Figure 1.--World War II was the first mechanized war. As aesult large numbers of mrchnics and technicians were neeed. A few Jpanese had cars or technival devices. The Japanese had to train personnel from the ground up. A best we can determine the Japanese launched the Pacifc war with well trained mechanics and technicians. The number was adequate for a peace time military. The Japanese trained hard for combat oprtations. They totally nignored the fact that war with an industrial power would result in substantial casualties nd that mechanics and technians would hve to be replaced. There was bot effort made to increase the capacity of training facilities or increasing the the speed of the training program without reducing the quality. These are technical students at th Edajima Neavy School.

One topic rarely addressed issue in World War II is mechanics. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that the war was the first highly mechanized war in which horses and draft animals played only a minor role. The various weapons systems, especially planes and tanks are the subject of exhaustive treatment. The mechanics which kept these mechanical devices running are largely ignored. And here the United States had a huge advantage. The United States was the only country in which the average worker had the earnings power to purchase a car and larger numbers of farmers had tractors and trucks. Thus huge numbers of Americans of military age had a familiarity with mechanics. In Europe and Japan, very few teenagers even knew how to drive, let alone have mechanical skills. In addition a lot of American high schools had vocational programs including mechanics. Relatively few teenagers in Europe and Japan even went to secondary school, and mechanical programs at those schools were virtually nonexistent. Thus the Japanese had to train drivers and mechanics from the ground up. It is worthless to have advanced weapon systems if you do not have the mechanics to keep them running. And the Japanese experience a wide range of problems keeping their planes flying in the first two years of the War in which there was contested air battles. We do not at this time have any information on how good the Japanese mechanics were. We do not have data as to how effectively Japanese mechanics kept their planes flying. One factor here is that after 1942, with the arrival of advanced American aircraft types, Japanese aircraft played only a limited role in the War. Japanese soldiers received little or no air support. After the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot (June 1944), the Japanese began shifting to Kamikaze tactics. And mechanics become less important when you essentially hide aircraft which are then prepared for only a single on-way combat mission. the IJA on the ground was not highly mechanized. They had tanks and trucks, but not very many. When the Japanese soldier moved, he usually did so on foot. This the demand for mechanics became far less than that needed by the Americans or any other World war II air force.

Mechanized Warfare

One topic rarely addressed issue in World War II is mechanics. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that the war was the first highly mechanized war in which horses and draft animals played only a minor role. World War I navies were of course mechanized, armies were not although the American did introduce trucks and the British introduced tanks. Air warfare was of course mechanized, but played only a small role. This changed remarkably in World War II, both the land war and air war. The importance of mechanics in naval war did not change, but the scope of the War did change meaning more mechanics were needed. There were also more small ships (especially submarines) operated outside of fleet operations or at distances from bases.

National Economies

The various weapons systems, especially planes and tanks are the subject of exhaustive treatment. The mechanics which kept these mechanical devices running are largely ignored. And here the United States had a huge advantage. The United States was the only country in which the average worker had the earnings power to purchase a car and larger numbers of farmers had tractors and trucks. Thus huge numbers of Americans of military age had a familiarity with mechanics. In Europe and Japan, very few teenagers even knew how to drive, let alone have mechanical skills. In addition a lot of American high schools had vocational programs including mechanics. Relatively few teenagers in Europe and Japan even went to secondary school, and mechanical programs at those schools were virtually nonexistent.

Japanese Military Services

The Japanese military services because so young people had mechanical skills had to train drivers and mechanics from the ground up. It is worthless to have advanced weapon systems if you do not have the mechanics to keep them running. Available information suggests that the Japanese had an adequate cadre of mechanics for peace time and the war in China, skilled mechanics in the well delved bases from which it launched the War, but as the military moved into the South Pacific and Southeast Asian, mechanical support deteriorated. This was nit only because they were unable to build support infrastructure in the many new bases and adequately supply the vases they did set up. In addition, the Japanese did not have the training program needed o replace the inevitable loss of trained mechanics as the War progressed, especially as American air power built up and began to hammer Japanese bases throughout the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Given the level of training required for draftees with out mechanical skills, Japanese training programs proved totally inadequate.

