Figure 1.--The U.S. Army as ac result of the World War II experience had excellent field artillery, although production had to ramped up when America entered the War. It did not, however, have an effective anti-aircraft gun, part of a general pattern of failure to develop an interface between ground warfare and the air component. Eventually after failed efforts, not only the U.S. Army, but also the U.S. Navy turned to the Swedish Bofors company. The first Bofors arrived in New York aboard the Army transport vessel USAT American Legion, which had evacuated 897 people, including members of the Norwegian royal family, through the Finnish port of Petsamo--then still in Finish hands (August 1940). This is the Bofors 40 mm anti-aircraft gun on display to the public on Army Day (1941).

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France during World War I fought almost entirely with British and French weapons, especially the heavy weapons like artillery. There were several reasons for this. This was not the case in World War II. The United States was unprepared for war, but the British bought America enough time to begin preparations. There were four types of artillery: infantry weapons, field artillery, tank and anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft guns. The American GI was supported by excellent, domestically designed and manufactured field artillery, in contrast to the weakness of American tanks guns until the very end of the War. There was also naval artillery. And unlike German artillery, American artillery was highly mobile. Erwin Rommel noted the effectiveness of the American artillery in his initial confrontation with the U.S. Army after Kasserine. Artillery cover allowed the Americans to quickly recover from the Panzer thrust. The Allies and Soviets had a huge advantage over the Germans because of their larger industrial capacity, both the ability to manufacture artillery and to build the vehicles providing mobility to the artillery. (Here American Lend Lease helped provided the Red Army the mobility it needed trough deliveries of trucks.) The Allies beginning in North Africa followed the German example and won air superiority. The Allies were about to pound German positions well beyond the range of artillery. The Germans were not impressed with American tanks, but American artillery was a very different matter. And mobility acted as force multiplier for each artillery unit. A U.S. self propelled artillery battalion could easily move where ever it was needed on short notice. Thus they could support the units where it was most needed whatever the battle situation. Motorized artillery likewise could usually be where it was needed. A single American self-propelled 105mm battalion might be worth several German 208mm gun battalions that were only semi-mobile. This was because the 105 battalion was where it was needed and in range to fire far more frequently than the 208 battalions were. This proved be a critical factor in defending the Bastogne pocket in the Battle of the Bulge. Not only were American artillery excellent weapons, but they were produced in great quantity. And the highly mechanized American Army had the ability to move its artillery rapidly. And even small American infantry unit had radios and other communications equipment to call in artillery support. The United States did not give a lot of attention to anti-aircraft guns in the inter-War era, part of a general pattern of failure to develop an interface between ground warfare and the air component. Eventually after failed efforts, not only the U.S. Army, but also the U.S. Navy turned to the Swedish Bofors company.

World War I

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France during World War I fought almost entirely with British and French weapons, especially the heavy weapons like artillery. America did not have an army in being when it declared war on Germany (April 1917). President Wilson seems to have thought America could fight the War by providing the Allies financial and material without committing a major army in Europe. The British and French quickly disabused him of this and explained the desperate need for an American Army, especially after the Russian Army in the East began to disintegrate. When the United States entered the War, not only did it not have a a sizeable army, but it did not have a sizeable arms industry as well. Every part of the U.S. Army was unprepared, including the artillery. It gradually became clear that the main German blow wold come in Spring 1918. Many men could be at least partially trained by that time, but creating a modern arms industry in year was a different matter. Thus for the men that America began to transport to France, America had to rely on the British and French for arms, including artillery. Much of the weapons provided were French, including the artillery. The French provided 3,834 field pieces and mortars, as well as 10 million rounds of ammunition. The standard American artillery piece was the 3-inch gun and the Army only had 600 of them. They were replaced with the far superior French 75-mm gun. The French 75-mm gun had an effective recoil system. Because of the limited recoil, it was easier to aim and was a rapid fire weapon. It was not very effective in breaking through the trenches, but it was in some of the more open engagements with the Germans that developed during the 100 Days Campaign.

