Figure 1.--Here we see German soldiers somewhere in the Reich during 1941. Notice the officers are giving the military salute. They look to be preparing to deploy which almost certainly would have meant to the East, preparing to join the Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union which would turn into a meat grinder. The kids are probably the children of the commanding officer.

The Wehrmact had many strengths which were on display from the first day of the War (September 1, 1939). German military strengths brought great victories at the beginning of World War II as they had at the start of World War I. The Germans had the most competent officer corps in the world. The Großer Generalstab (Great General Staff) was a key element in the strnth of the Garman Army. Erwin Rommel got a lot of attention becauses of his successes in the West. There were a substantial number of German commanders in the East of comparable skillm byr did not get the attention Rommel got, not only because they were not facing the Western Allies, but because the Soviets neither allowed Western journalists to report on military campigns or released much detail about the fighting on the Eastern Front. This level of skill was the work of the work Großer Generalstab. The Germans were well armed thanks to the massive NAZI rearmameht porogram. The Germans were better prepared because other countries were trying to avoid fighting another war and limited military spending. The Großer Generalstab had also developed the highly effective tactical battle doctrine known as Blitzkrieg--combined mixed arms tactics, essentially modern warfare. It would take the British nearly 4 years to adopt and perfect these tactics. The Soviets and Americans were faster learners. And if all of this was not enough, the NAZIs added an ideological construct that appealed to many Germans and was imposed on those who did not share their values. The Hitler Youth (HJ) program was very effective in preparing German youth for the War, both ideologically and the skills needed.

Great General Staff: Großer Generalstab

German Führer Adolf Hitler, along with his Soviet Ally Joseph Stalin, launched World War II with the most profesional, competent military officer corps in the world. The foundation was the German General Staff, originally the Prussian General Staff because the German Empire was built around Prussia and the Prussian Hohenzollern monarchy. The Großer Generalstab (Great General Staff) was a ermanent body controlling the Prussian Army and after unification the Imperial German Army. It was responsible for the continuous study of war in all most its many facets. It was also responsible for drawing up and reviewing plans for mobilization or campaign. The Großer Generalstab had existed since the Napoleonic Wars. It began operating unofficially (1806) and was officially established by law (1814). There was no comparable body in any other country, even Napoleonic France. It was was he first general staff ever created. And it was unique even after ither counries began establishing similar bodies. It was most distinguished feature was the formal selection of its officers. The criteria was the intelligence and proven merit rather at a time when other countries had selection processes based on patronage and aristocratic birth. The Großer Generalstabor was also notable for the exhaustive and rigorous training programs for staff officers. This all gave the Germans a decisive strategic and tactical advantage over their many adversaries for 140 years. The NAZIs embarked on a program to train boys to be warriors beginning with the Hitler Youth (HJ). This would take some time. The HJ was not at first compulsory. Thus when Hitler launched the War, many of the young recruits had some military experience and a fighting spirit, but the officer corps of the German military had been trained in the military schools of Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic. And they were heavily influenced by the the Prussian military tradition. Luckily for the World, Hitler neither trusted the officer corps or respected its professional judgement.

Preparation

None of the World War II beligerant countries were prepared for War. The two countries most prepared were Germany and Japan. Hitler had turned Germany into a state with a single purpose--to support a modern military machine that could expand the Reich. And unlike the period leaduing up to World War I there was no military arms race. NAZI Germany began its rearmament program at a time when the Allies were attempting to limit military expenitures to deal with welfare problems resulting from the Depression. This allowed Germany and Japan to gain a significant military advantage over the Democracies. Neither country, however, had the capacity to wage a protracted global war, although as a result of their military successes, both countries substantially improved their strategic position. Only two countries had the economic capability of waging a protracted global war--the Soviet Union and the United States. To the East, unlike the Democracies, Stalin was persuing a massive armament program. The Soviet effort was impaired by two factors. First the Soviets devoted huge resources to obsolete weapons systems. Second, Stalin purged the miitary officer corps, killing large numbers of competent, trained officers. The United States despite its industrial capacity had made very little effort to build a sizeable military force, epecially an army. Thus while Germany did not have the resorces for a protracted war, their military prearations gave them an advantage at the onset of the war against countries that were intent on avoiding a war. If the Germans could achieve victory in short wars before a coalition could be organized against them, sucess was possiblw. Here the Isolationist Movement in merica played into Hitler's hands.

