caucauses. In the Meditrannean, the Luftwaffe was supporing Rommel in his drive toward Suez and attempting to
blast Malta into submission. In Borway, the Luftwaffe awa trying to stop the Arctic convoys. Now forces had to be diverted for the Baedecker Raids. In the west Luftflotte 3, and in Germany itself Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte wre alloted substantial forces of day and night fighters to counter RAF Bomber Command's Strategic Bombing Campaign. After 1942 each month of the war would see the Luftwaffe becoming progressively weaker. This reached a peak in early 1944 when the new long-range P-51 Mustangs largely destoyed the Luftwaffe in aerial battles over the Reich. The order of battle just before the Alemein and Stalingrad disasters included the following. Luftflotte Ost (Lufflotte 1, V Flegerkorps and Luftwaffen-Komando Don deployed on the northern and central Russian fronts had 2,110 aircraft. Hitler still hopd to seize Lnningrad. Luftflotte 2 deployed in the Mediterranean (North Africa, Itly, and Greece) had 170 aircraft. The superority of the Desert Airforce would be an important factor in Britain's victory at El Alemein. Luftflotte 3 was deployed in Western Europe (France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) had 750 aircraft. Here the Luftwaffe was attemptung to stop the RAF bomber streans as well as to protect imprtant industrial facilities in France and the U-boat facilities in french ports. The U.S. 8th Ait Force would fight its fitst battles with the Luftwaffe over France. Luftflotte 4 was deployed in southern Russia with 890 aircraft. Note that in this criticl area where the campaign in the East would be largely decided, the Luftwaffe had only about 20 percent of its force--not unlike the French Air Force when the Germns struck in 1940. It was principally deployed to level Stalingrad and failed to stop the Red Amy buildup north abd south of the city. Hitler refused to believe there was any buildup. Luftflotte 5 was deployd in Norway and Finland with 260 aircraft. Their primary function was to interdict the Allied Arctic convoys trabsporting Lemd Leaee supplies to the Soviet Union. Luftwaffen Commander Center in Germany had only 330 airccraft, but this would have to be stradily increased as the Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign intensified with more Lncasters reching Bomber Command and the American beginning raids on Germny (1943).
The Luftwaffe was streached to the limit with operations in the Soviet Union, North Africa, Norwat and over the Reich cities. Hitler ordered, however, that the Luftwaffe must strike baxk against the Britishs. The result was the Baedeker Raids. They were a series of Luftwaff air attacks on Briitish cities. The targets of the raids were chosen for their cultural or historical significance, rather than for any actual war industries. Both the Germans and British used the term. This was because German diplomat Baron Gustav Braun von Stumm, a spokesman for the German Foreign Ministry, following Hitler's lead after learing about Rostock, made astatement, "We shall go out and bomb every building in Britain marked with three stars in the Baedeker Guide" (April 24, 1942). This was not, however, what Goebbels in the Propaganda Ministry wanted to hear. With Germany losing its capability of terror bombing, he had been pursuing the line that Germany stood for Europen culture and that the British were fighting a dirty war, killing women and children and destruying cultural treasures. Stumm's remarks indicated that Germany was doing just that. The Baedeker Raids, involved a relatively small bomber force, began (April 1942). The Germans hit Bath, Canterbury, Exeter, Norwhich, and York (April-May 1942). Smaller raids followed, continuing d into 1943. Thecraids were smaller because of planes lost. The cities were hit and therews damage. The Luftwaffe managed to destoy some landmaks such as the cathedral town of Exeter (April 24) and the Regency town of Bath. This included the Assessmby Rooms in Bath. Many homes were destroyed (April 25-27). Next the Luftwaffe hit the cathedral city of Norwich (April 27-29). The Luftwaffe staged a small raid on Canterbury (May 31). There was another small attack on York (October 31) in reprisal for the RAF raids on Cologne and Mainz. This was the final reprisal raid. The depleted Luftwaffe was no longer capable of mounting further raids. Hitler was unable to strike again at Britain until the V-1 campaign following D-Day (June 1944). Given the limited forces available to the Luftwaffe, these raids had no appreciable impact on the War. Hitler, Göring, and Goebbes could not appreciate at the time how feeble the effort was in comparison to what the Allies were marsaalling against the Reich. Not only were the British building a massive force of Lancasters, but the American 8th Air Force was beginning to build up its forces in Britain. Shortly after the main Baeddeker raids, Bomber Command staged the first Thouand Bomber raid of the War -- devestataging Cologne. By this time Hitler was becoming a rare voice on Germany radio.
