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The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) established the Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training ((教育総監部 Kyoiku sokanbu--OIGMA) (1898). Its mission was to provide centralized oversight for the Imperial Japanese Army training efforts. This included the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, specialized weaponry and technical training schools, and the various military preparatory schools located around the country. The OIGMA was also responsible for tactical training. Over time the OIGMA acquired added responsibilities concerning over Army logistics, transportation, and support matters. The OIGMA also acquired considerable prestige and political power within the Japanese Army. He reported directly to the Emperor through the Imperial General Headquarters rather than to the Army Minister or the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office. The IG post thus by the 1930s had become the third most powerful position within the Imperial Army. As a result, the IG position was one of intense competition among senior Army commanders. Competition for the IG post played a role in February 26 incident in which IJA soldiers staged a coup d'etat in Tokyo (1936). The tactical competence of the IJA officer core proved lacking during World War II. There was no lack of discipline in the IJA, but tactical competence is a different matter. The individual Japanese conscript was among the most disciplined and committed soldier of the War. He was well trained. Unfortunately for him, his weapons were inferior and poorly supplied. In addition the officers who led him in many cases more indoctrinated than professionally trained. The Japanese Army proved highly effective against poorly led and armed Chinese troops. And they scored a major victory over the British in Malaya, but against well led Allied trips the Japanese fared badly. Officers were prone to lead frontal attacks into entrenched positions. This proved disastrous on Guadalcanal (1942). They did prove adept at defensive tactics designed to kill as many Americans as possible, although Japanese soldiers were sacrificed in much larger numbers. One of the Japanese atrocities often ignored is he way the Japanese Army through away the lives of its young soldiers in hopeless battles or no battles at all. Japanese soldiers throughout the Pacific were starving at the end of the War, but still not allowed to surrender.
Drill was a very common part of European and American education in the 19th and early-20th century. This primarily consisted of marching and learning marching moves. It was adopted primarily because it taught discipline. It was mote common for boys than girls. Japan after the Meiji Restoration established a national educational system for the first time and used European models for their new system. The physical educational (PE) program as designed by the new Ministry of Education (MoE) at first involved light gymnastics, but over time, drill and eventually overt military training became part of the physical education system. The first PE program designed by the MoE was light gymnastics (1878). The primary purpose of the PE program was to promote health. The Moe made PE a required subject and adopted military gymnastics (1886). The MoE reorganized the PE and adopted military drill (early 20th century). The MoE gradually turned to military personnel for PE instructors. During the Taisho era (1912-26) about 50 percent of school PE teachers were military personnel. Schools began assigning military officers to secondary and tertiary schools to teach military drill. This included both marching and military exercises. The military began to see school PE as preparing students for subsequent military training. [Okuma] At the end of World War II this was extended to preparing children to participate in resisting an anticipated American invasion--Ketsugo.
The Meiji conscription system would prove adequate For World War I (1914-18), but began to crack after Japan's militarist dominated goverment became increasingly aggresive. Chaing's Nariinlist Givernent decided not to resist when Japan seized Manchuriua (1931). Japan's intrusion into northern China turned into a full scale war (1937). Unexpectedly the Chinese continued to resist despite major defeats. And this created the need for an expanded army. The Japanese did not expect such significant Chinese resistance. This conscription had to be exapanded. The first changes were to allow Koreans and Formosans to volunteer. Previously a relatively small share of the available young men were drafted. With the war in China, conscription began to increase and deferments reduced. Japan thus fielded the largest army in its history. Japan launched the Pacific War by attacking Pearl Harbor (December 1941). , the great majority of the Japanese Army was in China. The early Japanese victories were achieved with a small portion of the Army against poorly trained and armed Western forces, mostly colonial policing forces. The American units in the Philippines retreated to Bataan and were basically starved out. The easy naval victories ceased with Midway (June 1942) and then the Japanaese Armny encountered real resistance by trained and well-armed combat troops, first on Gudalcanal from the Americans (August 1942) and New Guinea by the Australians (September 1942). This is when losses increased and more men were needed. The Pacific War thus forced wholesale changes in the Meiji Concription System. The Japanese militarists were forced to attempt to match the greater size and resources of the United States with a greater effort by the Japanese people. The Goverment began to expand the age ranges for military service (1943). Eventually all healthy males aged 15-60 years as well as females aged 17-45 years were drafted. And we have noted younger uniformed school girls in factories. As the military situation in World War II became more desperate. University syudents who at first received deferments began to be drafted. This was at first done by shortening the final year, but gradually other changes were made in the academic program. Then as a result of increasing lossess, the Army began drafting all males over 20 years, including college students (September 1943). [Shillony, p. 778.] This occurred at about the same time that Japan began to experimenbt with the first Kamnakaze suicide attacks. This is part of the reason that such a high percentage of college level enlistees were assigned to the 'Special Attack' Kamikaze squadrons. Next youths under 20, some as young as 15 years old, were made eligible for military service (1944) The National Resistance Program was adopoyed (February 26, 1945). This made men 15 to 60 and women 17 to 40 subject to training for a projected final defense of the homeland asinvasion was looking increasingly likely.
