Figure 1.-- The soldiers and junior officers who constituted the bulk of the Wehrmacht's combat troops were younger men and youths who entered the military army after years of extensive ideological preparation constituting much of their lives. They were inducted into the Hitler Youth at age 10 years. The HJ developed a very effective program for capturing the loyalty of a generation of young Germans for NAZI ideology.

The senior officers of the Wehrmacht had varied political attitudes. As the NAZI regime persisted, officers with pro-NAZI attitudes tended to raise in the command structure. As they were older men, they had extensive experiences before the NAZIs seized power and thus had greater perspective with which to assess Hitler and the NAZIs. What their polityical mleanings, Hitler offered tec prospects of ending the Versailles restivtiins and massive rearmament, a huge allure to the officer corps. The soldiers and junior officers who constituted the bulk of the Wehrmacht's combat troops were younger men and youths who entered the military army after years of extensive ideological preparation constituting much of their lives. They were inducted into the Hitler Youth at age 10 years. The HJ not only provided ideological prepration, but preliminary training in many useful military skills. Hitler distrusted the school system because when he seized power, most teachers were not Party menmbers, but the education system like other Germans institutions was rapidly NAZIfied. The impact of this indoctrination combined with a heady German nationalism that existed before the NAZI take over created an ideological preparation that resulted in the creation of some of the most effective soldiers of the War. It should be strssed that the older German population was not as throughly prepared for war, but the younger generation was. Even youth from working-class families that had socialist and communist orientations before Hitler seized power became if not committed National Socialists, commited hard-fighting soldiers. And once in the army, the ideological effort continued. There were theoretical ideological sessions. Newspapers, army information sheets were distributed to the troops. There were also movies and newsreels. Radio programs were directed at the troops who were provided large numbers of radio receivers. Commanders read out orders of the day. Educational brochures on were printed for the troops, including subjects like history and geography. Book were collected for militry unit libraries. There were talks by a range of visiting lecturers. The most effective ideological indictrination was the propaganda exploiting existing prejudices and concerns. This was especially true in the case of Jews, Slavs, Asians (there was a substantial Asian population in the Soviet Union), and Communists. As a result, when Hitler launched Barbrossa, the men of the Wehrmscht were well prepared to wage, as ordered, a campaign of extreme brutality extrene harshness and brutality against what they perceived to be a demonic enemy posing a deadly threat to their country. This was all before they entered the Soviet Union. And once they encountered the Soviets, including Red Army soldiers, political commissars, Jews, and other civilians, most saw them through bthe ideological lens that the NAZIs had created. And after the War shifted and the Red army began to drive west, their fears intensified. This was in part because of the ideological preparation and now also the fears that the Red Army would do their country and families what they had done in the East. This explains in part why the average Wehrmacht soldier, and not only the Waffen-SS, fought on long after any reasonable prospect of victory had long-since evaporated.

Created: 2:26 AM 4/5/2012
Last updated: 2:26 AM 4/5/2012