Figure 1.-- 'Prince of Wales' abnd 'Repulse' were sent north to disrupt Japasnese landings in northern Malaya. The British underestimated Japanese naval power. Adm. Tom Philips be gn to eithdra, but underestimated the range of Japanese aircaft. The losses at Pearl Harbor asnd then the sinking of Firce Z left the Allies without a sunstantial battleship fiorce in the Pacific allowing the Kapanese to seize the Southern Resource Zone.

After the Japanese occupied southern Indochina ad the Americans embargoed crude oil, it was clear that Japan which had joined the Axis would attemot to seize the Dutch oil fields in the Dutch East Indies. American and British codebreakers had learned that a Japanese strike was iminent. A Royal Navy task force made up of two of Britain's most powerful ships Prince of Wales and Repulse. were sent without air cover. [Gilbert] The battleship Prince of Wales, the battle cruiser Repulse and four escorting destroyers was dispatched to Singapore. Singapore had powerful sea defenses, but the defensive plan was to dispatch a fleet in time of danger. That plan did not take into account that Britain might be fully engaged in Europe. The ships reached Singapore (December 2). An accompanying aircraft carrier had run aground while en route. Thus the Briyish force lacked air cover. The importance of air cover was not yet fully appreciated. The Prince of Wales was the most modern battleship in the Royal Navy. She had been maukled by an enciunter with the German battleshiop Bismarck. After the Japanese began landing, the British ordered the Prince of Wales and Repulse to disrupt the Japanese landing forces. At the time the Royal Navy commnders were unaware that the Japanese had taken all British airbases in northern Malaya and there would be no air support. Royal Navy commanders still believed that the Japanese could not sink a battleship maneuvering at high speed on the high seas. Japanese bomvers sank both ships (December 10). Until this time American and British naval commanders, and many Japanese commnders (except Yamamoto), were convinced that the backbone of the fleet was the battleships. These assumptions were overturned by first Pearl Harbor and then the sinking of the two British ships. American commanders actually had no choice, but to adjust their thinking as the battleships of the Pacific fleet had been sunk or destroyed at Pearl Harbor. The only capital ships availavle were the Americasn carriers which Yamamoto had hoped to destroy in the attasck on Pearl.

Created: 12:15 AM 8/3/2023
Last updated: 12:15 AM 8/3/2023