A glance at the map of the Pacific makes it clear that if Japan was to have an empire in Southeast Asia, it also needed the Philippines which sat astride the sea routes, Japan thus only a few hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor attacked the American forces in the Philippines. Bombers from Formosa (Taiwan) destroying most of the Air Corps planes on the ground at Clark Field, the center of American air power on the Philippines. Even though MacArthur had reports of the attack on Pearl Harbor several hours before the Japanese struck, no measure were taken to prepare for the Japanese attack. The Philippines was considered to be beyond the range of Japanese land-based air craft. As a result, the American and Philipino forces were able to offer little resistance to the Japanese invasion ar Lingayen Gulf to the north of Manila. MacArthur decided to base the defense of the Philippines on Bataan. He declared Manila and open city and concentrated his forces there. Tragically there was no time to transfer the needed supplies for his forces. The American and Philippino forces in Batan put up a valliant defense, but ran out of food and amunition. The devestated Pacific Fleet was unable to resupply them. Many military historians believe that the Japanese conquest of the Philippines was the most important American military defeat in American military history. President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to Australia before General Wainright was forced to surrender. America soon learned of Japanese attrocities during the Bataan Death, further fueling American hatred of the Japanese.
A glance at the map of the Pacific makes it clear that if Japan was to have an empire in Southeast Asia, it also needed the Philippines which sat astride the sea routes,
The Philippines was the largest American colony. It ws acquired from Spain in the Spanish-American War (1898). It was made a Commonwealth (1935). This was the first step in a 10-year plan to grant independence ti the Islands.
General Douglas MacArthur had served as Chief of Staff of the U.S. army. The rise of the militarists in Japan and their increasing beligerence posed a threat to American interests in the Pacific, especially the Philippines's. President Roosevelt sent MacArthur to the Philippines to organize the defence of the Islands. MacArthur retired in 1937 but stayed on the at the request of the Commonwealth Giovernment to become the country's military adviser. The Philippine Department was the most distant U.S. Army command in the Pacific. The Japanese joined the Axis and their actions in Indo-China and the American response caused a steady spiral in relations. American-Japanese negotiations broke down (June 1941).
the War Department established a new command to organize the defense of the Philippines (July 26, 1941) and named the United States Armed Forces, Far East (USAFFE, or AFFE). President Roosevelt recalled MacArthur to active duty as a major general. Congress approved $10 million to mobilize the Philippine Army. The Army sent 100 B-17 Flying Fortress to bolster Philipino defenses.
<! Plans updated (late 1930s)= for Japan: Rainbow 5:
involved shift from offense to defense in Pacific;
At the time of Pearl Harbor, General MacArthur's ground forces consisted of the Philippine Army of 10 divisions and supporting troops, with a total strength of about 100,000, and a U.S. Regular Army contingent of more than 25,000. Of the latter force, the largest unit was the Philippine Division, consisting of one American regiment and two Philippine Scout regiments. The Japanese struck before the Philippine Army could be completely trained or properly equipped.
The fall of France to the Germans (June 1940) created opportunities for the Japanese. France under Vuichy cintrol began colaborating with the Germans. The Japanese joined the Axis (September 1940) and with the consent of their German partners forced Vichy authorites in Indo-China to make concessions. The Japanese deployed troops to northern Indo-China (November 1940). That was bad enough. And the reason that Preident Roosevelt decided to make Pearl Harbor the permanent base of the Pacific Fleet. But then the Japanese essentially seized southern Indo-China (July 1941). Look at the map. Indo China was basically a pistol pointed at just what the Japanese wanted--the oil rich Dutch East Indies and British Borneo. And southern Indi Chima was the point pf the speer which is why the Americans reacted so strongly, reponding with the oil enmbargo which they understood could be a 'casus belli'. In the meantime Indo-China provided Japan the forward bases it needed in case of war. And the Philippinos felt increasingly threatened.
