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The German logistical train while inadequate for the Ostheer was massive. The logistical requirements of a German division were a fraction of that required by an American division and further reduce by pillaging the local population for food and basic necessities. Still, supplying more than 3 million men with the necessities of war was a huge logistical undertaking, made worse by various German policies like retraining damaged tanks and aircraft to the Reich instead of repairing them in the fields or the need to ship fodder for the huge number of horses employed. Hitler had planned to run the German war economy on food and other resources from the East. This did not materialize as the food obtained was barely enough to feed the Ostheer. And German barbarity in the east caused production to plummet. This the supply trains returned from the East, generally empty. One exception was slave labor. Civilians were routinely rounded up and shipped west to work in Reich War industries or as household servants. Many on these slave transports arrived in such poor condition that they were unfit for work. As the Ostheer moved east, it left in its wake an increasingly long and vulnerable rail line and a population that hated them--a perfect recipe for partisan activity. Actually a substantial part of the area occupied were disaffected non-Russian ethnic areas that saw the Germans as liberators, especially in Ukraine. German brutality quickly turned potential allies into bitter enemies. As one historian puts it, when ever Hitler had to choose between pragmatic war winning options and ideological NAZI actions, he always opted for the National Socialist solution. [Roberts] The shock of German victories left most rear areas relatively quiet, but barbarous NAZI actions soon changed that. and by 1942 with the Red Army still undefeated and winning back substantial areas this began to change. Soviet authorities began to organize partisan bands that had been operating in isolation--this would become the most effective Partisan Movement of the War. The first partisans were mostly cut-off Red Army soldiers, but as NAZI brutality became increasingly, evident they were joined by an increasing number of civilian. Ostheer commanders fighting the Red Army asked for action to be taken to protect their supply lines. Thus was not entirely new to the Germans. Atrocities had been reported in German colonies and in occupied areas during World War I, most notably in Belgium and France. Many of what the Germans saw as partisan activity was actually friendly fire casualties. Hunting down partisans is difficult work meaning diverting badly needed combat troops. So the German response was to murder civilians to deter the partisans. In World War I, the reported atrocities were in the thousands. In World II it would be different, killing in the millions. In part because of Generalplan Ost, the goal was to obtain land for German colonization, so the civilian population had to be removed anyway. So the German Bandenbekämpfung strategy was rather than expend scarce resources hunting down the partisans, just kill the entire civilian population in an area where the partisans are active. Without the civilians the partisans could not operate. The NAZI Jewish Holocaust is often seen as the major killing operation of World War II. It was not. Some 25-30 million Soviet citizens perished in World war II, the vast majority were civilians. The Jews killed in the Soviet Union were less than 5 percent of the total. There were various NAZI killing programs--the single largest was the Bandenbekämpfung. Large areas of Belarus and eastern Poland were essentially depopulated. One author calls them the Bloodlands. [Snyder]
The German logistical train while inadequate for the Ostheer was massive. The logistical requirements of a German division were a fraction of that required by an American division and further reduce by pillaging the local population for food and basic necessities. This was all dpne by rail. Still, supplying more than 3 million men with the necessities of war was a huge logistical undertaking, made worse by various German policies like retraining damaged tanks and aircraft to the Reich instead of repairing them in the fields or the need to ship fodder for the huge number of horses employed. Hitler had planned to run the German war economy on food and other resources from the East. This did not materialize as the food obtained was barely enough to feed the Ostheer. And German barbarity in the east caused production to plummet. This the supply trains returned from the East, generally empty. One exception was slave labor. Civilians were routinely rounded up and shipped west to work in Reich War industries or as household servants. Many on these slave transports arrived in such poor condition that they were unfit for work.
As the Ostheer moved east, it left in its wake an increasingly long and vulnerable rail line and a population that hated them--a perfect recipe for partisan activity. Actually a substantial part of the area occupied were disaffected non-Russian ethnic areas that saw the Germans as liberators, especially in Ukraine. German brutality quickly turned potential allies into bitter enemies. As one historian puts it, when ever Hitler had to choose between pragmatic war winning options and ideological NAZI actions, he always opted for the National Socialist solution. [Roberts] The shock of German victories left most rear areas relatively quiet, but barbarous NAZI actions soon changed that. and by 1942 with the Red Army still undefeated and winning back substantial areas this began to change. Soviet authorities began to organize partisan bands that had been operating in isolation--this would become the most effective Partisan Movement of the War. The first partisans were mostly cut-off Red Army soldiers, but as NAZI brutality became increasingly, evident they were joined by an increasing number of civilian.
