Figure 1.--
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Figure 1.-- |
President Roosevelt was apauled at developments in Europe and the steady stream of German and Itlalian annexations (Austria, Sudentenland, Czechoslovakia, Memel-Klaipeda (Lithuasnia), and Albania. The President in his press conferences and in an address on Pan-American day sent a public message to Hitler. He had Hull send the same letter to Mussolini. The President asked for assurances that they would not invade 31 countries and colonies that he listed in the next 10 years. He offered a conference to deal with trade and disarmament issues. Both Hitler and Mussolini privately rediculed the President's message. Mussolini complained of "Messiah-like messages". In conversations with Göring they attribed the message to "an incipient mental disease". It was Hitler who made a public issue of the message. In a speech before the Reichstag he sarcastically read out the President's list. His performnce is a common set piece for world War II documentaries. Hitler also drew on the Nye Committee findings for his address. [Freidel, p. 314.] The Reichstag led by Göring responded in laughter to the President's message and in thunderous approval for their Führer. Hitler at the time did not consider isolationist an immediate America a real threat. Historians difer as to how they assess Roosevelt's diplomacy. [Black, p. 521.]
President Roosevelt was apauled at developments in Europe and the steady stream of German and Itlalian annexations: Ethiopia (1935), Austria (1938), Sudentenland (1938), Czechoslovakia (1939), Lithuania--Memel/Klaipeda (1939), and Albania (1939). Certainly in Britain and France the rapid advance of Hitler was terrifying. Many Germans saw Hitler as simply restoring Germany's proer bundaies before Versailles. Had Hitler stoped with the Suedtenland and curbed his genocidal racist progam, he would have been seen as one of Germany's greatest statesmen. But in seizing the remainder of Czechoslovakia, he crossed two lines. First he violated a solemn pledge that he would make no more territorial claims in Europe. This meant that the Allies could no longer negoriate with him. (Although Stalin did.) Second, when hecseized the remainder of Czechoslovakia, he was no longer uniting the German people, but he was beginning to subjegate foreign peopkes, in this case the Czechs.
The President in his press conferences and in an address on Pan-American day sent a public message to Hitler. He had Secretary Hull sent the same letter to Mussolini and ask for assurances that they would not invade 31 countries and colonies that he listed in the next 10 years. The list included: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the netherlands, Belgiun, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzeland, Lichestine, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran. Of these 14 would be invaded and overun by the NAZis, included three preciviously seized by the Soviets. An additional two were klater overun (Egypt/Russia). Hitler cowed most of the others to vary degree (joining the Axis or to support the German war effort economically. Stain attacked Finland. The Invsion of others precented by the British, although in fairness to Hitler, some of these Arab countris and Iran would have preferred to join the Axis. The President wanted a 10-25 year moratorium on military action and a conference of to discuss discuss trade issues and arms limitation. Territorial and other claims could be mediated.
The President thouht it would "put the dictators on the spot". He read it to reporters. He wondered publically why countries could "find no better methods of realizing their destinies than those which were used by the Huns and Vandals. fifteen hundred years ago." [Reynolds, p. 54.] He was cautious to tell reporters that he was not mediating, ever cauthious of the Isolationists.
Both Hitler and Mussolini privately rediculed the President's message. Mussolini complained of "Messiah-like messages" in private, but as the letter was not sent by the President, declined to react publically. Göring was with Mussolini in Rome when Roosevelt's letter arrived. In conversations with Göring they attribed the message to "an incipient mental disease". They reportedly decided that Roosevelt's polio had gone to his head. Hitler's reaction was different. He was furious.
Hitler ordered Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to get statements from the countries Roosevelt mentioned (except Britain, France, Poland, and Syria) so he could claim that the countries the President mentioned were not really threatened. Ribbentrop reported that the countries involved did not feel threatened. All except Romania and Switzeland replied. I am not sure why they did not reply. Romania and the Baltics may have felt more threatened by the So iets than the Germans..
