Deteriorating Luftewaffe Defense (September 1944 - April 1945)


Figure 1.--

After the liberation of France and the resumtion of strategic bombing, the Luftwaffe defenses began to crumble. One of the objectives of the strategic bombing campaign was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. And as the fighter escorts engaged Luftwaffe fighters there was a dramatic and unsustanable loss of German pilots. The Allies established air surperiority over Germany and bombed German cities at will. The Luftwaffe which still had planes could often not maintain an effective training program because of fuel shortages and in many cases could even muster the fuel to fly the rapidly dwindling number of remaining planes. The Luftwaffe was so desperate for pilots by the end of the War that Hitler Youth boys were being used. Most were boys fron the Flieger HJ. Some Flieger HJ boys flew the Komet ME-163, in part because it was so dangerous that it was wasteful using trained Luftwaffe pilots who were in increasingly short supply. The Luftwaffe's defensive capability was also eroded as Allied ground armies overun Luftwaffe airfields and early warning radar sites. This included fields from whic Luftwaffe night fighters had been wreking havoc on Bomber Command formations. This meant that the Allied bombers would reach the Reich with little warning and accompaied by esorts that could overpower dwindling Luftwaffe fighter forces. This left German cities virtually undefended, except by flak batteries.

Destruction of the Lufwaffe

After the liberation of France and the resumtion of strategic bombing, the Luftwaffe defenses began to crumble. And the Allies, now with bases in France and Italy, could put even more pressure on the Luftwaffe. One of the objectives of the strategic bombing campaign was the destruction of the Luftwaffe. Attacking German cities had forced the Luftwaffe to come up anf give battle and when they did they were destroyed. The Allies by mid-1944 had largely achieved this objective, both the planes and especially the pilots. As the Allied fighter escorts engaged Luftwaffe fighters there was a dramatic and unsustanable loss of German pilots. The Allies established air surperiority over Germany and bombed German cities at will.

Pilot Training Program

The critical factor for the Luftwaffe proved to be pilots. This was the same position the British found themselves in during the Nattle of Britain. The British, however, were unprepared for the War, the Germans seemingly should hazve anticipated polot needs. The Allied strategic bombing campaign targeted aircraft plants, the Germans responded by decentalizing contstruction. They built aircraft parts in parts and only assembled them in the finl stage. The FW-190's plywood construction facilitated this. Production was not efficent and the Germand could not begin to compete with American production, but it meant that the Allies were unable to stop German production. While the Luftwaffe effectively adjusted production, they did not organize pilot training programs to meet needs, especialy to replace the pilots lost defending German cities from the Allied strategic bombing. The Germans like the Japanese had an extremely effective pilot training program. It was not, however, designed to produce large numbers of pilots in a short period of time. Luftwaffee pilot losses escalated dramatically once the P-51 Mustangs began accompanying the nombers deep into Germany. The Luftwaffe which still had planes did not have an effective training program. There was only one school to train fighter pilots. There were problems, especially fuel shortages, but the Lufrwaffe reacted poorly to the need to train more pilots. The training program was not expanded until 1944 and by then it was to late. This failure on the part of Luftwaffe pilots seems curious. There were many factors outside the control of Luftwaffe commanders, trasining pilots was not one of them. There were plenty of boys emerging from the Hitler Youth that would have been more than willing to become pilots. The Luftwaffe was so desperate for pilots by the end of the War that Hitler Youth boys were being used with minimal training. Most were boys fron the Flieger HJ. Some Flieger HJ boys flew the Komet ME-163, in part because it was so dangerous that it was wasteful using trained Luftwaffe pilots who were in increasingly short supply.

Fuel Shortages

One of the most serious factors impairing Luftwaffe operations was fuel shortages because of loss of Ploesti the increasing effectiveness of Allied raids on the synthetic fuel plants. This impaired the Luftwaffe training program as ell as air opeations. Because of fuel shortages and in many cases could even muster the fuel to fly the rapidly dwindling number of remaining planes.

