*** World War II European Theater -- logistics on the Eastern Front








World War II: Logistics on the Eastern Front (1941-45)


Figure 1.--One of the major problems faced by the Wehrmacht was the Soviet Union's lack of a modern road system and the German's limited motor vehicle supply. The German logistical system on the Eastern Front was thus highly tied to the Soviet rail system. Here we see two Russian boys by a train. The photograph was taken during the War, but we do not know when or by whom. Note the boys' Red Army style caps.

Military histories commonly concentrate on the major battles, generals, tactics, and weaponry. Often neglected are logistics. This is not a mistake military planners make. Questions of logistics are commonly decisive in warfare. It was logistics and the overwealming superiority of the Allies in men and material that determined the outcome of World War II. No where exceptin the Pacific was logistics more important than the vast Eastern front. It was by far the largest campaign of the War involving the longest terresterial supply lands. The Germans launched the invasion of the Soviet Union with an incomplete logistical plan. The Germans prepared for a quick summer campaign which would achieve victory by the fall. There was no plan for fighting or supplying the three army Groups in cold winter weather. The resultung disaterous defeat before Moscow (December 1941) doomed the NAZIs to defeat. This may seem astonishing given the competency of Wehrmact. But Hitler did not ask the Wehrmact planners if Barbarossa was feasible. He ordered them to prepare a plan assuming that Soviet resistance would colapse. The German Wehrmacht was not as is often thought a modern mechanized force. The Wehrmacht had powerful mechanized panzer divisions, but much of the Wehrmacht still rlied on horse-drawn transport. And the Wehrmacht encountered another problem at it entered theseemingly enless steppe of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union did not have a modern road network. When the rains arrived the Wehrmacht was mired down in an empenetrable sea of mud. Thus the Germans had to depend on the Soviet rail network. This limited both operations and supply. The NAZIs hoped that these limitations would also restrict the Red Army as after Stalingrad it relentlessly deove west. The Red Army as a result of Lend Lease, however, had access to the industrial powerhouse of the United States. And among other items, huge numbers of lovomotives and trucks poured into the Soviet Union. The Soviets were not impressed with American tanks, American trucks were a very different mattr. As a result, in five stunning offenses during 1944, the Red Army destroyed the Wehrmact--exactly what the Wehrmact had attempted to achieve with Barbarossa--and advanced to the very borders of the Reich.

Military History

Military histories commonly concentrate on the major battles, generals, tactics, and weaponry. Often neglected are logistics. It is not very exciting writing a book about logistics. Military historians want to write about panzers, U-bots, anf fighter aircraft. And just try and sell a book about logistics. It does not mske for very exciting reading. This is, however, a serios mistake in any balaced assessment of military campaigns.

Importance

Questions of logistics are commonly decisive in warfare. It was the superior logistics afforded by the Royal Navy that played a critical role in the British vicyories ovr the French in a series of wars. The German use of railways was critical in their 19th century victories. And logistics was key to the Federal victories in the Civil War. It was logistics and the overwealming superiority of the Allies in men and material that determined the outcome of World War II.

Eastern Front

No where exceptin the Pacific was logistics more important than the vast Eastern front. It was by far the largest campaign of the War, in fact the largest campaiun in human history. The Eastern Front involved the longest terresterial supply lines of the War, from Germany to the Volga and Caucauses. The logistical limitations of the Wehrmacht did not show up in the small confined battlefield of Western Rurope with highly develooped transport system including paved roads. Once the Whermacht launchd itself east, logistical problems began to appear at ay early point.

Barbarossa: Logistical Plan

The Germans launched the invasion of the Soviet Union with an incomplete logistical plan. The Germans prepared for a quick summer campaign which would achieve victory by the fall. There was no plan for fighting or supplying the three army Groups in cold winter weather. This was not because there were not Wehrmacht planners that did not see the dangers. Hitler did not want to hear warnings. He wanted a plan for victory in a quick summer campaign. Those who attempted to point out the dangers were reprimanded. The resultung disaterous defeat before Moscow (December 1941) doomed the NAZIs to defeat. This may seem astonishing given the competency of Wehrmact. But Hitler did not ask the Wehrmact planners if Barbarossa was feasible. He ordered them to prepare a plan assuming that Soviet resistance would quickly colapse.

