Figure 1.--The Japanese invasion of China was a disaster for the Chinese people. That was not was concerned the Japanese. They were concerned that Japan was not reaping any real benefits from the huge effort at great expense being made in China. The Chinese economy was still based largeky on agriculture and the hard work of the Chinese peaantry. The Japanese were able to seize rice and other food from the peasantry, but they did not significantly increase food shipments back to the Home Islands, especially when the cost of waging the War is computed.

The Chinese Nationalists-- Kuomintang (KMT was making progress in uniting the country and developing the economy (1920s). Chaing decided not to challenge Japan's seizure of Manchuria (1931). He decided that China just did not have the industrial to support a modern army that could take on the Japanese. Here as would be shown by events, he was absolutely correct. The KMT was sponsoring industrial projects, but the Japanaese struck before thery had approached the level of Japanese industrialization. China was the first country that Japan attacked in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Japan had made in clear in the Twenty-One Demands issued duriung World War I (1915) that they had much larger objectives in China. Their goal was to to explot China for their advantage. Given that many Chinese were living on the edge, the consquences were potentially devestating And this was before the military had seized control of the Japanese Government. The resporce-poor Japanese were attracted by China's vast resources and potential mmarkrt for their manufactured goods. China at the time was divided by warring feuding loads and had verey little modern industry. Japan could see that the faced an increasingly united and stronger country. They struck again north of Beijing at the Marco Polo Bridge (1937). The Japanese action was taken by local commanders, but the Government in Tokyo supported their actions and commited major forces when the KMT resisted which resulted in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese rapidly seized China's prosperous coastal cities where most of the still-limited industry was located. They expected Chainag to sue for peace. He did not but instread retreated ibto the interior. The Japanese attempted to pursue the KMT fiorces, but the Japanese Army was still largely unmotorized. China is a huge country. And while Japan had an industrial economy, it was not large enough to equio the motirized arny rgat was needed to move into the unbterior. As a result, the Japanese were unable to defeat the KMT armies in their remote interior locations. THe Japanese pursued the war with unimaginable brutality. The best known atroicity was the Rape of Nanking (1937), but there were many such, albeit on asmaller scale. Whole villages weeew masacered. The Japanese used their air firce to m=bimb undefended Chinese citiies. They also use poison gas and bilogical weapons. The Nationalidsts for their part to an extenbt pursued a scorced earth policy as they retreated. As a result, large areas of China was devestated. The Japanese expected to reap great rewards from seizing China. As it turned out, it prived verety costly to wage war and garrison the occupied areas. The war dragged on nearly 5 years before the Japanese mikitarists decided that they could finally end the War by attacking the United States (1941). Japanese anti-partisan operations were brutal killing oprtations The Japanese killed some .25 million people after the Doolittke raids. The distruction, misamanagement, and the seizure of food devestated China and food became an increasing pronlem. Some 2-3 million people died in a famine in Henan Province (1942-43). The economy was virtually destroyed. One study estimates that Chinese industrial output was only 20 percent of the output before the War. of pre-war China. [Sun, p. 1319.] The human cist was incaluable. There is no precise account, but Chunese eastumates are sone 20-25 mnillion people and are not unreasonable.

Japanese Imperialism

The Meiji Restoration (1867) was ignited by a defensice concept--the need to modernize so that Japan would not be carved up by the Europeans like China. A key component was to build a modern military. With their new military, the Meiji idea soon morphed into the need to build an empire. China was the first country that Japan attacked in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and Japan had made in clear in the Twenty-One Demands issued duriung World War I (1915) that they had much larger objectives in China. Their goal was to to explot China for their advantage. Given that many Chinese were living on the edge, the consquences were potentially devestating And this was before the military had seized control of the Japanese Government. The resporce-poor Japanese were attracted by China's vast resources and potential mmarkrt for their manufactured goods. The were becoming increasingly aggressive, insisting on their Twent-One Demands. Chinese students were incessed, organizing boycotts of Jspanese ptoducts -- infuristing the Japanese.