The Baedeker Raids had no real affect on the the British war effort, thet did, however, impair the German war effort. OKW had finally realized the importance of Malta in the huge losses of Italiam convoys suppling the Afrika Korps. Removing the Luftwaffe bombers from Sicily helped relieve the critically important British bastion of Malta. Malta which at the time was barely stuggling to survive from intensive Axis bombardment. The Allies conducted the strategic bombing campaign without impairing other military operations. Hitler on the other hand ordered terror raids aof no real value and used planes that had to be remove from major military operations. The first example was during the Battle of Britain when Hitler diverted forces attacking forward RAF bases in Kent and Surrey to bomb London. Here we see forces upon Hitler's orders being withdrawn from the critical Malta campaign. Because of the losses in taking Crete (May 1941), Hitler refused to authorize a oaratroop assault on Malta. Here Hitler's thinking in fascinating. He was apauled by 1,500 killed in h battle for Crete. After launching Brbarossa, casualties averaged that much daily.
The ballance of forces had turned decidedly against the Germans since the Blitz. The Luftwaffe no longer had a substantial force to throw at Britiain. The Luftwaff was fully engaged in Russia and to a much lesser extent the Mediterranean. The German raiders dropped an estimated 3,300 t of bombs on Britain contrasted to 53,800 t that the Allies dropped on Germany. [Tedder] These numbers are stark testimony to the extent to which the ballance of power had shifted in the air.
Once America joined the War in December 1941, a massive bombing campaign against Germany from England became feasible. America's indistrial potential gave the Allies to mount a strategic bombing campaign orders of magnitude above the Luftwaffe's capability. The air campaign became a major aspect of Allied strategy. While American began building in facilities in 1942, the British debated how to begin the strategic bombing campaign in 1942. Some wanted to target key German industrial sites, especially German synthetic fuel plants. Had they done so at this time might have changed the course of the War. Hiting precission targets, however, over heavily defended, often cloud-covered German cities. Air Marshall Arthur "Bomber" Harris, the head of RAF Bomber Command, introduced area bombing as the RAF's principal strategy in the bombing campaign. Harris phrased it susinctly, "The Germans sewed the wind, now they will reap the whirllwind." The RAF began its area bombing strategy on March 28, 1942 with a massive night time raid on L�beck. Hitler transferred two bomber groups of about 100 planes each from Sicly which conducted Baedaker targeting historic treasures of British cities. The ballance of forces, however, had turned decidedly against the Germans. The RAF responded on May 30 with its first 1,000 bomber raid on Cologne. The results were devestating. American in 1943 joined the British in round-the-clock bombing. One of the worst hit cities was Hambug. There were firestorms which destetated the central cities. The firestorms sucked trees, vehichles, sections of buildings, and people into the conflagerations. Those not killed by the bombs and flames were suffocated by the smoke and lack of oxygen. The American 8th Air Force with even larger number of bombers than the British began initial opearions against the Germans in 1943. The Americans opened their full-scale daylight bombing campaign on January 27, 1943 with an attack on Wilhelmshaven. Througout 1943, German cities were exposed to "round the clock bombing" inflict serious civilian casulties. The Americans bombing by day, attempting to hit specific targets using their Nordon bomb sites. The British bombed by night and at best could hit specific cities. Large numbers of German civilians were killed, injured, or rendered homeless. The American and British air crews suffered very heavy casulties against German fighters and increasingly effective anti-aircraft guns. At times it was unclear if the bombing campaign could be sustained. Long range fighters were not available in 1942-43 to escort the bombers to their targets in Germany. The actual impact of the campaign was disappointing. German civilian morale did not crack under the British area bombing and the Americans found it much more difficult to hit specific industrial targetys than anticipated. Even so, the air campaign forced the Luftwaffe to deploy major assetts defending German cities rather than on the critically important Eastern Front. Especially important large numbers of Luftwaffe fighters and even more important trained pilots were being shot down by the bombers. In addition large numbers of artillery pieces, which could have been used against Russian tanks, had to be diverted to anti-aircraft defenses. These defenses were manned largely by the Hitler Youth.
