Figure 1.--Here we see a German 88 and its motorized gun crew. The German 88 is one of the best known World War II artillery pieces and arguably the single most important artillery pieces of the War. You can see the Panzertruck which is a halftrack troop hauler and it is towing a 88mm gun on a mobile chassis. Those troops would be the gun crew and an infantry security force. Prototype 88s were first produced in 1928. And production was increased after the NAZIs seized power. The snapshot is undated, but looks ton us to have been taken some time in the 1930s before the War. Panzer units had motorized transport like this. Most of the German Army, hiwever, was unmotorized infantry and the artillery moved largely byhorses. This did not prove an impediment in the early campaigns in the West. Barbarossa was a different matter. Invading the Soviet Uniion largely on foot with horse-drawnb carts was not wise decision. It was a factor in slowing the German advance during Barbarossa and in the bitter winter weather.

All of the major beligerant countries, except Japan and Italy, had important artillery arms. The German 88 is one of the best known World War II artillery pieces. It was created as an anti-aircraft weapon, but became a multi-purpose gun, especially formidable as a tank killer. The Nebelwerfer multi-barreled mortar was also a very effective weapon. The Germans began the War, however, still dependent on horses to move artillery. This impeded their mobility and was a factor in the failure of Barbarossa. German draft animals were unable to withstand the rigors of the Russian winter. The Americans Germans devoted substabtiak resources on giant guns. Artillery was a strong point of both the Soviet and American armies. The Germans also had excellent atillery. Erwin Rommel noted the effectiveness of the American artillery in his initial confrontation with the U.S. Army at Kaserine. Artilery covver allowed the Americans to quickly recover. The Allies and Soviets had a uge advantage over the Germans because of their larger industrial capacity. In addition, the Germans with the onset of the strategic nombing campaign was forced to deploy a substantial part of its artillery production in the Reich around major cities, instead of at the front. The expansion of air power to an extent cut into artillery operations. At the beginning of the War, the Germans used the Stuka as mobile artillery. The Allies beginning in North Africa followed the German example and won air superority. The Allies were about to pound German positions well beyond the range of artillery. Japanese artillery was inferior, but effective enough to cause substantial casualties in several island campaigns. The Japanese became very adept at concealing their artillery pieces, necessary because as earky as Guadalcanal they were forced to fight the war without air cover. The Germans were not impressed with American tanks, but American artillery was a very different matter. Not only were American artillery excellent weapons, but they were produced in great quantity. And the highly mechmuzed American Army had the bility to move its artillery rapidly. And even small American infantry unit had radios and other communications equipment to call in artillery support.

America

The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France during World War I fought almost entirely with British and French weapons, especially the heacy weapons like artillery. There were several reasons for this. This was not the case in World War II. The United States was unprepared for war, but the British bought America enough time to begin preapatiions. There were four types of artiller: infantry weapons, field artillery, tank and anti-tank guns, and anti-aircraft guns. The American GI was supported by excellent, domestically designed and manufactured field atillery, in contrst to the weakness of American tanks guns until the very end of the War. There was also naval artillery. And unlike German artillery, American artillery was highly mobile. Erwin Rommel noted the effectiveness of the American artillery in his initial confrontation with the U.S. Army after Kaserine. Artilery cover allowed the Americans to quickly recover from the Panzer thrust. The Allies and Soviets had a huge advantage over the Germans because of their larger industrial capacity, both the ability to manufacture artillery and to build the vehicles providing mobility to the artillery. (Here American Lend Lease helped provided the Red Army the mobility it needed trough deliveries of trucks.) The Allies beginning in North Africa followed the German example and won air superority. The Allies were about to pound German positions well beyond the range of artillery. The Germans were not impressed with American tanks, but American artillery was a very different matter. And mobility acted as force multiplier for each artillery unit. A US self propelled artillery battalion could easily move whereever it was n eeded on short notice. Thus they could support the units where it was most needed whatever the battle situation. Motorized artillery likewise could usually be where it was needed. A single merican self-propelled 105mm battalion might be worth several German 208mm gun battalions that were only semi-mobile. This was because the 105 battalion was where it was needed and in range to fire far more frequently than the 208 battalions were. This proved be a critical factor in defending the Batogne pocket in the Battle of the Bulge. Not only were American artillery excellent weapons, but they were produced in great quantity. And the highly mechnized American Army had the bility to move its artillery rapidly. And even small American infantry unit had radios and other communications equipment to call in artillery support. The United States did not give a lot of attention to anti-aircraft guns in the inter-War era, part of a general pattern of failure to develop an interface between ground warfare and the air component. Eventually after failed efforts, not only the U.S. Army, but also the U.S. Navy turned to the Swedish Bofors company.