The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) established the Office of Inspectorate General of Military Training ((教育総監部 Kyoiku sokanbu--OIGMA) (1898). It was led by the Inspector General (IG). Its mission was to provide centralized oversight for the Imperial Japanese Army training efforts. This included the Imperial Japanese Army Academy, specialized weaponry and technical training schools, and the various military preparatory schools located around the country. The OIGMA was also responsible for tactical training. Over time the OIGMA acquired added responsibilities concerning over Army logistics, transportation, and support matters. The OIGMA also acquired considerable prestige and political power within the Japanese Army. He reported directly to the Emperor through the Imperial General Headquarters rather than to the Army Minister or the Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office. The IG post thus by the 1930s had become the third most powerful position within the Imperial Army. As a result, the IG position was one of intense competition among senior Army commanders. Competition for the IG post played a role in the February 26 incident in which IJA soldiers staged a coup d'etat in Tokyo (1936).
The tactical competence of the IJA officer core proved lacking during World War II. There was no lack of discipline in the IJA, but tactical competence is a different matter. The officers who led Japanese soldiers in many cases more indoctrinated than professionally trained. The Imperial Japanese Army Academy (陸軍士官学校 Rikugun Shikan Gakkō?) was Japan's principal officer training school for the Imperial Army. The Academy was initially opened as the Officer Training School at Heigakkō near Kyoto (1868). It was renamed the Imperial Japanese Army Academy and relocated to Ichigaya near Tokyo (1874). The Academy was assigned to the the Army Education Administration (1898). The Academy was divided the same year Japan invaded China (1937). The Senior Course Academy was relocated to Sagamihara in Kanagawa prefecture. The Junior Course School moved to Asaka, Saitama. The Japanese celebrated the 50th graduation ceremony at the new Academy buildings in Sagamihara (1937). Emperor Hirohito attended. A separate school was established for military aviation officers (1938). The Academy was a prestigious institution and Tokyo Imperial University alumni served on the faculty. As part of an effort to build up a puppet regime in China to replace the Chang Kai Check's Nationalists, a substantial number of Chines cadets were accepted. (We are not sure of Korea.) Many of these cadets would reach prominent ranks in the Republic of China (Taiwan) Armed Forces. Japan's military preparatory school provided many of the officer candidates.