The United States was Japan's major sioyrce of oil. The American oil embargo thuis brought the simmering relatiins with America to a boil (July 1941). General Tojo grew up in the Jpanese Army. His father was a generral, rather like MacArthur. He cwas strongly influenced by World War In and commited to the idea of tiotal war--the idea that the whole nation much be mobilized. He made his name in Manchuria which the Japanese invade (1931). He argued for the reorganization of the Japanese Army and the integration of Manchurian resources into what was becoming the Japanese war economy. He beame one of the Army's leading experts on resources, a makor issue with resource-poor Japan. He served as chief of police affairs which meant the brutal suppression of the conquered Chinese people in what became the Japanese privince of Manchuko. Tojo was promoted to chief of staff of the Kwangtung Army--at the time the mostb powerful formation inthe Japanese Army. Tojo during his time in Manchuraia came under the infuence Yōsuke Matsuoka, a fiery ultra-nationalist and CEO of the South Manchuria Railway whuchwas muchnmore than a railway, but ione of Asia's largest corporations. Tojo also became acquainted with Nobusuke Kishi, the Deputy Minister of Industry in Manchukuo and was basically managuing Manchukuo's Japanese-controlled economy. 【Browne, p. 60.】 Tojo at this time still thought that war with the Soviet Union was his primary resonsibility. Tojo strongly supported Japan's forward policy in north China as the Japanese sought to expand theur control further south into China. Once appointed to Army Chief of Staff (1937), Tojo asttempted to increase Japanese penetration into the Inner Mongolia from Manchukuo. He persinally led units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade in Operation Chahar, his only actual combat experience. 【Cowley & Parker, p. 473.】 The Militarists launched the invasion of China (1937). He then began to shift his attention to political affairs. He became Vice Ministerv for War (1938).
They achieved great victories, but became bogged down in China and unable to complete their conquest, in part because of Amrican aid to the Chinese Nataionalists. The Soviet Red Army victory at Khalkhin Gol and the NAZI-Soviet alliance seems to have reoriented his and it did other Japanese officials orientastion from the Strike North Faction.
He became a leading voice for the Japanese Militarists who called for an end to British and American influence in the Far East and the seizure of their colonial,possessions, joining the Strike South Fasction. War in Eurioe provided great possibilities, ear first for French colonoes. Tojo became War Minister (1940). It is at this time that Japan began to moce inton Indo-China, intenssifying diplomatic tension with the United States which had broken into the Japanese diplomatic Purple Code and thus able to follow Japanese diplomatic (but not miliatary) moces in some detail. Gen. Tojo became Prime-Minister and essentially a military dictator (October 1941). The militarists now had complete control of the Government. The problem for Tojo as Prime-Minister was that Japan to complete the conquest of China needed oil. Britain was fully engaged in Europe and the Battle of the Atlantic, the Americans were not -- although still not well armed. And the American Philippine Islnds stood between Japan and the resources they so desperately coveted in the British and Dutch controlled Southern Resource Zone, especially the oil. Extensive negiotiatuins took place between the Japanese and the United States. The fundamentsl American position was that the oil Japan wanted could not begin flowing again until Japan withdrew from China. This meant that Japan would either have to give up its primary goal of conquering China or go to war wih the United States. Tojo chose the military sollution -- war with the United States. Tojo was aware of American industrual strength, but like his military colleagues was convinced that Japan's marshall spirit could ovewhealm what ever matererial advantages America possessed. It was Tojo who ordered the attack on Pearl Hsrborans set in motion yhe expansive military offensive, incliding the inasdion of the Philippines.
A Japanese carrier taskforce composed of six carriers on December 7, 1941, executed a surprise attack on the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. It was a brilliant tactical victory for Japan, but perhaps the greatest mistake in modern military history as it brought a suddenly united America with its vast industrial capacity into the War. The Japanese launched 360 aircraft which in 2 hours struck Peal Harbor just as the American sailors were waking up on a sleepy Sunday morning. The strike sunk or heavily damaged six of the eight American battleships, three cruisrs, three destroyers, and most of the Army Air Corps planes on the island. America was at war. and its primary striking force, the Pacific Fleet, was effecively in capacitated. As strange as it may seem, this may have been a blessing in disguise. american naval thinking still fiocused on the battleships. and the Japanese carriers at this time basdly outclassed the American carriers. A fleet engagement atv this time could have been far more costly than what occurred st Pearl.
