|
The Germans did not at first give much attention to air defense. The Whermacht version was an attack mode built around the concepot of Blitzkrieg. They, as Air Chief Marshall Harris pointed out, were under the illusion that they would bomb other countries, but not be bombed themselves. Luftwaffe Chief Göring assured Hitler and the German people that the Luftwaffe would prevent that. He of course proved terribly wrong and the German people would suffer the consequences. The Luftwaffe was given control of the bulk of the German anti-aircraft artillery (Flak). While initially a small operation, the gradual escalation of the Allied Strategic Bombing campaign turned the Flak batteries into a huge operation. Most of these batteries were built around cities, the primary targets of the Allied bombers because this was where Geman industry was located. We know a great deal about the Luftwaffe Flak Defenses. We know less about Luftwaffe anti-aircraft for its air bases. These bases, at least the ones in the Reich were largely secure during the first years of the war. The RAF operating a t night at forst had trouble finding cities, let alone pon point air bases. This only became possible with the entry of the U.S. 8th Air Force in the Strategic Bombing Campign and the beginning of day-light bombing (1943). We do not think German air bases were at first priority targets, in part becaue the fighters scrambled before the bombers reached them. And for the first year losses were very heavy. This began to change with arrival of the P-51 Mustangs (December 1943), especually after crippling the Liftwaffe (February-March 1944), the fighters were allow to go down to the deck and seek out targets like locomotives, rail yards, trains, barges, airfields, and eventually anything that moved. 8th Air Force General Doolittle did not tie his fighters to the bombers. He ordered the escort pilots to "go hunting for Jerries. Flush them out in the air and beat them up on the ground on the way home." [McFarland and Newton, p. 160.] Thus even the Luftwaffe planes that did not rise to engage the American raiders were targetted. Squadrons were formed to do just this. An American force of 600 fighters were ordered to strafe airfields all over Germany (April 1944). Daily tolls of Luftwaffe planes sometimes exceeded 100 a day. These raids were dangerous and exposed the fighters to ground fire. The American fighters were also ordered to hit transportation targets. Unlike similar raids in France, they were conducted without concern for civilian casualties. [Schaeffer, p. 68.] Unlike the cities, there were no large batteries of Flak guns. We are not yet sure just how the airfilds were defended, but believe that smaller guns were used like machine guns to ward off low alditude attacks. Hopefully readers will know more about this.
McFarland, Keith D. and David L. Roll. Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman Years (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2005), 456p.
Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 272p.
Navigate the CIH World War II Pages:
[Return to Main deteriorating Luftewaffe defense page]
[Return to Resumed 1944-45 strategic bombing campaign]
[Return to Main World War II Allied combined air campaign 1944 page]
[Biographies]
[Campaigns]
[Children]
[Countries]
[Deciding factors]
[Diplomacy]
[Geo-political crisis]
[Economics]
[Home front]
[Intelligence]
[POWs]
[Resistance]
[Race]
[Refugees]
[Technology]
[Totalitarian powers]
[Bibliographies]
[Contributions]
[FAQs]
[Images]
[Links]
[Registration]
[Tools]
[Return to Main World War II page]
[Return to Main war essay page]
[Return to CIH Home page]