Tactical Concept: Blitzkrieg

The Prussian military was one of the most reprected in Europe. Prissiaas not a great or rich country. What it had was a powerful, but not large aemy. It was said at the time that Prussia was an army with a country attached rather than a country with an army. And from an early stage the Prussians gave great attention to speed and mobility. And because the Prussians maintained a small, but throughly trained standing army, they were a valuable ally to have. At the time Europe was involved in a series of both religious and dynastic wars. Wars werev very frequent occassions. Speed and mobility were capabilities that the Great Elector himself had emphasized. What we called Bltzkrieg in World War II and now called comined arms or combined operations is simply a modern version of the Great Elector's tactics with industrial weaponry. The Prussian Army provided the core of the Imperial Germany Army formed after unificationm (1871). The German Schlieffen Plan developed by the Imperial German Army General Staff was a Blitzkrieg-style operation. Only the World war I Germany Army was not capable of executing it. There was no supportive air arm and the army moved at the speed of marching men and draft animals. The Germans had no tanks and only a handfull of trucks--all operating on wooden wheels. The end result was failure and eventually a disterous military defeat. Germany like the Prussia of old could only win if they struck hard and fast and defeated the enemy at the onset. Having failed with the Sclieffen Plan, the greter human and material resources of the Allies prevailed. Blitzkrieg means 'lightning war'. It was an innovative military technique applying modern weaponry to the well-established basic Prussian military doctrine. The Germam military brooded after their defeat in World War I and developed the tactics needed to win another war. And now the weapons existed to execute a Schlieffen Plan operation (ground support air craft, fast-moving tanks, and trucks). Several German commanders reached the same basic concept. The most notable was Heinz Guderian who stressed the importance of speed and the value of dive bombers and light (meaning speedy and maneuverable) tanks. The concept was brillantly outlined in his book--Actung Panzer. The German General staff was more conservtive, but Hitler was impressed with Guderian concepts. Hitler was one of innumerable German soldiers who spent 4 years in the trenches of the Western Front and experienced the frustration of static warfare. Guderrians tactics and daring appealed to him. The result was the starteling German victory in France (June 1940). Hitler and OKW after the victory in France convinced themselves that it was German superiority and not tactics that brought victory. Hitler was convinced that the key factor was his military genius. It would take the British and Soviets a costly few years to learn and perfect Blizkrieg tactics, but once they did the masive human and material resources of the Allies would mean disater for the NAZIs and the German people. The Soviets Allies had the population to create massive armies and a substantial indistrila capability to build arms. As American industry mobilized, the Allies had industrial capacity to create the tools of Blizkrieg in quantities the Whermacht could only dream of in the heady days of successful offensives.

Mission-oriented Leadership: Auftragstaktik

'Auftragstaktik' has been described as a cultural philosophy. It can only be achieved in an extrodunarily professional ,ilitary serbice. The overall commander is to dertermine the oobjectibe. It is up to the lower level commanders who actually face the eneny and local sitiation to determine hiw to best achieve the objective. The local commander is givemn the flexability to detrrmine how to best accomplishment the missions. The German military put great empahasis on how offivers were selected an advanced, more than any other military at the time. Once becoming a military officer it was like a special fraternity of brothers. Vonds were forged with comrades which built teamnspirit and working togethervtonmaster complex tasks. This is a command structure thab not simolybtransnit orders. Rather Mission Command is integrated into education and training from the very beginning of cadet training and in the training non-commisooned officers. None other than Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, regarded as the creator of the modern German Army, explained the system, "In general, one does well to order no more than is absolutely necessary and to avoid planning beyond the situation one can foresee. These change very rapidly in war. Seldom will orders that anticipate far in advance and in detail succeed completely to execution. The higher the authority, the shorter and more general will the orders be. The next lower command adds what further precision appears necessary. The detail of execution is left to the verbal order, to the command. Each thereby retains freedom of action and decision within his authority." [von Moltke]