Whermacht Logistical Capability

The Wehrmacht relied heavily on rail transport. Hermany had the finest rail netwoirk in Germany. And the German rail system was closely coordinasted with the Wehrmacht. It proved relastivekly easy for the Wehrmacht to utilize the rail systems in Western Europe. In the Soviet Union this proved more complicated. And this was the least if the German roblems in the East. From railheads trucks were needed to get supplies to the front-line soldiers, espdcilly soldiers rapidly mobing east. The German Wehrmacht was not as is often thought a modern mechanized force. The Wehrmacht had powerful mechanized panzer divisions, but much of the Wehrmacht still rlied on horse-drawn transport. This was in part areflectioin of German military doictrine. Since the creation of Pruddia, the Germans masintained a string standing army and relied on a quick victory before logistical issues and industrial strength became important. Industriual capacity was also a factor. Germany of course profuced trucks, very good trucks. The number was, however, limited. Not only dif gErmany had a limited industrial capacity to produced trucks, but the war placed many demands on German industry that made it difficult to sgnificantly expanded truck production to meet the enormous needs of a vast army operating on the trackless expanses of the Eastern Front. Germany fid not profuce huhe numbers of triucks on Amnerican-style assesbly lines. The Wehrmacht in the rin up to Basrbarossa seized cars and trucks from all over occupied Western Europe. This, however, created problems of its own. Whermacht supply oifficers had to meet requests for spare parts for a dizziung number of different makes and models. As a result, horse-drawn cars and waggoins accompanied the German offensive into he Soiviet Union. German officials photigraphers avoided photographing what looked more like a 19th century army. This was not what Goebbels propaganda machine wanted to show as the vaunted unstopable German war machine. But we see countless photographs of horse-drawn transport in the snapshots taken by German soldiers recording their military life. And the German draft animals proved unable to withstad the riggors of the Russian winter. Dependence on horse power thus left the Wehrmacht particulasrly vulnerable to the winter. The Wehrmacht also had an airlift capability provide by Luftwaffe cargo plains. While not incoinsequential, it was very limited.

Soviet Road Network

And the Wehrmacht encountered another problem at it entered the seemingly enless steppe of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union did not have a modern road network. In fact they virtually had no road network of any kind. There were virtulalay no paved or even improved road network of any kind. Goods were moved by rail. Only about 2 percent of freight traffic was moved by truck in 1940 in the year before the German invasion. [Аксененко, et. al..] As a result of a joint venture with Ford, the Soviet Union was producing a sizeable numbr of trucks and tractors by the 1930s. But they were not used for long distance haulage. They were used to move goods within cities or from rural areas around cities into the cities as well as supplies from the cities into the rural areas around the cities. Improved highway connectiins between cities did not exist it. Thiswas very different from what the Wehrmacht found in Western Europe. Rather than improved roads there were heavily rutted dirt tracks which turned into inpenetrable rivers of mud when the fall rains began.

Rails in the East

The war in the East was different in many ways than the war in the West. One of the many differences was the role of the rail roads. The Western offensive following D-Day did not involve railroads to any extent because the Allies focused on destroying the elaborate French rail system to cut off the invasion beaches and thecforces in France from supplies and reenforcement. And the Germans destroted what was left as they tretrarted behind rhe West Wall. Thus the French rail system was not available to help supply Allied armies as they drove toward the Reich. This is very different that the situation that unfolded in the East. Neither the Wehrmachtor the Red Army were fully motorized forces. They relied haeavily on horse-drawn carts, but they had two of the largest rail systems in the East to support military operations. And both countries relied very heavily on their rail systems in a variety of ways. They at first connected the NAZIs and Soviets as allies. And then became critical lifelines and targets as the two countries fought it out to the death. Given the vast dimmensiions of the Eastern Front, only rail lines could deliver the vast quantities the supplied needed to fight out yegreatest armed conflict in history. This was all complicated by the different rail gagaes. The Soviets used their rail system to move factories and industrial equiopment as well as skilled wirkers east to keep them out of German hands. Soviet trains transported Americam Lend Lease supplies to the front line. The Germans had anticipated using the Reichbahn to transport the the booty from the East to feed thevNAZI war machine. this did not transpire, but the trains brought cast muners of Soviet citzens into the Recich to seeve as slave alnor replacing workers conccripted for military service.

