Figure 1.-- Here German troops are moving toward the front, probably passing through Poland in 1942. They are throwing candy to the children. The Germans were highly dependent on rail lines, especially in the East. There not only were the roads primitive or non-existent, but the Whermacht was desperately short of trucks to move supplies. Hitler began the War with arelatively small motor vehicle industry. Grmans made high quality motor vehicles, but produced only a small fraction of the cars and trucks built in America. Thus German factories could not provide the number of trucks needed in the East.

Logistics commonly does not make headlines are attract detailed attention among militarian historians. It does, however, commonly determine the outcome of battles and wars. This may not be the case when one side has a clear predominance of power or far surperior tactics and/or equioment. This is why the Germans and Japanse did so well in the opening phase of World War II. Logistical indequacies doomed their war efforts to failure when they failed to quickly defeat their major opponents. In the end it would be the logistical strength of America and France that would gradully shit the ballance of power. America not only had the resources and logistical capability to supply its own forces, but its Allies as well. The Soviets managed to stop the Germans before receiving meaninful logostical support. It was Lend Lease supplies, especilly trucks, that helped transform the Red Army into a modern, highly mobile force. Since the dawn of civilzation, logistics and transport have played key roes in warfare. Perhaps the first major battle in which logistics is known to have played a major role was Kadesh (13th century BC). Novel logistical practices were used to fight a battle far from home bases. Logistics was often the key factor in battlefield success, but is often neglected in military history. And logitians do not get the same acolades as brilliant battlefield commanders. As new military forces came into bing, logitical trains had to be developed to accomodate. The horse, chariot, and iron weapons all required major revisions in logistical systems. For centuries the donkey, mule, and ox cart were the primary logistical elements. As empire grew in size, ships began to be vital. Here the first major ship born logistical systems were introduced by the Persians and Greeks (5th century BC). From ancient times to modern times there were few important innovations in land logistics. Sea logistics changed with the perfection of the sail (15th century). It was not until the 19th century that major changed in logigistical system began. The most important was the steam engine with led to the railroad and stea,p-poweed ships. The railroad became a major factor in modern wars, in part because roadsystems were still primitive even in indusrial countries. The next major innovation was the internal combustion engine which made modern mechanized war possible. The railroad and the internal combustion engine first came together in World War II. As did modern shipping. The British began the War with the only fully mechanized army, but without the effective Blitzkrieg tactical doctrine developed by the Germans. The Germans had a notoriously poor logistical system. It did not make a great differemce ion the short, realtively small battlefields of the West, it did, however, in the East. The Germans were dependent on the railroads. The Soviets had a different gage, in part as adefensive measure. The Red Army was also not fully mechanized and after Stalingrad it would have taken years to drive west had the oviets not obtained large numbers of trucks through Lend Lease, especially the standard duce-and-a-half. The Allied air campaign severely damaged the French rail lines before the Normany D-Day landings and the Germans destroyed much of whar was left as they retreated. Thus the Americans organized the Red Ball Express to keep forward American units supplied as they drove toward the borders of the Reich. Seabord logisics were important for Britain, America, and Japan. The British and Americans mastered the logistical issues, in part through the Liberty Ship. The Japanese did not. The American submarine campign virtully destroyed inadequare maru fleet with which the Japanese began the War. By the end of the War Japanese factories were without raw materials, the popultion hungry, and garisons throughout the Pacific starving.

Logistics in World War II

"Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare" is today a widely accepted truism, often attrubute to American general Omar Bradely. Logistics, however, commonly does not make headlines are attract detailed attention among militarian historians. It just is not very exciting and it is excitement that tends to sell military history books. Nor does it often attract the most capable commanders--especilayy in countries with an offensive attack ethos (Germany and Japan). Which means that the logitians do not rank high in the military command structure of those nations. It is logistics, however, that commonly determines the outcome of battles and wars. This may not be the case when one side has a clear predominance of power or far surperior tactics and/or equipment. This is why the Germans and Japanese did so well in the opening phase of World War II. Logistical indaquacies doomed the German war efforts to failure when they failed to quickly defeat their major opponents. This was the case in World War I and the Germans reprated the same mistake even more spectacularly in World War II. Logistics would be a key part of the Wehrmacht's failure in the Ostkrieg. And it was with Barbrossa the first months of the Ostkrieg thsat the Gemans had theif best chance of winning the War. And in the end it would be the industrial logistical strength of America and Britain that would gradaully shift the ballance of power. The War in the West played a far more imprtant role in the War than many authors recognize. And the logistical strenth of the Westen powers to bring their industrial power to bear on the Germans. This was a hige logitical undertaking because America was seoarated from the battlefiekd by two great oceans. Abnd oceans separated Britain from the Empire's reporces. Grmany in contrast was connected to the battle field by direct rail lines and the efficient Reichsbahn. Hitler took a real interesr in rtge Reichsbahn, but failed to devote needed resources. America not only had the resources and logistical capability to supply its own forces, but its Allies as well. The Soviets managed to stop the Germans before receiving meaninful logostical support. It was Lend Lease supplies, especilly trucks, that helped transform the Red Army into a modern, highly mobile force able to execute Blitzkrieg on a monumental scale. Japan mananaged to seize the resources it needed at the onset of the Pacific War. It did not have ther logistical capability of getting these resources back to th War industries of the Home Islands. Anbd as the war progressed, the United Star=tes sestroyed what logistical capability Japan possessed wven before the strategic Bombing Campaign destroyed rhose factories.

