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The full extent of the change was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion--Overlord. Eisenhower demanded personal control over both Brish and American air forces. Here the British objected, but when Ike threatened to resign, Churchill capitulted. Eisenhower also was confronted with resistance down the chain of command. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had taken a terrible drubbing from the Luftwaffe in 1942 and 43. Npw that they were gettng the upper hand, they wanted to persue the attack over Germany. Harris and Spaatz both argued that they could best contribute to Overlord by continuing th straetegic bombing campaign over Germany. Spaatz in particular wanted to focus on the German petroleum industry. Not only would reducing petroleum production restruct the Wehrmacht, bur the Luftwaffe would have to give battle affording the Allied fighter escorts to destroy the remaining fighter force. The Allied air commanders were opposed by a British civilian, a scientist on the air plnning staff--Silly Zuckerman. He devised the Transportation Plan which sought to essentially destroy the French transpotation system leading to the invasion beaches. The idea was to target 80 railway marshelling and repair centers located in Belgium and northern France. (The targets included the transport system leading to the Pas de Calais as well as Normondy so as not to tip off the Germans as to the location of the invasion.) The Germans could not heavily defend the whole coast. Their ability to defeat the invasion would rest on their ability to rush powerful forces forward and gain control of the invasion beaches before the Allies could land sufficienr forces to exploit their manpower and resource superiority. Zuckerman had the support on one air commander--Air Marshal Tedder. Eisehower decided on the Transportation Plan and backed it even when Churchill expressed concern over possible French civilian casualties. In persuing the Transportation Plan the Allied bombers proved much more uccessful at hitting ground targets than one believed possible. Here the Allies improved their target marking techniques. The supression of Luftwaffe was another high-priority factor factor. Raids on Germany were not entirely ceased. The Luftwaffe by June was so devestated that they were a non-factor.
The Allies in early 1944 succeeded in gaining control of the skies over Germany. The principal factor here was the advent of fighter escorts, particularly the P-51 Mustang. American bombers and the fighter escorts began shooting down substantial numbers of Luftwaffe fighters. The Luftwaffe was unable to replace pilots at the rate they were being shot down.
The full extent of the shify in the air war was not completely apparent because the Allies shifted priorities from Germany to France in preparation for the cross-Channel invasion--Overlord.
Eisenhower as the time for the invasion approached, demanded personal control over both Brish and American air forces. Here the British objected, but when Ike threatened to resign, Churchill capitulted.
Eisenhower also was confronted with resistance down the chain of command. Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force had taken a terrible drubbing from the Luftwaffe in 1942 and 43. Npw that they were gettng the upper hand, they wanted to persue athe attack over Germany. Harris and Spaatz both argued that they could best contribute to Overlord by continuing th strtegic bombing campaign over Germany. Spaatz in particular wanted to focus on the German petroleum industry. Not only would reducing petroleum production restruct the Wehrmacht, but the Luftwaffe would have to give battle affording the Allied fighter escorts to destroy the remaining fighter force. The Allied air commanders were opposed by a British civilian, a scirntist on the air plnning staff--Silly Zuckerman. He devised the Transportation Plan which sought to essentially destroy the French transpotation system leading to the invasion beaches. The idea was to target 80 railway marshelling and repair centers located in Belgium and northern France. (The targets included the transport system leading to the Pas de Calais as well as Normondy so as not to tip off the Germans as to the location of the invasion.) The Germans could not heavily defend the whole coast. Their ability to defeat the invasion would rest on their ability to rush powerful forces forward and gain control of the invasion beaches before the Allies could land sufficienr forces to exploit their manpower and resource superiority. Zuckerman had the support on one air commander--Air Marshal Tedder. Eisehower decided on the Transportation Plan and backed it even when Churchill expressed concern over possible French civilian casualties.
The Tactical Ninth Air Force was established in England. Its initial assignment was to help execute the Transportation Plan and to destroy Luftwaffe basis and beach defenses. After the invasion it would provide close air support to Allied armies driving toward Germany.