The Bandenbekämpfung / Bandit (Partisan) Campaign (1942-44)

The German logistical train while inadequate for the Ostheer was massive. The logistical requirements of a German division were a fraction of that required by an American division and further reduce by pillaging the local population for food and basic necessities. Still, supplying more than 3 million men with the necessities of war was a huge logistical undertaking, made worse by various German policies like retraining damaged tanks and aircraft to the Reich instead of repairing them in the fields or the need to ship fodder for the huge number of horses employed. Hitler had planned to run the German war economy on food and other resources from the East. This did not materialize as the food obtained was barely enough to feed the Ostheer. And German barbarity in the east caused production to plummet. This the supply trains returned from the East, generally empty. One exception was slave labor. Civilians were routinely rounded up and shipped west to work in Reich War industries or as household servants. Many on these slave transports arrived in such poor condition that they were unfit for work. As the Ostheer moved east, it left in its wake an increasingly long and vulnerable rail line and a population that hated them--a perfect recipe for partisan activity. Actually a substantial part of the area occupied were disaffected non-Russian ethnic areas that saw the Germans as liberators, especially in Ukraine. German brutality quickly turned potential allies into bitter enemies. As one historian puts it, when ever Hitler had to choose between pragmatic war winning options and ideological NAZI actions, he always opted for the National Socialist solution. [Roberts] The shock of German victories left most rear areas relatively quiet, but barbarous NAZI actions soon changed that. and by 1942 with the Red Army still undefeated and winning back substantial areas this began to change. Soviet authorities began to organize partisan bands that had been operating in isolation--this would become the most effective Partisan Movement of the War. The first partisans were mostly cut-off Red Army soldiers, but as NAZI brutality became increasingly, evident they were joined by an increasing number of civilian. Ostheer commanders fighting the Red Army asked for action to be taken to protect their supply lines. Thus was not entirely new to the Germans. Atrocities had been reported in German colonies and in occupied areas during World War I, most notably in Belgium and France. Many of what the Germans saw as partisan activity was actually friendly fire casualties. Hunting down partisans is difficult work meaning diverting badly needed combat troops. So the German response was to murder civilians to deter the partisans. In World War I, the reported atrocities were in the thousands. In World II it would be different, killing in the millions. In part because of Generalplan Ost, the goal was to obtain land for German colonization, so the civilian population had to be removed anyway. So the German Bandenbekämpfung strategy was rather than expend scarce resources hunting down the partisans, just kill the entire civilian population in an area where the partisans are active. Without the civilians the partisans could not operate. The NAZI Jewish Holocaust is often seen as the major killing operation of World War II. It was not. Some 25-30 million Soviet citizens perished in World war II, the vast majority were civilians. The Jews killed in the Soviet Union were less than 5 percent of the total. There were various NAZI killing programs--the single largest was the Bandenbekämpfung. Large areas of Belarus and eastern Poland were essentially depopulated. One author calls them the Bloodlands. [Snyder]

Sources

Аксененко, Н.Е., Бернгард, Ф.К., Богданов, Г.И "История железнодорожного транспорта России и Советского Союза, Т.2 : 1917–1945 гг" (History of railway transport in Russia and the Soviet Union, vol.2, 1917–1945) St. Petersburg, ПГУПС (a railway university) 1994–1997.

Громов, Н.Н.; Панченко, Т.А.; Чудновский, А.Д.; "Еденая транспорттная система (Unified Transportation System), Москва, Транспорт, 1987 (textbook).

Glantz. David. Barbarossa Derailed - the Battle for Smolensk, 10 July-10 September 1941 (2010).

Roberts, Andrew.

Snyder, Timothy. Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (Basic Books: New York, 2010), 524p.

Westwood, J. N. "Chapter 8: Transport" in Davies, R.W.; Harrison, Mark; Wheatcrofttitle, S. G. (eds.). The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 158–81.







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Created: 10:05 PM 7/30/2007
Last updated: 4:13 AM 9/27/2019