Figure 1.--The press caption here read, "Hunger Appeased: A far cry from an American outdoor picnic is this little group of Italian youngsters who cram biscuits in their mouths in the center of a war-torn street of Torre Annunziata. The barefoot kids huddle over the food, probably the first substantial bite they have had in a long time." It wss dated October 11, 1943. hich is shortly after the Americans had sdecured Naples. orre Annunziata is a neghboithood of Nsaples.

Italy like Germany was not self-sufficent in food production. Unlike Germny, Fasscist Italy had nearly two decades to rectify the situation. And unlike Germany there were serious inefficiecies in the agricultural system to be rectified. The German plan was basically to seized food from occupied countries--essentilally to export hunger. Which of course was useful in another primary German goal, basically to muder 10s of millions racially 'undesirable' people in, primarily in Eastrer Europe as part of Genreralplan Ost. Mussolini's Fascist Goverment set out to improve the agicultural production. At the time that Mussolini seized power about 25 percent of Italy's purchases of imported goods and services went foe wheat. That was not a situation conducive for a country preparing to build a sizble military and empire wanted. So food self suffiency becasme an important goal. The country's agricultural sector was exptremely weak, productivity was low with large numbers of landless agricultural workers living in extreme poverty, especially in southern Italy. Solving the agricultural problem was necessary to free up foreign exchnge and promote industrial development. [Nützenadel, p. 88-89.] This was the key to real military poweer. And soon after seizing power, Mussolni launched the Battle for Grain (July 1925). Given the importance of bread and pasta in the Itlalian diet, this was very important effort. This became an important step in the new Fascist economy. This involved education, mechanization, fertilizers, higher yielding wheat varitiesm, and irrigation. The Fascists did not address land ownership patterns. Another part of this was he Battle for Land. The most prominent propject here was the reclamation of the Poitine marshes south of Rome. This was a problem existing since Roman times. And there were real achiervements. Wheat harvests increased by 40 percent. This substantially reduced the cost of food imports. Domestic harvestsd, however did not fully replace imports and percapita wheat consunotion declined by 14 kilograms. [Corner, p. 253.] This was the situation at the time Mussolini that war cluds began to appear in Europe. Mussolini ordered an invasion of Ethiopia, the first step in expanding the Empire (1935). The League of Nations decided on a largely ineffectual embargo. Britain could have stopped the invasion by closing the Suez Canal or enbargoing oil shipmnts. It decided not to, hoping to use Mussolini to moderate Hitler. The League embargo thus did not amount to much. With the war, real restrictions came (June 1940) [Dimarco]. Heavy rationing of foods such as meats, butter, and cereals began. Drafting millions of soldiers for the War affected both the work force and production. This was especially the case of the agricultural sector which was not yet significantly mechanized. Agricultural production fell, creating food shortages which by the time of the Allied invasion were becoming severe. People on farms made out better than people on the cities. Fruits, vegetables, cereals, and meat were more easily available in the countryside, and they were often simply exchanged among families rather than bought. City resodents had nothing to barter. A major problem as transport the war affected the ability of getting the dwindling food supplies into the cities. One meaure adopted by the Government was the 'orti di guerra' (war orchards). Areas of city parks and sports field were turned overr to growing vegetables. Of course this was only a panacea and could not begin to supply what was needed.

Food Problem

Italy like Germany was not self-sufficent in food production. Unlike Germny, Fasscist Italy had nearly two decades to rectify the situation. And unlike Germany there were serious inefficiecies in the agricultural system to be rectified. The German plan was basically to seized food from occupied countries--essentilally to export hunger. Which of course was useful in another primary German goal, basically to muder 10s of millions racially 'undesirable' people in, primarily in Eastrer Europe as part of Genreralplan Ost.

