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Japan's primary air defense was simple geography. the Pacific Ocean. American bombers did not have the range to reach Japan. The initial American plan was to bomb Japan from China and the new B-29s had the range to reach the Home Islands from bases being prepared in China. China was, however, less than satisfactory. Getting supplies to America bomber forces were a night mare they had to delivered to India, transported to remote areas, and then flown over the towering Himalayas, called 'The Hump'. And then the Japanese Ichi-Go offensive seized most of the airfields. But then the Americans seized the Marianas which provided the needed air bases and were easy to supply. The Americans initially targeted industrial facilities, but then began fire bombing raids on cities (March 1945). With the destruction of the Imperial Fleet and the seizure of the
Okinawa, Aircraft flying from Allied aircraft carriers and Okinawa joined in the air campaign. Unlike the air campaign over northern Europe, the Japanese were powerless to stop the air attacks. The number and quality of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns available for air defense was inadequate. Japan was left to defend the Home Islands with with essentially the same aircraft with which Japan had begun the War. They were now obsolete not fast enough or capable of the altitude to reach the B-29s. The Japanese during the final months of the War formed 'Special Attack Units' and 'Air-shaking Units'. These were temporary short-lived units with their distinctive names (commonly mythology and history) and markings. They were part of existing squadrons. These units were trained to ramming Allied bomber s. They usually had their armaments removed to permit faster speeds and higher altitudes. Some had air frames reinforced. The anti-aircraft guns were also proved inadequate, unable to fire at sufficient altitudes.
There were a range of other limitations, including fuel shortages, inadequate pilot training, poor radar, and a lack of air defense coordination. The U.S. Navy targeted Imperial Navy picket ships. So the Japanese had little advance warning of the attacks. Despite the vulnerability of Japanese wood and paper homes in cities, the firefighting services were poorly trained and equipped. Few air raid shelters were built for civilians. At first the Japanese came up to intercept the B-29s. But the the bombers were fast enough that they were not very successful And after the Marines took Iwo Jima, P-51 essort aircraft could accompany the bombers or engage in low altitude attacks on selected targets as well as targets of opportunity. The Japanese fighters eventually stopped coming up to challenge the bombers April 1945). This was because they had not been very successful and because it was deemed more important go save available aircraft and fuel for a massive Kamikaze attack on the expected American invasion fleet. The American bombers began calling their raids 'milk runs'.
The final reorganization of Japanese air units was part of Operation Ketsu-Go, the defense of the Home Islands. All Japanese air units were centralized under the command of General Masakau Kawabe who was preparing a massive Kamikaze attack on the allied invasion fleet.
Japan's primary air defense was simple geography. Two very prominent features protected Japan. The most obvious barrier between Japan and America was the vast Pacific Ocean. Allied bombers could reach Berlin from Britain. The distance was 600 miles and that was at the outer limit of Allied bombers. The distance from Hawaii to Tokyo was 3,900 miles. So you can see that the Japanese felt themselves to be safe from potential American bombing. Allied bombers just did not have the range to reach Japan. And it was a safe bet that even with technical innovation no plane was going to be developed to fly the necessary distance. Another major barrier was the Himalayan Mountains. Now bomber bases could be built in China, the massive quantities of maternal and fuel would have be flown into China because the the Japanese controlled all the Chinese ports. And the United States did not have the airlift capability to do this. Now there was an airlift operation referred to as The Hump during the War, but it did not deliver the quantity of fuel and equipment required for a strategic bombing campaign.
The initial American plan was to bomb Japan from China and the new B-29s had the range to reach the Home Islands from bases being prepared in China. China was, however, less than satisfactory. Getting supplies to America bomber forces were a nightmare. They had to delivered to India, the farthest distance from America of any sea ports. Then transported to remote areas in India over very basic infrastructure. And then flown over the towering Himalayas. It was called 'Flying the Hump'. Thus was very dangerous. Many planes that went down over the Himalaya were never found. And then the Japanese Ichi-Go offensive seized most of the airfields in China within range of Japan (1944).
The initial plan for bombing Japan did not include the Marianas because they were deep within the Japanese territory. And in 1942 and most of 1943 the Allies were still inching forward in the Solomons and New Guinea. But then the Americans seized the Marianas which not only provided the needed air bases, but were very easy to supply. Not only were they a straight shoot from West Coast ports, but Japan ignored German suggestion and did not use its substantial submarine force in any serious way to threaten American supply lines. The Marianas were seized by the Americans after fierce island campaigns (June-July 1944). The new B-29 Super Fortresses operated from massive base complexes on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian -all untouchable by the Japanese.