Collapse of the Manchu (1911-12)

Agitation for a Chinese republic was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. A rebellion broke out (October 10, 1911). It led to the over throw of the Manchus. The last emperor, Hsuan Pu-yi, a small boy, abdicated (February 7, 1912). China had been in turmoil for some time as a weakened imperial regime lost control of the country. The turmoil that followed the fall of the Imperial regime and the attempts of Republican forces to gain control further disrupted economic activity. The Republican era was a period of great turmoil and domestic disorder. Sun Yatsen and the new Chinese Republic were able to overthrow the Imperial regime, but not hold China together. Former imperial generals seized provincial areas. They fought with each other and the central Republican authority. Chinese Republicans hoped that with the overthrow of the Manchu, that they could begin developing a modern economy. This did not prove possible, in poart because of the warlords. Some areas descended into chaos and economic collapse.

The Kuomingtang (KMT)

Eventually Chang Kai-shek and the Kuomingtang (KMT) finally seized control and both ended foreign control of treaty ports (except Hong Kong and Shanghai) and brought the war lords under control. They also defeated the Communists, almost destroying them. Mao's Communists would latter escape by the Long March into remote Yan'an, Shgaanxi.

Unification (1920s)

Sun Yat-sen's republican revolutionary movement was damaged by Yuan Shikai's attempt to become a new emperor. The student-led May Fourth Movemnent help revive the fortunes of the Nationalists. After Yuan's death a governent survived in Beijing. A succession of warlords replaced Yuan. It still was the government recognized by foreign powers. Sun Yat-sen returned from his refuge in Japan and helped restablished a rival government in Guangzhou (Canton). He managed to obtain support from southern warlords. He restablished the KMT (October 1919). A wave of patriotic, nationlist sentiment spread throughout China after World War I. The Chinese were increasingly resentful of the foreign concessions, but now the Japanese with their Twenty-One Demands bore the brunt of Chinese ire. The war lords were another matter of concern. Sun Yat-sen and the KMT (republicans/nationalists) had considerable popular support, but little military strength. The result was a three-way struggle for power among warlords, Nationalists and Communists. Sun had become president of the southern Guangzhou government. Sun become president of the southern government (1921). Sun spent his last years trying to strengthen his government in the south and unify the country. Sun attempted to obtain help, especially military assistance, from the Western democracies. None were prepared to assist. Sun and the KMT still had the taint of revolutionaries. Sun eventually turned to the Bolsheviks which has just emerged victorious in the Russian Civil War. The Bolsheveks because they were actively fomenting revolution were being isolated by the major world powers. China offered an opportunity to break out of that isolation and help create a friendly power along its long border. Soviet propaganda issued strongly-worded attacks on Western imperialism along with criticism of capitalism. The Soviets had a quandry. The KMT was anti-imperialist, but it was not a Communist Party. And there was a small Communist Party in China--the CCP. The Bolsheviks decided on a dual policy, supporting both Sun and the KMR as well as the small CCP. The Soviets hoped that the two consolide, but saw advantages with whoever managed to unify China. Thiswas the beginning of the epic struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists. The alliance between the KMT in Guangzhou and the southern warlords btoke down (1922). Sun fled to Shanghai. Sun as the leader of the not very sucessful KMT, accepted Soviet aid. Sun by that time saw that Soviet support was critical. Sun obtained a pledge from a Soviet representative in Shanghai that the Soviet Union would provide assistance for Chinese unification (1923). Soviet advisers, including Comintern agent Mikhail Borodin, quickly began arriving in China. They attempted to reorganize the KMT along the lines of the SovietbCommunist Party. The Comintern, essentially an agency of the Soviet secret police, ordered the CCP to cooperate with the KMT. They were to join the KMT, but retain their CCP identity. Sun was thus able to arrange an alliance with the still small CCP. He then began a campaign to supress the warlords and unifying China. Sun died of cancer (1925). Chiang Kaishek, the KMT military commander seized control of the party. Chiang launched the well-known "Northern Expedition". He campaigned from Guangzhou (Canton) north to to Shanghai. This essentially unified Southern China with the great bulk of the country's popilation. Most importantly, the KMT won control of the Lower Yangzi. Chiang also seized many foreign concessions. Chiang who did not trust the Communists anyway, fell out with them and launched a campaign against the CCP (1927). One of the CCP members who managed to escape was Mao Zedong.