Army

Navy

Air forces

The Japanese air forces (both Navy and Army) experience a wide range of problems keeping their planes flying in the first two years of the War in which there was contested air battles. We do not at this time have any information on how good the Japanese mechanics were. We do not have data as to how effectively Japanese mechanics kept their planes flying. One factor here is that after the first year of the War, with the arrival of advanced American aircraft types, Japanese aircraft played only a limited role in the War. Japanese soldiers received little or no air support. After the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot (June 1944), the Japanese began shifting to Kamikaze tactics. And mechanics become less important when you essentially hide aircraft which are then prepared for only a single on-way combat mission. the IJA on the ground was not highly mechanized. They had tanks and trucks, but not very many. When the Japanese soldier moved, he usually did so on foot. This the demand for mechanics became far less than that needed by the Americans or any other World war II air force. One historian focusing on this issue tells us that "The Japanese studied and trained hard at aerial tactics, but they failed to develop the airfield construction techniques and equipment, as well as the units, necessary to build air bases, maintenance, supply and dispersal facilities." And to further complicate the problems, there was virtually no cooperation between the Army and Naval air forces. In fact it was almost as if they were at war with each other. One Japanese observer tells us, "They hated each other, [they] almost fought. Exchange of secrets and experiences, the common use of airplanes and other instruments, could not even be thought of.” [Chihaya]
Army aviation: Japan's first major land campaigns of the Pacific War were launched in Malaya and the Philippines. The navy’s 22nd Air Flotilla supported the offensive in Malaya from three well developed airfields in and around Saigon. They also had bases the Thais allowed them to open for the offensive in Burma. Air units were at full strength, both aircraft and crews. There were adequate quantities of both high quality aviation fuel and spare parts. The bases had a full compliment of mechanic to maintain the aircraft and thus the aircraft received excellent maintenance, fully complying with established maintenance schedules. Their precious high-performance Zero fighters revived engine overalls every 150 hours of flight. And in Malaya and Singapore, Burma, and the Philippines the Japanese captured well developed British and American air bases. The situation changes in the South Pacific. The Japanese seized large numbers of islands throughout the Pacific. This meant that air bases with support facilities and staff had to be built and operated. They had not prepared for the necessary building and expanded maintenance staff. And this first became apparent in the Solomons and New Guinea. These were among the most isolated places on earth with stone-age infrastructure. The Japanese were so slow in building an airfield on Guadalcanal that the Americans were able to organize an invasion and seize the half-completed airfield, christening it Henderson Field. And here the Japanese began experiencing real problems, it would prove to be the tuning point of the War. The Japanese built a major base complex and Rabaul in the northern Solomons. It would prove to be their only sophisticated base in the theater. Not only did the Japanese begin the War with a peace time mechanical and other non combat infrastructure, but they began it with a peace time merchant marine. This meant that even before the disaster at Midway (June 1942) and American submarine campaign began to bite (1943), the Japanese merchant marine did not have the capacity to supply hundreds of far flung garrisons across the Pacific. This meant that in addition to an inadequate number of trained mechanics the mechanics they had at those largely undeveloped bases had trouble obtaining fuel (especially high-quality aviation fuel), food and spare parts. Thus the Japanese were not able to fully maintain the aircraft deployed. These bases and aircraft were of little military value unless the bases could be adequately supplied. And as American sea and air power increased in the South Pacific, this became increasingly difficult. Even the huge complex at Rabaul encountered problems. Incessant air attacks killed many mechanics and destroyed maintenance facilities. The Americans never seized he complex, but the garrison at Rabaul was not only not a factor in the War, but the survivors of the aerial bombing were starving.
Naval aviation: The Japanese Imperial Navy operated from well developed bases with competent mechanics. Navy aircraft were, however, played a role in seizing areas throughout the South Pacific. And in doing so lost substantial numbers of aircraft on undeveloped airstrips. Staffing these airfield with maintenance staff were a virtually impossibility. And then the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway resulted in the loss of not only many pilots, but substantial numbers of mechanics and maintenance staff. The American air assault on Truck further reduced Japanese naval aviation mechanics and maintenance staff. The deciding factor in the final carrier battles were, however, not mechanics, bur obsolete aircraft and poorly trained aviators.

Sources

Chihaya, Lt. Cmdr. Masataka.

Whitman, John W. "Japan's faytally flawed air force in World War II," Aviation History (September 2006).

Created: 9:01 PM 8/5/2015
Last updated: 9:01 PM 8/5/2015