Ostheer commanders fighting the Red Army asked for action to be taken to protect their supply lines. Thus was not entirely new to the Germans. Atrocities had been reported in German colonies and in occupied areas during World War I, most notably in Belgium and France. Many of what the Germans saw as partisan activity was actually friendly fire casualties.In the Soiviet Unon they were dealking with real abnd sustauned partisan activity against a vital and exposed supply lines.
Hunting down partisans is difficult work meaning diverting badly needed combat troops. So the German response was to murder civilians to deter the partisans. In World War I, the reported atrocities were in the thousands. In World II it would be different, killing in the millions. In part because of Generalplan Ost, the goal was to obtain land for German colonization, so the civilian population had to be removed anyway. So the German Bandenbekämpfung strategy was rather than expend scarce resources hunting down the partisans, just kill the entire civilian population in an area where the partisans are active. Without the civilians the partisans could not operate. The NAZI Jewish Holocaust is often seen as the major killing operation of World War II. It was not. Some 25-30 million Soviet citizens perished in World war II, the vast majority were civilians. The Jews killed in the Soviet Union were less than 5 percent of the total. There were various NAZI killing programs--the single largest was the Bandenbekämpfung. Large areas of Belarus and eastern Poland were essentially depopulated. One author calls them the Bloodlands. [Snyder]
NAZI Führer Adolf Hitler from the outset of preparations for the invasion of the Soviet Union made it clear that Barbarossa would be different. He instructed OKW to issue standing orders that spelled out just how the war in the East would be pursued. And unlike World War I, it would not be just severe. This time it would be genocidal. The Whrmacht issues a series of brutal standing orders, primarily associated with the Eastern Front. The orders issued by OKW that mostly affected the anti-partisan operations were -- The Commissar Order and Barbarossa Decree. Note that the initial orders were issued before the actual invasion. And OKW made it clear that the War in the Est would not be like the campaigns in the West. It would be a war of anialation. Civilians resisting military occupation are a violation of the rule of law. But the Germans treatment of civilians premessed on Generalplan Ost left the civilians little choice, but to resist, including the children.
Hitler appointed Himmler to irganize the security effirts military commanders were requesting in rear areas (July 1942). initiatives in rear areas. One of his first steps was to prohibit the use of the term 'partisan'" to describe the resistabce fighters. Longerich 2012, pp. 626–27.] He insisted that the term Banden (Bandit)was the term to be used by German forces. Hitler also ordered that Himmler was 'solely responsible' for 'bandits' in the occupied East. The ionly exception was the frint-line areas under military administration where the Ostheer commanders held sway.
Before Himmler was given contril, the Otheerr cimanders had been brutal, killing anyone suspected of resistance activities. Eisatzgruppen had killed uthlessly much of the Jewish populaation in the occupoied areas (1941). The Banden campaign would be different Himmler set out to eliminate the ebntire population in areas designated as Banden areas. Hunding now the partisdans was aiffucult, time consuming process. Murdering the civilian populiion was a much easier undertaking. Himmler's job was to find the SS killers willing to carry out these actions. And their orders criminalised resistance, real or imagined. This basically transformed security operations into mass murder. [Westermann 2005, pp. 191–92.] Something by this time many SS formations would very good at. The carnage was given furher impetus by Hutler with Führer Directive 46 Action Against Banditry(August 18, 1942). bHitler endorsed Himmler's radicalisation of anti-partisan warfare. Hitler ordered the security forces to act with 'utter brutality' to achieve 'complete extermination' of 'gangs'. He also providing immunity from prosecution for any acts committed during 'bandit-fighting' operations. Hitler confirmed his designation of the SS as the organisation responsible for rear-area warfare in areas under civilian administration. In areas under military jurisdiction (the Army Group Rear Areas), the Army High Command had the overall responsibility. Hitler declared the entire population of 'bandit' (partisan) operating areas s as enemy combatants. This meant that the German objecrive was by no means pacification, erather mass murder--the complete destruction and depopulation of large areas--Tote Zonen (dead zimes). [Geyer and Fitzpatrick, p. 380.]
