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One of the two Italian intelligence agencies during World War II was the military's intelligence agency--the Servizio Informazione Militari (SIM). SIM was a relatively small operation compared to the intelligence services of the other major World War II beligerants. SIM has several major sections responsible for 1) espionage, 2) counterespionage, 3) special services (sabotage and assasination), 4) cryptology, and 5) assessments. One author reports that counterespionage and special services were most effective. [Holt] Given the limited resources available to SIM, they were remarkably successful. And they proved more difficult to fool than the German Abwehr.
One of the two Italian intelligence agencies during World War II was the military's intelligence agency--the Servizio Informazione Militari (SIM). SIM was a relatively small operation compared to the intelligence services of the other major World War II beligerants. SIM has several major sections responsible for 1) Sezione Calderini--espionage, 2) Sezione BonsignoreCalderini--counterespionage, 3) special services (sabotage and assasination), 4) cryptology, and 5) assessments. One author reports that counterespionage and special services were most effective. [Holt]
SIM under the direction of Roatta was active in the inter-War era. It oversaw support for Croatian and Macedonian nationalists in Yugoslavia. SIM arranged the assaination of Yugoslave King Alexander I during a visit to France (1934).
After the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935), SIM attempted to distract the British and French with various operations including a terroist campaign in France conducted by the Fascist Cagoulards. SIM also provided arms to Arabs in Palestine. They also managed to turn some Ethiopian tribal chiefs. One SIM coup was sunstitute photographs of victims of the Italian poison gas campaign in Ethiopia with photographs of leprosy victims. This allowed Italian diplomats to descredit the photographs as a hoax when published by London newspapers. [Holt]
Hitler launched World War II with the invasion of Poland (September 1939). Mussolini had allied Italy with NAZI Germany through the Axis alliance. This was a defensive alliance and as Germany had invaded Poland, Ialy was not obligated to follow Germany into the Wat. And with its long exposed Meditteranean coast, Italy was more exposed to the British and French with their poweful fleets than was Germany. Mussolini watched couvestly as Hitler cjaled up aeries of victories: Czechoslovakia (March 1939), Poland (1939), Denmark and Norway (1940). And then Hitler launvhed the long-awaited Western Offensive (May 1940). Mussolini was afraid of missing out in the spoils of war. SIM director Carboni produced military assessments wild overstating the Allied (Britih and French) forces, in part reflecting reflecting the opinion of Marshall Badoglio that Italy was not prepared for war. After the War, Carboni claimed that the SIM reports were an attempt to prevent Mussolini from entering the War.
Mussolini rejected the SIM assessments and declared war on Britain and France when it looked like the Germans had won the War (June 1940). They may have been a factor in Italy's inactivity in Libya at a time when the British were unprepared to defend Egypt. Mussolini had Carboni removed (September 1940). Carboni was replaced by Col. Cesare Amè. Badoglio ws displeased with the appointment. Mussolinii decided to invade Greece 3 weeks after the Amè appointment over Badoglio's objections (October 1940). It is unclear if Mussolini even consulted SIM. The SIM countet-intelligence operations were very successful. The found or otherwude neutralized the agents inserted by the British. This included a radio operator. SIM's Cryptology section also achieved success in breaking codes and ciphers. One successful method was burgalizing embassies to obtain code books. They craxked into the French diplomatic codes. {Alvarez] Some informationwas obtained by reading foreign mail. The police assisted with this operation. SIM like the Italiam military was not prepared for war. SIM did not have networks set up in the countries with which would fight (America, Britain, and the Soviet Union). It moved to set up operations equipped with radios. One important operatuin was Clark's Cheese in Egypt. SIM had a curious relationship with its German counterpart, the Abwehr. Admiral Canaris and General Amè had remarkably frank conversations. Amè was tootally inpolitical. He was not tied to Mussolini and the Fascist Party. He continued to direct the SIM after Mussolini's removal (July 1943). There was less cooperation between SIM and the Abwehr on the working level. The SIM did not trust the Abwehrto honor agreements suvh as not to run clandestinr networks in Italy. They momitoted German intelligence activities and agents in Italy. And they did not share details on theur their doubling of Allied agents. [Holt] JUst before the Italian surrender, Bagdolio put Carboni back in charge of SIM (September 1943). When Italy declared war on Germany, SIM vegan cooperating with Allied intelligence (October 1943). Given the limited resources available to SIM, they were remarkably successful. And they proved more difficult to fool than the German Abwehr. There are several instance of the Abwehr accepting Allied misinformation while SIM was more skeptical.
Alvarez, David. Left in the Dust: Italian Signals Intelligence, 1915-1943.
Holt, Thaddeus. The Deceivers.
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