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The war in the East was different in many ways than the war in the West. One of the many differences was the role of the rail roads. The Western offensive following D-Day did not involve railroads to any extent because the Allies focused on destroying the elaborate French rail system to cut off the invasion beaches and thecforces in France from supplies and reenforcement. And the Germans destroyed what was left as they tretrarted behind rhe West Wall. Thus the French rail system was not available to help supply Allied armies as they drove toward the Reich. This is very different that the situation that unfolded in the East. Neither the Wehrmachtor the Red Army were fully motorized forces. They relied haeavily on horse-drawn carts, but they had two of the largest rail systems in the East to support military operations. And both countries relied very heavily on their rail systems in a variety of ways. The rails at first connected the NAZIs and Soviets as allies. And then became critical lifelines and targets as the two countries fought it out to the death. Given the vast dimensions of the Eastern Front, only rail lines could deliver the vast quantities the supplied needed to fight out the greatest armed conflict in history. This was all complicated by the different rail gagaes. The Soviets used their rail system to move factories and industrial equiopment as well as skilled workers east to keep them out of German hands. Soviet trains transported Americam Lend Leasr supplies to the front line. The Germans had anticipated using the Reichbahn to transport the the booty from the East to feed the NAZI war machine. this did not transpire, but the trains brought cast muners of Soviet citzens into the Recich to seeve as slave labor replacing workers conccripted for militarybservice.
The Soviet People's Commissariat of Railways (NKPS) opperated a rail transport system very different from the country's primitive road network. While basic, it was itbwas the world's second largest rail network. Soviet railroads carried some 85 percent of freight transport and a 92 intercity passenger transport. The only other important freignt system was sea and riverine transport (12 percent). [Аксененко, et. al..] Much of the system was inherited from th Tsarist rail system. The Tsarist rail system extended 81,000 kilometers (km) (1917). The Soviet Union had only expanded the system to 106,000 km (1940). The extent (length) was only exceeded by that of the United States. [Громов, et al] While the Soviets had not amssively lengthened the rail net work, the NKPS was carrying four times the freight volume. The Soviet Union gave great emphasis to expanding heavy industry from an early point. Tsarist Russia at the time World War I wasindustrilaizing very rapidly, something Soviet authors often ignore. Whether Doviet brutality and the Gulag speed up or slowed Soviet industrial growth is an open question. The First Five Year Plan and collectivizatiin certainly disrupted and actually reduced agricultural output which must have adevedrsely affected industrial growth. Soviet policy was for maximum industrial expansion. Expanding the rail stystem was seond priority and kept to a minimum so that resources could be concentrated on industry. This caused problems when rail transport failed to meet the needs of industry. [Westwood, 1958, p. 158.] Problems also occurred when due care was not given to logistics in locating steel mills and other industrial plants. As a result, there were factories shutdowns and failures to deliver raw materials on time. One major rail project was the Turkestan–Siberia Railway, linking Western Siberia via Eastern Kazakhstan with Uzbekistan. The Russian rail system had a wider 5 ft gage (eventually redefined to 4 ft 11 27⁄32 in) than standard European gage (4 ft 8 1⁄2 in). The difference appears to be primary the influence of American raulroad engineers at an early stage of Russian railroad constryction.
NAZI-Germany and the Soviet Union signed what the called was a Non-Aggression Pact (August 1939). It was in fact an Agression Pact beginning with both countries invading Poland (Seprember 1939), lunching World War II. The extent of the agression planned is revealed in theSecret Condicil the two countries agreed to, partiononing the free countries of Eastern Eurioe between them. After Poland was occupied and partitioned, thge NAZIs and Soviets as part of further agreements commotioned to helping each other increase their war making capabilities. The Soviets agreed to supply the NAZIs with large quantities ocriticak material critically needed for their planned offensive in the West. It included oil, critical maetals, grains and other materials. The materials provided by the the Soviers were delivered by the Soviet NKPS to the German Reichbahn. The material had to be tbe relaoaded on Reichbahn freignt cars and tankers with the smaller Reichbahn gage. The Germans were to supply industrial and military goods, but delayed actual shipments. These deliveries by rail were secure because the British and French had not way of interdisting rail deliveries. At tge same time German U-boats were attempting to cut British sea lanes. The supplies provided by the Soviet Union played a key role in the German invasion of the LowcCountruies and Framve and Nattle of Britain.