It was Hitler who made a public issue of the President's message. Roosevelt's public statements had been a irritant to him for years. The Führer convoke the faithfull of the NAZI Reichstag. Actually the session did not take place in the Reichstag building which had been damaged by fire right after the NAZIs seized power. Rather this and other major addresses took place at the Kroll Opera House. Göring presided. Hitler spoke before a dramatic background of a huge NAZI eagle. He had perhaps the largest radio audiece of his career. He sarcastically read out the President's list of threatened countries. His point was essentially that peace-loving Germany could not posibly threaten all those countries. His target audience was Germany as he was careful in the leadup to Wotld war II to maintain the fiction that he did not want a War. Many in Germany had been traumitized by World War I and were terrified of another War. His performance with the dramatic background is a common set piece for world War II documentaries. Hitler also drew on the Nye Committee findings for his address. [Freidel, p. 314.] The Reichstag led by Göring responded in laughter to the President's message and in thunderous approval for their Führer.
Hitler spoke for 2 hours. (These long speeches are an indicator of a speakers obsession with himself. Fidel Castro is another good example. A orator like Roosevelt nore intuned with his audience keeps his speeches short.)
Hitler predictably railed against Versailles and the Jews, but not the Bolsheciks--an indicator that he was giving thought to a possible arragement with Stalin now that Poland was the next target. Hitler claimed that he had no intention of attacking Poland, but revoked the 10-year non-aggression pact (1933). That Pact had been used by NAZI diplomats to demonstrate that the regime was more reasonable than its enemies had depicted. Hitler justfied this action on the basis of Poland's British alliance (only actived by a German attack). Hitler was in fact claiming that he was a man of piece while his speech in fact initiated a major propaganda campaign as a prelude to invading Poland. Hitler also abrogated the 1935 naval agreement with Britain. (Chamberlain was very concerned with preserbing this agreement this at Munich and made a point of it when he returned from Munich.) Hitler then began a vitriolic attack on Roosevelt. He said that the nations named had not asked for Roosevelt's intervention and did not feel threatened. He offered guarantees for those countries that did. (This may have sounded good, but the world had now seen the value of Hitler's commitments and those that did feet threanted would hardly say so with the Wehrmact on their borders and Roosevelt offereing no military assistance.) Hitler denied any aspirations in the America. (Roosevelt had raised this issue as it had more appeal to American audiences.) Hitler's statement about the Americas was true for the time, but of course of course Hitler's threats built on his successes. Hitler compared the Third Reich and New Deal in terms of economic recovery. (Part of Hitler's appeal to the Germans was his success in dealing with the depression. Hitler essentially ended the depression by massive public works and military expansion. This by 1939 had essentially bankrupted the NAZI state. The massive military spending could not go on indefinitely without disastrous economic consequences. Thus war was almost necessary as the German war effort could be financed by exploiting the occupied areas.) Hitler claimed to have "restablished the historic unity of German living space" and he accomplised this "without spilling blood" or subjecting Europe to the "misery of war". Hitler compared his and Roosevelt's backgrounds and Germany and the United States. He mentioned his working-class background and Roosevelt's rich family. (This was also a standard approach. He liked to identify wuith the average German worker and idealize the working class-both farmers and workers. Of course "Socialist" was part of the name of the NAZI Pary, but in fact there was very little socialism in the NAZI program. It was the big industrialists that benefitted. Hitler after finally approving the celebration of Labor Day closed all independent trade unions in Germany.) Hitler turned the Roosevelt letter around and suggested expanivene American designs. sarcastically claimed "My world, Mr. Roosevelt, in which Providence has placed me ... is limited to my poeple." The Reichstag exploded in slavish aplaused and laughter at appropriate times led by the magnificently uniformed and huge Goering. In partiular they exploded in laughter when Hitler began reading the list of 31 countries. Surely Hitler must have been pleased wih himself at the reaction. There were no longer thoughful advisers in his political entrorage.