Inter-War Era

In World War I the artillery arm of the U.S. Army had fought in Europe equipped entirely with French or British weapons. There were many reasons for this: the need to standardize Allied arms, lack of shipping space, and lack of industrial capacity. However, another factor was that many ordnance specialists in Britain and France felt that the indigenous American gun designs were not up to European standards. As a result, in 1921 the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Charles P. Summerall (one of the most brilliant artillerymen in U.S. Army history) established the Westervelt Board to examine the army's ordnance requirements for the future. The board's report was impartial and farsighted, and it had dramatic consequences for the U.S. Army artillery in World War II. The board recommended that the standard divisional artillery piece be increased in caliber from 75mm to 105mm, while the general support weapon for the division was to be standardized as the 155mm howitzer. The 4.7" corps general support gun (a British design) was to be discarded in favor of the 155mm gun (a French design). In addition, the board recommended that heavier pieces of the most modern type be designed, and that all artillery pieces be suitable for rapid motorized road movement. Finally, improvements in fire control methodology and communications were recommended, based upon concepts that had been pioneered by Summerall as an artillery brigade commander in France.

Preparedness

The lack of modern artillery types was not the case in World War II. The U.S. Army in the inter-War era developed some highly effective field artillery. Innovative artillery and ordnance officers on a shoe-string budget experimented with new gun designs and doctrine. Artillery had been the primary killer in World War I. Thus the Army placed a real emphasis on developing effective field artillery. The lack of funding meant that not many artillery pieces were built, but the research and designs for important weapons were ready to be turned over to American industry. America after World War decided that the War had been a great mistake. Not only was America determined to never participate in a European War again, but there was a popular desire to reduce military spending to the bone, especially the Army. What funds were available were funneled primarily to the Navy and Air Force. Thus while the Army had designs for some modern weapons, especially artillery, it did not have the money to build them in any numbers. This did not change significantly until Stalin and Hitler launched World War II (September 1939). The United States began to increase military spending, especially after the fall of France (June 1940). A peace time draft soon followed (September 1940). And as the Army began to grow, much of the research needed to modernize the artillery was already done. Designs had been completed and prototypes developed and tested for most of the artillery, guns and howitzers, that the U.S. Army would use during the War. The United States was unprepared for war, but the British bought America enough time to begin preparations. The United States was still unprepared when the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, but America was in much better shape than was the situation in 1939 when Hitler and Stalin launched the War. And unlike some other weapons systems, such as tanks, the U.S. Army had already done the needed research knew precisely what they wanted. It just needed Congress to turn the money taps open as Hitler had don in Germany. And American industry had an order of magnitude greater than Germany to produce. Hitler vaguely understood that. What he did not understand is how rapidly America's potential would shoe up on the battlefield.

Chronology

When Hitler and Stalin launched World War II (1939), the U.S. Army's primary field artillery was basically obsolete World War I era guns consisting of the the French M1897 75mm gun and M1918 155mm howitzer. (They were produced in America based on he French designs.) The French 75 is commonly seen as the beginning of modern rapid-fire artillery. It played an important role in slowing down the German advance in Belgium toward Paris in World War I, but by 1939 was badly outdated. It was designed to decimate the mass infantry attacks of the 19th century, but this was no longer how modern armies operated. By the time U.S. ground forces went into combat (1942), both of these pieces were being replaced by modern and much more effective guns. The artillery proved to be one of the strongest arms of the U.S. Army. Artillery often does not get the attention it deserves from World War II historians. And the Germans by 1942 faced counties with excellent artillery items. First in the East but eventually in the West as well. The Soviets had excellent artillery to begin, but at first not with the needed mobility. The Americans made a startling metamorphosis, from obsolete French guns, moved by horses and unreliable trucks. In only 2 years, the U.S. Army moved from 20 years of Congressional budgetary restrictions. Finally Congress wrote a blank check and the U.S. Army was prepared and used the cascade of funds to good effect. The transformation of the U.S. Army's Artillery arm began at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, the location of the U.S Army Field Artillery School. Also at Fort Sill then-Lieutenant Colonel Lesley J. McNair introduced modern instruction methods which greatly facilitated the rapid expansion of the U.S. Army, including the Field Artillery branch. The Field Artillery branch during the inter-war years had developed a good idea of the artillery needed for modern mobile war. A U.S. Army historian believes that, "Their designs were well thought out and served America well and, in some cases, are still serving America’s allies." This mean that when the allocations were finally approved, th Army was able to make well-founded decisions as part of the Army's general Industrial Mobilization Plan. (This was a plan the War Department began working on in 1931 and which the Navy also eventually participated. It was meant to avoid the difficulties that occurred when America declared war on Germany (197). Aware of the public's aversion to another war and the military's even preparing for one , the published versions included the statement, "This plan does not propose the modification of any of our constitutional processes. Indeed the prime purpose of procurement planning and of the Industrial Mobilization Plan is the preservation of these processes for the people of the United States.") [U.S. Army] The United States was the only country with such a plan at the time of World War II. Interestingly, a gifted, but still unknown young major, Dwight D. Eisenhower worked on the first version. (Thankfully Gen. Marshall was noticing him.) The outcome was why American troops landing in North Africa (November 1942) had high quality field guns, although the French 75mm gun still were being used.