The Germans launched the Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). The German Wehrmacht was dependent on the Reichbahn for its supplies. They did notbhave a massive fleet of trucks. Supplies were delivered to railheads at the front and them brought forward by trucks and horse-drawn carts. (The Wehrmacht was not fully motorized and dependend heavily on horsepower.) The Germans during the early stages of Barbarossa extended a great deal of resources and effort to convert much of the rail system in the western part of the Soviet Uniin to the narrower German/international standard gauge. The Germans were hoping to engage most of the Red Army as close as possible to the Soviet western border. It was here the German forces were fully supplied. They had some success, but the Red Army was so large that substail forces continued to impose the Grmans as tgey moved east. As the front moved hundreds of kilometres east the logistical task became larger and LARGER. The Germanised rail system could barely keep up with the demands of advansing Germns, especially the gas-guzzling Panzers divisions. This necesitated HUGE deliveries of fuel and other supplies. At least five lengthy trains of fuel per day were required by the tank units of Army Group Center alone. There was also a huge need for amunition as well as more and more replacement parts for those repairs that the field workshops could carry out. Tank engines and drives have a very short lifespan inncombat before major overhauls are required which means a constant supply of new engines and drives must be kept up. [MacDonald] The German armored thrusts into Soviet territory were not the ‘walk in the park’ often portrayed in films and German memoirs. After the first two months, Soviet resistance stiffened measurably. The Wehrmacht having to overcome a lot of unexpectedly fierce and determined resistance. The Germans were shocked as they began to encounter increasing numbers of the new T-34 tanks. The battle for Smolensk lasted almost 2 months not the 2 days scheduled. [Glantz] The debilitating Battle for Smolensk derailed the Wehrmacht timetable, with huge quantities of troops and equipment of all kinds needing to be replaced from Germany. [Glantz] This was a major factor in Army Group Center being caught in the open, 'within sight of Moscow'”, with the onset of the coldest winter in 100 years.
The German Reichbahn palyed a major role in the Holovausr, delivering Kews to the death camps to ne murdered. Reichbahn personnel were among thevGerman civilians most knowledgeablevabout what was hahappening. The one major exception to this was the Einsatzgruppen killing by bullet in Soviet Union which began atvthe onset of Barbarossa. The Eisatzhruppen killing squads did not go throigh the intermediate step ofvconcentrating Jews in ghettos. Instead they killed Jews in full public view in the villages are selected areas in ravines or forrests.. There was no real atte,pt to hide what they were doing. In fact in many cases they encouraged locals to participate in the killing process.
Badly damaged tanks and other equipment were sent back to the manufacturers works in Germany which placed extra strain on the system. In addition some 700,000 German wounded or severely frostbitten troops were evacuated, mostly by train, to hospitals in the Reich or to hospitals in Occupied Europe before January 1, 1942. [MacDonald]
Beginning withe Austrain Anschluss, the Reichsbahn moved to the captured railways (rolling stock and infrastructure) of the countries captued into their system.
