The Holocaust and the Allies: Military Options


Figure 1.--By the time the Allies develooed the capnility to bomb eastern Germany and occupied Poland where the death camps werre, the SS had already closed or were in the process of closing those hidious faciities. They had also begun to erase evidence of the camps as part of Aktion 1005. The only large group of Jews still in NAZI hands were the Hungarian Jews. After the other Death Camps were closed, the killing continued at the Auschwitz-Birkenau facility. Here Hungarian Jews are arriving (Summer 1944). Within only a few hours ,the children here and their mothers would be gassed.

Certainly there were limits as to what they could do given the German military dominance in the early years of the War. Much of the killing was done in 1941-43 when Allied military alternatives were limited. Allied military capabilities by 1944, however, had increasing to the point that some actions were possible. None were, however, ever employed. What could be done other than winning the War as rapidly as possible is difficult to assess. The death camps could have been added to the air campaign. Many have argued that the American Air Corps should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschvitz and the other death camps and the railheads leading to the camps. Such attempts in 1943 would have resulted in enormous losses of air crews given the strength of the German air defenses. Such raids would have had to be conducted in day light to target the gas chambers, relatively small targets. It has to be understood that aerial bombing in World War II was a far cry from modern precession targetting. On even a well executed raid, only a small fraction of the bombs actually fell on the target. Thus any raid on, for example, the gas chambers at Birkenau would have meant large numbers of bombs falling throughout the work camps at Auschwitz killing large numbers of the slave laborers at the camp. Targetting the several NAZI death camps would not have been a small surgical operation. It would have required a major undertaking and given the distances and German defenses it would have been very costly. I do not know to what extent the miitary possessed the detailed knowledge of camp operaions that would have allowed them to make those assessments. Perhaps it should have been done, but it would not have been an easy decission. I am not sure, however, to what extent the military actually assessed the possibility of such an operation. Bombing the rail heads was also not an easy matter. Given the forced labor available to the Germans, rail lines could have been rapidly reconmstructed forcing repaeted strikes and further exposing aircrews to German air defenses. Another factor to be considered was that in early 1944 the air campaign against Germany was sidelined so that the Americans and British could focus on the German Channel defenses. It was only after the D-Day landings and subsequent break out (June-July 1944) that the Allies were able to resume the strategic bombing campaign in force. By that time, the Red Army had entered Poland and the Himmler ordered the SS to begin closing down and evacuating the death camps.

Intelligence Reports

The Brigtish learned very quickly through Ultra intercepts in 1941 that the NAZIs were killing large numbers of Jews as part of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The Holocaust killing began here with the Einsatzgruppen before the Death Camps were operational. The Einsatzgruppen reporting on their 'achievements'at first used low-level police ciophers that were easy to crack. This information because of the importance of Ultra could not be released to the public. Churchill did announce what was happening in guarded terms, ommitiung the source (August 24, 1941). He stated in a broadcast, "... whole districts are being exterminated. .... We are in the presence of a crime wihout a name." [Churchill, August 24, 1941] The reports of killing Jews were so common that the Bletchely Park ciode breakers asked if they should continue submitting the reports. "The fact that the Police [meaning Einsatzgruppen] are killing all Jews that fall into their hands should by now be sufficently well appreciated. It is now therefore proposed to continue reporting these butcheries specually, unless so requested." [Bletchely Park communications, September 11, 1941) Subsequently when other sources were available, Churchill spoke more openly. "None have suffered more cruley than the Jews, the unspeakable evils wrought on the bodies and spirits by Hitler and his vile regime. ThecJews bore the brunt of the Nazi's first onslauhjy upon the citadels of freedom and human dignity. He has borene and continues to beara burden that might have eemed to be beyond endurance." [Churchill, Jewish Cgronicle] The Germans noting these and other statements and suspecting the source, ordered the Einstzgruppen not to report their daily tolls electronically. Credible reports from Poland reached American authorities in 1942. Many writers who are disturbed about the Allies failure to act point to the 1942 reports in particular and often assume that because of these reports that Allied authorfities were fully aware of what was happening. This is a misunderstanding of intelligence in warfare. First we do not fully understand just how this informatiin was dessiminated among policy makers. Second just because an event reported does not mean that policy makers can accept it as fact. The NAZIs for example received creditable reports that the Allied cross-channel invasion would come at the Pas de Calais and not Normandy. In fact these reports were so creditable that the Wehrmact did not commit their Panzer Divisions when the Allies actually invaded at Normandy. We also know about the many creditable reports that Sadam Hussein had stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction. One of the otoblems with the reports coming out of Poland was that they were coming from Jewish or Polish sources all with vested interests in what was happening and with a desire to draw the Western Allies into actions in Poland.