America and Germany

America's primary adversary in terms of artillery was Germany. Japanese artillery was important only to the extent that it was hidden away. The Japanese Army did not have the capacity to go toe to toe with American artillery. The Germans could. And they and the steel industry to produce excellent artillery in substantial quantity. As in other areas, there is a fascination with German arms. American artillery gets rather limited recognition in World War II histories. One expert tell us that the superiority of Allied and especially American artillery was besides close air support was one of the most important advantages the Allies had. He describes American artillery as "flexible, accurate, lethal, and highly mobile and the German artillery was 'competent but uninspired'. He writes, "A component by component examination of American and German artillery shows that almost from the beginning of America’s participation in the conflict the U.S. Army had the superior system. American artillerymen did not try to combat the enemy’s artillery by building bigger guns. The approach from the beginning was to build a better system and it worked. That was clear to most competent observers at the time. One of the key differences was not the guns themselves, but mobility. The Germans moved much of their artillery with horses. The U.S. Army was completely motorized. It had both the vehicles and the fuel to both move artillery. There was also a far greater communications capability. American front line units had the ability to call up artillery support far far greater than their German counterparts. Viewing the Italian campaign, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel commented, 'The enemy’s tremendous superiority in artillery, and even more in the air, has broken the front open.' During the Normandy campaign, Rommel added, 'Also in evidence is their great superiority in artillery and outstandingly large supply of ammunition.' By any reasonable standard, especially during the latter part of World War II, the American artillery arm was very clearly superior to that of the Germans." [Dennis] A historian writes "By the summer of 1944 the field artillery had proven itself to be the most brilliant performer in the American combined arms team." [Doubler] None other than General George S. Patton, commander of Third Army, also praised the artillery, "I do not have to tell you who won the war. You know. The artillery did."

Types

There are several different types of artillery: infantry weapons, field artillery, tank and anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft guns. When the term is used, however, it is generally the various forms of field artillery that is being discussed, meaning primarily mortars and howitzers. Here we want to discuss the wider field of artillery.

Small unit infantry artillery

The basic U.S. Army infantry formation is the company (100-250 men), but in practice often about 180 men. It was composed of two or more platoons. Generally companies did not have field artillery pieces. But they were equipped with light motors, a light-weight movable weapon that can be carried by men on foot. It was usually broken down into the tube and tripod base and carried by two people. the standard World War II motor fired a 15 pound round hundreds of yards, essentially a grenade launcher. A company generally had three 60mm motors. They also might have bazooka anti-tank rockets-- a shoulder fired weapon. Only above the company level does field artillery come into play.