German anti-Partisan activities varied over time. The propensity for violence on the part of German officers varied. One author describes a prevalent "guerrillaphobia". [Shepherd] Many officers were convinced that partisans could divert the Wehrmacht from the Schwerpunk and could only be defeated by the most ruthless application of force. This was a prevalent belief within the Reichwehr even before Hitler seized power. And after seizing power, he moved to polticize the Wehrmacht. NAZI supporters were promoted and officers of the Imperial Army that believed in chilverous conduct were shunted aside. Added to this, the anti-Semetic and anti-Slavic NAZI ideology set up a condition in which anti-partisan operations would be waged with unprecedented barbarity. Some authors suggests that the anti-partisan operations were conducted at least in part as pat of the NAZI goal of reducing Jewish and Slavic populations. Another factor that has to be considered is the limited resources that the Germans devoted to anti-partisan activities and the huge area involved. This set up very different circustances than in the West.
Three groups were involved in the anti-partisan operations: the Wehrmacht, the SS, and the Reich Labor Front. The Wehrmacht placed its anti-partisan operations in the hands of Security Divisions not prepared for front line operations. They also included some non-German units made up of Cossacks and Muslims. In additions, units resting behind the frontlines might be attached temporarily to SS units for anti-partisan operations. The SS
Einsatzgruppen after annihilating Jewish communities were deployed for anti-partisan units. SS combat units were also deployed for anti-partisan units. These units included formations recruited from anti-Soviet local people, and Muslims. Another major participant in the anti-partisan operations was Fritz Sauckel's Reich Plenipotentiary for the Mobilization of Labor. The three groups often independently without any coordination. One author believes that the Wehrmacht Security Divisions and SS units often cooperated, but there was little cooperation with the Sauckel's Labor Organization. Anti-partisan operatins ere coordinated by Erich von dem Bach-Zalewski, the Höhere SchutzStaffel- und Polizeiführer (Higher Chief of SchutzStaffel--HSSPF) for the area of Army Group Centee in his capacity as Chef der Bandenkampfverbande, directly subordinate to Himmler. Arny Group Center was the lrgest German formation of the Ostheer. As an HSSPF, Bach Zalewski was able to call upon SS and Police forces in the region, as well as working with Heer units, imcluding rontline units, the rear area Security Divisions, and the Geheime Feldpolizei (GFP). The most notorious anti-partisan unit was the Sonderkommando Dirlewanger. SS-Sonderkommando Dirlewanger (SS-Sonderbataillon Dirlewanger/Sonderkommando der Waffen-SS Lublin) was formed from Wilddiebkommando Orienburg, a small anti-partisan units made up of poachers, SS disciplinary prisoners and Osttruppen (1941). They were trained by SS-Totenkopf-Standarte 5. New recruits were obtained from convicts (military and civilian) and volunteers from the concentration camps (mostly political prisoners). It was formed in German occupied Poland. SS-Obergruppenführer Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüge, Höhere SS und Polizeiführer Ost, threatened to arrest them nd thegy were moved to Belorussia soon after (February 1942). It operated in Belarys (1941-44). it was upgraded to SS-Regiment Dirlewanger (August 1944). Himmler was very proud of them. He wrote in an internal memo, "In 1941 I organized a ‘poachers’ regiment’ under Dirlewanger ... a good Swabian fellow, wounded ten times, a real character - bit of an oddity, I suppose. I obtained permission from the Führer to collect from every prison in Germany all the poachers who had used firearms and not, of course, traps, in their poaching days - about 2.000 in all. Alas, only 400 of these ‘upstanding and worthy characters’ remain today. I have kept replenishing this regiment with people on SS probation, for in the SS we really have far too strict a system of justice ... When these did not suffice, I said to Dirlewanger ... 'Now, why not look for suitable candidates among the villains, the real criminals, in the concentration camps?' ... The atmosphere in the regiment is often somewhat medieval in the use of corporal punishment and so on ... if someone pulls a face when asked whether we will win the war or not he will slump down from the table ... dead, because the others will have shot him out of hand'." [Himmler] They were incolved in numeris arocities in both Herman occupid Poland and the Soviet Union (Belarus).
Commanders
SS-Obersturmbannführer Dr. Oskar Dirlewanger (? 1940 - ? Aug 1944)
Area of operations
Poland (General Government) (1 Sep 1940 - 17 Feb 1942)
Belorussia (Anti-Partisan) (17 Feb 1942 - 5 Aug 1944)
Holders of other notable badges & decorations
See 36. Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS
Notable members
Oskar Dirlewanger (Infamous founder of the unit) >
There were several HeervSicherungs (security) divisions. These wee low quakity divisiins wihnlight weaonry that were von coinsidered suitble for front-line servuce. The 221st Security Division was a Heer division. It was Commanded by General Johann Pflugbeil and assighned to security operations in Army Group Center rear areas.