Ideological Preparation (1933-45)

The senior officers of the Wehrmacht had varied political attitudes. As the NAZI regime persisted, officers with pro-NAZI attitudes tended to raise in the command structure. As they were older men, they had extensive experiences before the NAZIs seized power and thus had greater perspective with which to assess Hitler and the NAZIs. What their political leanings, Hitler offered the prospects of ending the Versailles restrictions and massive rearmament, a huge allure to the officer corps. The soldiers and junior officers who constituted the bulk of the Wehrmacht's combat troops were younger men and youths who entered the military army after years of extensive ideological preparation constituting much of their lives. They were induicted into the Hitler Youth at age 10 years. Hitler distrusted the school system because when he seized power, mosdt teachers were not Party menmbers, but the educastion system like other Germans institutions was rapidly NAZIfied. The impact of this indoctrination combined with a heady German nationalism that existed before the NAZI take over created n ideological preparation that resulted in the creation of some of the most effective soldiers of the War. Even youth from workers families that had socialist and communist orientations before Hitler seized power became committed National Socilalists. And once in the army, the ideological effort continued. There were theoretical ideological sessions. Newspapers, army information sheets were distributed to the troops. There were also movies and newsreels. Radio programs were directed at the troops who were provided large numbers of radio receivers. Commnanders read out orders of the day. Educational brochures on were printed for the troops, including subjects like history and geography. Book were collected for militry unit libraries. There were talks by a range of visiting lecturers. The most effective ideological indictrination was the propagabda exploiting existing prejudices and voncerns. This was especilly true in the case of Jews, Slavs, Asians (there was a substantial Asian population in the Soviet Union), and Communists. As a result, when Hitler launched Barbrossa, the men of the Wehrmscht were well prepared to wage, as ordered, a campaign of extreme brutality, unbelieveable arshness and brutality against what they perceived to be a demonic enemy posing a deadly threat to their country. This was all before they entered the Soviet Union. And once they encountered the Soviets, including Red Army soldiers, political commissars, Jews, and other civilians, most saw them through the ideological lens that the NAZIs had created. And after the War shifted and the Red army began to drive west, their fears intensified. This was in part because of the ideological preparation and now also the fears that the Red arnmy woukd do their country and famikies what they had done in the East. This explains in part why the average Wehrmacht soldier fought on long after any reasonable prospect of victory had evaporated.

Discipline

One of the most important characteristic of a successful military is discipline. Democracy with all its benefits and achievenment does not breed discipline. Germany and Japan (but not Italy) were different, but were very disciplined socities. The modern German state was built around Prussia. And Prussia had an extrodiary military tradition. It turned a small, poor principality into m a major Eiropean power. As VVolataire explanined rather than a country with an army, it was an arny with a country. From the 17th cebtury, the Army was a way for brightbyoungnpeople of limited means to advance. The ame would be true in Jaoan. Another Frenchmanm the Comte de Mirabeau, explained that war was the national industry of Prussia, and they got very good at it. In Prussia, an officer in uniform was respected in a way far beyond that in othervcountries. One historian writes, "Status, respect and pretige attached to officers in uniform. The lesson of the great national revival of 1813 was discioline, and it was not forgotton even in the defeat of 1918." [Roberts, p. 24.] Even in defaet, the Germans turned to the military, electing Field Marashal Paul von Hindenberg president (1925). It is not normal for defeated generals to be elected. World War II would be Germany's fifth war of aggression in 75 years and the Wehrnacht and its men, if not the nation, were prepared for it. Four of those wars were overseen by the Otto von Bismarck, the Iron Chancellor. He was careful to maintain friendly relatiobs with Russia and tomisolate a victim before going to War. His successors, Wilhelm II and Hitler would disregard both precepts. And if anything, after 6byears of untense ideological preparation, the Germans were even more disciolined than in World War I. German culture was part of the reason that the Germans were so disciplined. The Hitler Youth also played a role in instilling discipline. .