Field Artillery

The American GI was supported by excellent, domestically designed and manufactured field artillery, in contrast to the weakness of American tanks guns until the very end of the War. There was also naval artillery. And unlike German artillery, American artillery was highly mobile. The Kasserine Pass battle in Tunisia is regarded as a shocking American defeat-a stunning defeat of American armor. Often not mentioned is how quickly artillery units responded. After Kasserine, none other than Erwin Rommel noted the effectiveness of the American artillery in his initial confrontation with the U.S. Army. . Artillery cover allowed the Americans to quickly recover from the Rommel's Panzer thrust. The Allies and Soviets had a huge advantage over the Germans because of their larger industrial capacity, both the ability to manufacture artillery and to build the vehicles providing mobility to the artillery. (Here American Lend Lease helped provided the Red Army the mobility it needed trough deliveries of trucks.) The Allies beginning in North Africa followed the German example and won air superiority. The Allies were about to pound German positions well beyond the range of artillery. The Germans were not impressed with American tanks, but American artillery was a very different matter. And mobility acted as force multiplier for each artillery unit. A U.S. self propelled artillery battalion could easily move wherever it was needed and on short notice. Thus they could support the units where it was most needed whatever the battle situation. The most commonly used field artillery piece used by the U.S. Army in World War II was the M2A1 105mm howitzer. Huge amounts of shells were fired. We notice a report that one 105mm howitzer fired 300,000 shells in only abut a year (D-day to V-E Day). We are not sure how common that was. A single American self-propelled 105mm battalion might be worth several German 208mm gun battalions that were only semi-mobile. This was because the 105 battalion was where it was needed and in range to fire far more frequently than the 208 battalions were. Much German artillery was moved by hires. This proved be a critical factor in defending the Bastogne pocket in the Battle of the Bulge. Not only were American artillery excellent weapons, but they were produced in great quantity. And the highly mechanized American Army had the ability to move its artillery rapidly. And even small American infantry unit had radios and other communications equipment to call in artillery support.

Tank destroyers and anti-tank guns

While the Army with its limited budget had developed advanced, modern field artillery, this was not the case for the Armor Branch, including the tank guns and anti-tank guns. Minimal budgets had limited design work on armored vehicle prototypes and the main guns for them. The same was true for anti-tank guns. There was also minimal doctrinal experimentation. The U.S. Army came up with the rather misguided tank destroyer concept. The tank destroyers were assigned to armored divisions. Anti-tank guns were not assigned to the artillery arm. Rather they were deployed with specialized infantry rather than artillery crews. The anti-tank guns before the War were of relatively small caliber. The 37 mm round was fairly standard. The British Army used a slightly larger 40mm 2-pounder gun). As the War developed and heavier tanks appeared, anti-tank guns needed to fire larger and more effective armor-piercing rounds. The compact hollow charge projectile impacted anti-tank warfare. It did not depend on a high muzzle velocity and could be fired from low-recoil, man-portable light weapons, including the German Panzerfaust and the American recoilless rifles. American anti-tank guns were manned by anti-tank company and other anti-tank units as parts of infantry regiment. they were composed of a Company headquarters, three anti-tank platoons and an anti-tank mine platoon. They were composed two jeeps, two 0.75 ton weapons carrier trucks and a 1.5 ton cargo truck. Each anti-tank platoon had a jeep, a .50 cal machine gun, 3 trucks, 3 57mm anti-tank guns, and 3 bazookas. The anti-tank mine platoon had 1 jeep and 2 trucks. The regimental anti-tank company was part of an infantry regiment, which also consisted of 3 infantry battalions, each of which had dedicated anti-tank units, primarily anti-tank platoons.