With the American fleet immobilized at Pear Harbor, the Japanese were able to sweep through the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia. Guam was quickly taken. Resistance at Wake Island surprised the Japanese, but after the initial assault was repulsed, a second assault took the island. MacArthur's defense of the Philippines was compromised when most of his planes were destroyed on the ground at Clarke Field. General MacArthur commanded the most important American military force west of Pearl. His handling of the defense of the Philippines was disappointing at best, bordering on incompetence. He failed to strike back at the Japanese in the hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor by bombing Japanese bases in Formosa. He also allowed much of the available aircraft to be destroyed on the ground. [Schom] The horror of the Bataan Death March created an image of the Japanese military in the American mind that fueled a hatred for the Japanese. [Schom] Hong Kong quickly fell. The Japanese also seized the oil-rich Dutch East Indies (modern Indonesia). Allied naval forces fought a series of engagements to stop the Japanese, but could not match the powerful Japanese naval forces. Nimitz and Halsey tried to distract the Japanese with hit an run carrier raids. The Japanese moved south from Indo-China, seizing Malaya and then the bastion at Singapore. The Repulse and Prince of Wales are lost in the defense of Singapore. Then they moved west through Thailand and defeating the British in Burma. Within a few months the Japanese had carved out the huge empire with enormous resources that they had long coveted. The Japanese then targeted New Guinea in preparation for a move south to Australia. All that remained to stop them were four American carriers.
The Philippines played a central role in the Pacific War. It was not that the Jaopabese were that much interested in the Philippine themselves, but because thev Islands were located between the resources they coveted in the Southern Resource Zone and the Home Islands. And because they were an American Commonwealth, taking the Islands meant war with the United States. The defense of the Islands was undertaken by Gen. Maxtarthr after he retired from his position of Army Chief of Staff. He acceoted the job as Field Marshal of the Philippines ASrmy, a pompous title he insuisted on having (1935). He arrived in the Philippines with Lt. Col Eusenhower on his staff. His job was to train a non-existent Filipino Army now that the United States had commited to Filipino indeopendence. The result was a total failure. This was in part due to inadequate funding for arming the Filipinos, but the reaining was alo a failure. Thus when the Japanese invaded, while the MacArthur had a large numbers of troops which for the most part were of no real military value. Thec defense of the Island was thus based on the poorl asrmed y U.S. Army troops and Filipino Scouts, a Filipino contingent of the U.S. Army. There was also a tiny naval force and a more imprtant Army Air Corps contingent. Despite warmings from OPearl Harbor, Mac-Arthur allowed his air cintingent to be largely destroyed on the ground. For unexplained reasons, Mac Arthur ignored pre-War plasnnjing to conduct a defense of the Philippines in the Bataan Peninsdula. There was no pre-war stationing of supplies. And by the gtime he deciddd to fll back to Bataan, there was no way to ger the needed supplies fir an extended fight to the men falling back to the penisula. After a valiant fight, the stsrving men were fiorced to surrender. The reistance on Bataan was the first real ground resistance the Japanese faced in the Pacific War. The next would be when the the Japanese unexpectedly encountered the Australian Army on New Guinea and the American Marines on Guadalcanal (August 1942). From June 1942 until October 1944, the only fighting that occurred in the Philippines was between Japanese occupying forces and Filipino resistance fighters with the Filipino Scouts at their core.
Japan only a few hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor attacked the American forces in the Philippines. (It was only a few hours later, but because of the internatioinal date line, it was December 8.) Bombers from Formosa (Taiwan) destroying most of the Air Corps planes on the ground at Clark Field, the center of American air power on the Philippines. Fort Stotsenberg was also attacked. Naval facilities were also damaged. Even though MacArthur had reports of the attack on Pearl Harbor several hours before the Japanese struck, no measure were taken to prepare for the Japanese attack. The Philippines was considered to be beyond the range of Japanese land-based air craft.
Military historians have to ask the question of why General MacArthur was so unprepared for the Japanese attack when it came. Not positioning the air assetts lost December 8 was bad enough, but MacArthur also did not properly prepare for the subsequent Japanese invasion of the Islands. MacArthur's force, especially after the loss of his air assetts was not sufficent to defend the Philippines indefinitely. It was adequate to resist the Japanese for more than a fews months if it had been properly managed. The forces at his disposal were no inconsequential. MacArthur failed to position supplies and munition in the Bataan peninsula. This location had been identified in War Plan Orange and the unrevised Rainbow-5. The American and Filipino forces on Bataan in fact resisted valiantly and were finally forced to surender only because they were starving and out of amunition. Immediatley after Pearl Harbor there was still time to move supplies into Baatan. Many military historians believe that the Japanese conquest of the Philippines was the most important American military defeat in American military history.