Skills

Skills were another factor. Despite the Hollywood nomsebce, the German Army was very good at war. Better in fact than the Allies at most aspects of war. It is no accident that the Geramsn did not lose battles where they had superior forces. A rare exception was the Battke of Britain, And most of their victories were achieved against larger forces. All the Allied victories came where they outnumbered the Gerams and were able to bring superior resources and fire power to bare. A British Guards officer and future historain who studied the Wehrmacht in detail explains, "... when it came to digging deep slit trenches or aiming howitzers they were simply better that the Allies." [Howard, p.89.] This was in part due to the basic military skills taught in the Hitler Youth before induction and actual military training began.

Combat Power

The quality of the German soldier was a major factor in German combat power annd success. Despite countless Hollywood films. The Germans were the finest soldiers of World War II. By this of course we do not mean the most ethical and finest people, only that they excelled in military skills and commitment to preceived patriotic duties. There are various ways of measuring this. Until the final months of the War, the battlefied performance clearly show this. Man to man and unit for unit the Germans generated more combat power than Allied or Soviet soldiers. The German inflicted more casualties on the Allies than the Allies on the Germans This included battles in which the Allies and Soviets prevailed. This meant 30-50 percent higher casualties on the Americans and British than they suffered. [Dupuy, pp.253-55.] And most of the battles the Allies had more men, equipment, artillery, and air cover. In the East the higher casualties inflicted on the Red Army was even greater -- including huge Soviet victories like Stalingrad. Of course this eventually changed, but only in the final months of the War. A British historian writes, "Although they lost because of their Füher's domination of grand strategy as well as sheet size of the populations and economies ranged against them, it is indisputable that the Germans were the best fighting men of the Second World War for all but the last months of the struggle, when they suffered a massive dearth of equipment, petrol, reinforcements and air cover." [Roberts, p. 599.] This is absolutley the case, although we might put the Japanese soldier even above the German, soldier, only the Japanese soldier was not led by nearly as competent commanders. This is mean in no way to disparage the soldiers of the democracies. It is thus the enviroment created by a democratic society is not ideal preparation for the militarty. Democratic societies teach children to think for theselves. Soldiers need to be taught to obey orders whuch is what children in totalitarian societies are taught. The Allied commanders, including, Bradely, Brooke, Eisenhower, Montgomery, and others understood, but for obvious reason never saif=d so publically. They planned operations accordingly. It was why Eisenhower clung to the Broad Front appraoch after D-Day.

Drugs

Hitler's us eof drugs and relationship with Dr. Morrel has been known for some time. Less well known until recently is the extensive use of methamphetamine (crystal meth) throughout the Wehrmacht. This wasa surprising development given that the NAZIs had criticised vthe widespread use of frugs, espcially cocaine, during the Weimar years. Meth was developed and manufactured by the Temmler pharmaceutical company in Berlin. Knoll pharmaceutical produced Isophan, a slightly different concotion. Pervitin was introduced (1938). It was touted as a 'magic' pill, prized for maintaining alertness among weary troops after extended periods of hard campaigning. It was also an anti-depressive. It was briefly available to the civilian population over the counter. It was even sold in boxed chocolates. The doctor who invented it, Fritz Hauschild, would go on to play a major role in East Germany’s sports doping program. Meth was avalaible in pill form as the drug Pervitin. Even after drug sales to the general public were restricted, the OKWd issued the 'stimulant decree', ordering Temmler to produce 35 million tablets for military use (April 1940). It was military doctor, Otto Ranke, who brought it to the attention of Wehrmacht commanders. He experimented with Pervitin using 90 university students and concluded that drug would help German soldiers fight the coming War. With no concern for long term effects, it was clear that Pervitin would enable German soldiers soldiers stay awake for days at a time and march longer distances. This was of obvious importance for a German military that would invade the Soviet Union largel on foot. It was distributed by the millions to Wehrmacht troops beginning with the invasion of France (May 1940). The drug was extensively used by the Heer amnd Luftwaffe. We are less sure about the Kriegsmarine. Crystal meth thus helped fuel the NAZI Blitzkrieg that sept through France. It would also be widely used in Barbarossa and the resulting Ostheer campaign in the East. The Allies to a much lesser extent used amphetamines (speed) in the form of Benzedrine. [Ohler]

