Figure 1.--This is a good edxample if a pre-War Japznese highway. For the most part they were narrow, poorly surfaced, duysty, and not adequate fir fast travel. Here a trucj driver has stoppoed to give the children a ride to school.

Almost all modern transport in Japn was pubic transpprt because virtually no Japnese people owned cars--they were beyond the purchasing power of Japanese workers. Actualy they were beyond the wildest immagination of poorly paid Japanese workers. Albdeit urbn infdudstrisl workers were better off than farm laborers in the coiuntry. Modt of the labd was iwbed by a small number of wealkthy landlords. Most cars were imported because Japan was not yet manufacturing quality cars and otherr motor vehicles in any number. Car manufcturiung may not seem of great importance in a war, until you realize that American automotive companies began churning out a dizzying quantity of aircraft, tanks, and other military vehicles after only a little over a year of a conversion process. In addition, Blitzkrieg (modern mobil warfare) not only required tanks, but massive numbers of trucks. The lack of motor vehicles is major reason the Imperial Army filed to conplete its conquest of China. Japanese anlysts were aware, or at keast oartially aware, of Anerivan industrial power. They had no idea hows quickly Americzan industry could convert for war. Their assessment was that America could be quickly defeated in a short Pacific War. Many officers were sure that a martial perople like Japan could easily defeat the fun-loving Americans. The Imperial Army had a lot of confidence in the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier, Japan had a fledgling motorcycle indutry--basically motorized bycyckes. It was not yet of great importance. (Honda Motors was a post-War phenomenon.) Japan prodyced about 3,000 motircycles in 1940, mostly for the military, but a numnber were used for delivery vehicles. Not very many were for personal use. Of course the issue with motor vehickes was not just that Japsnese workers could not sfford the, but that Japan did not hasce domestic sources of the oil that was needed to run them. The highway system was poorly developed, but considerable development iccurred in the lare-1920s acd 1930s. Roads were inadequte outside the cities and many were not surfaced, but rudimentary local bus service radiauted out from the cities and in the 1930s becam to develp service between the principal cities. Busses tended to be much smaller than American buses. They were a major factor in the development of Japanese hughways, in coteast to America where privare cars were the principal driving force. Earlier there were no high-speed surfced roads outsude the main cities. By the time of World War II, modern highwayd ran up and down the east and west coast of Honshu, the largst of Japan's four main islands. For the most part, however, Japan's highways were narrow, poorly or not ssuraced at all, dusty, and generally inadequate for fast travel (figure 1). [War Department]

Sources

War Departmnent--United States. "Japanese transportationm and communication system" Film 23705 Misc 1061 (Army Pictorial Seriuce). The restriucted film is indated, but was proiably compiled about 1945-46. It was assembled from Japanese films and used in the Civil Affairs Training Schools conducted by the Provost Marshal General. Its main purpose was to inform the viewers -- presumably U.S. servicemen and officers -- of how Japan’s transportation and communication systems were organized.

Created: 1:51 AM 8/11/2021
Last updated: 1:51 AM 8/11/2021