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Europeans were very concerned about poison gas being used when war broke out in Europe. All the major powers had chemical weapons. The weapons had been used in World War I and it was widely believed that if another war broke out, thsat that thery woulf be used again. Civilians and school children were drilled in civil defense measures and the use of gas masks. This did not occur in Europe. As the War developed, none of the beligerants employed chemical weapons. Thus by the time the United States entered the War, there was less fear of chemical weapons. The American policy concerning poison gas after it entered the War against Germany was to create a vastly superior stock pile and improve delivery systems so that if the German military first used gas, then the United States could respond with overwhelming force. A factor here was the air superority that the Allies began to develop during 1942. The CWS received a $1 billion dollar appropriation and expanded to over 60,000 employees. It was directed to prepare for both chemical (gas) and bacteriological warfare, as well as producing incendiaries for bombing, flamethrowers, and other devices. There were differences wihin the Administration and among the military over public statements and eventully the use of chemical weapons. Differents also developed with the British. The United States threatened Japan after reports of Japan using chemical weapons in China were received. The most serious incident concerning poison gas occurred in Italy. After the Allied invasion of Italy (September 1943), the Lufwaffe attacked Allied shipping. The Allies were using the port of Bari in southern Italy. A Luftwaffe attack caught about 50 ships at Bari waiting to be unloaded (December 2, 1943). The German raid was devestating to the ships moored together in the small port. Seventeen Allied ship were destroyed. One of the ships hit was a U.S. Liberty ship laden with a secret cargo of mustard gas bombs. The ship exploded after receiving a direct hit. The crew was killed immeditely. The gas s[read across the port and into the adjoining city. More than a thousand Allied servicemen and more than a thousand civilians died. [Reminick]
Europeans were very concerned about poison gas being used when war broke out in Europe. All the major powers had chemical weapons. The weapons had been used in World War I and it was widely believed that if another war broke out, thsat that thery woulf be used again. Civilians and school children were drilled in civil defense measures and the use of gas masks.
Despite expectations, the beligerant European countries did not use chemical weapons. The early German successes and fall of France were presumsably factors. This did not occur in Europe. As the War developed, none of the beligerants employed chemical weapons. This restraint cointinued even as other restraints were abandoned and both sides steadily moved toward Toital War. Thus by the time the United States entered the War, there was less fear of chemical weapons.
The Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor shatered the Pacific Fleet and bought America into the War. For several years President Roosevelt had been trying to convince a reluctant Congress to arm America. A range of different actions were approved. The approporiatins involved seemed massive, but in terms of what was needed were relastively limited. Unfortunately for the Japanese, the principal impact of their attack was to end any limits on Congressioinal appropriatioins. The military which had had to plead for the smallest of appropriastions now got what ever they asked for and more--much more. Budget increases of 1,000 percent were not uncommon. And in addition to published appropriations were secret appropriations, especisally the Manhasttan Project. The American chemical weapons program ewas just one of the many prorams affected.
The American policy concerning poison gas after it entered the War against Germany was to create a vastly superior stock pile and improve delivery systems so that if the German military first used gas, then the United States could respond with overwhelming force. The Army’s Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) received a $1 billion dollar appropriation and expanded to over 60,000 employees. That was audget increase of nearly 1,000 percent and apersonel increase of 600 percent. The CWS was directed to prepare for both chemical (gas) and bacteriological warfare, as well as producing incendiaries for bombing, flamethrowers, and other devices.
Germany sat the beginning of the War achieved tactical air superiority over the battlefield in both Poland and France. The limits of the Luftwwffe were exposed in the Battle of Britain (1940). The Luftwaffwe agsaiun achieved bsattlefield superority in the Balkans (1941), but with Barbsarossa despite spectacular achievements was unable to achieve the the same impact on the vast Eastern Front that it had in the West (1941). Weakened in the East, the American entry into the War meant that the Allies began to devlop air superority over France (1942). As the strategic use oif chemical weapons required air delivery, growing Allied air power significanly changed the calculation.
There were differences wihin the Administration and among the military over public statements and eventully the use of chemical weapons. There were both domestic differences abd differences with the British,
Secretary of State Cordell Hull, urged the the President to approve a unilateral declaration that America would not use chemical weapons. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, agreed with Hull, “The Navy is against the use [of gas] in wartime.” Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, a powerful voice in the Admimnistration opposed any such public statement. Stimson was concerned thsat any such statement might generate a domestic debate on moral and political issues that would
delay or complicated American production of chemical weapons. He also was concerned that it wpould signal weakness to the Axis powers which already viewed the democracies as weak opponents.