The destruction of American airpower at Clark Field combined with Pear Harbor, made it impossible for the American and Philipino forces to offer significant resistance to the Japanese amphibious invasions. The Japanese wasted no time in following up on their inintial strike. They landed at Aparri and Vigan on the northern coast of Luzon (December 10). The principal invasion force began landing on Luzon at Lingayen Gulf (December 22). Smaller landings were made south of Manila and on other islands in the Philippines. The uninitalmlandings were limited. And contrary to Gen. MacArthur's reporting there was initially the potential to transfer aupplies and heavy equiopment to Bataan. MacArthur did not do so.
MacArthur about one month into the War finally saw that defensive opertations were failing. They were unable to stop the Japanese drive south to Manila. It was not that the Japanese outnumbered his fiorces. It was that the large Filipino contingent was largely untraind zand poorly armed. For which he has gto bbear the reposnsibility--especially the poor training. Rather than have the city destroyed, he abandoned the city and declared it an open city (December 24). The Japanese occupied the city (January 2).
Bataan was a small peninsula west of Manila. It was already identified as the plave to base a strategic retreat in the event of a Japanese invasion. Yet there wa no pre-invasion staging of supplies there nor was there a real effort to transfer supplies, food and amunition or heavy weeapons there kin the early phase of the Japanese invasion. MacArthur's behavior seems deluisdional. Admiral Kimmel and Gen. Short wr pilloried after Pearl Harbor for the sucess of the Jaoanese suroprise attack, MacArthur on the other hand receibed a Medal of Hinor for an even more incompetent defense of the Philippines dofr which he had amplel warning. MacArthur after suffering stunning defeats, stasged a cgasogtic retreat to Bataan, Corregidor and three small islands in Manila Bay. He concentrated his forces there and was in place, but little in the ways of supplies to support his fiorces (January 7). He seems tio hasve hoped that he could hold out until relieved by the Pacific Fleet. He did not fully appreciate the extent of the damage to the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and the full power of the Imperial Navy, especially the Japanese carriers. Tragically MacArthur did not properly use available time to transfer the needed supplies for his forces. The Americans and Filipinos lost most of their supplies asnd heavy eqwuipment during the withdrawal. The Japanese naval blockade prevented resupply or the landing of reinforcements. The American and Fhilipino forces in Bataan put up a valliant defense. Their resistance was heroic and inflicted substantisl casualties in gthe Japanese. At the same time, self agrandising press releases fron Gen. MacArthur's headquarters focused on manufactured heroism being duisplayed by the General. The American public bought it. One person who dud not was the newly appointed Gen. Eisenhower in the Army War Plans Division who had srved under MacArthure in the Philippines. He understood that the disaster in the Philippines was in part tacticasl blunfers as well as the result of sufrrounding himself with sycophant rather than talent. The real heroes on Bataan rapidly ran out of food, amunition, medical supplies. The devestated Pacific Fleet was unable to resupply them. The starving men on Bataan held out against an overwhelming Japanese force. They in fact performed far more than could be reasonably asked. They were the first real ground resistance the Japanese faced in the Pacific War. The next would be the Australian Army on New Guinea and the American Marines on Guadalcanal (August 1942).
General MacArthur commanded the defense of Bataan from Corregidor. President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to Australia (March 12). MacArthur had insisted on a personal order from the President. Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright was left in command. He left Corregidor on PT-Boats and was neerly intercepted by the Japanese. Reaching an American base in the southern Philippines he was able to board a plane which broyght him to Australia. MacArthur was ordered to command Allied ground forces in the South Pacific. He was shocked to find that such forces in Australia were virtually non-existent. Most of the Australian Atmy was in Egypt ans American forces had not yet begun to arrive. When he arrived in Mebourne he announced, "I shall return." Notably he said "I" and not "We".
U.S. troops on Bataan were reduced by hunger, disease, and casualties. They were no longer capable of resisting the well-supplied Japanese. Maj. Gen. Edward P. King, Jr. surrendered the forces on Bataan (April 9, 1942). It would be the largest surrender in American military history. Mac Arthur safely enconsed in Australia was incensed. He wanted both King and Wainwright court marshaled.
