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World War II Japanese War Economy: Sectors--Communications

World War II Japanese communications
Figure 1.--Commercial radio was brand new industry, masde possible by the technological advances mafe possible during World War II. Boys, less so the girls, were fascinted by it and made simple crystal sets so they could listen like this boy is doing. .

Japan had the most sophisticated communicatioins system in Asia at the time whuich if course at the time is not is not saying much. Japan had mnodern newspapers and the people were avid readers, especially the men. Japan had the gighest literary rates in Asdia because of their excellent public school dsystem. Especially important was Newspaper Row in Tokyo. Before the War, Japan had some 7,000 newspapers which unlike radio broacasting were privately owened. Quite a few of these papers had substantial circulations. Japan has never had a free press, but until the militarists seized power, there was a lively discussion of many issues. The government provided the papers of events and subjects that could not be mentioned. There were no libel klaws in Japan abd the papers often dealt with a rannge id facbndakls. This was poosible as long as the Imperial government was not involved. Publishing was extremly labor intensive. Type had to be set by hand because of the number of charcters in the Japanese languages use of Chinese characters. The papers were sold at corner newsstands. We believe that home delivery and newsboys were relatively rare. One aspect of warreprting that is not clear to us is how the newspapers could continually reprt that Japan was winning the war, when the islands battles kept getting closer and closer to Japan. Surely anone reading the newspaperts must have known. Prpaganda is one thing, but it has to have some element of truth to be effective. Radio was a brand new industry. Commercial radio because of the technological advances during World War was launched immediately after the War (early-1920s). The history of radio in Amnerica and Europe is fairly well known. We know very little about Japanese radio. One Ameruca assessmebt was that the Japanese made great progress, but was 'not up to American standards'. [War Department] We assume they are takjing about both technology and programing, but do not yet have details. The government has maintained tight contro on briadcasting friom the bginning. This is not some the country's militarists introduced. Control was even tighter than in NAZI Germany. Every radio (receiver) purchased in Japan had to be licensed. Owners had to pay a small monthly fee. While small it also mean that many Japanese could not afford tom own a radio. It also meant that the Government knew where every radio in the country was located. The advances in radio were made in Europe and America. There was no need in Japan fior the powerful broadcast stations that bdecamne populasr in America. We know of no major advances made by Japanese scientiusts. They basically copied advances made in the West. This would mean that when they launched that they were at a grerat disadvantage to the Americans, especially in radar and related technologies. The radio listening was bery popular, although some families only had crystal sets. (A crystal set was the most basic type of radio, using only the power of the received radio signal to produce sound--which is why ear phones were needed.) We are not sure what the initial purpose of government broadcasting as braoacasting began while there was still a degree of parlimentary democracy. As the military seiuzed control, role of Jpananese briadcasting became clear, to deseminate propaganda and promoting an unquestioning nationalitic and expanionistic ethos, basically reinterating what the children were being taught in school and the newspaper were allowed to report. Most urbasn families had aadio if sxome kind. They were mostly inexpensive and very basic. Radios were less common in the poorer rural asees. The very basic radio manufacturing was another factor resulting in Japan laubching the Warwell behind behind America in radio technology and manfacturuing caability. The radio indusdtry/electronics industry in Japan was a small frction the size of the American uindustry. One result was that Japanese equipment was just not as good as American equipment. Japanese pilots, for exasmple, regularly complained that many radios were unreliasble. Another impact was that the Japnese actually used Amerccan equipment and parts in constructing their coding aparatus, a factor in the Americzn breaking of the Purple Code--the American Magic. The government also operted a telegraphic system. They lacked much modern equipment, but they established a well coordunted system with some 31,000 miles of line.