Fascist Agricultural Efforts (1920s)

Mussolini's Fascist Goverment set out to improve the agicultural production. At the time that Mussolini seized power about 25 percent of Italy's purchases of imported goods and services went foe wheat. That was not a situation conducive for a country preparing to build a sizble military and empire wanted. So food self suffiency becasme an important goal. The country's agricultural sector was exptremely weak, productivity was low with large numbers of landless agricultural workers living in extreme poverty, especially in southern Italy. Solving the agricultural problem was necessary to free up foreign exchnge and promote industrial development. [Nützenadel, p. 88-89.] This was the key to real military poweer. And soon after seizing power, Mussolni launched the Battle for Grain (July 1925). Given the importance of bread and pasta in the Itlalian diet, this was very important effort. This became an important step in the new Fascist economy. This involved education, mechanization, fertilizers, higher yielding wheat varitiesm, and irrigation. The Fascists did not address land ownership patterns. Another part of this was he Battle for Land. The most prominent propject here was the reclamation of the Poitine marshes south of Rome. This was a problem existing since Roman times. And there were real achiervements. Wheat harvests increased by 40 percent. This substantially reduced the cost of food imports. Domestic harvestsd, however did not fully replace imports and percapita wheat consunotion declined by 14 kilograms. [Corner, p. 253.] This was the situation at the time Mussolini that war clouds began to appear in Europe.

Libya (1920s)

Italy seized Libya just before World War I which was added to the Empire (1912). The Italians, however, had trouble defeating Arab resisrance. Nissolini unleashed the Italian Army on Arab resusdtance. The Army led by Gen. Rodolfo Grazinik with modern weaponry including aircradft, naxhin guns, artillery, chenmical weapons and concentration camps crushed the poorly armed Arab resistance. [Del Boca] Graziani was celebrated in Italy as a great Fascist warrior. (He would hce nore diffuculty with modern armies during World War II.) It is belieced that 10 percent of Libya's Arab popuoation were murdered on perished of hunger. And higher estimates exist. [Vndewalle , p. 31.] As far as we can tell few Italian settlers went to Libya over the next decde. There seems to hve been a general reluctance on he part of potential settlers.. Just before World War II, however, Mussolini embaeked on a major settlement campaign. Some 20,000 settlers were recruited and sent to Libya admist a huge propaganda campaign (1938). The volunteerswere attaccted by blow-interest loans keading to land ownershipo. Virtully overnight, some 40 Italian villages and hundreds of farms appeared in Libya. By the time Italy entered the War (1940), there were 40,000 Italian colonists in Libya as well as several thousand in Ethiopoia. One Author reports that life in these villages featured Fascist totalitarinism more than any place in Italy itself. [Pergher, pp. 319-21.] The Libyans who survived the concebtration camps were transprted to less fertile areas to clear the way for the Itlaian colonists. n enormous state program was established to support the settlers with new homes and the nest scientific advise on modern farming in Libyan conditions. The immediate goal was to increase agricultural production which could help supply Italy. North African had been a major source of grain during the Roman Empitre, but by the 20th century was much more arid. We are unsure how much additionl grain was produced abd shipped back to Italy as the settlemet was so recenty, we suspect it was not significant. There were, howver, demographic goals. Musolini believed that with better methids and and modern equipmebt that he was bulding a new breed of Italian 'soldier peasants' that would envigorate enrich the Italian population. [Rodogno]

Ethiopia (19335)

Mussolini ordered an invasion of Ethiopia, the first step in expanding the Empire (1935). The League of Nations decided on a largely ineffectual embargo. Britain could have stopped the invasion by closing the Suez Canal or enbargoing oil shipmnts. It decided not to, hoping to use Mussolini to moderate Hitler. The League embargo thus did not amount to much.

Outbreak of War (1939)

Hitler abd Stalin launched World War II by invading Poland (September 1939). Mussolini despite the Axis Alliance held back, not sure as to the strength of German arms. There was concern among Italian officials as to he food situation. Thisd resulted in pnic purchases of grain from Hungary and Yugoslavia. The concern was their inability to feed Italy with just domestic prioducrion. This corncern would prove tio be well founded after Mussolini, convinced the Germns were the wimning side, entered the War (June 1940).