Britain

Britain has a long history of naval artillery. Germny mtch ut uin World a I, but could not overcome the mumerical dvntage iof the huge Royl Navy. The British did not maintin alrge xtnding army or have any kind of lead in army artillery. World War I changed that. Britain began with a small volunteer army and had to turn to concription. The lethlity of wopen drove the armies into trenches on the Wesrern Front. This meant you needed rtillery to get to the eneny. The Royal Artillery played a huge role in the War as Britain developed the artillery capabilty to wage a modern war on the Continent. Artillery was in somways still basically medieval. Heavy artillery was still cumbersome pieces. They were moved on the bttlefield by horses and deployed s they were centuries earlier. And moving artillery was a major problem, a major limitation in breaking through the eneny lines. Britain's major problem was in increasing artillery production to match the Germans who began the War with huge army and sibstntial artillery arm. It was the artillery that led to the air war. Aircraft was more effective reconiasnce and target spotting. The Tyal Auir Firce nd the French Air Force would eventully druve the Germnsfrom ghe kies giving th llkies bd advntage as the clima=cx of the war developed (1918). Field telephone and radio transmitter led to improve control and communications. Britain neglected its military and sharply reduced it. The Brutish Army was able to meganize, partly becausr it was so small. This inckded the Royal Artilery. At the outbreak of workld war I, brutin had the world's only fully mechanized army. (The U.S. Arny despite the motorization of American society still had some mules.) The Universal Carrier (Bren gun Carrier), was available in increasing tow field pieces. The Universal carrier was a kind of open light tank that doubled as artillery tractor, personnel carrier, and reconnaissance vehicle. Used n many ways like a jeep with more power. Other vehicles were availble to movethe larger guns or for greater speed. This included military trucks, heavy tractors, and limbers (a two-wheeled vehicle to which a gun or caisson could be attached). The World War I QF gun that was a main stay in World War I was still in use. Many new guns were intoduced. Especially imprtant was 25 pounder. (British guns were classified by the weight oif the shell. Unlike the Germans, the British dailed to use their anti0aircrafy gun (3.7 invch) as a anto-tank gun. This gave the Germans an enormous advntage in the 3 yeats of the War, especuallin France snd the Western Desert. The British introduced self-propelled guns and specialist tanks to augment the traditional towed field guns. They also greatly expanded the Royal Artillery. While the Btitish Army was fully mechnized, roads were not always available. They used mules in Burma, often to transport disassemled artiley pieces in the Burmese jungle.

Czechoslovakia

France

France began the War with an excellent artillery. The probklenm for the French was that much of it was deployed in fixed enplacements along the Maginot Line. Much of the rest was not very mobile relying on horse-drawn transport. The French did have effecrtive tanks with artillery pieces, but most were placed to back up possible attacks on the Maginot line and not in a large tank force that could be used to attack the massed German tabnk force that emerged from the Ardennes and crossed the Muse. This led to the French surrender (June 1940). And as a result, French artillery was not an important factor in the War, at least on the Allied side. Under terms of the Armistice, thev French had to turn over military stocks to the Gemans. The Germans delivered some of this material to its allies. As far as we can tell, the Germans exploted the French economy to support its war effort, they did not use French factories to produce arms like artillery and tanks. This did not seem necessary at first (1940-42), but even after the Germans began to face massive Allied production, they still did not begin to use the French plants. We are not entirely sure why. We suspect that it was part of a long term plant to denindustruialize France and break it apart into small regional states that could never again threaten the Reich. The desire to hold military technology tightly within the Reich may have also been a factor. Shortages of raw material may have been an additiional problem. The Germans seem more intent on bringing French workes into the Reich to work in German war factories than allowing them to work in French factories. (This was in part becasuse the output pf French fctories fell precioitously.) As far as we knoe, the Germans made no effort to revive french artillery production. The mjor French industrial production supporing the Grman war effort was trucks--until the lloes bombed he plants. Once it became clear that production from French plants was needed to counter massive Allied arms production, it was too late. And the French plants had become vulnerable to growing Allied air power.