Anti-aircraft guns

The United States did not give a lot of attention to anti-aircraft guns in the inter-War era, part of a general pattern of failure to develop an interface between ground warfare and the air component. Eventually after failed efforts, not only the U.S. Army, but also the U.S. Navy turned to the Swedish Bofors company. In general the Army relied mote on gaining air superiority than anti-aircraft guns. The Navy put far greater emphasis on anti-aircraft guns. Here there were several reasons. First, aircraft can damage ground positions, but it requires massed attacks. In the Pacific, single aircraft could not just damage a ship, but sink it. Battleships took multiple hits, but one or two well-placed hits could sink a Japanese carrier, especially until after Midway (June 1942) because the Japanese have so little attention to damage/fire control. Thus early in the War, both the Americans and Japanese began cramming as many AA-guns on ships as possible. Existing ships returned to the Pacific coast for refits. New ships headed to Pearl with the guns already installed. Second, the United states did not have air superiority in the Pacific until well into 1943 meaning the combat air patrol (CAP) was not strong enough as needed. This improved significantly with arrival of the F6F Hellcat, but did not totally solve the problem. Third, Japanese Kamikaze tactics meant there was mo way for the fleet air arm to protect the ships on their own. they could savage wave of Kamikazes, bur even some of the poorly trained pilots would break through. Fortunately, the Swedish Bofors Company designed a magnificent anti-aircraft gun.

Naval artillery

All the major naval powers had the technology to produce high quality naval riles. This primarily meant 16 inch guns. The only larger guns were the 18 inch guns om Musachi and Yamato. Unfortunately for the Japanese, naval aviation made the huge investment in these ships and massive naval rifles a huge waste of resources. The primary naval battles of the war were fought between the United States Pacific Fleet and the Imperial Navy, both of which envisioned the war to be decided in a decisive engagement to be fought by their battleship fleets -- Kantai Kessen. This did not occur. In fact there were very few battleship on battleship engagements during the war. They were the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (1942) and the Battle of Leyte Gulf (1944). And they were both decided by American radar ranging rather than gun quality and range. Of course it would be naval aircraft that would decided most of the big battles because they could strike beyond the range of naval artillery--making the hugely costly battleship obsolete. There were many engagements between smaller ships. Here the Japaneses shown, especially at night. Once the U.S. Navy had equipped and trained its crews with radar systems, the Japanese were hopelessly outclassed.

Ordinance

American artillery was probably the strongest component of the U.S. Army's combat strength. Unlike other elements, it was more than a match unit for unit and gun for gun with the Germans. This was further enhanced with the development the development of the new proximity fuse. The U.S. Navy began using the fuses first in the Pacific. The Army was reluctant to use them in Europe out of concern that the Germans would learn of the technology and copy them. They were finally deployed to support the infantry in Europe during the Bulge (December 1944). The code designation was VT (variable-time) or POZIT. The technology was a tiny radar that triggered detonation at a preset distance from a solid object. The POZIT fuse had been developed for use against aerial targets. They were first used in Europe against the German V-1 Buzzbombs (Fall 1944). The VT fuse simplified and improved the lethality of air bursts, far more effective than complicated and unreliable time fuses.

Organization

The American artillery arm was organized into divisional and non-divisional components. With a few exceptions, divisional artillery battalions were organized with three firing batteries and a total of twelve tubes. The exception was the eighteen-tube armored field artillery battalion and the six-tube 8 inch gun and 240mm howitzer battalions. There are non-divisional artillery components as you go up the command structure. An U.S. Army infantry battalion was composed of three or more companies. There would be a heavy weapons company that included a mortar platoon (six 81 mm mortars). The rounds of these heavier motors weighed about 12 pounds and a much longer range of over a mile. The regiment was composed of three battalions. It would have an artillery company with six 105mm howitzers. At an early stage of the War, American commanders debated whether an infantry regiment needed an artillery company. Basically artillery commanders to concentrate all available artillery. Infantry commanders wanted at least some artillery. The infantry won out and got regimental infantry. After the war, the general consensus was that the artillery men were right.