Rationing

With Italy's entry into the war, real restrictions came (June 1940) [Dimarco]. Heavy rationing of foods such as meats, butter, and cereals began. We have been unable to find details on the Italian rationing system. Many Italins as the war cinytinued seemed to hve trouble finding even the rationed anount in shops.

Conscription

Drafting millions of soldiers for the War affected both the work force and production. This was especially the case of the agricultural sector which was not yet significantly mechanized.

Food Shortages

Agricultural production fell during the War. Hard-won gins befor the warwere lost becausr of various war priorities such as conscripting farm labor, Fertilizers were less availble. One studt sduggests that food priduction declined 25 percent durung the War (1940-43). [Helstosky, p. 105] This was creating creating food shortages which by the time of the Allied invasion had become severe in the cities. People on farms made out better than people on the cities. Fruits, vegetables, cereals, and meat were more easily available in the countryside, and they were often simply exchanged among families rather than bought. City resodents had nothing to barter. A major problem was transport. The War affected the ability of getting the dwindling food supplies into the cities. Here both the Allies bombing and fuel shortages were involved. One acoount tells us, "Food shortages began much earlier than I had remembered. On 28 March 1942 Venice had the first demonstrations caused by bread shortages, and on 29 March there were bread-riots at Matera, where groups of women broke into Fascist Party headquarters and were dispersed by force and shots fired in the air. Ciano commented in his diary 'These are serious symptoms, especially as the harvest is far away and the available food supply scarcer and scarcer.' Ciano took a short fishing holiday in May 1942; he comments in his diary '[food] is very short. ... Renato, my fisherman, has lost thirty pounds in a few months, and he tells me that the members of his family are losing weight at the same rate.'" [Ghiringhelli]

War Orchards

The Germans

World War II histories accurately depicted Italy as the junior partner in the xius alliance. This was not how the relationship began. Mussolini seiuzed poweer in Italy a decacde befiore Hiitler seized power. And at the time the NZUIs were a rag-tag affair, a minor party to which no one paid any attention. Many of the policies and operations adopted by the NAZIs were based on the Italian Fascist model. The NAZI Holocaust against the Jews was uniquely NAZI, but much of the rest closely followed the Italian Fascist play book. The NZIs closely followee what the Fascists were doing. Finally with the War and the different military potential of the two countries did the relationship change.

Pre-War era (1920-30s)

Mussolini and his followes invented Fascism in the aftermnath of World War I. And along with the Bolsheviks in Russia they developed the trappings and institutions of a totalitarian state. The NAZIs as they evolved in Germany during the 1920s closely followed Mussolini's Fascist Party and were impressed with what they saw. They used the Itlaliamn Fascist model as they developed the NAZI Party and established the NAZI totalitarian police state, quickly opening their first concentration camp within weeks of coming to power--Dachau. One of the many Fascist actiions the NAZIs found intetestin was the pacification of Libya and efforts to establish model Fascist villages for agricultural settlers. Italian efforts were widely publicized in Party publications and presentions. [Bernhard] This was in part an effort to increase food production and also an effort to reeinvigorate the race--to create thoroughly Fascist soldier peasants to defend the expanding borders of the Italian Empire. That related to a primary NAZI program. British Prime-Minister Nevile Chamberlain thought that he coiuld disuade Hitler from European agressioin by returning the Afriucan colonies Germany lost in World War I. But Hitler had no real interest in African colobnies. His eyes were firmly fixed on The East', meaning the vast European Steppe possessed by the Soviet Union. Hitler made tht clear from the very beginnin. [Hitler] This was the NAZI dream of Lebensraum. This would have solve Germany's food problem permanently. And what Italy was doing in Libya, ejecting the indigenous population and setting up model NAZI agricultural communities was precisely what the NAZIs wanted to do in The East--Generalplan Ost. The German Labor Attache at the Rome Embassy, ctually accompanied the first 20,000 Italian settlers to Libya abd reoported back in detail. [Bernhard, p. 73.] A delegation of NAZI dscholars, journaklists, n Party officials trveked to Libya just before the outbreak of the War, fousing on the settlementy work (1939) [Bernhard, p. 73.] What particularly impressed the NAZIs was that the Italians were proceedibng to change the etnic makeup of the population. [Bernhard, pp. 75-76.] NAZI Agriculture Minister of Agriculture Richard Walther Darré visited Italy to study their program and assess the possibility of expanded food shipments to the Reich. [Helstosky, p. 105.]