Newspapers and Magazines

Japan had modern newspapers and and magazines. And the people were avid readers, especially the men. Japan had the highest literary rates in Asia, especially women, because of their excellent public school system. Particularly important was Newspaper Row in Tokyo. Before the War, Japan had some 7,000 newspapers which unlike radio broacasting were privately owned. Quite a few of these papers had substantial circulations. Unlike American newspapers, there was not a lot of advertising. This was not a major revenue stream in Japan. Japan has never had a free press. Press censorship was formalized with the Newspaper Law which gave the goverment the legal authority to censir news (1909) This law restricted publishing of governmental documents and legislations. Press censorship was further tightened with the Peace Preservation Law (1925). This solidified the pursuit of thought crimnes--'thought crimes'. The Tokku or The Thought Police was the Japanese secret police force. The Japanese as they began building an overseas empire formed the Kempei Tai. Only subsequently was a domestic secret police service formed. This greatly enforce censorship. This authirized the arrest of communists, labor organizers, and members of groups designted as 'radical'. This begn the suopression of 'authors, journalists and publishing figures accused of secretly plotting to revive the communist movement in Japan'. [Hatanaka, p. 178.] The law made all forms of dissent illegal. The government could arrest anbd punish any individial person who criticized the military, government, or Emperor, or even for not supporting the war effort when war came. The Japanese secret ppolic, an army unit, becanme the gebcy ggrssively enfoird-cing these laws. This basically left the Japanese people without any real knowledge of economic and military developments. Goverment control of the news only increased as the militarists fully seized power. The government provided the newspapers editors lists of events and subjects that could not be mentioned. There were no libel laws in Japan and the papers often dealt with a rannge of scandals. This was poosible as long as the Imperial government was not involved. Publishing was extremly labor intensive. Type had to be set by hand because of the number of charcters in the Japanese languages use of Chinese characters. The papers were sold at corner newsstands. We believe that home delivery and newsboys were relatively rare. Print media strongly supported the war effort beginning with the seiuzure of Manchuria. As far as we can tell there was no crticicism or real discussion of the seizure of Manchuria (1931) or the invasion of China (1937). Fear of the military and their editors knowledge of the dangers resulted in total support from newspapers and magazines. Pearl Harbor only intensified this dictum. [McClain, pp. 490-91.] The Miltary wanted articles attacking the Americans and British. The major theme was that it was the Americans anmd British who started the War because of their arrogant desire to rule the world. [Cook and Cook, p.66] This was nececessary because before the War, many Japanese had positive attitudes toward the Americans. Reporting on the War was warped. For the first 6 months of the War there was a lot oif good nbews to report. This changed with Midway (June 1942). Reporting on Midway exemplfied Jaoanese reporting on the War. It was reported as a great victory! Wildly exagerated numbers were reported of American losses. This would continue throughout the rest of the War. No mention was made of Japanese carrier losses. Most of the fleet participating in the battle operated separateky from Kido Butai and had no knowledge of what had transpired. The carrier survivors were rescued and not given shore leave when they returned. The wounded were isolated. They were ordered to keep it all quiet. The Imperial Navy did not even tell the Army for many months, let alone permitting newspaper stories. Journalists were widely nationalistic, but there were doubters. Japan had war correspindents, but we know very little about them. There were no Earnie Pyles among them. Some had real reservations, but of course that was not allowed to seep into what actually appeared in Japanese newspapoers. War correspondent Hata Shoryu was a student at the Osaka Foreign Language Institute during the Manchurian invasion (1931). In a book he published afrer the war he said that he 'felt he must oppose the growth of fascism in Japan'. [Shoryu] He was, however, unable to do so. As a war corespondent, he had to sekf-censor to make sure his articles had followed the rules before they reached the military censors for approval. He writes that many people distrusted the government. He recalls that reporting on the news dominated newspaperrs. And there was competition among the newspapers in hetting out war reports. Asai Tatsuzoor was a wartime journalist and photographer. he wrote after the war that sharing photoigraphs with people was difficult bcause of restrictionsissued by the by the head of the moving picture division. Tatsuzo describes people forming long lines to get into newsrooms. We are not sure how creditable this was. Some asked, 'Are we winning this war?' [Tatsuzoor] He reports that many photographs published in the press or films shiown in the newsreels were staged to elicit an emotional resopmse. Tatsuzo reports that the footage he shot became the property of the Japanese government and that he himself even after the War couldn't see it even today. Much of it was porobably destroyed afrter the War. He was ordered mot to shoot footage at the Nanking Massacre, but was there and saw the piles of corpses of Chinese victims. It was not just war reports that were censored. Articles that might distract the public or make them recall happier times were spressed. Respect author Jun'ichirō Tanizaki received an offer to serialize his novel Sasameyuki in the literary journal Chūōkōron. It was a well-received, a nostalgic account of pre-war family life, a kind of Japnese Heimat. Military censors warned the that the book did not contribute to the needed war spirit. Tanizaki's was not pro-Western. He depicted Westernization and modernization as corrupting. Th military haf ther poweer of arrest or they could just cut off the mewsprint papper supply. The editoes stopped the serialization. [Jansen, p. 643.] That did not satidy the military censors. Shortly after they 'ordered Chūōkōron and Kaizō, a general interest magazine with socialist leamongs, to voluntarily close down. The Kenpeitai beat 'coffessions' out of staff members who were forced to say that they were Communists. [McClain, p. 491.] One aspect of war reprting that is not clear to us is how the newspapers could continually reprt that Japan was winning the war, when the islands battles kept getting closer and closer to Japan. Surely anone reading the newspaperts must have known. Prpaganda is one thing, but it has to have some element of truth to be effective. It has to be mentioined that while we are talking about war-time Japan here. Even in modern Japan today, the Japanese people, espcially the children, are unawate of the extent of Japanese war crimes and atrocities.