The officer training curriculum included college-level general education courses, traditional martial arts, and horsemanship. After successfully completing the 2-year junior portion of training at Asaka in Saitama, cadets were assigned for 8 months to infantry regiments. This was to familiarize them with actual weapons and give them some basic experience with platoon leadership. Next they resumed their with the 2-year (20 month) senior program at Sagamihara in Kanagawa. Graduates were assigned to a regiment and made apprentice officers with the rank of sergeant-major (but treated as officers). After successful completion of this 4-month probation period in their regiments, the graduates were formally commissioned second lieutenants. We are unsure at this time as to the tactical training given to the cadets. We can only say at this time that the tactical performance of Japanese commanders beyond building island death traps was very poor. We would say the most deficient if all the major World War II combatants. The officer corps totally bought into the idea that the Americans were soft and dominated by their women and their material superiority could be defeated by the Japanese warrior spirit. That could only have occurred had this not been instilled as part of their officer training. Their disastrous experience in testing out this tactical doctrine with the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol does not seem to have caused these to reassess their beliefs. It did cause them to decide to choose a new opponent--the Americans who they apparently decided were softer than the Soviets. The tactical instruction whatever it was led to a Japanese predilection for frontal bayonet assaults which after the early campaigns led to disastrous casualties. Another issue we are still unsure of is what about the training program created an officer corps that conducted horrific atrocities resulting in the deaths of 15-20 million people, including all of the Chinese POWs. These atrocities were not conducted by groups like the NAZI SS, but the regular Japanese Imperial Army.
The individual Japanese conscript was among the most disciplined and committed soldier of the War. He was well trained. Unfortunately for him, his weapons were inferior and poorly supplied. Japanese conscripts before the War were drafted for 2 years. A year of that 2-year period was devoted to training. Once the War began this was shortened to 3 months. Most conscripts had already received military training through he schools beginning in the primary years. Discipline was harsh. Officers and NCOs had every right to strike subordinates, not only during training, but in the field as well. The idea that a successful commander like Gen. Patton could be cashiered for striking an enlisted man would have been seen as absurd to the Japanese. Considerable emphasis was placed on spiritual training. The Japanese Army made this the foundation of all other training. The governing motto of the Imperial Army was that 'Faith equaled strength'. The idea was to draw on traditional Japanese cultural norms and values to create effective soldiers to compensate for the deficiencies in modern equipment and technologies Japan would face in confronting better equipped European armies. The Japanese faced another problem. As the War progressed, especially after attacking the United states, the military was forced to conscript lower quality recruits. The Japanese military decided to focus more and more on spiritual ideological training. The Japanese knew the Americans were a great industrial power. They thought, however, that it would take time to convert to war production. They also believed that the Axis alliance would act to divert American military action to Europe and the Germans. One aspect of spiritual hardening was the emphasis on bayonet fighting, much as the officers were obsessed with swords. The military hierarchy postulated with considerable assurance that because of the superior spiritual aspects of the traditional Japanese warrior culture that no enemy could defeat them in close combat. Part of this assessment was the widely held belief that the American soldier was pampered and soft and would not stand and fight when confronted with a terrifying Banzai charge. Thus close in fighting was the best way to utilize the unique strengths of Japanese culture to overcome the material strengths of any European adversary or especially the Americans. The Japanese soldier was not taught to be a soldier, but potent. This belief was backed up a long cultural history of Emperor Worship, which continually reinforced this mindset and belief. The Japanese soldier never though of himself as a soldier, but as a modern reincarnation of the ancient Samurai warrior. This was a process that did not begin with conscription, but in the schools at a very early age. In addition, the Japanese soldiers were trained to expect very little material support. They were meant to survive on very limited rations and live off the land--seizing the supplies of retreating foes and civilians.
The Japanese Army proved highly effective against poorly led and armed Chinese troops. And they scored major victories over the British in Malaya and Burma and the Americans in the Philippines. Against well led and supplied Allied troops, however, the Japanese fared badly. Officers were prone to lead frontal attacks into entrenched positions. This proved disastrous on Guadalcanal (1942). The American Marines on Guadalcanal reported virtually suicidal Banzai attacks against American positions defended with machine guns and backed with artillery. The Marines reported the attacking Japanese were intent on using their bayonets, thrusting first and firing later. They did prove very adept at defensive tactics designed to kill as many Americans as possible, although Japanese soldiers were sacrificed in much larger numbers. One of the Japanese atrocities often ignored is he way the Japanese Army through away the lives of its young soldiers in hopeless battles or no battles at all. Japanese soldiers throughout the Pacific were starving at the end of the war, but still not allowed to surrender.
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