World War II (1940-45)

While Italian Fascism was an inspration for the NAZIs, the they did not rate the Italian svery highly on their racial spectrum. They were far away from theer blond, blue-eyed Nordic ideal. And therse attityudes aawere only confirmed when the Italians demondtrated mikitary incompetence in one military failure after amoyher neginning with their invasion of southern France (June 1940). This ultimately led to the Italins trying to to exit the War (September 1943). Knowing this was about to occur, the Germans had preposution forces throughout the country and quickly move additional forces in to occupy Italy even as the Allies were landing in the south. Racial attitudes combined with comtempt for an ally that was betraying them. Italian food production had declined significantly during the War (1940-43). whith the German occupation nanf resulting Allied drive up the pnminsula, harvests plummeted--one stufy suggests more than 60 percent from pre-War levels. [Helstosky, p. 105]. To make matters worse the Germans continued food shipments from the areas they controlled. Thus the previously agreed to quantities of grains, cheese, vegetables, and fruit badly needed in Italy were shipped to the Reich. As in other occupied countries, no consideratiuin was given to the impact on the population. In excahnge the Germand sent coal. Before the War, the Itlalians imported coal from Britain, but were now dependent omn the Germans. In additions, the Itlalians had to supply the needes of the occupying German forces and at levels far above the Italian ration amounts. The Minister of Agriculture in the rump Fascist state in northern Italy (1944-45) nappdaled to the Gerams for grain or at least trucks, but was ignored. One author writing about food, notes, "When the Allies liberated Italy they were shocked by the utter deoprivationof the urban population. As the troops arrived in the pott of Naples they were horrified to observe malnourished peopole , dressed in rags, picling scaps of Garbage out of crevives in the pioetrs. In the town itself a prostitute could be bought for 25 cents , the price of an American C ration can of meat and vegteable hash." [Collingham, p. 174.] And that wa only at the beginning of the Germn occuption.

Source

Bernhard, Patrick."Hitler's Africa in the East: Italian colonialism as a model for German planning in Eastern Europe, " Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 51, No. 1, Special Section: The Dark Side of Transnationalism (Januasry 2016), pp. 61-90.

Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (Penguin Books: New York, 1962), 634p.

Corner, Paul. "Fascist agrarian policy and the Itlaian economy in the inter-war years, " in John A. Davis, ed. Gramsci and Italy's Passive Revolution (Croom Helm: London, 1979), pp. 239-74.

Del Boca, A. "Dal fascism a Gheddafi," in Gli italiani in Llbia Vol. 2 (Rome 1988).

Dimarco, Louis A. "The Italian Home Front in World War II," Presentation at the Dole Institute (September 6, 2018). Dimarco goes in to describe Italy's the poor infrastruture.

Ghiringhelli, Peter. "An Account of my life in Italy 1940 — 1946," WW2 People's War Article ID: A1993403 (BBC: 2003). The suythor goes inyto great deatail about obtaining food in Itly during the War.

Helstosky, Carol. Garlic and Oil: Food and politics in Italy (Berg: Oxford, 2004).

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf Tran. Ralph Manheim (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1971), 694p.

Nützenadel, Alexander. "Dictating food: Autarky , food privision, and consumer politics in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943," in Frank Trentmann and Flemming Just, eds. Food and Conflict in Europe in the Age of the Two World Wars (Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 88-1108.

Pergher, Roberta. "A tale of two borders: Settlement and national transformation in Libya and South Tyrol under Fascism" Masters Thesis (University of Michigan: 2007).

Rodogno, D. Fascism's European Empire: Itlaian Occupation during the Second World War (Cambridge: 2006).

Vandewalle, D.J. A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge: 2006).

Created: 5:20 AM 3/23/2021
Last updated: 1:09 PM 10/10/2021