The railways managed by the "Eastern Railway Division" (Generaldirektion der Ostbahn) was a little different. It was initially run from that part of the Polish State Railways within the so-called General Government gelegene Teil der Polnischen Staatsbahnen (PKP). The Ostbahn (Generalgouvernement) began to operate (November 1939). In the Polish canapaign and the subsequent Western camapigns (Denmark, thevNetherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece), the standard gauge networks could be easily used. The campaign kin gthe Soviet Union was very differrent. Troops and materiel and to be transferred to the Soviet broad gauge lines or converting them to German standard gauge. Unlike theother countries, much o fthe the Red Army and Soviet railways managed to withdraw east or destroy the majority of its rolling stock during its retreat. The Germans did seize sone Soviet rolling stock, especially in the very early pahase of Barbarissa. Rolling stock, however is mobile. And with only a few days warning, it could be moved east. And without the Soviet rolling stock, the Gerams had tonlay the German narrow stick.
The differing gauges had the effect of making virtually useless the large numbers of locomotives and rolling stock captured. Without time consuming and costly modifications of locomotive and rolling stock ‘running gear’ (axles mainly) it could only be used on Soviet gauge railways - which of course meant trans-shipment (unloading and reloading) of cargo. The necessary hardware and specialist manpower to do the modifications had to be brought from Germany or Occupied Europe
Converting a long rail line between centres was relatively easy —- the big problem arose in junctions and marshalling yards where thousands of switching points had to be modified or replaced in order to get the maximum benefit out of the many sidings in the marshalling yards used for distributing freight destined for many locations. [MacDonald]
Germany lacked virtually all the raw materails needed to wage war. Hitler's vision was that by the seizing the East that he would have all the food and critucal raw materials thatbGermany lacked to fight his wars. This icluded the oil taht the Whrmacht desperately needed. With the resources of the East, Germany could not be blockaded as Britain was able to do in World War I. As most of Hitler;s visions, they did not work out. The Whermanch was barely able to feed itself from what it a able to seize in the East. Very little surplus was left to sjip but from the Reich. And because the Red Ary wa not defeated, Germany wa akso uoable to obtain the oil and other raw materals needed. As it worked out it would be Frane and th occupied West that would support the German war economy. Geramny did obtain needed labor in the East. Huge numbers of peoole were forcibly seized and transported ny the Reichbahn for slave labor in the Reich.
The initial shock of the invasion found the Soviets unpreoared. After the first few months, parisan groups began to form and the exposed rail lines were an inviting target. Which mean that even after the narrower gage wa installed, there was a constntbneedto repaor partican damage. One well co-ordinated (from Moscow) partisan operation in 1943 crippled the railway system in German held territory with hundreds of detonations the length and breadth of occupied Soviet territory. This reaquired lengthy repairs. [MacDonald]
The NAZIs hoped that after Stalingrad, these limitations would also restrict the Red Army as it relentlessly deove west. The Red Army as a result of Lend Lease, however, had access to the industrial powerhouse of the United States. And among other items, huge numbers of locomotives and trucks poured into the Soviet Union. The Soviets were not impressed with American tanks, American trucks were a very different matter. America provided the Red Army with Studabakers and other trucks in numbers the Germans could only dream of. As a result, in five stunning offenses during 1944, the Red Army destroyed the Wehrmact--exactly what the Wehrmact had attempted to achieve with Barbarossa--and advanced to the very borders of the Reich.
Аксененко, Н.Е., Бернгард, Ф.К., Богданов, Г.И "История железнодорожного транспорта России и Советского Союза, Т.2 : 1917–1945 гг" (History of railway transport in Russia and the Soviet Union, vol.2, 1917–1945) St. Petersburg, ПГУПС (a railway university) 1994–1997.
Громов, Н.Н.; Панченко, Т.А.; Чудновский, А.Д.; "Еденая транспорттная система (Unified Transportation System), Москва, Транспорт, 1987 (textbook).
Glantz. David. Barbarossa Derailed - the Battle for Smolensk, 10 July-10 September 1941 (2010).
MacDonald, Pete, personal commuication (September 27, 2019).
Westwood, J. N. "Chapter 8: Transport" in Davies, R.W.; Harrison, Mark; Wheatcrofttitle, S. G. (eds.). The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 158–81.
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