Economic Progress: The Nanjing Decade (1928-37)

The Chinese Nationalists-- Kuomintang (KKMT was making progress in uniting the country and developing the economy (1920s). Chaing decided not to challenge Japan's seizure of Manchuria (1931). He decided that China just did not have the industrial to support a modern army that could take on the Japanese. Here as would be shown by events, he was absolutely correct. The KMT was sponsoring industrial projects, but the Japanaese struck before thery had approached the level of Japanese industrialization. The period between the KMT attack of the Communists and the Japanese invasion is often referred to as the Nanjing Decade--after the KMT capital (1928-37). The KMT nominally controled all of China. And Chiang significantly expanded the strength and authority of the centeral givernment. Even so, large areas of China were beyond his conrol. Local warlords or warlord coalitions while nominally recognizing the KMT Governent were in effective control of large areas. Especially importabnt were Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. The Japanese Kwantung Army was a major force in Manchuria and finally seized control (1931). The Communists also resisted repeated KMT attacks finally withdrawing to remote north-western China beyound the reachbof KNT armies. The KMT's control was strongest in the eastern regions of China around Nanjing. The Central Plains War (1930) and the Japanese seizure of Manchuria (1931) helped to strengthen Chiang's authority.

Japanese Assessment

China after the fall of the Imperial regime (1911) became divided by feuding war loads and had verey little modern industry. Japan could see that with the KMT that the faced an increasingly united and stronger country. They struck again north of Beijing at the Marco Polo Bridge (1937). The Japanese action was taken by local commanders, but the Government in Tokyo supported their actions and commited major forces when the KMT resisted which resulted in the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Military Campaigns (1937-45)

The Japanese rapidly seized China's prosperous coastal cities where most of the still-limited industry was located. They expected Chainag to sue for peace. He did not but instread retreated ibto the interior. The Japanese attempted to pursue the KMT fiorces, but the Japanese Army was still largely unmotorized. China is a huge country. And while Japan had an industrial economy, it was not large enough to equio the motirized arny rgat was needed to move into the unbterior. As a result, the Japanese were unable to defeat the KMT armies in their remote interior locations.

Japanese Atrocities

The Japanese pursued the war with unimaginable brutality. The best known atroicity was the Rape of Nanking (1937), but there were many such, albeit on asmaller scale. Whole villages weeew masacered. The Japanese used their air firce to bomb undefended Chinese citiies. They also use poison gas and bilogical weapons. apan did not and does not today admit the full extent of its responsibility for launching World War II. Many Japanese attempt to hide the extent of their country's war crimes and prefer to view their country as a victim of the War. The list of Japanese atrocities and war is very long, involving the deaths of millions, mostly innocent civilians. The list in its entirity is too long to list here, but we need to mention some of the most grevious atrocities committed by the Imperial armed forces. The primary war crime is the launching of aggerssive war first against China (1937) and then the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands (1941). Specific examples include the terror bombing of undefended Chinese cities (Shanghai); mascres of Chinese civilians (the Rape of Nanking), use of biologcal and chenical weapons, mistreatment and massacres of Allied POWs (the Batan Death March), abuse of civilain internees, use of slave labor, conscription of civilian women for prostitution (Korean comfort women).

Scorced Earth

The Nationalidsts for their part to an extenbt pursued a scorced earth policy as they retreated.