As Supreme Commeander Eisenhower demanded control over all Allied air forces took control of the strategic air forces (April 1944). Eisenhoiwer directed the 8th Air Force and Bomber Command to redireect ther operations to France. Thios was a difficult decession because wth the fighter protection provided by long-range P-51 fighters the Allies were inflictging damage on both the Luftwaffe and German war industries. Under Eisenhower targeting shifted to destroy the Luftwaffe and Liftwaffe facilities in France, the German petorelum industry, and to disrupt rail communications, especiallyrail lines leading to the invasion beaches. Here the Allies had to bomb lines leading to both Pas de Calais and Normandy so as not to reveal where the landings would take place. The Wehrmact depended heavily on the French railroads to move men and equipment. Eisenhower ordered the Allied air orces to sever the bridges over the Seine, Oise, and Meuse rivers (May) These attacks were largely successful so that at the time the Allies landed, the French rail system was near collapse. The Allies followed up Overlord with Operation Dragoon, landings along France's Mediterranean coast (August 15). The Dragoon force moving north joined up with southern advance from the D-day landings near Dijon (mid-September).
Operation Dragoon in addition to the amphibious landings included a glider landing (Operation Dove) and a deception (Operation Span). A major accomplishment of Dragoon was the seizure of Marseilles and its important port. The Allied advance after Operation Cobra which desrtoyed the German 7th Army slowed as the Allies moved into Belgium an northern France and approached the borders of the Reich (September). The major provlem was gas (petrol) and other supplies. Allied units consumed enormous quantities of supplies, much greater quantities than comparable German units.
Marseilles and the southern French railways became an important conduit of supplies because of the limited port access the Allies had at the time in northwestern Europe. The Allies brought back the Port of Marseilles and its railroad trunk lines back into service despite the destruction sustained by Allied bombing and German demolition. The southern supply route became very important to the Allies as they prepared to penetrate the Siegfried Line (West Wall) and enter the Reich. The southern route delivered about a third of Allied supplies.
In persuing the Transportation Plan the Allied bombers proved much more successful at hitting ground targets than one believed possible. Here the Allies improved their target marking techniques. The supression of Luftwaffe was another high priority effort. Allied air forces flew more than 200.000 sorties in preparing for the invasion. The Wehrmacht was dependant on the French railroad system. The Allies devestated that system. Allied flyers destroyed 1,500 locomotives and in the process also destroyed the military cargos they were pulling. Bridges were another priority target. Large numbers were destroyed. Of paricular importance, the Allies destroyed the 24 bridges over the Seine. This essential cut Wehrmacht forces on the coastal beaches off from Paris and rear areas where reinforcements were based. These bridges were also needed to supply the beach defenses. The Allies were careful not to give away the location of the invasion by targetting sights primarily around Normandy. Thus for every raid in the Normandy area, there were two raids in other areas--primarily the Pas de Calais.
Next to the Transportation Plan, the highest priority given to the Allied air forces was Luftwaffe instalations in France. The Luftwaffe bases in France and Belgium were either destroyed or so sevely damaged as to be unusable. The Allies destroyed 36 Luftwaffe bases as well as 41 radar instalations. These attacks as well as the attacks on Germany had forced the Luftwaffe to withdraw from forward air bases that were needed to defend the landing beaches. Ironically this was the same task that the Luftwaffe had been assigned in the Battle of Britain.
Allied raids on Germany were not entirely ceased. The priority was on targets in France, but the Allies wanted to keep the pressure in the Luftwaffe by continuing some attacks on into the Reich.