The Americans initially targeted industrial facilities, but then began fire bombing raids on cities (March 1945). With the destruction of the Imperial Fleet and the seizure of the
Okinawa, Aircraft flying from Allied aircraft carriers and Okinawa joined in the air campaign.
After World War I, Europeans became obsessed with the idea that if there ever was another war, that cities would be bombed not only with explosives, but poison gas. The Germans had began bombing London and other British cities during World War I. The Germans used not only their Zeppelins, but also developed the long-range Gotha bomber. The mantra that developed after the War was that 'the bomber will always get through'. The Germans convinced themselves that after Hitler seized power that Germany could not be bombed. The Japanese were even more sure of that and began bombing Chinese cities (1931). They were right that China did not have the ability to bomb them, but curiously they ignored the Soviet Union which had air bases within short range of major cities. Even after bombing Chinese cities for a decade, the Japanese saw bombing their cities as a war crime and executed some American airmen (1942). It of course would be the United States that Japan would choose to go to war with. The United States had strategic bombers, but none that could read Japanese cities. The Japanese did not believe that America could develop longer range bombers or take bases close enough to reach Japanese cities. This of course was a flawed assessment based on the assumption that it would be a short war that Japan would quickly win. No thought seems to have been given to the the fact that Japan's cities were more vulnerable to aerial bombardment than those of any other country. The vast majority of Japanese people lived in homes constructed of highly flammable wood and paper -- essentially vast areas of kindling that would ignite in fierce fire storms when set off by incendiary bombs. As far as we know, the Japanese militarists who drove Japan to war never consider Japan's vulnerability.
Japan in the 1930s and early-40s held practice bombing drills. In fact one was just finishing when the Doolittle bombers hit (April 1942). But Japanese fire fighting capabilities were primitive and not prepared to deal with large-scale fires. Despite the vulnerability of Japanese wood and paper homes in cities, the firefighting services were poorly trained and equipped. Few air raid shelters were built for civilians. After the Americans breached Japan's inner defense lines and seized the Marianas (June-July 1942)m, Japanese authorities realized that the Americans with their new B-29 would be coming. They knew what the Americans and Brutish had drone to Germany. Japanese authorities launched a major Civil Defense effort in the cities. They tore down homes to create fire breaks, hoping to stop the spread of fires, aware that the Americans would be dropping incendiaries. The effort involved tearing down over 0.6 million homes in around 280 cities (figure 1). We believe this was done (August 1944). They were still optimistic because rais launched from Chinese bases were ineffective.
Unlike the air campaign over northern Europe, the Japanese were poorly equipped to stop the air attacks.
There were B0-29s shot down, but nothing like the attribution rate experienced over the Reich. Japan's weak air defenses were simply unable to stop the American air raids. 【Zaloga, p. 51 】 The number and quality of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns available for air defense was inadequate Japan was left to defend the Home Islands with with essentially the same aircraft with which they had begun the War. There were some new designs, but only available in small numbers. They were now obsolete not fast enough or capable of the altitude to reach many if the the B-29s. And after the Marines seized Jima (February 1945), the B-29s had P-51 fighter escorts. The P-51s went down to the deck to engage in low altitude attacks on selected targets as well as targets of opportunity. The Japanese during the final months of the War formed 'Special Attack Units' and 'Air-shaking Units'. These were temporary short-lived units with their distinctive names (commonly mythology and history) and markings. They were part of existing squadrons. These units were trained to ram Allied bombers. They usually had their armaments removed to permit faster speeds and higher altitudes. Some had air frames reinforced. The anti-aircraft guns were also proved inadequate, unable to fire at sufficient altitudes. There were a range of other limitations, including fuel shortages, inadequate pilot training, poor radar, and a lack of air defense coordination. The U.S. Navy targeted Imperial Navy picket ships. So the Japanese had little advanced warning of the B-29 raids. At first the Japanese came up to intercept the B-29s. But the the bombers were fast and at high altitudes, they that they were not very successful The Japanese fighters eventually stopped coming up to challenge the bombers (April 1945). This was because they had not been very successful and because it was deemed more important to save available aircraft and fuel for a massive Kamikaze attack on the expected American invasion fleet. The American bombers began calling their raids 'milk runs'. The aircraft tallies were 74 B-29s shot down in air combat, 54 B-29s by anti-aircraft guns, and 19 by a combination. Japanese losses were 1,450 aircraft in combat and another 2,750 as a result of other causes such as strafing attacks on air fiends. 【Zaloga, pp. 542-55.】
Japan had developed some radar by 1945, but it wasstill very basic. So the Japanese had little advanced warning of the B-29 raids. The Japanese radar was fairly primitive and only short range. Thus the Japanese interceptors normally only had less than an hour to intercept the incoming B-29s. The British were able to do it in less than 15 minutes during he Battle of Britain (1940), but the B-29s were at higher altitudes which most if the Japanese planes labored to achieve. And successful attacks in the bombers were best conducted from higher altitudes. Also important was speed. The fact that the B-29s at high altitudes were faster than many if the Japanese fighters made radar tracking especially important. 【Zaloga, pp. 52-53.】 Radar can be given to much credit in air warfare. What is more important is a coordinated air defense system. This why the British Chain Home System was so important in the Battle of Britain. Japan not only had still primitive radar, but it did not have a well-functioning integrated system. In particular IJAAF and IJN were not effectively coordinating their operations. 【Coox, p. 413】
Japanese signals intelligence operations could pick up on the B-29s before showing up on the radar scopes by intercepting the bombers' radio communications, but this did not provide the all important directional information which revealed targets and made possible the calculation of intercept points.
