Figure 1.--The Hiter Youth movement effectively prepared German youth for war. The Balilla was also a major youth movement promoting Fascism with many of the same ideals of the Hitler Youth. Italian soldiers did not, however, persue the war with the same itensity as the Germans. This World Press photo was taken in Rome and dated August 16, 1937. The caption read, "Italy's soldiers of the future, some of the 4,500 children who took part in the Great Physical Culture Program in the Mussolini Forum, march with chests bared and Bayonet-fixed rifles across their shoulders past Il Duce and high government officials who witnessed the display.".

Hitler at the end of the War concluded that the alliance with Mussolini and the Italians was the greatest mistake of the War. That is arguable, but it seems correct that the Italians caused a great deal of trouble for the Germans and returned very little. Mussolini and his 8 million bayonets failed in every military campaign they initiated, except the invasion of Albania and this was because the Albanians did not resist. The Italians failed in France (1940), Greece (1940), Egypt (1940), and East Africa (1941). Italian troops performed badly in the Western Desert (1941-42), Soviet Union (1941-43), Tunisia (1943), and Sicily (1943). And at the end the Army failed to resist the NAZI take over of their country (1943). After the Italian Armistice, the great majority of the Italian army, left without orders, or was disbanded. Thousands of soldiers were killed by the Germans in attempts to quell any move by the former Axis nation to join the Allies or the partisans, while tens of thousands were disarmed and deported to Germany as prisoners. The Italian Navy and Air Force performed better, but were hampered by inferior equipment. Italian special forces, however, had some impressive achievements. Overall the performance of the Italian military must be ranked as the greatest martial failure of the War. Had the Italians been even marginally effective, they could have easily taken Egyot and Suez early in the War. The question arises as to why. Various reasons had been offered. Hitorians have suggested factors such as ineffective leadership, poor training, obsolete equipment, and inadequate supplies. Italian officers often took little interest in the well being of their men. Certainly poor equipment was a factor.Fieldmarshall Rommel who had extensive experience with the Italian Army said of the Italians, "They are worthless fighting a war, but we should not judge people whether they make good soldiers or not, otherwise there would be no civilisation." [Young] I'm not sure that it was the Italian character. Some have claimed it is the Italian interest in "La dolce vida". That may be a factor. The Hiter Youth movement effectively prepared German youth for war. The Balilla was also a major youth movement promoting Fascism with many of the same ideals of the Hitler Youth. Italian soldiers did not, however, persue the war with the same itensity as the Germans.

Hitler's Assessment

Adolf Hitler as a young poliican was a great admirer of the Benito Mussolini who seized power in Italy (1924). Mussolini for his part was convinced that Hitler would never seized power and wanted nothing to do with him. The two after Hitler seized power slowly moved together. Hitler at the end of the War, however, concluded that the alliance with Mussolini and the Italians was the greatest mistake of the War. That is arguable, but it seems correct that the Italians caused a great deal of trouble for the Germans and returned very little.

8 Million Bayonets

Italy was not a major indistrial power. The north was industrialized, but its industrial capaity was a fraction of the other major European industrial powers (Englnd, France, and Germany). And industry in the 20th century was necessary to build the weapons systems needed to wage war. Italy with its relatively small indistrial base was not in the position to wage war against major industrial powers. In terms of population, however, Italy was one of the larger European countries. Mussolini claimed that Italy could send 8 million bayonets to the front to fight its enemies. This in effect was true. Itly had a population that sutin a substantial military. What Italy did not have was an industrial base that could adequately equip its soldiers with modern weapons. Fighting the Libyans, Ethipians, and Albanians was one thing, fifgting Britain and the United states ws a very different matter.