Radio

Radio was a brand new industry. Commercial radio because of the technological advances during World War was launched immediately after the War (early-1920s). The history of radio in Amnerica and Europe is fairly well known. We know very little about Japanese radio. One America assessmebt was that the Japanese made great progress, but was 'not up to American standards'. [War Department] We assume they are talking about both technology and programing, but do not yet have details. The government has maintained tight contro on briadcasting from the beginning. the restictions on oress freedom of course apoplied to radio news. But vghis wsas less an issue because broadcasting was a done by the government. This is not some the country's militarists introduced. Control was even tighter than in NAZI Germany. Every radio (receiver) purchased in Japan had to be licensed. Owners had to pay a small monthly fee. While small it also mean that many Japanese could not afford to own a radio. It also meant that the Government knew where every radio in the country was located. The advances in radio were made in Europe and America. There was no need in Japan fior the powerful broadcast stations that bdecamne populasr in America. We know of no major advances made by Japanese scientiusts. They basically copied advances made in the West. This would mean that when they launched that they were at a grerat disadvantage to the Americans, especially in radar and related technologies. The radio listening was bery popular, although some families only had crystal sets. (A crystal set was the most basic type of radio, using only the power of the received radio signal to produce sound--which is why ear phones were needed.) We are not sure what the initial purpose of government broadcasting as braoacasting began while there was still a degree of parlimentary democracy. As the military seiuzed control, role of Jpananese briadcasting became clear, to deseminate propaganda and promoting an unquestioning nationalitic and expanionistic ethos, basically reinterating what the children were being taught in school and the newspaper were allowed to report. Most urbasn families had aadio if sxome kind. They were mostly inexpensive and very basic. Radios were less common in the poorer rural asees. The very basic radio manufacturing was another factor resulting in Japan laubching the Warwell behind behind America in radio technology and manfacturuing caability. The radio indusdtry/electronics industry in Japan was a small frzction the size of the American uindustry. On result was that Japanese equipment was just not as good as American equipment. Japanese pilots, for exaample, regularly complained that many radios were unreliasble. Anotyher impact was that the Japnbese actually used American equipment abd parts in constructing their coding aparatus, a factor in the Americzn breaking of the Purple Code--the American Magi.

Telegraph

The government also operted a telegraphic system. They lacked much modern equipment, but they established a well coordunted system with some 31,000 miles of line.