Allied Military Capability

There were severe limitations as to what the Allies had the capacity to do given the German military dominance in the early years of the War. Much of the killing was done in 1941-43 when Allied military alternatives were limited. The Britiush did bomb the Reich from a fairly earky point in the War, but they kearned early that they could only do so at night with any hope of survival. Daylight bombing dif not begin until after President Roosevelt and Prime-Minister Churchill announced the around-the clock strategic bombing campaign of Germany (January 1943). The *th Air Force bombed during the day while RAF Bomber Command bombed at night. Throughout 1943, the 8th air Force sustanined very heavy casualties even when bombing trgets in western Germany like the Ruhr. Trying for targets in the east such as NAZI occupied Poland would have been virtul suiside. Allied military capabilities by 1944, however, had increasing to the point that some actions were possible. This was especially true when long-range P-51 MUstang escorts became available. No bombing campaigns, however, ever employed. What could be done other than winning the War as rapidly as possible is difficult to assess. After the Luftwaffe was largely destoyed (January-April 1944), General Eisenhower took control of the Allied air forces to support the D-Day operation. It is at this point the Allies had the capability to strike the killing machine, but by this time the Holocaust had largely succeeding in killing most of the Jews the NAZIs had in their hands. The SS had closed or were in the process of closing the death camps. The one exceoption was the Hungarian Jews which were being killed at Auschwiyz which ws still operating. As discussed below, however, the ability of bombers to stop the Holocaust is hifgly over estimated by people who have not studied thecair war in ahy detail.

Bombing Alternatives

The death camps could have been added to the air campaign. Many have argued that the American Air Corps should have bombed the gas chambers at Auschvitz and the other death camps and the railheads leading to the camps. Senator George McGovern who flew bombing strikes in the War has argued this. [McGovern] Such attempts in 1943 would have resulted in enormous losses of air crews given the strength of the German air defenses. Such raids would have had to be conducted in day light to target the rail lines and gas chambers. The rail lines could have been hit, but this would not have been effective. Bombing the rail heads was also not an easy matter. Given the forced labor available to the Germans, rail lines could have been rapidly reconmstructed forcing repaeted strikes and further exposing aircrews to German air defenses. There was not just one line to the Auschwtz, but many alternate lines. In addition, rail lines hit by bombers could and were repaired in hours. The Germans were very adept at this. Hiting the gas chambers is much more difficult than commonly realized because they were such small targets. It has to be understood that aerial bombing in World War II was a far cry from modern precession targetting. On even a well executed raid, only a small fraction of the bombs actually fell on the target. Thus any raid on, for example, the gas chambers at Birkenau would have meant large numbers of bombs falling throughout the work camps at Auschwitz killing large numbers of the slave laborers at the camp. Targetting the several NAZI death camps, which were further East would have been even more problemstic. would not have been a small surgical operation. It would have required a major undertaking and given the distances and German defenses it would have been very costly.

German Options

A reader writes, "I have also noted that some people who claim that the Allies should have used some of their bomb missions to destroy either some parts of some camps or even better the train lines leading to the camps. Your discussion of the Allied capability above is very good. And I would add that the NAZIs would have used other parts of the camps to do the mass killings and used forced labor to rebuild. Also with the rail lines to camps destroyed Jews would have either been killed the '"old fashion way' right where they were or they would have been force marched to the camps with many being killed along the way. There was really nothing the Allies could do about it until they had troops on the ground at those camps liberating the surviving victims." I think our reader is correct here. The NAZUIs were intent on killing even when it impaired their war effort. And with millions of Jews in their control, there was no way to stop the killing. Of course the Holocaust was so succesful in part because the Germans were able to organize trhe killing using very small numbers of people to kill large numbers of civilians in an almost industrial process. The Einsatzgruppen in the Soviet Union were very small. And the number of Germans at the Death Camps even smaller. Look atr the images at Auswitz as the trains were unloading. There were only a handfull of SS men involved to kill transports involving thousands of victims. To the extent that the Allie could have complicated the pricess or destroyed the killing facilities, a few more victms might have esxaped. The oroblem is that the Allied military capability is much more limited than commonly understood.

Military Assessment

I do not know to what extent the miitary possessed the detailed knowledge of camp operaions that would have allowed them to make those assessments. It is much easier for us today to say that it should have been done, but it would not have been an easy operation as is often assumed. And as we have discussed, the Allied knowledge appreciation of the Holocaust was far from perfect. I am not sure, however, to what extent the military actually assessed the possibility of such an operation.

D-Day

Another factor to be considered was that in early 1944 the air campaign against Germany was sidelined so that the Americans and British could focus on the German Channel defenses. It was only after the D-Day landings and subsequent break out (June-July 1944) that the Allies were able to resume the strategic bombing campaign in force. By that time, the Red Army had entered Poland and the Himmler ordered the SS to begin closing down and evacuating the death camps.

Sources

Bletchely Park communications, September 11, 1941. National Archives records, HW 1/51. The HW 1 records contain many reports of killing operations submitted to Berlin by the Einsatzgruppen.

Churchill, Winson. Radio broadcast, August 24, 1941. Churcill Papers 9/152.

Churchill, Winston. Signed letter. Jewish Chronicle (November 14, 1941).

McGovern, George. Editorial, Washington Post (January 27?, 2004).






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Created: 2:44 AM 2/1/2005
Last updated: 3:51 AM 8/10/2012