Stimson argued that Germany and Japan as well as Italy, had ignored international treaties. e alo pointed out that
Italy had used gas in Ethiopia and Japan had done the same in China. Stimson insisted that “the only deterrent is fear of our retaliation. I strongly believe that our most effective weapon on this subject at the present time is to keep our mouths tight shut.” [Bernstein]
Germany had a very extensive arsenal of gas weapons. They did not, however use them in the War. There must hsave been a discussion as to use use of these weapons. We do not yet hsave details on this.
The Jsapsanese also had chemical weapons and unlike the Germans did use them. The weapoons did not use them agaist the United States. They did use them in China.
Primeminidster Churchill became concerned about German gas attacks on the Eastern Front against the Soviets. We do not yet details on this, either how seriously the Germans were considering this or how Churchill learned about it. We do not know if it was an Ulktra decript. At any rate, Churchill publically threatened Hitler that if the Germans used poison gas on the Siovbiets, thsat Britain would retaliate with gas attecks on German cities (May 1942). Britain was already increasing bombing rids on German cities with coinventional ordinance. President Roosevelt followed Churchill's warning with one of his own. President Roosevelt armed with new reports of Japan using poison gas in China, issued a comparable warnning. “If Japan persists in this inhuman form of warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be regarded by this Government as though taken against the United States, and retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out.”
Germany had introduced chemical weapons in World War I (2915). Churchill was a strong advocate in replying to the Germans in full measure. Thus chemical ordinance was widely used on the Western front by both sides. (The Germans also used chemical weapons on the Eastern Front where the Russians had no chemical ordinance or adequate supplies of gas masks.) Churchill never joined the post-War moral condemnation of chemical weapons. At various points in World War II, Churchill was prepared to use chemical weeapons, espercisally in 1940 when German invasion seemed eminent. Here the Cabinent was a restraining force.
President Roosevelt differened from his British ally. President Roosewvelt was a fervent opponent to the use of poisdon gas and entirely areedthast it was immoral. His policy was to warn retaliation and with growing American air power, this was a potent threat. He hoped that the warnings would deter the Axisfrom initisating gas warfare. The warnings seemed to have an effect on the Germans. Aganst the Japanese the response was more mixed. There were continued incidents in China.
The President and his his advisers chose to interpret these incidents as the actions of local commanders rasther than a policy decesion oif the Imprrial Government. The Japanese certainly gave him sufficient justification for retalitory attacks had he chosen to lsaunch them. His strongly felt moral beliefs helped disuade him from ordering suych attacks. [Bernstein] Instead he continued to issue warnings to he Japanese in the hope thsat the Imperial Government would restrain their field commanders. The Presidennt well into the War made a definitive statement based on a State Departmrnt draft (June 1943). “Use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope we never will be compelled to use them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies.”
The President's clear, forceful statement must have discouraged most military planners from even considering the use of chemical weapons. And the general consensus within the milkitary establishment was that chemical weapons would not be useful. Navy officials were convinced that chermical weapons would not be effective against military targets. This was probably the case for naval actions. Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval operations, stated “Hit for hit and pound for pound no service chemical is considered to offer as great effectiveness as high explosive.” One gets the impression that he was ship to ship naval action. American carrier superiority by 1944 was such that pouson as might have been useful. And in assault on small islands, poison gas could have had aajor impact. American Air Force commsanders reached similar conclusions. The Air Force like the Navy believed strongly in high expolsive until late in the War, even though incendisaries had proven to be more effective.
The most serious incident concerning poison gas occurred in Italy. After the Allied invasion of Italy (September 1943), the Lufwaffe attacked Allied shipping. The Allies were using the port of Bari in southern Italy. A Luftwaffe attack caught about 50 ships at Bari waiting to be unloaded (December 2, 1943). The German raid was devestating to the ships moored together in the small port. Seventeen Allied ship were destroyed. One of the ships hit was a U.S. Liberty ship laden with a secret cargo of mustard gas bombs. The ship exploded after receiving a direct hit. The crew was killed immeditely. The gas s[read across the port and into the adjoining city. More than a thousand Allied servicemen and more than a thousand civilians died. [Reminick] The deployment of the gas was reportedly the result of an Allied intelligence assessmnent that Hitler was going to begin using chemical wweapons in Italy. This assessment followed reports from the Italians who claimed that Hitler threatened to use chemical weapons on the Italians if they switched sides.
Suisidal Japanese resistance and resulting heavy American casualties in the last year of the War caused Americam planners to reconsider the possible use of chemical weapons.
Bernstein, Barton J. "Why we didn’t use poison gas in World War II," American Heritage Magazine (August/September 1985) Volume 36, Issue 5.
Reminick, Gerald. Nightmare in Bari: The World War II Liberty Ship Poison Gas .....
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