Cohesion

What is especilly notable is the extent the Wehrmacht maintain its cohesion even when the War was irevocanly lost and they faced ovewheamling odds. This was especially notable in the East. The destructiin of Army Group Center as a resukt of Operation Bagration (July 1944) sealed the fate of the Reich. Army Group Center had been the largest and most formidable formation of the Wehrmacht and its utter destruction as well as the liberation of France and destruction of the 7th Army meant that the War was lost. Yet not onlt was the Wehrmanch able to stage the Bulge Offensive (December 1944), but the German soldiers facing the massively superior Red Army in the East continued to resusta and naintain unit cohesibeness. More than 0.4 million German soldiers were lost in the 5 months of fighing during 1945. All for no reason, achieving nothing. One historian reports that the remants of the Heer kept fighting , 'showing astinishing resiliance in the face of utter hopelessness and retaining military cohesion until the momments they were marched off into a ten-year captivity spent rebuilding the infrastructure of the Soviet Union that they had destroyed." [Roberts, p. 548.] Resistance in West faded after the Allies crossed the Rhine (March 1945), but did not end. Actually some minimal resistance at the Elbe (April 1945) convinced Eisenhower to stop movement toward Berlin, knowing the area would be part of the Soviet Zone. The impressive cohesion of The Germans were is sharp contrast od some Allied armies. The Germans did surrender, but only after they has exahausted all means od resistance such as in Slatingrad (Fevrueat 1942). Thus was in contrast to French armies whuch surendered to the Gerams (May June 1940). Or the Britisish Army in Singapoew which surrendered to a numerically inferior Japanese force (February 1942) or the British in Tobruk who surrendered to the Germans almost without a fight (June 1942). Prime Minister Churchill was shocked. He condined ti an assicuate, :What can you do when the soldiers will not fight?" Churchil was in Washington at the time. In his menoirs he writes, "I did not attempt to hide from the President the shock I had received. It was a bitter moment. Defeat is one thing; disgrace is another." [Churchill]

Industry

German industry was certainly a huge asset at the onset of the War. Germany and the Soviet Union had the largest economies in Europe. Exceeded only by that of the United States. When Hitler and Stalin signed an alliance, Germany was clearly in a dominant position. This was the case when the Germans faced small countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark and Norway. Critical was the fact that the NAZI Government was pursuing a massive Rearmament program at a time that the democracies were severely limiting military spending. This enabled the Wehrmacht to gain the huge victory in the West, defeating and occupying France (1940). The Grrmans were, however, unable to repeat that success, against another major powere--both Britain and the Soviet Union withstood the initial German blows (1940-41). And America was beyond theor reach. And after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union and declared war on the United States (1941), the Wehrmacht faced a coalition of enemies withn an industrial capability far exceeding that of Germany. Theoretically, German could convert the substantial industrial capacity of the NAZI Großraum (NAZI occupied and influenced Europe) into a huge poer base. But indutrial productiom declined, reducing the capability of the Germans to use the economies of occupied countries to their advantage. (German industrial profuction increased somewhat, but this was far offset by the economic collapse in the occupied countries. German occupation policies meant that the output of the occupied countries plummeted meaning that the capability of the Gernans to exploit the occupied ecomomies declined. And the Allied industrial complex, unlike the Germans, had access to all the needed raw materials that Germany lacked--especially oil.

Sources

Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War: The Hinge of Fate (1950).

Dupuy, Trvor N. A Genius for War: The Gernan Army and General Staff, 1807-1945) (1977).

Howard, Michael. Captain Professor .

Ohler, Norman. Der Totale Rausch (The Total Rush). Published in English as “Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich”. This book is well reserched and documented. Without real evidence, however, he tries for whatever reason to explain a majority of the NAZI atrocities to drug usage rather than their abhorent ideology and leadership.

(von) Moltke, Helmut Karl Bernhard , Instructions for Large Unit Commanders (1869).

Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War: A New History of the Second World War (Harper Collins: New York, 2011, 712p.

Created: 8:36 AM 7/28/2019
Last updated: 11:42 PM 8/3/2020