Stalemate

As a result of theJapanese invasuion, large areas of China was devestated. The Japanese expected to reap great ecionomic rewards from seizing China. (Jusdt as the Gernmabds expected from invadung the Siviet Union. As it turned out, it proved verety costly to wage war and garrison the occupied areas. Exploitibng Chuina fed the Jaoanese Arny un China, but very little accured to bebefit the Jaoabese domrstic economy. Waging war is very exoensive. A major problem for the Japanese was that the deeper they plunged intonCg=hina, the more men they had to deploy for garrison dutyy. This meant that were fewer men available for combat operations. In the end, all the Japanese could secure was the citoes and rail lines. It nmean that the country side was left in the hands of the Chinese. The war dragged on nearly 5 years before the Japanese mikitarists decided that they could finally end the War by attacking the United States (1941).

Government War Role

The KMT Governmebt responded to the War emergency with a massive increase in economic injvolvemnent, taking control of the limited war industries in the areas still under their control. KMT government-owned industries were only abiut 15 percenbt of GDP before the War (1936). As the War porogressed, the Government seized control of many industries as part of the War effort. The KMT appointed a special commission to assess industries and mines (1938). The commission also looked at price controls. The KMT steadily increased the industries they controlled. Wgat we are unsure about is tonewhat vextent if any, KMT ciontrol actually improved operations. It mnay have well increase the potential for graft and ciorruotion. Some 70 percent of indusyries in the unoccupied zonme was under KMT control (1942). [Sun, p. 1237–40.]

Anti-Partisan Operations

Japanese anti-partisan operations were brutal killing oprtations The Japanese killed some .25 million people after the Doolitle Raids.

Food

The distruction, misamanagement, and the seizure of food devestated China and food became an increasing problem. Some 2-3 million people died in a famine in Henan Province (1942-43). World War II Chinese children food Figure 1.-- Food was a major attraction drawing Japan into China. Japan was not self sufficient in food and needed to import rice and other food stuffs. China across the East China Sea beckoned as a seeminly ineeaustable source of not only raw materials, but food as well. Million of Chinese peaants given lived on a razor edge of survival, producing just enough to feed themselnes. Thus any decline in production could have dire consequences for the Chinese people. The Nationalist Government did a reasonably good joib of managing food production and distribution in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese invasion. And at first the Japanese primarily occupied northern China and coastal areas around Shanghai and the major ports. As the war dragged on, however, the situation began to worsen.

Economic Distruction

China's economy was virtually destroyed. One study estimates that Chinese industrial output was only 20 percent of the output before the War. [Sun, p. 1319.]

Human Cost

The human cist was incaluable. There is no precise account, but Chinese eastumates are sone 20-25 million people and are not unreasonable. It put sChina in the same lague as the Soviet Union. One reason that the deaths in China are so high is that the Japanese Army in China after nearly 9 years of war had no Chinese POWs to relaease. They captured several milliion Chinese soldiers and murdered all of them. Japanese atrocities were another part of it. Another malor killer were the famines that occurred as a result of the Japanese incasu=ion and seizure of food.

Historiography

Assewssments of Chiunese World War II history and econics is difficyklt because so few Western scholars have been avble to pursue imprtant topics. Language is a majoe oroblem. The number of gistorains and economidts with Chinese lannguage skills are linited. And Western scholars with the assesnt bof the Communidts were exckuded from China for decades. For the most part, it is necessary to rely on Chinese work. The problem here is that Chinese historians and economists have to follow the Communist Party line. A good example is comments like, Chimese Industry was severely hampered after the war by devastating conflict as well as the 'inflow of cheap American goods'. [Sun, pp. 1237–40.] Now after the War, the Chinese economy was short of everything. American shipments were badly needed. Woulf the author have prefferef, that the United States not shipped in supplies. Or does he think the United States shoukd have charged the Chinese more fir its goods. Much of it was aid supolies donated by the U.S. Government. With commnts like this, it is difficukt to know how much of the werk is honest economics or Communist propaganda.

Sources

Sun, Jian, 中国经济通史 Economic History of China Vol 2 1840–1949 (China People's University Press: 2000.).

Created: 7:12 PM 10/26/2020
Last updated: 7:12 PM 10/26/2020