The Japanese forced the Americans and Filipinos who surrendered on Bataan on a grueling march. General Homma ordered that the men who surrendered be moved to Camp O'Donnell in central Luzon, about 100 miles to the north. Information is sketchy. There is no evidence that I know of that Homma intentially ordered a death march, however, it is demonstrable that he was extrodinarily callous and felt no real responsibility toward the welfare of POWs. Healthy troops provided with food and water would not have found this a horendous undertaking to march this distance. The men who surrendered on Bataan, however, were not healthy. The major reason they surrended was they had run out of food and munitions and were starving. Many were sick. The Japanese underestimated the size of the American force and disregarded efforts by General King to organize an orderly movement of his men. From the beginning, the Japanese harshly treated the POWs. Beatings were common. Men were killed for even minor enfractions and sometimes for no real reason. The Japanese searched the POWs and any man with Japanese items were immediately executed. 【Daws, pp. 73-74.】 Personal property of any value was stollen. The actual march began at Mariveles on April 10. General King offered to provide vehicles which was rejected out of hand by the Japanese. 【Dyess, pp. 69-71.】 The POWs had to travel on foot, even the sick. Stranglers and those who collapsed along the way were kliiled, many bayoneted. 【Groom 】 The Japanese soldiers conducting the march randomly beat the POWs. They were denied food and water for several days. The lack of water in the tropical heat was especially harrowing. Food tht was provided was inadequate. The POWs were allowed a few hours tgo sleep, but under conditions that made real rest difficult. Finally the POWs were cramed into suffocating box cars. A few men escaped to fight as guerrillas. The survivors suffered 3-1/2 years of inhumane treatment as prisoners of war. Men perished in both the prison camps and in prison transports. America soon learned of Japanese attrocities during the Bataan Death, further fueling American hatred of the Japanese.
Corregidor is a small rocky island just south of Bataan. Corregidor was small, but strategically placed. It is located at the entrance of Manila Bay, one of finest natural harbors in the Pacific. It was like a cork in a bottle. Corregidor dominated Manila Bay. After the retreat to Baatan, the defense of the Philippines was conducted from Corregidor. Corregidor also became the seat of the Philippine Commonwealth government. The Japanese first bombed Corregidor (December 29) and intensive attacks continued for about a week until the focus shifted to Bataan. Japanese artillery began to target the island (early-February). It was from Corregidor that Philippine President Manuel Quezon and General MacArthur departed for Australia (March 1942). General MacArthur was replaced by Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright.l He commandeed what was left of U.S. Forces in the Philippines (USFIP) (March 21-May 6, 1942), . General MacArthur remained the nominal commander. After the fall of Bataan (April 9), the Japanese concentrated on Corregidor. The surface of the island and fortification was blasted to pieces. The garrison retreated into the island's caves and tunnels. After a month of daily shelling, General Wainwright sent a message to MacArthur in Australia, "Situation here is fast becoming desperate." (May 3) MacArthur failed to admit how serious the situation was or show any willingness to order surrender. The Japanese started landing (May 5). The first wave was cut up by small arms fire and the few artillery pieces still in action. Additional landings gradually overwealmed the American defenses. Wainwright finally decuded to surrender (May 6 at noon). He ordered the American flag lowered and a white flag raised. He radioed General Sharp of the Visayan-Mindanao Force to release command of the Visayas and Mindanao islands to him. Wainwright only wanted to surrender Corregidor so that resistance could continue in the south. He sinaled the report to President Roosevelt, 'with head bowed in sadness but not in shame', that he was surrendering Corregidor. This was the beginning of the end of organized American resistance in the Philippines. The Japanese took Wainwright to Cabcaben, Bataan, to formally surrender to General Homma. Wainwright insisted he only had control over Corregidor, but Homma refused to accept this. He threatened Wainwright to torture and kill the American POWs. Wainwright was especially concerned about the Army nurses on Corregidor. Wainwright signed the surrender agreement (May 7). He was brought to a radio station to inform all of the American forces in the Philippines. MacArthur safeky in Australia was furious and never forgave Wainright. The Corregidor garrison was not involved in the Bataan Death March. They Japanese took them to Manilla where they were paraded through the streets. They were then transorted by train to Prison Camp Cabanatuan.