Historical Background

Since the dawn of civilzation, logistics and transport have played key roles in warfare. Since time immemorial, logistics has been a factor in warfare. In fact many wars did not occur because of gthe distances between people. Once wars began between major civilizations, logistics became a major factor. Perhaps the first major battle in which logistics is known to have played a major role was Kadesh (13th century BC). Novel logistical practices were used to fight a battle far from home bases. Logistics was often the key factor in battlefield success, but is often neglected in military history. And logitians do not get the same acolades as brilliant battlefield commanders. As new military forces came into bing, logitical trains had to be developed to accomodate. The horse, chariot, and iron weapons all required major revisions in logistical systems. For centuries the donkey, mule, and ox cart were the primary logistical elements. As empire grew in size, ships began to be vital. Here the first major ship born logistical systems were introduced by the Persians and Greeks (5th century BC). From ancient times to modern times there were few important innovations in land logistics. Sea logistics changed with the perfection of the sail (15th century). It was not until the 19th century that major changed in logigistical system began. The most important was the steam engine with led to the railroad and stea,p-poweed ships. The railroad became a major factor in modern wars, in part because road systems were still primitive even in indusrial countries. The next major innovation was the internal combustion engine which made modern mechanized war possible. The railroad and the internal combustion engine first came together in World War II. As did modern shipping. The British began the War with the only fully mechanized army, but without the effective Blitzkrieg tactical doctrine developed by the Germans. World War II has been called a war of logistics because it was fought over a global battlefield and war material and raw material in large quantity had to be moved vast distances.

Country Trends

The countries which faced the biggest challenge were Japan and America and to a lesser extent Britain. For the Soviet and Germans the logistical system was dominated by the railrod. For the Americans and Japanese logistics primarily involved shipping. This meant shipping in the Pacific for the Japanese. For the Americans it meant a world-wide shipping challenge, but primrily the Pacific and North Atlantic. The British faced the same challenge, but as their war was primarily fought in Europe and the North Atlantic, it was not the same global challenge America faced. The Germans who launched the War failed the logistical challenge even though they had the easiest logistical challenge. They were located in the heart if Europe and fighting a continental war. The Germans had a notoriously poor logistical system. It did not make a great differemce ion the short, realtively small battlefields of the West, it did, however, in the East. The Germans were dependent on the railroads. The Soviets had a different rail gage, in part as a defensive measure. The Red Army was also not fully mechanized and after Stalingrad it would have taken years to drive west had the oviets not obtained large numbers of trucks through Lend Lease, especially the standard duce-and-a-half. The Allied air campaign severely damaged the French rail lines before the Normany D-Day landings and the Germans destroyed much of whar was left as they retreated. Thus the Americans organized the Red Ball Express to keep forward American units supplied as they drove toward the borders of the Reich. Seabord logisics were important for Britain, America, and Japan. The British and Americans mastered the logistical issues, in part through the Liberty Ship. The Japanese did not. The American submarine campign virtully destroyed inadequare maru fleet with which the Japanese began the War. By the end of the War Japanese factories were without raw materials, the population hungry, and garisons throughout the Pacific starving.

Transport Milleau

There are three major transport milleau: land (rail and road), sea, and air. Land transport means primarily rail and to a lesser extent road. Sea transport means primarily merchant sdhipping, although in Europe river barges was of some imporance. Air transport was a factor for the first time in history, but the actual quantities relatively small. The transport mix varied by country, campaign, and geogrphic area. It was America and Japan that had the largest challenges because so much of the War was fought at such great distance from both countrie. It was America that successfully developed the greatest logistical system in human history to meet that challenge, mastrering all three transport sytems as well as helping its allies doing the same. Japan's failure to overcome the logistical challenge was an imprtant factor in the collapse of their war effort. One of the few advantages the Germans had was a highly efficent rail system anf interior lines that could rapidly deliver men and equipment to far flung battlefields. The two major failure of German arms came in the East and West where the Germans failed in delivering needed men and equipment. This began in the East in the fight for Moscow (November 1941). The Germans outran their supply lines. The same occurred at Stalingrad (November 1942). In the West, Allied air power cut the Atlantic Wall off from supplies and reinforcement (June 1944). The greatest contraint on the Allied side throughout the War was shipping. The American Liberty Ships was critical in dealing with thise contraints, but they were never eliminated.

Created: 6:52 PM 4/18/2011
Last updated: 4:35 PM 5/14/2022