Night Fighters

Bomber Command did not initially benefit from the arrival of fighter escorts. The fighters escorted Allied planes on daylight raids, but they were not useful in protecting British bombers on nightime raids. The Luftwaffe was shooting down more British bombers in nighttie raids than American bombers in day light raids. Two developments occurred in July-August 1944 which dramatically changed the night-time situation. The first was pure luck. An inexperienced Luftwaffe pilot landed his Ju-88 night fighter at an English airfield, thinking he was still over the occupied Netherlands. This gave the British the opportunity to learn just why the Luftwaffe nightfighters had been so effective. The first was SN-2 airborn radar that Window was not effectively jamming. The second was the Flensburg device which allowed the Germans to use a device called Monica in the tail of British bombers as a virtual beacon. Monica was suposed to alert British pilots of te approach of a night fighter, instead using Flensburg they were virtual beacons. These devices were simply defeated by adjusting Window and removing Monica from the British planes. The second development was the liberation of France and Belgium. The Allies veran the forward Luftwaffe bases and radar sights that were vital to the success of the night fighters.

Early Warning System

The Luftwaffe's defensive capability was also eroded as Allied ground armies overun Luftwaffe airfields and early warning radar sites. This included fields from whic Luftwaffe night fighters had been wreking havoc on Bomber Command formations. This meant that the Allied bombers would reach the Reich with little warning and accompaied by esorts that could overpower dwindling Luftwaffe fighter forces. This left German cities virtually undefended, except by flak batteries.

Anti-aircraft Defenses

The Germans did not at first give much attention to air defense. They as Air Chief Marshall Harris pointed out were under the illusion that they would bomb other countries, but not be combed themselves. Luftwaffe Chief Göring assured Hitler and the German people that the Luftwaffe would prevenbt that. He of course proved terribly wrong. The Luftwaffe was, however, given control of the bulk of the German anti-aircraft artillery (Flak). While initially a small operation, the gradual escalation of the Allied Stratehic Bombing campaihn tuned the Flak batteries into a huge operation. Most of these batteries were built around cities, the primary targets of the Allied bombers because this wa swear Geman industry was located. We know a great del about the a href="/essay/war/ww2/air/eur/sbc/gd/flak.html">Luftwaffe Flak Defenses. We know less about Luftwaffe anti-aircraft for its air bases. These bases, at least the ones in the Reich were larhely secure during the first years of the war. THe RAF operating at night at forst had trouble finding cities, let alone pon point air bases. This only became possible with the entry of the U.S. 8th Air Force in the Strategic Bombing Campign and the beginning of day-light bombing (1943). We do not think German air bases were at first priority targets, in part becaue the fighters scrabled before the bombers reached them. And for the first year losses were very heavy. This began to change with arrival of the P-51 Mustangs (December 1943), especually after crippling the Liftwaffe (February-March 1944), the fightewrs were allow to fo down to the deck and seek out targets like locomotives, rail yards, trains, barges, airfields, and eventually anything that moved. 8th Air Force General Doolittle did not tie his fighters to the bombers. He ordered the escort pilots to "go hunting for Jerries. Flush them out in the air and beat them up on the ground on the way home." [McFarland and Newton, p. 160.] Thus even the Luftwaffe planes that did not rise to engage the American raiders were targetted. Squadrons were formed to do just this. An American force of 600 fighters were ordered to strafe airfields all over Germany (April 1944). Daily tolls of Luftwaffe planes sometimes exceeded 100 a day. These raids were dangerous and exposed the fightrs to ground fire. The American fighters were also ordered to hit transportation targets. Unlike similar raids in France, they were conducted without concern for civilian casualties. [Schaeffer, p. 68.] Unlike the cities, there were no large batteries of Flak guns. We are not yet sure just how the airfilds were defended, but believe that smaller guns were used like machine guns to ward off low alditude attacks. Hopefully readers will know more bout this.

Sources

McFarland, Keith D. and David L. Roll. Louis Johnson and the Arming of America: The Roosevelt and Truman Years (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, 2005), 456p.

Schaffer, Ronald. Wings of Judgement: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 272p.







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Created: 2:48 AM 7/11/2005
Last updated: 9:58 PM 5/19/2014