The Japanese behaved barbarically when they entered Manila. Many went on a drinking spreee and raped or otherwise abused Filipino girls and women. The Japanese conducted celebrations and parades in Manila to honor their stunning victory. The Manila residents were ordered to attend. The Japanese quickly rounded up American civilians who were interned in camps. The treatment of the internees varied widely. The pro-Japanese Filipinos who cooperated with the occupation authorities. To many it seem that the Americans were gone for good. Gradually as opinion turned decisively against the Japanese, collaborators were targeted. The Japanese seized the banks which were put in the hands of Japanese bankers who attempted to convince Filipinos to deposit their dollars. Authorities ordered the theaters to operate 24 hours a day. The best seats were reserved for the Japanese military. Soldiers went into shops and bought all sorts of items with occupation money which had no real value. Shop owners had no choice as to refuse to accept the Japanese script was to rusk death. Eventually Japanese authorities ordered Filipinos to hand in their dollars in exghange for Japanese military yen. The Philippino people suffered greviously under Japanese occupation. The Japanese press ganged large numbers of Filipinos into slave labor camps. Filipino women were forced to work in brothels operated by the Japanese military.
Supreme Court Justice Jose P. Laurel who had been wonded in an attempted assasination became the president of the Japanese-sponsored Republic. The National Assembly voted for him (September 25, 1943). Benigno Aquino Sr. the father of Ninoy and the head of Kalibapi, was elected Speaker. The Japanese flew the three most prominent Fhilipino leaders (Laurel, Aquino, and Jorge Vargas) to Tokyo. They were decorated by Emperor Hirohito. Premier Hideki Tojo briefed them on the plan for Philippine Independence within the Japanese Co-Propsperity Zone. Premier Tojo demanded that the Philippine Government declare war on the United States and Great Britain. Dr. Laurel with considerable courafe refused to comply and explained to Tojo that few Filipinos would support this and that it would weaken his government. The Japanese-sponsored Republic was installed (October 14, 1943). It is often seen as a puppet government. There were, however, instances in which Laurel stood up to the Japanese. He insisted the Japanese remove soldiers and advisers from Malacanang.He also demanded custody of Manuel Roxas, the popular Filipino leader. The Americans landed on Leyte (October 1944). Gwneral MaacArthur proclaimed that he understood the Philipino government officials were operating under duress (October 23, 1944). The Japanese began arming pro-Japanese elements among Filipinos, led by Benigno Ramos, Pio Duran and General Artemio Ricarte (December 1944). President Laurel refused to draft Filipino soldiers to fight with the Japanese. Ramos organized the Makapili (Makabayang Pilipino) to take over the Government and sideline or dispense President Laurel. He thought he could rally young Filipinos to the Japanese. Laurel defied both General Yamashita and Ramos. American troops landed at Lingayen Gulf and began the drive south to Manila (January 1945). In town after town they were jououdly received bybthe Filipino people. The U.S. First Cavalry backed by Filipino guerrillas reached the UST (February 3). They freed 4,000 Americans and detainees. Later that night they reached Malacanang Palace. The Japanese flew Laurelvand some of his family to Tokyo. After the Japanese surender (Augusy 1945) the Americans arrested Laurel and returned him to Manila. He was charged with treason. Manuel A. Roxas, who has been saved by Laurel was eklected president of the Philippines (April 23, 1946). Laurel pleased not guilty to the treason charges (September 2, 1946).
He told the court, "I am neither pro-Japanese nor pro-American, I am pro-Filipino... There is no law that can condemn me for having placed the welfare of my people over and above that of America." Laurel's trial was scheduled for July 1947.