Mobility

The U.S. Army had the most mobile raillery arm of any World War II combatants, although we are not sure about the highly effective British Royal Artillery arm. A major advantage for the American artillery was that it was fully motorized and highly mobile. This of course was the consequences of the generally highly mobile and mechanized American military. There were specialized tractors for the larger pieces. A great deal of artillery was moved by standard trucks. And there was self-propelled units. All 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalions in the European theater were truck-drawn, although there was the possibility tractor-drawn 155mm guns. e 155mm gun battalions were almost all tractor-drawn, although a few evidently were also truck-drawn, depending on the available of vehicles. The 4.5" gun, 8" gun, 8" howitzer, and 240mm howitzer battalions were all tractor-drawn, although, again truck could be used. The prime mover was a standard two-and-one-half ton (duce and a half) truck for the 105mm and a 4-ton Diamond T truck for the 155mm howitzers. Tractors included the M5 thirteen-ton prime movers, which were utilized for the 105mm M2 howitzer, the 4.5" gun, and 155mm M1 howitzer, and the M4 eighteen-ton hi-speed, full-track, heavy prime mover, which was utilized for the 3" AA gun, the 90mm AA gun, the 155mm Long Tom gun, 8" howitzer, 8" gun, and 240mm howitzer. The Artillery Arm also used M-3 medium tank chassis, without armament for self-propelled units. [Dennis] Given the huge American tank production at efficient assembly lines. There were many usable chassis readily available. More than two-thirds of the tanks produced in World War II were produced in America and the Soviet Union.) M-31 and M-32 armored recovery vehicles were also used to move the heavier artillery pieces. The use of standard trucks and tank chassis were in keeping with army effort to maintain as few different vehicle models as possible. This greatly eased maintenance and vehicle repair efforts.

Fire Control

One of the greatest strengths of the U.S. Army Artillery Arm was fire control, made possible by close contact with front lime units. American artillery was equipped with armament that was at least as well designed as, often better than, any other artillery arm in the world. One of the great strengths of U.S.Army artillery was communications equipment and a fire control system that was equaled only by that of the British Royal Artillery. (The Soviet Red Army had excellent guns in large numbers, but was marched by the Germans because of poor fire control.) Forward observers operated with or near front line units and had access, via powerful radios and extensive telephone landlines, to a powerful array of weapons that could be bought to bear on the enemy. In addition to the forward observers even small front line units could call in artillery support. The Artillery signals system was designed to be highly redundant. Often when all other contact with front-line units was lost, the artillery communications net often continued to function. .A U.S. Army historian believes that what made the U.S. artillery arm the best in the world, was an unrivaled fire-direction system . It was developed by the U.S. Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. H describes it as "... a highly refined development of the crude system Gen. Summerall had pioneered in World War I. This system permitted rapid engagements of targets, and allowed the coordination of fires of many units from many widely separated firing positions. One of the most deadly tactics employed was the time-on-target (TOT) concentration. A TOT massed fires from several battalions onto a selected target and calculated the times of flight for the shells from each battery so that they all arrived on target at nearly the same instant (a similar tactic, called a 'Stonk'", had been developed independently by the Royal Artillery in North Africa)." [Dennis]

Logistics

Probably the greatest problem that America artillery gunners faced was basic logistics. The Allies failed to obtain a working port as part of the D-Day landings and subsequent breakout. Supplies had to be landed on the beaches. And they had to be trucked forward because the Allies had wrecked the French rail system so the Germans could not use it to supply the Atlantic Wall. The critical point was (fall 1944). Eisenhower diverted the limit supplies available to support Field Marshal Montgomery's Market Garden Operation, hoping to force a Rhine crossing. American artillery units had to strictly ration ammunition. At the low point, American gunners were limited to less than twenty 105mm rounds-per-day-per-gun. Third Army fired only 76,325 rounds of all types, averaging only 2,726 shells daily (October 11 to November 7, 1944). This may sound like a lot, but it was less than the number of shells fired on a single day during the Battle of the Bulge. After eliminating the Bulge, the American infantry had depleted its ammunition reserves to dangerously low levels.

Sources

Dennis, William G. "U.S. and German field artillery in World War II: A comparison," armyhistory.org

Doubler, Michael. Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945.

U.S. Army. Industrial Mobilization Plan: Revision of 1939: A Study of Methods for the Effective and Equitable Utilization of the Industrial Resources of the United States in Time of War (GPO: Washington, 1939). By 1939, he Joint Army Navy Munitions Board became involved.

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