Hitler at the time did not consider isolationist an immediate America a real threat. He knew quite well that America was a potential danger. America had emense industrial capacity and resources. American steel production capavity for example was greater than Germany and even that of the Reich and the occupied area at the peak of NAZI success. Hitler's calculation was that because of the Isolationists that America would not mobilize in time to save Europe and that once it command of Europe that his position was unassaiable. Hitler and the NAZIs followed the political debate in the United States, but without any real understanding. He appeared to have convinced himself that the Isolationists would make it imposible for Roosevelt to mobilize American resources and act decisively. Then he looked forward to a more amenable American politician after the 1940 election. Roosevelt's seemingly naive message may have convinced Hitler that Roosevelt was simply the American version of Chamberlain and Daladier. [Black, p. 521.] Actually Hitler's attitude toward America varied over time. He once saw America as a vibrant state. He was taken by Amerucan expansion and all the inventions which so fueld American industry. He saw the immigrants tht came to America as some of the boldest and most talented Europeans. By the time of World War II, however, he had convinced himself that Jewish immigration and racial intermixing had so weakened America that it could no resist the racially superior Third Reich. More practically he thought it unlikely that America could create an army, equip it, and transport it to Europe intime to interfere effectively with his conquest of Europe. There was some rationale for this because at the time the American army was smaller than that of Romania and military spending miniscule. The isolationists and their allies in Congress were resisting Roosevelt's requests for expanded military spending. Some historians also believe that Hitler's threat to the Jews was infact aimed at America in that he seems to have thought that America was dominated by Jews. [Reynolds, p. 145.}
Mny isolations in America were actually suportive of Hitler. Senator Hiram Johnson in particular was impressed. Gerald Nye argued that a more "reasonable approach to Germany" was needed. One is hard put to see after Munich how much more reasobale the Western democracies could be. Public opinion, however, was squarely with the President. Most Americans though Roosevelt's iniative reasonable and Hitler's response both insulting and intemperate. In particular the impression was that Roosevelt was seen as a man of peace. Step by step Roosevelt was building his case. Ever tuned to the winds of public opinion, the President was building his image as a man committed to peace while still standing up to Hitler. He was also astutely spliting the isolationists. A historian writes, "Roosevelt's message to Hitler did help establish his bona fides in the eyes of those moderate isoaltionist Americans who might otherwise be influenced by the ceasless alegations of warmongering by Borah, Nye, Johnson, Wheeler, and their followers. Roosevelt had already began to maneuver the militant isolationists into the position whre he could tar themwith the brush od being Nazi sympathizers." [Black, 519.] In the case of Linburgh and others thatis was quite simply accurate.
Historians difer as to how they assess Roosevelt's diplomacy. [Black, p. 521.] Some historians, especially European, persue the theme that Americans were naive and amateurish in foreign policy. "It does not bode well for the peace of the world when the President of the United States allowes himself to be maneuvered into appearing as an inept and ignorant fool." [Watt, pp, 258, 264.]
But the President was not so naive to think that his proposal would work. Hitler had already demonstrated bad faith. Roosevelts's audience was American public opinion. He mentioned to Mackenzie King, public opinon in Canada and America. [Reynolds, p. 54.] Roosevelt strategy to win in the public opinion poles was to portray himself as devoted to peace, but to depict the dictators as evil men, and to opposed them--but with out the threat of war, in fact he turned the argument around by arguing that this was the best way of preveting the war. Any support for war and intervention would have ended his political and the last best chanc for the democracies. This was connected with requests to build American military stregth. He also set out to portray the Isolationists as dupes of the NAZIs.
Black, Conrad. Franklin Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom (Public Affairs: New York, 2003), 1280p.
Freidel, Frank. Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous with Destiny (Little Brown: Boston, 1990), 710p
Reynolds, David. From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt's America and the Origins of the Second World War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001).
Watt, Donald Cameron. How War Came (New York: Patheon, 1989).
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