Figure 1.--. |
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We do not yet have a full assessment of the level of cooperaion in scientific reserch in weapons development among the Axis. Such cooperation was clearly not as close as the very intense Anglo-American cooperation. The transfer of technology was a one way flow, from Germany to Japan. The Japane defeat by the Soviets in the Machrian border war (1939) should have convinced military planners that Japan was not in a position to wage a war with a modern European army. The Japanese do not appear to have drawn this conclusion. Japan joined the Axis (September 1940). At this time I do not have any details concerning immediate Japanese steps to obtain German technology. Most Japanese senior commanders were convinced that the country's warrior spirit and code of Bushido would bring victory. Some officers saw the need to acquire modern technology. One of these was Tomoyuki Yamashita. Yamashita was familiar with Germany having served as a military attaché there after World War I (1919-1922). Yamashita rose in the military hierarchy. He participated in the unsuccessful military coup (1936), but was not punished. He fought in the Manchrian border war against the Soviets (1939). After Primemister Fumimaro Kondoye appointed Hideki Tojo Minister of War, Yamashita was dipatched to Europe. He arrived in Germany with a shopping list for modern military technology. When he returned to Japan, he strongly advised against going to war with the United States or the Soviet Union until Japan had modernized its military. We have few details on German provision of military technology to Japan at this stahe of the War. We do know that the Germans helped the Japanese build the Hind fighter which was based on the ME-109. The Germans insisted on substantial payments on the basis of commercial exchanges. It is unclear to us how aggressively the Japanes pushed or the Germans offerred their technology. We do know that despite very effective German naval radar such as the equipment on the Bismarck, Japan entered the War in the Pacific without naval radar. We do not fully understand if this was because the Japanese did not appreciate the importance or the Germans were unwilling to share the technology. Radar was of course a critical technology for carrier warfare. This did not change until late in the War. Germany in 1945 began sending the Japanese information on some of their weapons such a jet aircraft. The full extent of the provision of high technology weapons to the Japanese is not known. . The NAZIs insisted on lisensing agreements. The transfers were mase by U-boat. There were shipments of uranium, but the weapons blanned are not fully understood.
We do not yet have a full assessment of the level of cooperaion in scientific reserch in weapons development among the Axis. Such cooperation was clearly not as close as the very intense Anglo-American cooperation. Britain and American began sharing technology even before America entered the War. Often commercial concerns became minor matters. German technology transfers to Japan, at least until the later stages of the War seem much more constrained.
The transfer of technology was a one way flow, from Germany to Japan. Jaoan was rapidly developing an industrial economy. It was the most industrialized country in Europe. It did not have, however, an industrial oe academic base to compete with any of the major world industrial powers in a protracted War. This weakneess was masked in 1941 and 42 by the Imperial Navy. It was a modern, capable force. But its carrier aircraft had been built with the assistance of German technology. It is notavle thatvJapan did not introduce one entirely Japanese built weapon systen utilizing any novel technology. Japan was competitive in 1942 as they had built a naval force while the West had restricted military spending. Afyer only 1 year of war that inballance had been overcome. The Japanese army operated with much less effective weapons than the Imperial Navy. Many Army weapons were of extremely poor quality.
The Japane defeat by the Soviets in the Machrian border war (1939) should have convinced military planners that Japan was not in a position to wage a war with a modern European army. The Japanese do not appear to have drawn this conclusion.
Japan joined the Axis (September 1940). At this time I do not have any details concerning immediate Japanese steps to obtain German technology.
Most Japanese senior commanders were convinced that the country's warrior spirit and code of Bushido would bring victory.
Some officers saw the need to acquire modern technology. One of these was Tomoyuki Yamashita. Yamashita was familiar with Germany having served as a military attaché there after World War I (1919-1922). Yamashita rose in the military hierarchy. He participated in the unsuccessful military coup (1936), but was not punished. He fought in the Manchrian border war against the Soviets (1939). After Primemister Fumimaro Kondoye appointed Hideki Tojo Minister of War, Yamashita was dipatched to Europe. He arrived in Germany with a shopping list for modern military technology. Radar was reportedly high on his list. When he returned to Japan, he strongly advised against going to war with the United States or the Soviet Union until Japan had modernized its military. Yamashita after returning to Japan mastermined the Malay campaign against the British stringhold in Singapore (February 1942).
We have few details on German provision of military technology to Japan at this stage of the War. We do know that the Germans helped the Japanese build the Hind fighter which was based on the ME-109. The Japanese needed help in building the increasingly powerful air craft engenies to compete with the new genertion of air craft the Americans were introducing. The Germans insisted on substantial payments on the basis of commercial exchanges. It is unclear to us how aggressively the Japanes pushed or the Germans offerred their technology. We do know that despite very effective German naval radar such as the equipment on the Bismarck, Japan entered the War in the Pacific without naval radar. We do not fully understand if this was because the Japanese did not appreciate the importance or the Germans were unwilling to share the technology. Radar was of course a critical technology for carrier warfare. This did not change until late in the War.
One matter complicating Germany providing technology to Japan was the distances involved. Before the War, the Germans could freely ship cargoes to Japan and scientists could travel back and forth. Raw material and manufactured goods could also be exchanged. Material could also be exchanged. This was significantly changed after the War began (September 1939). The Royal Navy prevented German freighters except for blocade runners from reaching Japan. Some runs were possible after French ports became available (1940), even as late as 1942. This was dangerous as the Germans did not want their high technology to fall into Allied hands and thus would not risk especially sensiiove items.
Japanese freighters were a diifferent matter because until Pearl Harbor Japan was neutral (December 1941). The British did not want any incidents tomnprovoke the Japanese. Increasing Allied control of the seas made surface blockade runners impossible by 1943. Communication was still possible through the Trans-Siberian Railway, but the quanties were much more limited as well as the danger of the Soviets examening the equiment. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941), contact was only possible through long-range aircraft using forward bases. The Luftwaffe had a special group KG 200 for these and covert operations. They used the 4-engine JU-290. The Japanese also had a long-range transport plane, the KI-77. After Stalingrad (January 1941) and the retreat westward of the Wehrmacht, however, these flights were no longer possible. Finally only increasingly dangerous trips by submarines were possible, but sunmarines could carry only small cargoes. Regular U-boats were exremely limited. The Kriegesmarine converted a few U-boats to dedicated freigters by taking out the torpedoes. They could carry 252 t of freight. This is very small in comparison to a freighter, but proved adequate for transporting important pieces of high technology equipment. The increasingly desperate Germans were willing to trust very secret technology in these submarine shipments. Not only was the dteriorating military situation making them desperate, but the submarines if intercepted were more likely to be sunk than captured. Germany in 1944 began sending the Japanese information on some of their weapons such a jet aircraft. The full extent of the provision of high technology weapons to the Japanese is not known. . The NAZIs insisted on lisensing agreements. The transfers were mase by U-boat. There were shipments of uranium, but the weapons planned are not fully understood.
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