Movies

Hollywood dominated movie theaters around the world. Several countries responded by limiting shoiwing of American films. This particularly irritated Japanese militarists. Despite the gangster films, the general impression given was positive. This was the geneeral attitude among the Japanese public. They even adopted some asoects oif American cilture--modt oprimently baseball. Interestingly while the militarists despised the Americans, they went to see the films. And their takeway was that America was a nation of effete men, dominated by their women. Which emplanted the idea that despite American industrial might that the United States could not match Japan's samurai warrior spirit in any war. The militarists issed a new Film Law (1939). The law was to promote a 'healthy development of the industry'. The law banned what were seen as exually frivolous as well as films focusing on a range of social issues. Rather the military governmrent wanted films were to elevate the national consciousness, depict the national and international situation correctly, and promote what the military saw as the 'public welfare'. [McClain, p. 441-42.] In the pre-television era, movies were surely the most powerful media for propaganda. This was true for all bedligerent countries. And the Japanese also made use if it. [Ward] The Japanese films are destiunctuive in that they were not done just for Japanese audiuences, but rather with the occupoied peoples in mind.--espcially Chian. The idea here was to support thevJaoanese propaganda line--'Asia for the Asiatics'. There were several types of propaganda or what the Japanese called 'national policy films'. The central theme of these films commly involved self-sacrifice and honor to the emperor. Another major difference with Western films is that there were no dramaztic bginning like the invasion of Poland or Pearl Harbor. Rather the war is rarely exolained anbd is often assumed to a continuous phenomenon. [Brcak and Pavia] We see a shift in the filming. At first when the Jaoabese were coindiudent if a quick victiry in China, there was a degree of realism--films like 'The Five Scouts' whuivh was a universal soldiers tale without nationalist ardor. As the warin China dragged o, the military demanded more intensly patriotic themes. With Pear Harbor and the onset of the Pcific War the intensly propgbdustic films appear, what tyhe Haoanese refered to as 'national polity themes'. [Rhodes, p. 250] One analyst describes three major types of Japanese propagabda films: 1) combat, 2) spy, and 3) costume (historical) films. [Desser] The most obvious of course were the combat films--actual fighting. Japanese combat films in sharp contrast to the combat films of other World War II beligerants often gave a vague depiction of the enemy, presumably because Japan wanted to win over the poplation of China where is mired down the colonies which it suceeded in conquering. [Desser] Japanese films commonky depicted the suffering oif the friont-line soldirts, often showing them as an out numbered underdog. This was designed to create the image that Japan was the victim to elicit sympathy from the audience. [Navarro] Here the propaganda effort was a notable failure, primarily because the behavior of the occupying military force was so spectcularly brutal and explotive. They may have had some success in the Dutch East Inies (Indonesia), but here the main factor seems to have been the Indonesian nationlist leaders. The Japanese spy films were different. In these films, the enemy was usually clearly defined. The enemy was usually lazy, decadent, and greedy. This of course meant the Western democracies that Japan chose to fight after becoming mired down in China. [Brcak and Pavia] World War II propagandists commonly used the same tool -- prejudices and xenophobia as a tool. [Desser] Racism was more complicated. Here the Germns abd to some extent to Italians used. The British and Amnericans did not. The Japanese took a rather mixed approch. The British and Americans were depicted as racists. The Japanese people themselves were depicted as pure and virtuous suggesting a racially and morally superior people, but witout the aciyements of Duropean raciusm. The reason is obvious. They were conquering other Asians. We note examples of Japanese soldiers marrying Chinese women. We are not sure of the other conqyerd people. Or the extent to which such films were run in Japan itself. The spy films became a major genre after Japan launced the Pacific War against America and Britain. Of course it is difficult to hide Westerners in Japan and conquered territory. The other major type oof Japnese propagabda films were costume.histiotical films. We suspoect tht these were mostly shown in Japan. Here the purpose was to promote nationlmpride and reverence foir the country's historic traditions. [Desser] Here the samurai movie was especially important because the Japanese soldier was being trained to fight in the Samurai tradition.

Sources

Brcak, N., and J. R. Pavia. "Racism in Japanese and U.S. wartime propaganda." Historian Vol. 56 No. 4 (1994).

Cook, Haruko Taya and Theodore F. Cook. Japan at War: An Oral History.

Desser, D. (1995). "From the opium war to the pacific war: Japanese propaganda films of world war II." Film History Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 32-48.

McClain, James L. Japan: A Modern History.

Hatanaka, Shigeo. , Nihon Fashizumu Suppression of Free Speech in Japanese Fascism: An Abridged History (Tokyo: Kobunken, 1986).

Jansen, Marius B. The Making of Modern Japan.

Navarro, Anthony V. A Critical Comparison Between Japanese and American Propaganda During World War II.

Rhodes, Anthony. Propaganda: The Art of Persuasion--World War II (Chelsea House Publishers: New York, 1976).

Shoryus, Hata. War Correspondent, Homeland: Wielding Pen and Camera (1992).

Tatsuzo, Asai. Japan at War Wielding Pen and Camera: Filming the News (1992).

War Departmnent--United States. "Japanese transportationm and communication system" Film 23705 Misc 1061 (Army Pictorial Seriuce). The restriucted film is indated, but was probably compiled about 1945-46. It was assembled from Japanese films and used in the Civil Affairs Training Schools conducted by the Provost Marshal General. Its main purpose was to inform the viewers -- presumably U.S. servicemen and officers -- of how Japan’s transportation and communication systems were organized.

Ward, Robert Spencer. Asia for the Asiatics?: The Techniques of Japanese Occupation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945).

Yoshida, Phyllis Genther. "Japan’s energy conundrum," (Sasakawa Peace Foundationm USA: 2017)







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