President Roosevelt and Primeminister Churchill announced the around the clock bombing of NAZI Germany at the Casablance Conference (January 1943). Shortly after the Whermacht Stalingrad garison surrendered. The expanding Allied Strtegic Bombing Campaign and the Allied victories in North Africa caused a massive German shift of the Luftwaffe west. While nearly 75 percent of the Lufwaffe's strength was deployed in the soivietvUnion during 1942, nust before the critical Kursk (Zitadelle) battle, only 35 percent of the Luftwaffe was in the soviet Union. German air strength in May 1943 was 6.920 aircraft deployd as follows. Luftflotte 1, 4, and 6 were in the east with 2,370 aircraft. Luftflotte 2 was in the Meiterranean, now the northern coast (primrily Italy) with 1,100 aircraft. Luftflotte 3 was in the West with 690 aircraft. Luftflotte 5 was in Norway with 370 aircraft. The Central Command in Germany had 2,230 aircraft protecting the Reich's cities from the Anglo-American bombing. This force combined with substanyol manpower and artillery deployed round the cities required a major diversion of resources from the Eatern Front. Another 160 aircraft was deployed to the Balkans. The German air defenses,
the Kammhuber Line could not keep out the Anglo-American bombers, but they made them pay a terrible price. With the beginning of the American bombing, far more fighters were needed in 1943 to man the German air defenses.
The air war changed dramatically in 1944. The Luftwaffe had bled Blomber Command and the 8th Air Force in 1943. Neither fotced had achieved the results expected by Round-the-Clock bombing. Considerable damage had been done but the Luftwaffe had not been broken and the German war effort had not been severely impaired. In fact German war production was inccreasing. A series of devlopments in lte 1943 radically changed the situation in the skies over Germmany. First and most importantly, the Allies had solved the fighter escort problem. P-51s by December 1943 were beginning to reach the 8th Air Force in numbers. Second, the Allies had invaded southern Italy (September 1943). The new 15th Air Force was established at Foggia. This brought outhern Germany within in range, complicating the Luftwaffe's problems in defending the Reich. Third was the scale of the Allied build up in England. The 8th Air Force was beginning to reach parity with Bomber Command. The 8th Air Firce by the end of the year had the capability of staging raids composed of over 700 bombers on a sustained basis. The full extent of the change was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion. Here the Luftwaffe was so devestated that they were a non-factor. Once the invasion had succeeded and the liberation of France in Progress, the Allied renewed the strategic bombing campaign with a unimaginable ferocity.
With the deployment of long-range P-51 Mustand escorts, Luftwaffe losses left German cities esentially defensless. The major bombing of these cities, however, was delayed by Gen. Eisenhower who assumed command of the nomber firces (8th air Force and Bomber Command). He use them to hamnmer the German forces defending the Atlantic wall. The bombers began hammering the beach defenses and tranportation lines supporting the beach defenses. Another priority targer=t was Luftwaffe air fields in France. The destruction of the Lufeaffe can best be appreciated by the fact that on arguably the most important day of the war, only a hanfull of German figters rose to oppose the invasion.
Tedder, Lord. Air Power in War (London: 1948).
Navigate the Boys' Historical Clothing Web Site:Balance of Forces
Allied Strategic Bombing Campaign (1942-45)
German Air Power in the West (1943)
Destrucrion of the Luftwaffe (February-March 1944)
D-Day Air Operations (June 1944)
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Created: 11:25 AM 7/26/2015
Last updated: 11:26 AM 7/26/2015
