Figure 1.--A German soldier took this snapshot near Kursk in 1942. Notice the flat land scape. I'm not sure what the children are sitting on, proably some part of a wrecked military vehicle. After Stalin and Kursk, the Germans were no longer taking tourist-type photographs. The thoughts of a great Germanic crusade and heroic victories remaking the world order has disappeared.

Kursk was the last of three German summer offences in the Soviet Union. German sweeping summer advances had ended in winter disasters. The myth of Germn invincibility in summer campaigning died at Kursk. [Seidler] This time the Red Army emerged victorious and without the winter snows. The Wehrmacht suffered massive losses from which they could never begin to replace. The Soviets suffered substantially greater losses despite being in defensive positions. One author claims that the Soviet casualties were an incredible seven times those of the Germans. [Clark] That seems high. The Soviets could, however, replce their losses, the Germns could not. It was the Germans last important offensive on the Eastern Front. By the time of Kursk, substantial quantities of American Lend Lease aid had begin to reach the Soviets in addition to their expanding domestic arms production. After Kursk the American assistance essentialy enabled Soviet commanders to remake the Red Army. American trucks in particular gave the Red Army a mobility that the Wehrmacht did not have at the peak of its power, That mobility would enable the Red Army to do in 1944 what the Wehrmacht failed to do in 1941, largely destroy the enemy's field armies. Without the Soviet defeat of the Wehrmacht, the Western Allies would have been hard pressed to contain the Germans or cross the Channel. A victorious Russian ally, however, meant that peace following the War would be far from ideal and leave the peoples of Eastern Europe locked into a new totalitarian dictatorship for a half a century.

German Summer Offensives

Kursk was the Germans last important offensive on the Eastern Front. It was the last of three German summer offences in the Soviet Union (1941, 42, and 43). German sweeping summer advances had ended in winter disasters. The myth of Germn invincibility in summer campaigning died at Kursk. [Seidler] This time the Red Army emerged victorious and without the winter snows. The summer offenives in 1944 wold be conducted by the Red Army and unlikethe ehrmacht, all along the immense Eastern Front.

Losses

The Wehrmacht suffered massive losses from which they could never begin to replace. The Soviets suffered substantially greater losses despite being in defensive positions. One author claims that the Soviet casualties were an incredible seven times those of the Germans. [Clark] That seems high. Accounts vary as to the actual losses. One complication is that Operation Citidel was a wider operation ibvolving more than just the Battle of Kirsk, although the fighting at Kursk was by far themajor part of the fighting. The Germans lost nearly 55,000 men. There were some 140,000 wounded. Some 250-320 tanks and assault guns were destroyed and 600-1,600 damagd. About 500 artillery pieces were lost. The Germans lost about 160 aircraft. The relatively small number was due to the dipoition of much of the Luftwaffe in the West to protect German cities from Allied bombing. The Sovies lost over 175,000 men and 1,600-2,000 tanks and assault guns. Aircraft losses included 450-1,000 aircraft. The Soviets suffered the heavier losses, but they could replace their losses, the Germans could not.

Lend Lease

By the time of Kursk, substantial quantities of American Lend Lease aid had begin to reach the Soviets in addition to their expanding domestic arms production. The American Arsenal of Democracy was now turning out huge quantities of military equipment and supplies and the logigtical system was now fully in place. After Kursk the American assistance essentialy enabled Soviet commanders to remake the Red Army. American trucks in particular gave the Red Army a mobility that the Wehrmacht did not have at the peak of its power, That mobility would enable the Red Army to do in 1944 what the Wehrmacht failed to do in 1941, largely destroy the enemy's field armies.

Strategic Situation

The increasing attacks of the Western Allies for the first time since the German invasion began to significantly relieve pressure on the Red Army. The Allied strategic bombingcampaign forced theGermns to redeploy much of he Luftwffe est to protect German cities. This signoficantly affected German air support at Kirsk. The Allied victory in North Africa bagged some 240,000 Axis soldiers in addition to some 100,000 casualties (May 1943). And as a result, Hitler built up German forces in southern Europe to 45 divisions in addition to forces in France and Norway. The campaign in the Western Desert (1941-42) involved a relatively small German force. The deployment of 45 divisions, however, was a major German commiment from a military serious short of manpower. Hitler even began moving forces to Italy during the Kursk battle. The Kursk offensive following Stalingrad did not break the back of the Wehrmacht, it did destroy the German's offensive capability. Without the Soviet defeat of the Wehrmacht, the Western Allies would have been hard pressed to contain the Germans or cross the Channel. A victorious Russian ally, however, meant that peace following the War would be far from ideal and leave the peoples of Eastern Europe locked into a new totalitarian dictatorship for a half a century. The Kursk and subsequent Red Army victorie meant that the Allied Cross-Channel invasion would be possible in 1944.

The Front Fundamentally Shifts: North, West, and South

The Kursk battle was fought over a relatively small area--at least in Eastern Front terms. The Soviets s the Germans began to wihdraw west struck both north and south. The Kurk salient was on the seam between German Army Group Center and Army Group South. The Red Army even during the battle initiated Operation Kutusov striking at Army Group Center to the north toward Orel/Oryol (July 12). The Soviet Bryansk Front commanded by Markian Popov, attacked the eastern face of the German Orel salient. The Western Front commanded by Vasily Sokolovsky, attacked south toward Orel. The Western Front's attack was spearheaded by the 11th Guards Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Hovhannes Bagramyan. They were supported by the 1st and 5th Tank Corps. The Soviets mounted an even larger offesive against Germany Army Group South--Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. Itwas to be the main Red Army offensive for 1943. The gol was to destroy the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf to isolate the now extended southern portion of Army Group South. Here because of the hugelossessuffered at Kursk by the Voronezh Front, the Red Army could not strike immediately. They had to regroup, bring n replacenents, and resupply. They finakky struk at the ermans (August 3). These offensives set the stage for the massive Soviet operations all long the front (1944). The Sovies will break the back of the Wehrmacht and drive into the Baltics, relieve Lenningrad, move into Poland as far west as Warsaw, move into central Euroe reaching Bucharest, and drive deep into the Balkans.

Sources

Clark, Alan. Barbarossa: The Russian-German Conflict 1941–1945 (New York: William Morrow, 1966).

Seidler, Hans. Images of war: Battle of Kursk 1943 (2011).

Created: 6:37 AM 3/12/2017
Last updated: 9:15 AM 1/29/2018