Italy

Japan

Japanese artillery was inferior, but effective enough to cause substantial casualties in several island campaigns and against the poorly equipped Chinese. The principal problem the Japanese faced, was their industrial capacity did not enable them to produce the quantity of artillery needed to wage a war against an industrial giant like the United States. And Japanese military doctrine did not use what artillery they had in an effective manner. The Japanese became very adept at concealing their artillery pieces, necessary because as early as Guadalcanal they were forced to fight the war without air cover. Combined with these problems, the inadequate Maru fleet and then the increasingly effective American submarine campaign, meant that they had problems supplying their inuerable island garisons with food and arms as well as artillery and amunition. And there was the further problem with all the Pacific islands and they were often, not sure where the Ameicans would strike. And garisonning and supply an island the Americans did not attack were resources lost to the War. THe Japanese had to fight the Guadalcanal campaign without campaign. The Japanese did wreak havoc against invading American invaion forces on Tarawa and other Central Pacific islands, but few artillery positions survived naval artillery and aitr strikes. Even on Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Japanese artillery while hitting the advancing Americans, the Japanese paid a terrible cost. American artillery in grater numbers and well supplied meticuously pulverized the Japanese positions. Japanese casualties (almost always death because they engaged in suisidal Banzai attacks and refused to surrender) were often 10 times Ameriacn deaths.

Germany

The Germans had excellent artillery weapons in World War II. They fielded 37mm guns up to huge siege cannons, rail guns and howitzers and mortars. The German 88 is one of the best known World War II artillery pieces and arguably the single most important artillery pieces of the War. Prototype 88s were first produced in 1928. and production was increased after the NAZIs seized power. Upgades and modification occurred throughout the 1930s and World war II period. It was created as an anti-aircraft weapon, but became a multi-purpose gun, especially formidable as a tank killer. The Nebelwerfer multi-barreled mortar was also a very effective weapon. The German 170mm was intended for counterbattery fire with very long range for a relatively mobile weapon. The 210mm howitzer was shorter ranged but fired a heavier shell. The Germans began the War, however, still dependent on horses to move artillery. This impeded their mobility and was a factor in the failure of Barbarossa. German draft animals were unable to withstand the rigors of the Russian winter. The Germans devoted substabtial resources on giant guns. The effectiveness of German arttillery was severly limited as the War progressed by the loss of air superiority. And the Germans with the onset of the strategic nombing campaign was forced to deploy a substantial part of its artillery production in the Reich around major cities, instead of at the front. The expansion of air power to an extent cut into artillery operations. At the beginning of the War, the Germans used the Stuka as mobile artillery. Horse drawn batteries as the Germans used were far more problematic. They simply couldn't not keep up with a mechanized battle. They were slow making them vulnrable to air attack and required too much time to meet urgent needs. Thus German artillery in France and during the later pase of the fighting on the wastern Frint was largely immobile. German batteries that had barely enough transport to move their guns let alone the substantial quantities of ammuntion, manpower, and other equipment were not very useful in a fluid battle front.