Italian Military Performance

Mussolini and his 8 million bayonets failed in every major military campaign they initiated. The only exception was against the Libyans (1920s) and the Ethiopians (1935). In Europe the Italians had only one success--Albania (1939). And this was because the Albanians did not resist. The Italians failed in France (1940), Greece (1940), Egypt (1940), and East Africa (1941). Italian troops performed poorly in the Western Desert (1941-42), Soviet Union (1941-43), Tunisia (1943), and Sicily (1943). There are instances when the Italian soldiers fought well when proprerly led, but they were genrerally not well led or equipped. And at the end the Army failed to resist the NAZI take over of their country (1943). After the Italian Armistice, the great majority of the Italian Army, left without orders, or was disbanded. Thousands of soldiers were killed by the Germans in attempts to quell any move by the former Axis nation to join the Allies or the partisans, while tens of thousands were disarmed and deported to Germany as prisoners. The Italian Navy and Air Force performed better, but were hampered by inferior equipment. Italian special forces, however, had some impressive achievements. Overall the performance of the Italian military must be ranked as the greatest martial failure of the War. Had the Italians been even marginally effective, they could have easily taken Egypt and Suez early in the War when the British had only a small force to oppose them.

Assessment

The question arises as to why the Italian soldiers performed so poorly in World War II. Various reasons had been offered. Hitorians have suggested factors such as ineffective leadership, poor training, obsolete equipment, and inadequate supplies. Italian officers often took little interest in the well being of their men. Certainly poor equipment was a factor. Some military historians maintain that Italian army officers did not properly look after the care of their men. The Italian officer corps looked after their own amenities and too often took little interest in the welfare of their men. Others have suggested the poor military performance related to the Italian national character. Fieldmarshall Rommel who had extensive experience with the Italian Army said of the Italians, "They are worthless fighting a war, but we should not judge people whether they make good soldiers or not, otherwise there would be no civilisation." [Young] This is interesting because some Italian units with the Afrika Korps fought well. There were many instances where the Italians fought well if properly led. Perhaps not like the Germans, but the soldiers of most countries did not perform like the Germans. The Italian soldiers were, however, usually poorly led. I'm not sure that it was the Italian character. The Italians fought in World War I and there were no similar reports of poor performance. Perhaps it was the Italian interest in "La dolce vida". That may be a factor, here we do not yet have a firm opinion. It is, however, abudatly clear that the average Italian soldier had no burnng desire to wage war against America and Britain. A social factor has to be considered. There is a long history of landlords and leaders taking advantage of the Italian peasantry. And many Italian conscripts were peasants. Thus there was reason for them to be to be skeptical of their leaders. Most officers came from the middle-class and upper-class. Thus they looked very much like the same people that had been exploiting them for centuries. The Italian soldiers were also poorly supplied with modern weapons. Italy was not in 1940 a major industrial power capable of conducting modern warfare. Another fsactor was the political leadership, Mussolini seems to have had no serious concept of the capabilities of his military or how to wage war. For example he ordered the Army to attack Greece with no real consultation with military commaders, prepararion, or consideration of seasonal factors. He ordered the Army to attack Greece in October over mountaneous terrane. Once doesn't launch an attack over mountains when the weather begins to turn cold, especialy a poorly supplied and equipped army. Even Hitler listened to his military comanders on such matters. And if that wasn't bad enough at the same time Mussolini they attacked Greece, he was also attacking the British in Egyot. The Italians were ill-preped for one offensive, let alone two at the same time.

The Balilla

The Hiter Youth movement effectively prepared German youth for war. The Balilla was also a major youth movement promoting Fascism with many of the same ideals of the Hitler Youth. In fact te Balilla had more han a decade longer to shape the minds of Itlanian youth than the Hitler Youth. The Hitler Youth had only 6 years from Hitler's appointment as Chancelor to the outbreak of the War to prepare German youth. Italian soldiers did not, however, persue the war with the same itensity as the Germans. The Balilla program was clearly not as effective as the Hitler Youth program. It is not altogether clear why this was. Both programs pushed nationalism. The Itlian soldier did not, however, have any great desire to fight the British and especially the Americans. Nor were the Italians as willing to accept the toxic racist idelogy that the NAZIs succeeded in selling to the Germans. The Balilla also did not suceed in separating young people from their parents and other importnt institutions like school and church.

Created: March 17, 2004
Last updated: 5:43 PM 8/19/2009