Police Battalion 306 (Polizeibattalion 306) was a formation of the Order Police (uniformed police). Wih Brbossa it was deployed in securiuty operations in rearareas.
German anti-parisan operations in the Soviet Union can be divided into three
periods in which anti-partisan operatins varied.
The First period of German anti-partisan operations was Barbarossa (June-December 1941). Here Soviet partisans were weak and poorly organized. The Germans expecting a quick victory acted brutally without any consideration of the long-term impact of their actions. And Whermacht commanders at the higest echelon as well as occupation authorities knew about Generalplan Ost which set as a goal of Barbarossa, the destruction of much of the population. On paper the Einsatzgruppen which followed in the wake of the Whermacht was to destroy any insipient resistance and the Soviet infrastructure around which resisdtance could organize. In practice, the Einstazgruppen spend most of their time killing Jews and the enormity of this task asorbed most of their efforts. The Einsatzgruppen were attached to Whermacht, but in fact operated independently on SS ordes. The Wehrmacht set up Security Divisions were set up as plans for Barbarossa were being finalized (eaky-1941). Their assign ment was policing, security and anti-partisan duties in the rear of the main German field armies. Inlike the Einsatzgruppen, they were under the direction of the respective army rear area command, or Korück. They also behave brutally toward the civilian population. The brutality of the Germans only acted to turn civilians into partisans. Some fkled into the fiorests. Many more were willing to aid the partisans. When Red Army units began liberating towns and villages westv of Moscow they began finding evidence of attricities committed against civilians, leaving no doubt about the character of the enmeny they faced.
The Second period of anti-partisan operations were the 1942 campaigns. After the Soviet offensive before Moscow (December 1941), it became clear that the Eastern campaign would not be a short one or easy one. This did not change Hitler's mindset. It dfod, however, change the minset of the German officer's whjo had to actuallfight the Ear. Some Wehrmacht commanders began to defy orders and attempted a degree of moderation to pacify thir areas. [Shepherd] Large number of healthy young adults were transported gto the Reich for slave in thec German war economy. Generalplan Ost envisioned enslaving killing much of the population or driving the people beyons the Urals where they would slowly operish. With the failure of the Whermacht to destroy the Red Army, rather than enslaving the population in the East, they were being brought back to thec Reich for slave labor to support the German war economy--esentially replacing the workers drafted for military srvice..
The Third period of anti-partisan operations occurred during the German retreat west following Stalingrad. The retreat in 1943 primarily ioccurred in the Ukraine. retreating units often acted brutally, both killing large numbers of people, but destroying any thing that might be useful. At the same time, expanding Soviet partisan actions brought vicious reprisals. The front in the north was more stable. Army Group Center held ans the Red Army concentrated on the Ukraine. Thus Bylorussia annd Poland remained in German hands whikle the strength iof the partisans grew. German anti-partisan operations were severe in 1943 and only increased in early 1944. The SS organized operations would sweep areas designated as 'band infested'. They would descend on towns and villages, in some cases killing the entire population and burning the community to the ground. Depending on the commander, the children and in some cases the women would be spared.
The German anti-partisan operations involved a variety of players. The Germans not only used German troops, but also troops allied with them. Thus Germans, German allies (Hungarians and Romanians), and anti-Soviet formatiins recruited by the Germans which included Russians, Ukranians, Cosacks, and Muslims. The Germans did recruit Poles, but ethnic tensions such as the dufferences between Ukranianbs and Poles played into their hands. Anti-partisan operations were conducted primarily in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Poland and thus targeted those ethnic groups. The Red Army offensive before Miscow drove the Germans west away from the Russian Hearland. This the German anti-partisan campaign was cobnducted primarily kin the Ukraine and Belprussia and then later in Poland.
The survivors were transported west to the Reich where they were interned in concentration camps, including camps like Auschwitz. Many of the children the Allies found when they liberated the camps were the survivors from these anti-partisan sweeps. These sweeps while barbaric apparently did effectively reduce partisan activity.
Blood, Philip W. Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe (Potomac Books: Dulles, Virginia, 2006), pp. 400.
Geyer, Michael and Shelia Fitzpatrick. Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Himmler, Heinrich. Intrnal memo (August 1944).
Longerich, Peter (2012). Heinrich Himmler (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2012).
Shepherd, Ben. War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 368p.
Slepyan, Kenneth. The War behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West Russia, 1941-1944
Westermann, Edward B. The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West Russia 1941-44.
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