Soviet

At the time of World War II, the Red Army had the largest artillery and tank forces in the world. Much of the artillery was not very mobile. A focus was on producing artillery pieces (tubes), a part of Stalin's industrialization program. There were, however, serious weaknesses. Less attention was given to producing the ammunition, a little more complicated than producing the tubes. The ammunition meant nitrates and the Soviet chemical industry was less advanced than the German. In part because of Stalin's purges, these formations were broken up and the officer corps dispirited. Many experienced commanders were killed or imprisoned in the Gulag. Stalin's purge of the Red Army damaged the artillery branch. Artillery command and control required training and math skills. These were skills that could not be learned over night. And the Germans had an advantage with abetter educated population and more advanced electronics industry. Radio communication was important for effective command and control. After the NAZI-Soviet Pact, Stalin moved large forces west into the areas seized in cooperation with their German ally. When the Germans struck (June 1941), Red Army units including artillery had been moved out of prepared positions and into vulnerable positions along the border. Thus large quantities of artillery was destroyed or seized by the Germans. The Soviets did their best to move arms plants east beyond the Urals. These plants gradually began coming on line (1942) and were producing artillery in great quantity (1943). But not ammunition,. The ammunition plants were in Ukraine and could not be moved. As a result of Oprerastion Barbarossa (June 1941), the Soviet Union lost two-thirds of its ammunition productions. Much of the Red Army's ammunition plants were lost during Barbarossa. Artillery tube production was restarted beyond the Urals and much attention was given to it. But much of the production was light 76 mm guns. Actual data on Red Army artillery is difficult to come, but much of it was light 76 mm guns. The Germans had more heavier guns, a great many 105 mm guns. What Soviet data does exist often mixes in motors. The Red Army may have had more tubes, but the idea that the Red Army had a huge advantage in artillery is not born out by actual facts. And the Germans actually had an an advantage because of their greater number of heavy artillery tubes , especially 105 mm guns. We know that even in battles that the Soviets would eventually win that they sustained far greater casualties than the Germans. We wondered about them, just what was causing all those casualties? It was common for Soviet casualties to outnumber German casualties 3-4 to 1. Even at Kursk where the Soviets had built massive defensive belts and fortifications. Even here the Soviet casualties were enormous. One young historian has studies the statistics, explained it. Because artillery was the the major killer, it must have been the difference in the artillery. [Todorov] In the Red Army developed enormously during the War and by the end of the war there were complete artillery divisions. The basic guns were sound and were produced in huge numbers. American Lend-Lease trucks helped with mobility. Russian artillery soon surpassed German artillery in numbers of pieces. Russian offensives involved huge and sustained artillery bursts--materielschlacht. This huge initial bombardment actually was a weakener in the artillery branch. [Glantz] Available data shows that whatever the number of tubes, the Germans were constantly firing more tonnage of artillery (130-160 percent). [Isaev] The Germans may have had a smaller artillery components (in number of tubes), but it proved far more deadly because it had heavier artillery and a far more accurate targeting system. The Soviets while they had tubes lacked the larger numbers of heavier artillery the Germans had. The Soviets also had weak fire control systems. Nor were they producing the ammunition they needed. Here American Lend-Lease helped save the Soviets.

Sweden

Sweden was nominally neutral in World War and like most of Europe desperate to maintain its neutrality. Sweden was, however, vital to the NAZI war economy. And throught almost all of the War supplied the NAZI war machine. Sweden was Germany's primary source of iron ore which was the raw material needed for steel producion. Sweden had a small military, but hardly capable of of defeating a German invasion. The invasion never came, primarily because the Swedes provide the NAZIs what they wanted--iron ore as well as a range of manuactured goods. An invasion would have actually harmed the German economy by disruting the iron ore deliveries. Sweden had a small arms industry. For the most part, however, the Swedish arms were not up to World War II standards. There was on exception--the Bofors Gun, a rapid fire 40-mm anti-aircraft gun. It was designed in the 1930s by the Swedish arms manufacturer AB Bofors. It was one of the most successful medium-weight World War II anti-aircraft system. Both the Allies and Axis manufactured the Bofors Gun under license. They all tried to develop anti-aircraft guns, but found that the Bofors gun was superior. It was a complicated gun and the licenees attempted to simplify it, but the basic Swedish design comtinued to be used throuhhout the War. Its most effective use proved to be by the U.S. Navy in the Pacific War. Its rapid rate of fire significantly increassed the fire power of U.S. Navy ships. This proved ton be god send, where the desperate Japanes launcjed their Kamakazee attacks. It was of less use to the Gemans whose major need was heavy guns to raech the high alditude Allied bombers. Fot this they primarily used the venrable 88s.

Sources

Glantz.

Isaev, Alexiey (2010).

Todorov, Sasho. "Red god of war: Soviet artillery" WW2TV (October 1, 2021).

Created: 7:26 AM 11/21/2012
Last updated: 8:04 PM 9/12/2018