The Filipino resistance movement Hukbalahap developed throughhout the Japanese resistance. General MacArthur ordered Lt. Col. Claude A. Thorpe to evade Japanese patrols with some USAFFE officers and moved into the rugged Mt. Pinatubo area (January 1942). This was the birthplace of the Filipino guerilla movement on Luzon. Thorpe accepted recruits for underground warfare. Men from all over the lowlands joined Thorpe. Thorpe sent commando units to locations in Luzon even before Bataan fell. The organization was called the USAFFE Luzon Guerrilla Army Forces, part of which was Western Luzon Guerrilla Forces (WLGF) under the command of Capt. Ralph McGuire was an explosives expert. The WLGFs operated around Zambales. Many other groups formed in other areas. Purely Filipino guerilla organizations appeared throughout the Philippines. Some were led by pro-US Filipino officers others by the Communist-led Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (Hukbalahap). They did not only fight the Japanese, but also fought each other. One of the most important groups on Luzon was the Hukbalahap led by Luis Taruc. The brutality of the Japanese occupation helped fuel an effective Resistance campaigns carried out by guerillas which had achieved control of substantial areas. The Japanese, however, controlled the population centers, especially on Leyte and Luzon. The Americans delivered some supplies to the Fhilipino guerillas by submarine as well as operatives to help coordinate the canpaign. Most Filipinos were steadfastly loyal to the United States. This was in part because even before the Japanese invasion, America was moving toward Filippino independence. More than any thing it was the stark Japanese brutality that drove the Filippino to resist the Japanese.
The U.S. Navy preferred targetting Formosa (Taiwan), but MacArthur eventually prevailed with his insistence that America must retun to the Philippines. He considered his vow to return a pledge to the Philippinp people that had to be honored. Some how his vow, "I shall return" seems less approaptiate than "We shall return", but it was pure MacArthur and he convinced President Roosevelt. Reports from resistance fighters and American pilots revealed that the Japanese were not heavily defending large areas of the Islands. The inasion of Mindanao was considered unecessary and the decession was made to strike first further north at Leyte. It was in this engagement that the Kamakazis first appeared, although still in relatively small numbers. MacArthur President Sergio Osmeña waded ashore with the invasion force at Leyte Gulf (October 20, 1944). The American Army forces advanced steadily. The Japanese resisted, but could not match American fire power. The most serious Japanese resistence occurred at sea. The resulting naval engaement following on Battle of the Philippones Sea is commonly referred to as the Battle of Leyte Gulf. It was the largest sea battle ever fought and resulted in the destruction of the Japanese fleet as an effective fighting force. This opened the way for the land campaign. Further landings occurred at Ormoc (December 7, 1944). Then the fighting moved to Luzon. The Americans finally reach the main island of Luzon with landings at Lingayen Gulf (January 9, 1945). The initial American landings were unopposed. Japanese Imperial Army General Tomoyuki Yamashita had been tasked with the defense of the Philippines.
Browne, Courtney Tojo The Last Banzai (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1998).
Cowley, Browne and Geoffrey Parker. The Reader's Companion to Military History )Houghton Mifflin Harcourt:2001).
Daws, Gavan. Prisoners of the Japanese: POWS of World War II in the Pacific (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1994)
Dyess, Wm. E. The Dyess Story: The Eye-Witness Account of the Death March from Bataan and the Narrative of Experiences in Japanese Prison Camps and of Eventual Escape (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1944).
Grroom, Winston. 1942: The Year that Tried men's Souls.
<! "First Dark Days" provides the reader with an historical overview of the events from the perspective of the Americans residing in the Manila area. The Americans, she points out, slowly realized that captivity was not a possibility but a probability, and Cogan then describes the sights, sounds, confusion, and shock that characterized the last three weeks of December 1941. She reviews the attack on Pearl Harbor (8 December local time), losses in the Philippines at Clark Field and Cavite Naval Station, the lack of American opposition, the retreat and precarious food situation. Although Manila was declared an open city on 24 December it was still bombed by the Japanese, and Japanese troops captured Baguio on 27 December and Manila on 2 January. The civilian American Emergency Committee in Manila, concerned about the lack of supplies and food and remembering the Rape of Nanking in 1937, planned to use the University of Santo Tomas as a place of internment. A majority of the Americans in Manila remained to become incarcerated--the largest body of American civilians ever captured in U.S. history--but others took to the hills to hide or to join the guerillas. Cogan describes the Japanese advance, the tiring and tedious registration process as citizens became prisoners, and how the Filipinos would supply food to the internees, in the main, for money or valuables. For comparison she provides some illustrations of U.S. internment camps for Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans such as Manzanar and Lordsburg. Cogan also wrestles successfully in this chapter with different historical recollections of the same incident, carefully delineating these perceptions. >
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