The U.S. Navy successfully targeted Imperial Navy picket ships which were trying to provide advanced warning of the B-29 raids. .
Japan was left to defend the Home Islands with with essentially the same aircraft with which they had begun the War. There were some new designs, but only available in small numbers. They were now obsolete not fast enough or capable of the altitude to reach many if the the B-29s. But at first there were some interceptions and some B-29s were shot down in day light raids (November 1944-February 1945). This declined after February as the number of interceptors fell off. 【Coox, pp. 404–05.】 The Iwo Jima campaign and the expanded P-51 escort coverage were also factors. The Japanese never had much success with nighttime interception. The P-51 fighter escorts were especially important when Gen. LeMay ordered the B-29s to come down to lower altitudes. The P-51s also came down to the deck for attacks on selected targets as well as targets of opportunity--basically going after anything that moved. They encountered only limited fighter opposition. Japan did bot have the radar and communication capabilities to guide their interceptors to the P-51s as the British were doing as early as 1940. Some Japanese lighters did manage to intercept the B-29s, but the B-29s like the B-17s before them were solidly constructed, especially in comparison to Japanese aircraft. They could sustain considerable battle damage. All of this mean that the Japanese pilots began to see their efforts as basically futile. 【Hastings, p. 336.】
The Japanese during the final months of the War formed 'Special Attack Units' and 'Air-shaking Units'. These were temporary short-lived units with their distinctive names (commonly mythology and history) and markings. They were part of existing squadrons. These units were trained to ram Allied bombers. They usually had their armaments removed to permit faster speeds and higher altitudes. Some had air frames reinforced, but the results were minimal, only about 9 kills.
There were a range of other limitations, including fuel shortages, inadequate pilot training, poor radar, and a lack of air defense coordination.
At first the Japanese came up to intercept the B-29s. But the the bombers were fast and at high altitudes, they that they were not very successful The Japanese fighters eventually stopped coming up to challenge the bombers (April 1945). This was because they had not been very successful and because it was deemed more important to save available aircraft and fuel for a massive Kamikaze attack on the expected American invasion fleet. The American bombers began calling their raids 'milk runs'.
The anti-aircraft guns also proved inadequate, many unable to fire at sufficient altitudes. And they were available in inadequate numbers. Japan did nit have Germany's industrial capacity and ability to produce artillery. So there were not huge parls of AA-guns surrounding Japanese cities. The Army after the first B-29 raids in Tokyo attempted to upgrade the country's anti-aircraft artillery batteries (November 1944). Some 12-centimeter (4.7 in) guns began to be supplied to ad to the totally inadequate 7.5-centimeter (3.0 in) and 8-centimeter (3.1 in) guns. Zaloga, p. 53.】 The heavy guns were mostly positioned around Tokyo. Upgrades to other cities were more limited. br>
The final reorganization of Japanese air units was part of Operation Ketsu-Go, the defense of the Home Islands. All Japanese air units were centralized under the command of General Masakau Kawabe who was preparing a massive Kamikaze attack on the expected allied invasion fleet which the Japanese correctly anticipated was the southern-most island of Kyushu.
Coox, Alvin D. "Air War Against Japan" in Cooling, B. Franklin (ed.). Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1994). .
Hastings, Max. Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45. (London: Harper Press. ISBN 978-0-00-726816-0.
Zaloga, Steven J. Defense of Japan 1945. Fortress (Oxford: Osprey Publishing: 2007).
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