The Allies coomand of the air proved decissive on D-Day. The Allies used 8,000 planes to fly 14,700 sorties. To the surprise of the Allies, the Luftwaffe dod nor seriously oppose the invasion. Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh Mallory, who had played a key role in the Battle of Britain, paced his headquarters askinf, "Where is the Lufwaffe?" Allied airpower was, however, a key factor. D-Day began with British glider assults on key targets and American C-47s dropping paratroopers to seize control of key targets in rear areas to prevent the Germans from reinforcing the beach defenses. Bombers then pounded the beach defenses and fighters hit any German collumns attempting to move toward the beaches, especially armored units. Fighter patrolls over the actual beaches did not encounter any serious Luftwaffe opposition. The Luftwaffe managed only 300 sorties, few of which actually reached the asctual invasion beaches. Several of these soerties were flow at night meaning they could not effectively access targets. The minimal Luftwaffe effort had no real impact on the massive invasion effort. Allied patrols over French roads, on the other hand, were so effective that the Germans were forced to move on foot or at night, meaning that the Allies were able to seize and secure their beachhead before nightfall. The Germans concluded that Normandy was not the main landing site. Here two RAF quandrons helped confuse the Germans by dropping Windows foil strips in a pattern that suggested an armada was crossing the Channel at the Pas-de-Calais. Thus most of the German Panzers were held back in the Pas-de-Calais. The Panzers that were committed were mauled or badly delayed the 2nSS Pazer Division stationed in southern France took 17 days to reach Normandy.
The Luftwaffe by June 1944 was so devestated that they were a non-factor. A few fighter planes mounted a handful of attacks on the invasion beaches, but had no measurable impact and were driven off by the massive Allied air cover, The Luftwaffe was notable primarily from its absence from the skies over the developing beach heads. A measure of the the Luftwaffe's ineffevteness was Mulberry. The primary impeditment to the invasion was the fact that Germans heavily garrisoned the ports so that bringing in supplies was a major problem. The Allied answer was Mulberry--building artidical harbors on the beaches. This involved bringing over great hulking prefabricated concrete caisons (200 feet long by 60 feet wide, by 60 feet high). Now hitting fast moving manuerable and well armed war ships was one matter. The Mulberry caisons were largely unarmed, very difficult to manuver, and were towed at a top speed of 3 knots. The Luftwaffe could not even stop these Mulberry caisons (phoenixes) from being towed over and assembled. This was just one more of many Luftwaffe failures after the victory in France (June 1940). The reason of course was not so much the fault of the Luftwaffe, but the NAZI political leadership which decided to wage war against an alliance of nations which far greater industrial capacity than Germany.
The most crticized aspect of the allied war effot was the stratehic bombing campaign. It was is critizied basiclly on two groynds. One that it was imoral pral and two that it was ineffective. Morality is of course debateable. and the questio rises is what do you do when you are faced with an immoral oppent who began bombing civilians fron the first day of the War. Our contention is that the greatest crime of the ar would have been to fail to destroy Hitler abd the NAZIs. We discuss the issue of morality of stategic bombing on a separate page. The point we want to make here is the effectiveness of the srategic bombing campaign. It is true tht the cmpaign was istly. and it rook some time to destroy the German war economy, in large part because Albrt Speer was such an effective Armamnts Minister. But the issue of effectiveness can be very simply answered by a simple question--Where was the Luftwaffe on D-Day? The answer og course is that the Luftwaffe was a spent force, destoyed by the Allied bombing and the P-51 Mustang escorts in the skies over Germany. We all know aojt bloody Omaga. Imagine what would have tranpired had the Luftwaffe contensted the laadings in force. Not to mention wht impact the German Panzer Divisions would have had if they had had air cover and could have moved in force against the landing force. This alone would have justified the strategic bombing cmpaign.
American air power would delver the coup de grāce to the German 7th Army in Notmandy. The 7th Army was fully committed wihout any reserves behand the lines to plug in the gaps if the front was penetratd. German armor played a major role in prevented an alld break though, but not as mobile force. The Germans in Normndy used their armor esebtually as moveable pill boxes. American bombers delivered a concentrated attack i=on the Germans near St. Lo. The attack was devestating, burtually obliterated th S-Panzer Lehr Dicision and creating a massive gp in the German lines. This was the beginning ofOperation Cobra and the liberation of Fance.
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